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SYNOPSIS
This is a socio legal study of social regulation on domestic violence in Peru with 
particular reference to the South Andean communities It reviews the development and 
implementation of the state legal remedies on domestic violence. The thesis examines 
law as a result of historical processes, having different meanings for and impact on the 
various sectors of the Peruvian population Andean communities are the product of the 
exploitation and resettlement of the original native people. The thesis considers the 
way in which these communities from a subordinated position perceive state agencies 
and legal institutions. It is argued that Andean people do not perceive the legal system 
as a granter of fundamental rights but rather as a perpetrator of abuse From this 
perspective, the thesis studies how Peruvian feminists have come to see law as a tool 
by which to improve the position of women affected by domestic violence. It argues 
that this approach has not taken sufficient account of the reality of Andean women, 
their perceptions of domestic violence and their strategies for combating this violence. 
The study examines this reality and pays particular attention to the role of the judges 
of the peace in Andean women's strategies. It argues that Andean women are building 
a different social account of law which is at present not recognised by mainstream 
legal strategies designed to tackle domestic violence in Peru.

IV
'At present, in this life, more Indian drunks exist than in the old times. In the 
epoch of the Incas there was no man and never existed such a man because of the 
good justice that existed. To those who drank or idly chatted or gossiped or 
blasphemed, or who slapped his wife in the face or who fought with anyone or with
his wife the Inca brought him to justice. ’
Huaman Poma de Ayala, chronicle, sixteenth century.
‘...it should be clear that l do not romanticize the local, the South, or the periphery.
I do not romanticize, I take sides. ’
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 1998.
‘To live well is to understand each other, to plan things together...’ 
Hilda 20, Andean Community of Chitapampa
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1CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
This is a socio-legal study of discourses and practises on domestic violence in Peru. 
The thesis analyses the state legal remedies on domestic violence, with special 
reference to those feminist-oriented reforms and contrasts them with the reality of 
women from the South Andean communities of Peru on whom the fieldwork is based. 
It particularly reflects on Andean people’s perception of the problem and on their main 
forum of intervention: the rural judges o f the peace.
1. Re-examining Peruvian Feminist Strategies on Domestic Violence.
From a feminist analysis domestic violence is the most pervasive expression of 
patriarchy. In a male dominated social order, violence within intimate relationships is 
a way of social control over women, a powerful means to keep women in their place, 
that is, subordinate to and dependent on men (Bograd 1988:14, Dobash and Dobash 
1979, Dwyer etal. 1996:72).
These feminist claims are by now widely acknowledged. Anthropological studies of 
different social groups have confirmed the validity of the feminist understanding of 
domestic violence as an expression of gender hierarchy (Campbell 1992:234-7). Even, 
official records in different countries present a striking reality. These reports are 
considered to be just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ and much more violence is tolerated by
2women in their daily life than appears in any official statistics. (Tamayo 1991, Barnett 
1998:256)
From very early in the feminist claims, the legal system has been identified as the site 
of the main strategies to be developed to eradicate domestic violence. The law has 
had a historical role in creating and defining particular characteristics of gender 
relationships. In the past, to beat wives was a legal right conferred on husbands. By 
analogy, the same was tolerated when couples were not joined by legal marriage. 
This historical condition has had effects until the present and has given validity to 
feminist legal strategies on domestic violence.
As elsewhere, the subject of domestic violence in Peru is proposed and raised by the 
Peruvian feminist movement as a key issue in understanding women’s subordination. 
In this long struggle for public recognition of domestic violence as a serious social 
problem the Peruvian feminists have also focused on law as a fundamental strategy to 
eradicate this extensive social practise. In Peru this process has had a particular 
characteristic since the issue of domestic violence has been assumed by feminist 
lawyers’ as a specialised group to whom an ‘authoritative voice’ to produce a 
discourse on domestic violence has been recognised by the rest of the activists. The 
following is an account of the reasons and rationality of legal reforms pursued in Peru 
by the feminist movement with a special reference to its insertion into the international 
human rights discourse and how these legal reforms relate to the diversity of Peruvian 
women.
1.1 Breaking the silence; the option for paralegalitv.-
The Peruvian feminist movement was bom and perpetuated within sectors of ‘well
educated, alternative' women1. From the very first women’s association in 1876,
1 For a review of the history o f the Feminist Movement in Peru see Equipo de Ditiision ( 1998)
3through the first appearance of a ‘modem and political’ feminist movement in Peru in 
1911 demanding equal access to education and civil and political rights for women, 
until the contemporary movement which took shape in the late 1970s, feminists have 
been active, demanding and eventually achieving results to improve women’s position 
in society. By the late 1970s feminists began to be recognised as an 'authoritative 
voice’ on women’s concerns awaking the attention of the media. The contemporary 
feminist movement was made up of women dissidents of the left-wing parties 
disappointed with the machismo of the cadres. They were self-identified mainly as 
‘socialist feminists’.
The Peruvian feminists of the seventies raised the well known international slogan: 
‘the personal is political’ as paradigm of their gender demands. In this sense, the 
personal should be brought into the public light because the private sphere had made 
invisible the oppression that women were suffering. Issues such as sexuality, 
reproduction and domestic life were tackled as spheres of gender confrontation. The 
concept able to explain all discrimination against women was ‘patriarchy’ However, 
of all forms of oppression that women suffered in the hands of ‘patriarchy’ there was 
one which made impossible the project of women as autonomous human beings: 
gender violence.
Gender violence was defined as any kind of physical, moral or sexual maltreatment 
that women suffered at the hands of men for the fact of being a woman Domestic 
violence, rape, and sexual harassment were the priority themes.
The law and the legal system were identified as the main targets of gender strategies. 
The legal system was regarded as an accomplice of gender violence and its operators: 
policemen, judges and forensic doctors, through their sympathy to male violence,
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reinforced women’s situation. Women were afraid to go to a police station: the 
treatment of raped women was degrading and battered women faced complete 
indifference. Sexual harassment was a situation that nobody recognised as deviant.
Peruvian feminists, assumed the task of challenging the dichotomy private/public, and 
another slogan was raised to serve as inspiration for their actions against domestic 
violence: ‘breaking the silence’. Tamayo (1993:105) states: 'They perceived the social 
silence shared by the victims of violence as a factor which prevented the eradication of 
violent acts against women’. 'Female solidarity’ was encouraged and practised 
(Tamayo 1993:105) . ‘Open houses’ (workshops for collective discussions) were 
organised, inviting women to talk about their experiences of violence, creating the 
awareness that domestic violence was a common problem.
At the legal level, 'Legal Advisory Services’ were established in the shanty towns of 
Lima. The emphasis was on ‘paralegality’2, that is, privileging alternative ways of 
solving conflicts and aiding women in difficult situations. Lawyers were more social 
assistants than traditional lawyers. Some groups went further forming ’paralegal’ 
agents among the organised women in shanty towns, in this way, the same neighbours 
were responsible for the legal advisory offices.
Additionally, the 'training teams’ those responsible for developing awareness of 
gender issues, promoted ‘solidarity actions’ through the ‘popular women’s 
organisations’3, in the defence of women facing violence. Organised women in the 
district of Villa El Salvador in the Southern outskirts of Lima responded to this
2 This term will be explained further in chapter three
3 Such as ‘communal kitchen’ and 'Glass of Milk’ organisations The ‘communal kitchen’ has its origin in 
the 1950s The ‘Glass o f Milk’ organisation was promoted by the left-wing municipal government in 
Lima which organised women in poor zones to receive donated milk for the children, elderly and 
pregnant women This organisation became one of the most important 'popular women’s organisations’ 
in Peru during the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s
5‘awarenes’ creating the action of blowing whistles when a man was beating a woman. 
They joined together and remained outside the house until the man stopped his action. 
This strategy was repeated in other poor neighbourhoods of Lima. It contributed to 
calling the attention of the neighbourhood to the wrongness of domestic violence.
By the eighties the feminist movement had established its position regarding the law. 
They understood it as a: ‘...discourse and practise which legitimises the power relation 
which subordinates women’s interests and needs’ (Vazquez 1998:3). Consequently, 
there were few hopes in the legal system and a great pledge for the development of the 
‘women’s popular movement’.
1.2 The option for the complaint (and the legal system
Soon some feminist lawyers became concerned that the emphasis on " paralegal ity’ was 
not going to produce any impact on the formal legal system, precisely because by their 
nature such actions were carried on outside the system and its operators. It was 
thought that women should act as ‘subject of rights’, that is, as active legal 
protagonists and this could only be carried on within the system. Tamayo (1993:106) 
explains the process:
‘To understand this discourse, it had to be placed within a perspective 
which demanded women to participate as citizens, consequently 
encouraging the exercise of their rights within the framework of the 
legal system that backed them.’
The condemnation of domestic violence should be expressed in the way the system 
treats deviant behaviours, that is, through the criminal jurisdiction. The objective then 
was to ‘incriminate agents of violence’ and another slogan was created and promoted: 
‘if he hits you, report him’.
6In order to mobilise the legal system it is necessary to have the support of a 
professional body of lawyers. Consequently, the intervention of the feminist lawyers 
was even more prominent in the strategies against domestic violence. Legal services 
were moved from the shanty towns toward the same feminist centres and the legal 
personnel was expanded. The objective was clear: to facilitate women’s access to the 
legal system and to pressure the imperfect legal institution towards the right ends for 
women. Underlying this was the idea that women were powerless before the legal 
system, not just because they were ‘victims’ of violence (Tamayo 1993:106) but also 
because they had neither the economic resources nor the education and information to 
deal with the system. Women became more dependent on their lawyers and the 
system. Feminist lawyers left behind the idea of solving situations of violence within 
the social settings of the women involved and, in many cases, they even acted against 
the women’s own understanding of their personal situation.
1.2.1 Women’s Police Stations.-
The opening in 1987, in the city of Lima, of the first Women’s Police Station to 
handle complaints of domestic violence, became very important in the feminist legal 
strategy because it improved the conditions in which women accessed the legal 
system. This was the first public policy in Peru tackling specifically the problem of 
domestic violence and opening the formal legal system to a more adequate treatment 
of women’s concerns.
In addition to the reception and investigation of the complaints, the Women's Police 
Station implemented other services of assistance: psychological, social work, and the 
legal offices were installed, in an effort never previously pursued at police level. This 
opened the possibility for a more institutionalised support from the feminist
7organisations. Although feminist groups were not involved in the creation of this 
police station, from the beginning they considered it a pioneer experience with an 
extreme political importance. For instance, the ‘Peruvian Women’s Centre Flora 
Tristan’ implemented a legal advisory office in the same police station and was 
responsible for the annual training of women and policemen4. Later others women’s 
groups around the country assumed the same agenda and were campaigning for 
similar police stations in their cities. In 1993, five women’s police stations were 
already operating in other parts of the country (Estremadoyro 1993:64).
The women’s police stations, however, soon provided evidence of the lack of support 
in the legislation itself. There was a specialised police station for the reception of 
domestic violence complaints but there was no law on domestic violence that justified 
and supported the existence of such police stations. Feminist lawyers understood this 
problem and fiercely campaigned for the recognition of domestic violence within the 
legislation.
1.3 Domestic violence as a specific criminal offence.-
Feminist lawyers educated within a traditional legal perspective, held the idea that 
every deviant behaviour in society should have a ‘criminal type’ as correlation, 
consequently, domestic violence should be criminalised as such. The reform of the 
Criminal Code by the Peruvian Congress in the late eighties and beginning of the 
nineties gave the feminist lawyers the ideal opportunity to present their proposals in all 
criminal situations affecting women. Issues of abortion, rape and domestic violence 
were included. In relation to domestic violence the feminists reached the following 
proposal:
4 I was co-ordinator o f the women’s police station projects o f Flora Tristan and responsible for the legal 
office from 1989 until 1993
8‘Article a.- The crime of maltreatment of women in a marital or 
cohabitational relationship is a special crime ruled by specific process. 
Consequently, the man who maltreats his wife or cohabitee producing 
physical, psychological or moral injury through actions, offensive 
expressions or threats will be subject to public intervention measures, 
amongst those: police may enter his house, preventive detention of the 
aggressor for 24 hours or he can be obliged to appear in front of the 
authority to be assisted by specialised professionals in ‘family science’ 
amongst other measures’ (Cladem 1989:14)
The feminist lawyers also considered that in some situations of domestic violence
punishment should also include prison. ‘Article b’ states:
‘The man who commits such a criminal offence [described in article a] 
should be punished with a prison sentence of no more than two years: 1. 
If the injury produced demands medical attention or special treatment.
2. In the case of the aggressor having committed such a criminal 
offence previously the sanction should be applied even when there was 
only minor injury.’ (Cladem 1989:15)
There were other articles in which feminist lawyers simply repeated the articles of the 
Criminal Code on ‘Bodily harm’. In this way they considered the cases in which the 
aggressor endangers ‘the life or health’ of the victim, including the cases of mutilation, 
cruelty, disfiguration, and suicide. In all of these criminal situations the penalty was 
increased to that stated by the Criminal Code. Feminists understood that the fact that 
the aggressor has a relationship with the victim should be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance to increase the penalty (Cladem 1989:16-8). The reaction of the 
members of the Reform Commission of the Criminal Code was not a very positive 
one. Feminist lawyers were accused of having a ‘schizophrenic position’ in relation 
to criminal issues, wanting on the one hand more criminalisation of domestic violence 
and rape but, on the other hand, fighting for the decriminalisation of abortion (Tamayo 
1993:111). The final result, that is the 1991 Criminal Code, is evaluated by the
feminist lawyers in this way:
9‘The offences which involved gender related violence, such as rape and 
other sexual aggressions, deserved a benevolent treatment compared to 
other typical criminal behaviour. Maltreatment in a domestic violence 
context was not specifically classified, maintaining, in this way, the 
traditional choice not to mention its existence in proscriptive terms. 
Abortion, even in the case of rape, was criminalised with a punishment 
which deprived liberty’ (Tamayo 1993:111)
The truth is that the Commission, following a more up to date trend on criminal law, 
was in favour of reducing the penalty for most crimes. Its members took the feminist 
proposals into account although the results were not exactly as the lobby of feminists 
would have desired. In the case of abortion, the Commission reduced the penalty for 
women who aborted under any circumstances. Additionally, the cases in which 
women abort on the grounds of rape, foetus abnormalities and poverty received special 
attention and the penalty was further reduced to one year in prison. In the 
Commission’s understanding this was a way to decriminalise abortion without 
provoking a great controversy with the Catholic Church because the 1991 Criminal 
Code entitles the judges to abstain from imposing a sanction (reserva del fallo 
condenatorio) in cases with a low penalty. This remains a quite unfair situation for 
women who abort because they can still be subjected to criminal prosecution but a 
significant advance in a country where the Catholic Church continues to have a strong 
political influence. Additionally, in the case of domestic violence, the Commission 
increased the penalty in cases of 'Faltas (minor offences) against the person’ when the 
aggressor was the spouse or cohabitant of the victim.
The feminist campaign for the qualification of domestic violence as a criminal offence 
expressed the idea that the criminal system was the privileged site for contesting 
domestic violence. This approach has been prevalent among South American 
activists. In Argentina, where projects to challenge domestic violence have been more
10
a task for psychologists rather than lawyers, the approach is radically different. The 
idea is that domestic violence expresses a conflict which it is necessary to resolve and 
both partners in a violent relationship have responsibility in solving it. Chiarotti 
(1993:80) expresses that domestic violence should be considered an 'illegal behaviour’ 
which 'must be sanctioned’ but with civil sanctions. Argentinean feminists reject the 
idea of criminalising the problem They argue that the criminal system is shown to be 
inefficient at preventing the commission of most crimes, and on domestic violence the 
emphasis should be on prevention and not on criminalisation. Additionally, the 
criminal system obliges women to prove their complaints because that is the way that 
the criminal law works and it gives the judge all the power to decide whether these 
criminal offences were committed or not. Finally their most important reason is the 
same women’s will:
'The majority of battered women do not want their husbands to be put 
in jail. They fear retaliation, loss of employment, the lack of food for 
their children, etc. They want their husbands to stop hurting them, to 
change, and they seek the improvement o f family relations. The 
criminal judges cannot satisfy these demands’ (Chiarotti 1993:81)
1.4 Women’s Human Rights.-
In 1983 Peru subscribed to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of discrimination against women. This was considered a great advance for the 
recognition of women’s rights. This important international treaty, however, did not 
make any explicit reference to gender violence. By the end of the 1980s an 
international 'calf was made by the feminist movement in the United States to 
campaign for the recognition of all violence against women as human rights violations. 
It had as an objective to take this proposal to the 1993 United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (Friedman 1995:18-25). The campaign
11
sought to call international attention to the gravity of gender violence that although 
committed by private individuals should not be tolerated. The recognition of women’s 
rights as human rights implies making available the structure of the international 
human rights system to women affected by gender violence
Peruvian feminist lawyers were always aware of the possibilities of international 
treaties to improve the situation of women. The Constitution of 1979 recognised the 
International Conventions signed by Peru in the same hierarchy as the Constitution 
itself. This situation, however, was modified by the current constitution of 1993, 
which subordinated international treaties to the constitutional text. When the 
‘international call’ was launched the feminist organisations in Peru took the initiative 
in the region and the response of South American colleagues was immediate. One of 
the results of the South American feminist campaigns was a resolution of November 
1990 within the 25th Assembly of the Women’s Interamerican Commission (part of 
the Organisation of American States) urging the governments to take immediate 
measures to eradicate violence against women in the region (Loli 1991:11 ). One of the 
agreements was the elaboration of a Treaty to prevent, eradicate and sanction the 
violence against women. Such document was finally approved in 1994 by the General 
Assembly of the Organisation of American States and by now has been ratified by 
most of the countries of the region The South American feminists managed to include 
women’s human rights on the agenda of their state governments.
The issue of women’s human rights complicated the strategies on domestic violence, 
mainly because domestic violence is seen as part of a wider spectrum of crimes against 
women. This was going to be evident in the strategies of the Peruvian feminists. In 
the context o f the women’s rights campaign, the legal programmes of the feminist
organisations changed their strategies of open legal services to women to reproduce 
the logic of the human rights defence organisations. They no longer received cases 
from the general public and instead formed a lobby of feminist lawyers pursuing 
prosecutions of ‘test cases’ (casos tipo), that is, cases in which the ingredients of 
gender violence deserve the investment of institutional resources to become a 
‘precedent’ within the judicial system. This works on the logic of human rights 
violations in which even one case matters. We observe how the feminist legal strategy 
in Peru ‘evolved’ from a local strategy based in the active involvement and 
participation of neighbourhood women to the global strategy in which less women 
immediately and directly benefit but violence against women is included on the 
‘highest’ agenda of the world: that of the United Nations.
1.5 Domestic violence laws and judees of the peace5.-
It was within this atmosphere of the effervescent campaign for women's human rights 
that the MP Lourdes Flores from a conservative party (Christian Popular Party) took 
the initiative of a draft for a law on domestic violence. The context is very important 
to explain the rationality of the changes that feminist lawyers proposed to the original 
draft.
The ‘domestic violence laws’ have appeared as a more adequate answer to the 
dilemmas on how the legal system should intervene in cases of domestic violence. It 
means that, through a special legislation, domestic violence is condemned but the 
channels to process such cases are more focused on civil remedies and prevention. 
This position has been assumed by many Latin American groups such as the Puerto 
Rican feminists who supported the ‘Law for the Prevention and Intervention in
'  The reader unfamiliar with the Peruvian judicial reality would fine useful a brief description of this 
judicial system in Appendix I.
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Domestic Violence’ (Vicente 1993). This particular law served as an antecedent for 
the draft of the Peruvian version (which became Law 26269) (Tamayo 1993:103). In 
fact, both laws had very similar definitions of who can be protected by this kind of 
legislation. The Puerto Rican law defined as ‘couples’ a ‘wide spectrum of intimate 
relationships between people', so did the Peruvian law (Vicente 1993:93). They also 
had similar concepts of protective measures which included the ‘eviction of the 
aggressor’ from the home and/or prohibiting his visits (amongst other possibilities). 
However, the great difference was that the Puerto Rican law entitled the ‘municipal 
judges’, the equivalent to the judges of the peace in Peru, to intervene in cases of 
domestic violence, in this way women benefit for the locality and accessibility of this 
type of judge (Chiarotti 1993:83). For Vicente (1993:93) to channel the action through 
the municipal judge offered many possibilities for women to deal with their situation 
of violence and provides ‘the potential to have effects upon the legal system without 
having to depend on lawyers and other persons’.
The original draft presented to the feminist lawyers for consideration by the MP 
Lourdes Flores also offered the possibility of applying for protective measures to the 
most basic level of the judiciary. It was stated that the process for eradication of 
domestic violence could be started at the judges of the peace level. Authors like 
Chiarotti (1993:79) evaluated as positive the fact that the Peruvian draft offered to 
women a more accessible justice. However, while this was obvious to other South 
American lawyers, it was not to a group of their Peruvian colleagues. When MP 
Flores sent the draft of the law to the feminist groups, some of the feminist lawyers 
were indignant that the judges of the peace, ‘the lowest rank of judges’, had to deal 
with such an important women’s issue. Chiarotti (1993:83) documents the fact in this
way:
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‘In the Peruvian project approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 
September 3rd, 1991, the Justice of the Peace is competent (this has 
been highly criticised by our Peruvian peers who believe that, given the 
importance of the problem, such cases should go directly to the judges 
of higher rank)’
The position of these feminists prevailed and modifications were made to the final 
draft. Here is where the discourse of ‘women’s right as human rights’ had much 
influence. These colleagues were imbued with the spirit of the ‘sacred human rights’ 
-as Esteva and Prakash (1998) would call them- and their ‘high standard’ institutions. 
The Justicia of the Peace an institution which has its origin in a localised, non 
profesionalised and unpaid judicial administration was not sufficiently important to be 
responsible for such a task. This, despite that at present judges of the peace are 
divided into two kinds of magistrates. The letrado and the no letrado. The main 
difference between them is the setting in which they operate. The first one is an urban 
judge the second a rural one. The letrado judge is a lawyer, paid and appointed in 
those cities which are sites of the Superior Courts. In fact, the origin of the judges of 
the peace letrado.s was to ease the work load of the specialised courts. Consequently, 
there are no substantial differences in the nature of these judges with others in superior 
positions in the judicial hierarchy. The no letrado judges, instead, retained most of 
their original characteristics. They are considered an inevitable ‘evil’, ‘the justice of 
the poor’ by the other legal operators and hold a different rationality than the rest of 
the judges. Despite the obvious differences between them, the feminist lawyers 
rejected both.
The feminist lawyers approach overlooked the fact that almost the totality of the cases 
of domestic violence which reach the legal system are processed as ‘Fallas (minor 
offences) against the person’ and are handled by judges of the peace both in urban and
rural zones. Consequently, the proposal was that a beaten woman had to ‘jump’ over 
the judicial pyramid and go to the court judges in the capital of the provinces to claim 
protection at a judicial level in which it is necessary to pay, to wait and to have a 
lawyer. The alternative position adopted by other Peruvian peers and by other South 
American activists was to emphasise the real defence of the largest number of women 
possible and not just a sample, who were lucky enough to reach a feminist lawyer with 
a case with ‘sufficient violence’ to be considered as a ‘test case’. The problems that 
women had to face just to reach a police station and the large number of women that 
in our country suffer domestic violence, was dismissed.
On 25 march 1997 Law 26763 was promulgated trying to solve the deficiencies of the 
previous law. One of the important amendments is article 12 in which the urban 
(letrados) judge of the peace is entitled to order protective measures established by the 
law when handling processes of Fallas (minor offences). It is an improvement but 
exclusively refers to the letrado judge and only in the circumstances of a criminal 
procedure. Still at this judicial level, there is no possibility for a woman to apply for 
protective measures within the special procedure established by the law. If she wants 
to do so she has to go to the family judges and family prosecutors. The rural (no 
letrado) judges of the peace were also excluded from this law.
Additionally, the new domestic violence law transfers the responsibility for the 
procedures on protection from the civil judges to the family judges, of whom there are 
less. For instance, in the capital of the Department of Cusco, the second most 
important city of the country, there is just one family judge. Arguably, urban women 
face some hurdles to benefit from the law and the law is of no practical use to Andean 
pleasant women for whom even to reach the no letrado judge of the pieace can mean
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walking for hours through the mountains. In reality, rural women were not included in 
this ‘universal category’ of woman protected against violence.
1.6 Perception of Andean women.-
Peru is a country with persistent historical denial of its multiculturality. The home of 
‘great indigenous civilisations’, of which the last and most widely known were the 
Incas, is the place of an impoverished peasantry (Stem 1982:33). In Peru, all ethnic 
references were deleted from public declarations by governments throughout the 
Republican era. We are all Peruvian, we are all citizens but historically sectors of 
coastal people have been ‘more citizen’ than others. For us on the coast, it is possible 
to make accountable the legal representatives such as police and judges to perform the 
role assigned by the Constitution, in other regions of the country the same legal 
representatives can be agents of repression and exploitation with much more impunity. 
If the Peruvian state made our ethnic groups ‘invisible’ under the umbrella of 
citizenship, the feminist movement in Peru did the same but under another umbrella : 
the cultureless, raceless and classless category of ‘women’. This tendency has been 
difficult to reverse even though in recent years there has been a growing awareness of 
the tensions arising from the concept of a universal category of ‘woman’'’.
During the left wing military government, in the 1970s, there was an effort to make the 
Andean communities take an active role in the political process. This was a top-down 
approach but because of the appalling conditions of the Peruvian peasantry, it meant 
an air of renewal and the acknowledgement of their long and unheard struggle for 
survival. In this context, the feminists started to consider peasant women and to 
highlight here and there the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in rural areas.
See for instance Vargas (1998)
Feminists were invited to participate and collaborate in some governmental 
programmes. In the following years the feminist organisations in Lima established a 
collaboration with other groups in the provinces which emulated the urban-style of 
feminism of the Lima groups. It was not until the nineties that there was a sustainable 
support for other kinds of Non Governmental Organisations for Development (NGOs) 
in the rural areas to establish a collaboration in training on gender issues. These 
organisations were traditionally involved in ‘agricultural promotion’ but pressured by 
the international funding bodies were obliged, not without resistance, to include 
gender themes in their programmes.
In any case, from a feminist approach rural women have never been addressed in
terms of their ethnic categories, that is, they have never been named as Quechuas,
Aymaras, or Shipibas. Still, noticeable in the feminist public declarations is this
strong feeling and conviction to talk in representation of all ‘Peruvian women’ without
even having any kind of involvement with a large sector of them. Furthermore, despite
their original self-identity as ‘socialist feminists’ their perspective on ‘development
issues’ and also on law has been uncritical, in other words, has held a liberal approach
which ‘tends to assume that underdevelopment' and with it, the oppression of women,
is caused by ‘traditional values’ and ‘to develop’ also includes to embrace certain
Western values and political institutions (Stewart 1993:222). This is noticeable when
in Peru some feminist voices talk about ‘rural women’. In a paper entitled ‘Rural
women: citizenship and exclusion’. A feminist lawyer claims:
‘In general, the exercise and development of citizenship of the rural 
women has been affected by the particular intention in which the 
gender hierarchies are assumed in these settings...’ (Tamayo 1998)
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Consequently, the social groups to which these undifferentiated 'rural women’ belong 
denies them the full enjoyment of their status as citizens. Why? It is never explained. 
Another feminist lawyer evaluates:
‘The revision and analysis of the constitutional, civil, work, agricultural 
laws in force in Peru let us claim that formally there are few legal 
norms that discriminate against rural women. However, there subsist 
important obstacles which neither permit the full enjoyment of their 
rights nor the effective application of the current legislation’ (Macassi 
1998)
That is, the state has provided the 'rural women’ with all that they need for their full
development as citizens, however, there is a fundamental ‘obstacle’:
‘... rules of ancestral character which relegate women to a subordinate 
role and they are uniformly accepted. The traditional customs and 
values... reinforce women’s isolation and discrimination...The value 
and customs used as parallels not written norms, but strictly observed, 
do not permit that the laws are enforced in the daily life, reducing them 
to their formal aspects’ (Macassi 1998)
Consequently, for the rural women everything has already been created but it is their
'own culture’ that prevents 'a law’ as a magic act, improving the life of the Andean
women. The conclusion, can not be more obvious:
‘Because the cultural factor is a key aspect that permits the persistence 
of discriminatory practise and interpretations it is necessary to develop 
a training programme toward the different agents of the State and the 
civil society involved in projects of rural development, with the 
objective of incorporating the gender perspective in the planning and 
execution of projects, and [in this way] to improve the condition for the 
exercise of the rights of rural women’. (Macassi 1998)
For the rural women very little protagonism and self-determination is conceded in such
a statement.
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2. A different voice.-
This work acknowledges the validity of the feminist legal struggles to eradicate 
domestic violence and the belief in a society free of violence, however, it also 
understands that the best intentions may not just fail to produce the expected effects 
but in fact can have a negative impact on some Peruvian women. This work does not 
question the right of live free of violence for all women in the world, but rather the 
ways in which the law and the state are tackled to make this reality true in a 
multicultural country like Peru. This is not just an academic exercise but rather a 
subject of discussion with much more practical and political implication for ‘different’ 
women who are not always in the mind even of the most sensitive feminist activists.
This work based on eight months fieldwork experience in the highlands of Cusco, a 
South Andean department of Peru, tries to bring the perception that Quechua people 
-or the runakuna as they self-denominate themselves-, the largest ‘marked culture’ of 
Peru (Anderson 1990), have on gender relations, domestic violence and conflict 
resolutions to contrast their perception with those of the legal system and those 
involved in the Peruvian feminist campaigns. Using the terms ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ 
in their literal meaning (and not in their meaning within political theory) it is possible 
to say that in Peru, in relation to gender claims, there have been visions from the 
centre (those of the legal system and the feminist), understanding the centre as groups 
of people located in the capital of the country that because of their position and 
resources in society are able to create a trend of opinion and become prevalent in 
respect to other social groups and knowledge producing the invisibility or 
disqualification of other ‘voices’ and cultures: the periphery, mainly made up by the 
geographical and socially isolated groups located in the altitude of the Andean 
mountains and in the Amazonian jungle.
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It is not just the social differentiation which causes these different categories of 
Peruvians to engage in different ways with the legal system but also their particular 
conception of justice and conflict resolution. In the Andean communities a judge 
‘makes the justice’7 implying that the ‘justice’ has to be built and is a process. In 
modem law we say ‘managing’ as if justice is a pre-given entity that is ‘brought’ into 
the act of judging. This work explores to ‘make the justice’ in cases of domestic 
violence in the Peruvian south Andes.
3. The structure of the thesis.-
The main objective of this thesis then, is to critically assess the contribution of law in 
the area of violence against women in Peru particularly of those reforms proposed by 
feminist legal activists by considering the perspectives of women in Andean 
communities and of the role of the forums considered as important by Andean people, 
particularly judges of the peace. With this purpose the thesis has the following 
structure:
Chapter two develops two theoretical areas from which to explore the subject. The 
first one is an exploration of the links between feminist theory and legal strategies on 
domestic violence. The second deals with perspectives that consider the different 
engagement of people with law.
Chapter three explains the methodological approach highlighting the challenge of 
working among different ‘legal landscapes’ (Santos 1995).
Chapter four presents the law in Peru as the result of a complex historical process. 
Mainly focusing on the idea of its intrumentalism to operate a colonial system which 
set the practises for exploitation and repression of the native population, practises that
7 Translation from the Quechua expression.
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remained beyond the independence. The chapter concludes with the difficulty that 
some groups of society have in considering the official legal system as a means 
through which to enforce their rights.
Chapter five traces the history of the regulation of domestic violence, analysing laws, 
court cases and police records. It reveals the role of the legal system in the 
construction of a gender system and in the management of domestic violence, as well 
as, the limits of the legal system to address domestic violence even under a more 
feminist-oriented agenda. It concludes in the legal reforms as mainly thought to be 
applied by urban women able to access state agencies such as the police and time and 
money consuming procedures such as those at criminal and civil courts. A legal 
structure non-existent in rural areas.
The following three chapters are based on my fieldwork. Chapter six explores the 
construction of gender relations in Andean society and identifies the forums of 
intervention in marital conflicts.
Chapter seven explores the perception of domestic violence in Andean communities 
and in the way people, mainly women, believe this situation should be resolved.
Chapter eight assesses the main forum of intervention in domestic violence cases, the 
judges of the Peace.
Chapter nine concludes the thesis reflecting on important issues that come to light in 
the preceding chapters. It assesses the difficulties of implementing domestic violence 
legal strategies in multicultural societies at the same time that acknowledging the 
necessity of an affirmative action to challenge domestic violence which reflects
Andean women’s concerns.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
Introduction.-
This chapter defines two areas of theoretical exploration. Firstly it enquires into the 
relationship between feminist theory and the strategies on domestic violence. 
Secondly, it reflects on the different engagement of people with the law, or in other 
words, on the ‘social accounts of law’ (Maboreke 1996:49-56).
In relation to the first one, the following paragraphs sum up the feminist reflections 
and line of activism on the subject of domestic violence. It establishes a link between 
feminist theory and domestic violence strategies, not always presented in this form in 
the literature. In this review it will be noted how the development of discourses and 
practises on domestic violence within a feminist agenda have not been free of 
‘contradictory impulses’ (Ferraro 1996). The main proposition is that Peruvian 
feminists have come to see law as a means through which to improve women’s 
position in society. They have tackled a number of areas but have particularly 
concentrated on violence. They have been instrumental in the introduction of new 
legal measures to tackle violence both through specific activist projects (e g. special 
police stations) and through general law reforms. In so doing, they have increasingly
adopted the
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rhetoric of women’s human rights which has a tendency to universalise and 
homogenise both the issue and women.
The attitude of some feminists to see law uncritically is challenged in the second part 
of the chapter The main proposition is that law in post colonial societies holds 
particular characteristics that complicate any possible emancipatory’ claim1 or 
enforceability of rights for disadvantaged groups in society. This disheartening 
scenario, however, competes with alternative forms of ‘law’ in which people resolve 
their conflicts and negotiate their expected ends within a rationality common to the 
group
This takes us to the central point of the thesis: to unveil the difficulties of 
implementing domestic violence strategies in multicultural societies but also to 
explore into the alternative forms offered by different cultural groups to tackle the
issue.
1. Feminists strategies to eradicate domestic violence:
In the seventies, a systematic interest in the subject of domestic violence started in the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Canada (Marcus 1994:22, Dobash and Dobash 
1979:3,8). This had mainly a political expression represented by the self-denominated 
'movement of battered women', 'women for shelter', and ‘women's aid movement’ 
(Marcus 1994:22, Yllo 1988:28, Dobash and Dobash 1979:13). This activism was also 
accompanied by the study of the phenomena under a new feminist methodology. The 
following is an account of the different strategies used until now and how they linked 
with the feminist theory.
' An emancipatory agenda or project involves to create solidary and to develop participative common 
knowledge (Santos 1995:46-55)
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1.1 Liberal approaches on domestic violence strategies.-
Liberalism has been the ‘dominant ethos’ of the Western democratic world (Barnett 
1998:121 f .  The rationality of knowledge, the unrestricted respect of the individual 
rights, the principle of equality between citizens, and the right of a private sphere free 
of state intervention have been the main principles articulating liberal thought.
The liberalism pursued to constrict an absolutist state from interfering with 
considered basic liberties of autonomous individuals. The notion of the separation 
between a sphere regulated by the state -the public sphere-, and another sphere free 
from State regulation and/or interference, goes back as far as Aristotle, however it was 
mainly developed within the natural law tradition. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, all declarations of rights were inspired by this philosophy. The main 
example was the 'Declarations des droits de l’homme et du citouyen', in France 1789. 
From then on, the distinction between public and private spheres has been thought of 
in terms of the opposition between the realms of legitimate public regulation and the 
realms of freedom from intrusion, personal autonomy and private choices. This 
distinction has been useful in maintaining the belief that social and economic life (e.g. 
business, family) are outside of the government and the law (Rose 1987:63).
Feminists have pointed out that women's lives have been developed mainly within the 
private sphere and as a consequence, women's oppression has been invisible to the 
public gaze (I-acey 1993:94). The origin of feminist thought in the eighteenth century 
was focused on claiming the public sphere for women through the achievement of 
equal civil rights, access to education and employment (Barnett 1998: 3).
2 See Samos (1995) for an exhaustive analysis of the liberalism and the modem law
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Liberal feminists have passed through different phases during these three centuries but
they have been characterised for denouncing the claims of the ‘fathers of liberalism”
at the same time as assuming the law with all its promises. Barnett (1998:5) states:
‘[they] Accepted law as traditionally portrayed: the rational, objective, 
fair, gender-neutral arbiter in disputes over rights which applied to 
undifferentiated but individual and autonomous legal subjects. The 
objections voiced by feminists in this phase was to not law per se but to 
‘bad law’: law which operated to the exclusion or detriment of woman’
The task was to challenge the ‘male monopoly of law’ (Naffine 1990:2) this tackled 
the differential assignment of rights, duties and values for men and women. Examples 
of the most obvious 'sexist' laws were those which considered women as minors, 
which denied to women the right to vote and to be elected, or which restricted the 
rights of women as individuals when married etc. In evaluating the law by its 
discriminatory contents: some more obvious than others, the feminists arrived to the 
conclusion that 'corrective' methods (Smart 1992:31) could be applied to convert the 
law from a privileged site of women's oppression to a site of emancipatory conditions.
Naffine (1990:4) claims that 'the prevailing idea is accepted that law should be (and 
can be) impartial and reasoned' and that the objection to be made to law is its ‘failure’ 
‘to adhere to its own professed standards when it invokes discriminatory laws and 
practices’.
In this search for equality men became the measure of women, or the ‘super standard’ 
and what was right and fair for men was also for us as women (MacKinnon 1987:35, 
Barnett 1998:131). The reality is that gender-neutral laws have on many occasions
brought more adverse conditions for women than that legislation which established a
* John Locke (1632-1704) in his work Two treaties about the government' (1690), conceived the family 
as a natural, non political entity, as opposed to the State In the private space the father commanded not 
as a prerogative but as a duty Locke (1670 71) stated 'this right is naturally for the husband, the nature 
assigned to him as the more capable and strong', wives were by natural law' subordinated to  men 
(Cerroni 1975:32-5, Rose 1987:64)
differential treatment. This is because when the egalitarian principle was accepted by 
legislators these (mainly men) assumed that if women gained equal rights they should 
accept equal duties. A typical example of this new 'egalitarian' legislation was the 
denial of maintenance rights for divorced women or the restriction of the labour law 
protection to women without taking into account that women are disadvantaged in 
society anyway.
In relation to domestic violence, liberal feminists challenged the distinction between a 
public and a private sphere because it contributed to the impunity in which domestic 
violence occurred. Rose (1987:64-5) claims that the State has defined those aspects of 
life into which it does not intervene 'and then paradoxically, uses this privacy as the 
justification for its non-intervention’. On this basis has persisted the idea of the family 
as a sanctuary, saved in the privacy of the intimacy and for that free of external 
intervention (Dobash and Dobash 1979:2-7).
Consequently, the strategy from the end of the seventies onward has concentrated on 
taking the problem of domestic violence from the private-enclosed sphere into the 
public light. The terms wife abuse, battered spouse, battered women started to be used 
as card of identity of the problem: men 'as offenders .and women as the victims' 
(Marcus 1994:24). Women's refuges or shelters were promoted, as well as 
encouraging women to take their cases to the legal system making formal complaints. 
(Dobash and Dobash 1979, Yllo 1998 and Brograd 1988).
At the level of the legal strategies, specific regulation was demanded to tackle the 
problem (Frisch and Caruso 1996:109). On this basis, the law was not regarded as a 
problem but a residual category of a changing social order. What the campaigns for 
making the problem ‘public’ revealed, however, was the entrenched gender bias at
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police and judicial levels. Marcus (1994:24) expressed the idea in this way: 'the law 
enforcement and legal systems, through their failure to protect, were the source of 
battered women's revictimization'.
Nowadays and particularly in domestic violence, everybody is aware at least of the 
limits of the legal system. However, feminists still tend to focus on formal legal 
achievements rather than to evaluate wider structural problems that make difficult the 
implementation of their proposed strategies. The ‘women’s rights as human rights’ 
campaign is a good example of this attitude.
1.2 Structuralist approaches on domestic violence strategies.-
1.2.1 Marxist feminists.-
The text of Engels, ‘The origins of the family, private property and the State’ 
illustrated the Marxist perspective on women’s social condition. Engels described 
how women were removed from their privileged position in society toward a condition 
of oppression consolidated along the development of a capitalist mode of production. 
Marxism promised the liberation of women through the change in the correlation of 
the productive forces and their full incorporation into the new labour system; in this 
way, ‘enabling women to operate on the basis of equality with men in the public 
sphere’ (Barnett 1998:137).
The Marxist- feminists have criticised the liberal feminists for overlooking the 
differential ways in which women are oppressed in society depending on their class 
conditions. However, they challenged the Marxist mainstream pointing out that 
because of the pervasive nature of the gender relation an improvement in women’s 
condition is not guaranteed just by changing the productive system. Women could go
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to work but it was still assumed they were mainly responsible for childbearing and 
domestic chores. Reproduction was a category that was lacking in a traditional 
Marxist analysis of women in society. The Marxist-feminists, however, did not take 
into account other categories of oppression such as race. (Barnett 1998:138).
For Marxists feminists, as for the rest of Marxists, the law was evaluated as a 
‘superstructure of capitalism’ questioning their ‘self-proclaimed rational objectivity’. 
It was regarded as a tool that assured the privileges of one class to the detriment of 
another (Barnett 1998 136-7, Me Barnet 1984). Under a Marxist feminist analysis few 
promises can be expected from the official legal system in a capitalist society.
In South America, and particularly in Peru, feminists were mainly identified with this 
political stand. As mentioned in chapter one, the contemporary feminist movement 
had its origin in the association of women disenchanted with the left-wing militancy. 
In the 1980s the political strategy was to work with the poorest sector of the 
population and there was a great faith in the popular movement mainly in the women's 
neighbouring organisation and in the unions. In relation to domestic violence there 
was an overt challenge to the official legal system and a preference to develop 
'paralegal' resources and solidary networks to process women’s demands There was, 
for instance, a tacit refusal to work with the police which was dismissed as being a 
repressive and patriarchal organisation par excellence. If the legal system had to be 
tackled through the individual cases, a great display of social and political pressure 
was deemed necessary to assure any acceptable result within the official legal system. 
A successful strategy was considered to be that which managed the best practical 
results in favour of the woman in her particular circumstance rather than to reach the
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formality of a judicial decision4. From 1990 onwards, a switch to a more liberal 
approach to the legal system is noticeable.
1.2.2 Radical feminists.-
Catherine MacKinnon (1982, 1987, 1989) is considered the main exponent of this 
approach In her analysis, the paradigm of production is displaced by the paradigm of 
reproduction (Behabib and Cornell 1987:1-2). Particularly, in her early works there 
existed an effort to compare the category of class to gender. MacKinnon (1982:515) 
comments: 'sexuality is to feminism, what work is to Marxism’, both constructed, 
universal and expropriated social activities.
In relation to law, MacKinnon agrees that the contents of modem law are male but 
also, and more importantly, that the whole rationality of modem law is male. In this 
sense there is a questioning of the law itself -as a social institution- which does not 
appear in the liberal perspective. Law is created and reproduced in the male dominated 
social order. Its assigned characteristics: equality, neutrality and objectivity are indeed 
masculine aspirations, consequently, to insist on being treated equally under the law is 
to 'insist on being judged by the values of masculinity’ (Smart 1992:32).
MacKinnon’s proposals are considered a ‘dramatic shift’ in the feminist legal 
perspective of the eighties on Western feminism. Naffine and Owens (1997:4-5) 
highlighted that she was one of the first to reveal that the category of woman was 
socially constructed, and was constructed by men, this is the 'social woman' but 
especially the 'legal woman' was all that men thought she was. In relation to gender 
violence, she has emphasised that every expression of male violence is an exercise of 
power. Her writing on rape particularly caused much impact. MacKinnon has also
4 See for instance Tamayo and Vasquez (1989)
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influenced the feminists to challenge the ‘positivist paradigm’ when studying gender 
violence. Objectivity is a male subjectivity. ‘Scientific methods’ separate ‘abstract 
concepts’ from the experiences of the social world pretending ‘neutrality’ that simply 
means ignoring the perspective of the protagonists: women (Yllo 1998:36). In this 
sense, a woman researcher, does not have to be ‘impartial’, but deeply aware of 
women’s concern because that condition is inseparable from her own reality. Yllo 
(1988:42) adds:
‘For us, wife abuse is not part of the separate, observable, empirical 
world “out there”. Its existence is intimately connected to our own 
status as women, whether we have personally been victimized or not’
MacKinnon and her followers have been criticised for reducing all women to a single 
category of ‘woman’, -the essential woman-, and for narrowing the understanding of 
women's oppression under patriarchy in women’s use and abuse as sexual bodies 
(Naffine and Owens 1997:5). There is not just one category of ‘woman’ but also there 
is not just one category of ‘man’ and law can be a site of oppression for poor men as it 
is for 'subordinated' women, that is, law is not just male but it is also capitalist, 
Western, racist amongst others biases.
1.3 Poststructuralist approaches and domestic violence strategies.-
This approach includes a variety of feminists influenced by the work of Michael 
Foucault. Carol Smart (1995:7-8) identifies some ‘key elements’ which have 
particularly impacted on feminist theory. One of them is the ‘discursive construction 
of the subject’, the rejection of the idea of pre-given entities. There is not a ‘man’ and 
a ‘woman’ before the law, they are socially constructed categories and the law is one 
of the sources which informed such categories. The focus is then, in the discourse, on
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‘how the law works to produce gender’ (Smart 1992:33-4). However, to find the way 
in which law engages in such a role the first important step is to acknowledge that law 
is ‘as complex and contradictory as the dominant social order it reflects’ (Naffine 
1990:13), that is, there is not such a thing as the ‘unity of law’ and the law can appear 
as favouring women's interests but also preserving the conditions for women’s 
subordination. Consequently, there is not a ‘simple instrumental relationship between 
law and the structure of patriarchy’ as radical feminism proposes (Smart 1982:144, 
Naffine 1990:14).
Another central idea is the creation of ‘knowledge’ as authorised discourses. Smart
(1991:4) refers to the law as ’a body of knowlege/rules' 'which concedes little to other
competing discourses'. In this sense, the law generates a 'truth' about women that
overcomes or surpasses the women's own account of truth. Her analysis of rape cases
is an inspiring analysis of these issues (Smart 1989).
Specifically on domestic violence, Freeman (1982:139) states:
‘It is clear that not only does the law serve to reproduce social order, 
but it actually constitutes and defines that order. The legal form is one 
of the main modalities of social practice through which sexual 
stratification has been expressed. Law defines the character and creates 
the institutions and social relationships within which the family 
operates’.
He maintains that even when the gross manifestation of women's subordination has 
been eroded from legislation and has been replaced by equality and recognised female 
personal autonomy, the law reveals its 'ideological power' when intervening in 
domestic violence, for instance, through the criteria employed by judges, prosecutors
and police. (Freeman 1989:18).
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This approach reveals the inappropriateness of certain domestic violence strategies 
which rely on the promises of the formal legal reforms enforced through a legal system 
which ‘constitutes part of that problem’ (Freeman 1982:132). For Freeman (1989:32): 
‘The legal system cannot solve the problem of domestic violence because the problem 
cannot be solved by tackling known cases of violence and that is the only way the law 
can operate' but it can challenge the problem if, at least, their legal representatives 
do not behave as justifying the unequal power structure within the family.
It is difficult to identify a strategy on domestic violence reflecting a poststructural 
approach, however, whenever feminists question the role of the police, acknowledge 
the necessity to improve the space of the complaints and other procedures, or design 
wider alternatives to face domestic violence, they are taking into consideration the 
limits of the legal system explained here.
1.4 Postmodernism and the unessential women,-
The term postmodernism encompasses a diversity of authors and ideas that have in 
common their questioning of the main presumptions of modernity. Particularly, 
authors like Jean Francois Lyotard have challenged the belief that reason and the 
scientific methods can establish objective and universal knowledge (Parpart 1994: l)5. 
Trying to clarify the confusion between post-structuralism and postmodernism 
(commonly found in literature6), Smart (1995:9) suggests that post-structuralism 
concentrates on analysing discourses and social subjects representations, 
postmodernism instead is a critique of epistemology ‘It makes us rethink and 
reconsider what we think we know’. For Lyotard (1984) social reality is too complex 
and heterogeneous to be ‘totalised’ in general experiences or categories such as
5 See also Santos (1995)
6 See for instance Barnett ( 1998)
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‘gender, race and class’ and that doing so is to silence and to deny other possible 
accounts of reality (Sarup 1993: 154, Parpart 1994:2).
Feminists have had different reactions when confronted by post-modern ideas. Since 
postmodernism is concerned with challenging the development of grand theories to 
explain social reality, the idea of women’s oppression as an integral female experience 
which is explained by the sole cause of patriarchy is dismissed. This has produced 
much rejection from groups of feminists who find that post-modem ideas do not have 
any feasible application and on the contrary undermine affirmative action to improve 
women’s situation. In this sense, Parpart (1994:2-5) points out that the major critique 
to post-modem ideas come from the liberal feminists, particularly, those involved in 
the design of policies at international level (mainly at the UN, World Bank and the 
ILO). They believe that post-modem ideas produce ‘political fragmentation and the 
dissipation of awareness and feminist activism’ (Parpart 1994:5). Finally, it is 
considered that ‘postmodernism’ is another fashion of male academia which at other 
times has not hesitated to challenge the main feminist claims.
Other feminists, however, are inspired by postmodernism to rethink the diversity of 
women’s experiences. For instance, black feminists in the United States reflect on the 
experiences of the oppression of black women as substantially different to those of the 
white American women (Barnett 1998: 192, Parpart 1994:6, Waylen 1996: 8). There 
are also others feminists like Chandra Mohanty (1996) challenging the notion o f ‘third 
world women’ as an undifferentiated ‘other’, ‘oppressed by their gender and the third 
world underdevelopment’, that appear in the narrative of Western feminists. Third 
world women are presented ‘uniformly poor, without power and vulnerable’ whilst 
Western feminists hold a self-image of ‘modem, educated and sexually liberated
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women’. They are the Tole model’ and their recipes circulated as the right way of 
doing things in relation to the liberation of women, particularly, of third world women. 
(Parpart 1994:6-7)
1.4.1 ‘Intersectionalitv’.-
Waylen (1996:8) points out that feminists influenced by post-structuralism and 
postmodernism, have become increasingly interested in ‘notions of identity and the 
ways in which subjects are constructed'. In this exploration, it is important to 
understand how different categories of oppression such as race, class, gender, culture 
and ethnicity interact and affect women’s personal identities. The literature refers to 
these intertwined categories as ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw 1994:94-5)
Specifically reflecting on the issue of domestic violence, the literature offers some 
studies on the situation of black women and migrants in the United States. For 
instance Crenshaw (1994) identifies two levels of the intersectionality: structural and 
political. The structural intersectionality referred to the disadvantaged social and 
economic situation of ‘minority’ groups. In this sense, resources offered to black 
women and migrant women are not sufficient to overcome their situations. Black 
women suffer more unemployment and have less training than other sectors of the 
community. Additionally, migrant women, particularly the ‘Latinas’, have to deal 
with their lack of proficiency in English when going to the authorities and also the fear 
of being deported when their legal status is still uncertain. The political 
intersectionality refers to the black women’s location within two subordinated groups 
‘frequently pursuing conflicting political agendas’. The feminist claim asserts 
domestic violence as a problem of all women overlooking particular dilemmas that 
black women have to face because of racism (Crenshaw 1994:99-110). Just as one
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example, Ferraro (1996:88) reports that some black women who called the police for 
domestic violence problems finished up being imprisoned themselves for 
‘investigations’7. The conviction in black women and other so called ‘minorities’ 
groups of the prejudice that public authorities still hold against them, discourages them 
from attending the legal system and certain social services. Crenshaw (1994:103) 
states: ‘the desire to protect the home as a safe haven against assaults outside the home 
may make it more difficult for women of colour to seek protection against assaults 
from within the home’. On the other hand, anti-racist campaigners will tend to deny 
black men as perpetrators of domestic violence for the sake of challenging racist 
stereotypes. Some campaigners have even gone further to justify male violence as part 
of the 'identity' of the black community (Crenshaw 1994:101-2).
1.5 Domestic violence as a human rights violation.-
The 1990s international campaign to address women’s rights as human rights appears 
to contradict post-modern formulations and is evidence of the distance between the 
feminist academic discussions and the international activism.
In this global campaign for women’s human rights, the dichotomy private/public is 
stretched to the limit comparing the violence against women with other forms of 
human rights violation in which traditionally the state has been the infractor. The 
main argument is that so much gender violence is perpetrated by private individuals 
that it should not be ignored as an issue of human rights (Charlesworth et al. 1991). It 
has also been suggested that the state is responsible for the non prosecution of the 
cases of gender violence, consequently, if it fails it is in a way, an accomplice 
(Romany 1994).
7 cf. Freeman (1989:25-6) based in UK
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The central idea of the feminist perspective on women' rights as human rights is the 
concept of gender violence or the so called 'violence against women'. This refers to all 
acts of violence or abuse that women suffer for the fact of "being women', as a 
consequence of their subordinate position in society". It includes the most diverse 
types of gender-based abuse such as domestic violence, rape, women trafficking, 
genital mutilation, sexual harassment and death by dowry amongst others.
From the seventies onwards, feminists have worked and campaigned on the issue of 
'violence against women’ at international levels. In 1979 the United Nations adopted 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 
(CEDAW) which was regarded as a great advance in the defence of women's rights, 
however, this convention did not address explicitly the problem of domestic violence. 
This omission 'prompted the formation of a global coalition of 900 women's 
organisations, which successfully lobbied’ for recognition of gender violence as a 
human rights violation at United Nations level. In 1992, CEDAW was amended with 
a recommendation 'to protect women against all kinds of violence' and from 1994 a 
UN 'Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences' is 
responsible for reporting the problem at world-wide levels. Women met at the fourth 
United Nations World Conference on Women in Beijing promoting a 'Beijing Platform 
for Action’ which urged governments to 'take integrated measures to prevent and 
eliminate violence against women' (British Council 1999:3-4). In these international 
actions the lobby of Latin American feminists has played a leading role (Cullington 
1994:197).
In a feminist understanding, domestic violence has been considered as the main
expression of gender violence and specific strategies have been designed to tackle it in 
K See, for example, the book edited by Peters and Wolper (1995), particularly Bunch (1995).
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its dimension whilst acknowledging the need for specialised bodies of officers, 
activists and academics. To subsume domestic violence in a global campaign for 
human rights has complicated an already complex problem and this is being done at 
both levels, at the practical level (implementation) and at discursive level.
At the practical level we can observe two trends. There is a channel of resources 
toward the global issue of women's rights as human rights. At present, there is a 
self-critique of the previous overemphasis on domestic violence in detriment of the 
general issue of gender violence. A report of the British Council (1999:6) reads as 
follows: 'It is ironic that our attempts to highlight violence within families may 
overshadow the violence committed by those outside them'. This self-critique could 
be valid in countries which have dedicated resources to face the issue of domestic 
violence but certainly does not apply in countries where the problem has hardly been 
in the public attention. Additionally, in richer countries there is a set of services 
provided by the state, in most European countries there is an experience of a ‘welfare 
state’, however, in poorer countries like those in Latin America, there has never been a 
state as provider of basic services for the population In our countries, NGOs 
dedicated to improving women’s position in society were able to channel international 
aid to tackle the problem, becoming almost the only social support in cases of 
domestic violence. At present, the NGOs, under pressure from international funding 
bodies are concentrating on working 'with the state' because these bodies hold the 
presumption that there is an infrastructure that can be successfully employed to 
address the issue of gender violence in its whole complexity. The second trend, is a 
paradoxical one, it has been reported that many governments have confused the terms 
of'violence against women' with 'domestic violence' and they have concentrated their
38
policies on this area. For instance, it is in this context in which laws on domestic (or 
family) violence have been enacted in various countries (British Council 1999).
At the discursive level, the most important character of the campaign is the 
homogenisation of 'all' women suffering violence and responses to this wide range of 
situations of gender violence. A report by Oxfam (1999:2) about the result of a 1998 
international workshop on violence against women states that responses to violence 
against women can be developed ‘...within a framework of sanctions (exacting cost 
from the perpetrators) and sanctuary (supporting and empowering women)’ In a 
British Council (1999:20) report on domestic violence can be read the following: The 
basic philosophy of any strategy on gender violence must be to support and empower 
women and girls and to challenge abusive men'. In this report the concepts of 
‘sanctuary’ and ‘sanctions’ are also employed. It also proposes to challenge gender 
violence: 'ending the silence', in the rationality of taking the private into the public.
However, there are expressions of gender violence that can be placed in what the West 
would call the 'public sphere', such as genital mutilation which is performed as a 
central community-ritual event, another case is that of mass rapes in war There is 
also the problem of non differentiation between perpetrators. In many cases of gender 
violence women are the aggressors, as in the case of genital mutilation or in the cases 
of death by dowry. It has been explained that these women as perpetrators are 
subsumed in a structure of male power which conditioned them to behave in such a 
way. While this may be true, still it is quite difficult to see how such a violence can be 
challenged at practical level without addressing women as perpetrators. Additionally, 
for the victims, there is a difference between a partner who beats them and a 
paramilitary who rapes them in times of war. There are also obvious differences
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between 'the victims'. It is not the same to be a beaten women in a middle class urban
neighbourhood, as to be a beaten poor black woman or a woman in the highlands of
Peru, in terms of resources and in terms of perceptions by the legal representatives9.
Another aspect of the discursive level of this global campaign is the emphasis on the
extreme cases of violence in intimate relationships in order to ‘make the case’ of
domestic violence as human rights violation, which contradicts the original feminist
discourse that domestic violence is a pervasive and ‘normalised’ event in the life of
women and men. The literature addressing women's human rights contains plenty of
quotations such as this one in Beasly and Thomas (1994:323):
‘Maria was brutally assaulted in her own kitchen in England by a man 
wielding two knives. He held one of the weapons at her throat, while 
raping her with the other. After he finished, the man doused her with 
alcohol and set her alight with a blow torch. Maria lived through the 
assault to prosecute the man....’
While cases like Maria exist and are a painful truth, the experience of working in 
domestic violence reveals to us that most of the coercion that women suffer in their 
daily life by their partners is not necessarily expressed in an ostensible physical injury 
and often is more an imminent than an actual violence but enough to make women live 
in fear. For instance, in the women’s police station of Lima, 10,000 women arrive 
every year complaining about domestic violence, but only approximately 4,500 of 
them have evidence of physical injury, the rest do not fulfil that requirement. All 
10,000 women suffer domestic violence but in the form of threats, insults or ‘minor’
9 The following comments of Esteva and Prakash (1998 117), serious critics o f the Western 'global 
project' of human rights, is certainly illustrative o f what I am trying to express here 'Grander and more 
global than all the other conferences now regularly held from Malaysia to Mexico to promote human 
rights, its participants sought to liberate and bring justice to all the oppressed peoples of earth, and 
especially those whom they deem the worst off the impoverished woman and girl in the Third World, 
bought and sold, beaten and raped, a veritable slave of husband, in-laws, or employer, to the 100 million 
missing women o f Asia -the girls who do not survive their conception Forty thousand determined 
delegates flew back to their nations-states from Beijing with a 12-Point Platform for global action Of 
Herculean dimension, this Platform proposed bringing the unschooled, unclothed, homeless, unfed, 
abused, tortured and unfairly imprisoned under one humane universal umbrella o f human rights'
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physical assaults like pushing, slapping in the face or pulling the hair (Estremadoyro 
1993). On the other hand, in the global campaign the perpetrators are seen as violent, 
alienated men, and not as ‘ordinary’ husbands that is precisely what the battered 
women movement was trying to address. The discourse of human rights has impacted 
in such a way on the issue of domestic violence that Marcus (1994) proposed that 
domestic violence should be re-baptised as ‘terrorism in the home’.
Another aspect of this perspective on women's human rights is reinforcing the 
tendency to take the law and the legal system unproblematicaly. In the literature on 
the subject10 the legal system is presented as failing to provide an appropriate 
legislation and a gender awareness in their legal representatives. In this sense, there is 
implicit the idea that, as Smart would say, implementing ‘corrective’ measures, the 
law is able to provide adequate solution to gender violence cases. The law is rarely 
considered, as ‘part of the problem’ (Freeman 1982:132). Additionally, the law is 
almost exclusively thought of as the 'state law '. Other ways of solving conflict, or as 
Santos (1995) would say other 'legal landscapes' are simply not taken into account.
1.6 Domestic violence in the criminal svstem.-
Since the 1970s, when feminists started to bring domestic violence into the public
gaze, they have forcefully demanded that domestic violence be recognised as a crime
and, consequently, subject to the criminal system (Frish and Caruso 1996). Nowadays
the role of the criminal system to eradicate domestic violence is not self-evident".
Particularly in the last decade a wider legal response has been offered12. The notion of
domestic violence as a crime still subsists but legal remedies are approached in a
l0For a summary of world-wide legal responses on gender violence see for instance Connors (1994) and 
British Council (1999).
11 See Barnett (1998: 261-4) for instance
,2For an inventory of legal responses on domestic violence around the world see Armatta (1997)
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combination of legal jurisdictions (criminal and civil) and special jurisdictions (e g. 
family courts).
In Latin America the approach which has been prevalent is the criminalisation of
domestic violence (Chiarotti 1993:81). There is a strong belief in most Latin
American activists that if any other assault is considered a crime, violence between
intimates should not be the exception. They argue that the criminal law has a
'symbolic value’, because it deals with the behaviour considered deviant in society.
Additionally, considering domestic violence as a crime makes the problem ‘visible’,
this is 'deprivatized domestic violence’ (Chiarotti 1993:81-2). Frish and Caruso
(1996:105-6), based on the US experience, also suggest:
'Predictable law enforcement conveys the message of wrongfulness and 
social rejection and educates victims, offenders, children, neighbours, 
and the public at large that such behaviour will not be tolerated. 
Criminalization focuses the legal authority and coercive power of the 
criminal justice system on a set of behaviours now perceived as socially 
dangerous and currently not manageable using informal means of social 
control. Criminalization is thus more than the manipulation of law. 
The process includes the planned change of individual perceptions, 
organizational policies and procedures, and ultimately, the status quo of 
community life.’
To recognise domestic violence as a crime removes the idea that this violence is an 
'individual pathology’ rather than a behaviour "deserving punishment' (Frisch and 
Carusso 1996:105). In the UK, authors like Freeman (1989:27-8) have supported this 
position showing their disapproval of other kinds of treatment to domestic violence. 
He clearly does not support the case for treating domestic violence as a civil wrong. 
He refers to the 'crisis interventions’ programmes’ that privilege ‘counselling and 
pre-trial conference’ as embracing 'an ideology which tries to allocate blame and keep
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families together’ preventing the appreciation of ‘wife beating’ as ‘a brutal criminal 
assault and not just the symptom of a troubled marriage'.
From the scant literature questioning the criminalisation of domestic violence, Ferraro 
(1996) brings an interesting perspective. She shows us how a ‘feminist-inspired 
movement to help battered women’ appeared conciliatory with the ‘most reactionary’ 
discourse on ‘crime control’. Ferraro (1996:82), differing with Frisch and Caruso 
(1996), states that ‘the criminalisation of battering was not the primary focus of 
grassroots activists in the 1970s, but it has become central to the current discourse’. 
The first critique that Ferraro elaborates is the homogenous category of ‘battered 
women’ and of ‘those who batter’. Despite the evolution of the feminist thought these 
‘unidimensional’ images have not changed at all. This rigid perspective added to the 
demands for more repression, resulting in feminist demands being accommodated 
within conservative agendas looking for an increase in crime control. Ferraro 
(1996:82) states:
‘...conservatism has been more willing to accept feminist claims which 
can increase repression, can be merged within the criminal system than 
any other feminist claim that entitles to a more positive action in 
society’.
Ferraro (1996:83) remembers that when in the 1970s feminist activists demanded that 
domestic violence appeared in the public gaze it was with the purpose of revealing the 
political dimension of the male power in women’s life hidden in these ‘individual 
stories’. When challenging domestic violence feminists were looking for the ‘radical 
transformation of patriarchy’, which included revealing the ‘nuclear family’ itself as a 
site of oppression.
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The process in which domestic violence has come to be considered a crime shows a 
different turn to the first feminist political agenda. In the US, particularly during the 
conservative government of Ronald Reagan, in the first half of the 1990s, is when 
more 'effective' laws were enforced to treat domestic violence as a crime. For Ferraro 
(1996:85-86) these attitudes coincided with the restructuring of social services that by 
1992 almost eliminated the 'welfare for the poor’. To her the ‘official discourse’ 
turned the demand for more protection toward the battered women into a 'crime 
control model’. As a result ‘violent men have become the focus of criminal 
intervention and battered women the object of mental health reform’, the political 
dimension of questioning domestic violence as a main expression of patriarchy has 
been ‘overshadowed’.
Ferraro (1996:86) goes even further in questioning the affirmation much celebrated by 
the feminists, that arrest is an effective deterrent to domestic violence. In the US a 
pilot study was carried out in the 1980s by the police in Minneapolis which reached 
the conclusion that the arrest was an effective measure to stop violence. Six more 
studies were funded to verify the Minneapolis results but these studies did not find that 
arrest was a more effective measure than other modes of intervention (e.g. than 
separation or mediation). The latter conclusions however, were not taken into account 
in establishing the police attitude when intervening in domestic violence cases1'. The 
recognition of the arrest as the best police attitude in relation to domestic violence has 
been considered a triumph in the contemporary feminist agenda, 'this was understood 
to challenge legal tolerance of woman battering’. Ferraro (1996:88) remembers the 
warning of the 1970s feminist who claimed:
"Freeman (1989), based also in empirical studies, affirms the positive effect o f detention as a deterrent to 
domestic violence
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‘We must caution ourselves not to overemphasize the role of the police 
in the eradication of spouse abuse and work on the elimination of 
violence as means of enforcing the dominant power relationships of 
men over women.’
Additionally, Ferraro (1996:88) mentions that the role of the police can be evaluated in
a different way for different women, referring to the issue of ‘intersectionality\ For
Ferraro (1996:88) the nature of the criminal law will never be able to take into account
such an intersectionality. Criminal law has a concept of 'perpetrator and victim’ in
which considerations of ‘race, class, and sexual orientation that impinge on the
experience of battering’ do not have a place. On the other hand, the role of the police
and even shelters for battered women were seen by the feminist as aids in the
transformation of the women’s situation toward a more emancipatory agenda. Ferraro
(1996:89) expresses these ideas as follows:
‘The possibilities which have been obscured by the crime control 
discourse are the ideals expressed by feminists in the 1970s. 
Establishment of a guaranteed minimum annual wage, broad-based 
changes in our economic system, revaluing women’s work, and 
elimination of male privilege within the family are goals which have no 
language within the system of criminal law. These are goals involving 
the elimination of women’s dependency on men. They belong to a 
discourse of liberation which does not constrict women’s pain to a legal 
or scientific category. A discourse of liberation entails an 
understanding of the interlocking ideas, practices and institutions which 
perpetuate subordination and those that set us free.’
Zaffaroni (1993:21) goes further than Ferraro when claiming that battered women do 
not have a place in the interest of criminal law. For him battered women do not have a 
place because ‘the victim’ is no longer part of the criminal relationship, it is the state. 
‘The state is the sole offended’. While Maidment (1980:30) notices that the cases of 
domestic violence which fully entered in the criminal system lost the possibility of 
other kinds of intervention both for the perpetrators and battered women, Zaffaroni
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adds that the victim simply 'disappeared' and is no longer part of the ‘conflict 
resolution’, here there is not ‘struggle or settlement’ but an act o f ‘vertical power’, the 
power of the State. We are offered protection by the state under the form of the 
prosecution of a few individual cases which enter into the criminal system. Zaffaroni 
called these cases the ‘minuscule selection of ‘scapegoats’. Under this reflection, the 
political agenda demanded by the previous feminists becomes indispensable if we 
truly want to eradicate domestic violence.
1.6.1 Protective measures.-
'Injunctions', as they are called in Anglo-Saxon law, emerged to provide the victims of 
violence a more effective protection in wider circumstances and are fundamentally a 
means of preventing harassment in all its forms by the aggressor. The domestic 
violence laws in Latin America, whether they have criminalised domestic violence or 
have created special jurisdictions, offered to the victim the possibility to apply for 
‘protective measures’ (e.g. to forbid all types of visit by the aggressor, to oblige him to 
leave home etc.)14. As with the injunctions, they are ‘in essence civil coercive orders’ 
(Maidment 1980:28) but in case of disobedience it gives the police the authority to 
intervene. This intervention is not always effective and the police fail many times in 
enforcing the orders. In countries like Peru a ‘protective measure’ is almost a 
‘declarative principle’ with little practical impact, as will be reviewed in chapter five.
14 Armatta (1997) mentions these Latin American experiences cf. Barnett (1998:261-3) for UK.
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2. Differential engagement with law,-
2.1 Post colonial law.-
'Post colonialism1 is the subject of a broad intellectual debate15. The most obvious 
connotation of the word 'post colonialism' concerns the social, political and economic 
impact involved in the process of the 'transition from colonialism to 
self-determination' (Darian-Smith 1996:291-2). In the South American independence 
experience, this process was carried on by the same colonial elite in its aspiration of 
modernisation and political and economic autonomy from the metropolis. The 
Republican elite were heirs to the dichotomy established by European imperialism 
with the native population: The West as the civilised, the ‘others’, the non-western, 
people to be civilised. Europe was self-constructed as "different and superior’. 
(Darian-Smith 1996:294) The same reasoning was reproduced by the elite of the new 
nation-states drawing a distance between them as 'more western', more white, more 
descendants of Europe and the other cultural -and more original- groups of their own 
countries
However, to build a nation-state it was necessary to create an illusion of a national
project that all citizens shared. As Bhabha (1994:171) states: a newly built nation had
to 'give a hegemonic “normality” to the uneven development and the differential, often
disadvantaged, histories of nations, races, communities and peoples'. In South
America, under the label o f ‘freedom from colonialism’, power structures, relations of
oppression were perpetuated further than the post-colonial time. In fact, these
asymmetrical relationships formed the base on which these new nations were
l5For a summary of main ideas and debates on post-colonial theory see Childs and Williams (1997) One 
of the many publications containing a sample o f post colonial authors is Mongia ( 1996) The journal 
Social and Legal Studies dedicated a whole issue (1996, vol 5/3) to the link between 'post colonialism 
and law’
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established. Here is where the role of law is fundamental, or as Fiztpatrick 
(1995a:xv-i) suggests the building of the nation is ‘integral’ to that of modem law 
because it is the law which provided the illusion of ‘universalisation’ to this 
conflictive reality, it endorses the ‘civilised’ project.
Trazegnies (1980a:38) claims that in Peru two imports of legal systems occurred. One 
with the Spanish conquest during the sixteenth century and the second during the 
nineteenth century. The first was a 'forced imposition' the second a 'free import', the 
election of an independent country searching for adaptation to modernisation and 
capitalist development. The claim for a new legal framework, for the modem law, is 
the claim to be accepted in the 'civilised' word, in the modem project. As 
Darian-Smith (1996:296)16 suggests the law with its 'mythic universalism', 'provides an 
overarching frame, a totalising narrative, by which to structure, organise and idealise' 
the action of these new nation-states. It helps to build the spirit of one nation, the 
'general spirit’ and it appears as defending the ‘general interest’. The law gave an 
‘illusion’, the reality was exploitation and discrimination particularly against the 
native population for long after the independence. Even today some authoritarian 
features of the state still persist as well as the denial of the multiculturality of the 
country. In this sense, some authors like Purdy (1996:406-7) arrive to a radical 
conclusion: colonialism is not a fact of the past for the indigenous groups. For them 
the reality is colonial and they still are objects of so much usurpation and alienation. 
She claims (quoting Moody 1993:xxix17): 'to treat colonialism as a thing of the past is 
to ignore ... the continuing seizure of indigenous peoples' lands and the adulteration of 
their spirituality and culture’.
16 Inspired by Fitzpatrick 1992
17 Moody, R (1993). The indigenous voice visions and realities Utrecht: International Books
2.1.1 Criminal law.-
In South American colonial times -as elsewhere- the law was used to shape the 
colonised people into exploitation. The notion of the 'savage' created by the civilised 
West exposed the non-civilised people to a permanent state of transgression18. For 
Norrie (1993) the criminal law has remained as the official way in which repression is 
performed within a framework of legality. He (1993:98) states: ‘Thus in the criminal 
law, the rule of law enforces an exploitative and oppressive social system, but it does it 
in a way that proclaims its self-limiting character’. Since the state holds the monopoly 
of the use of force and also concentrates the production and implementation of the 
legal norms, it has the attribution to declare the illegality of certain events or 
behaviours'9. This is mainly done through the criminal law that is the ‘state’s most 
efficient apparatus of coercion’ (Carson 1974TO)20.
Purdy (1996) reaffirms these ideas when defining the police station and the prison as 
'sites o f  legal violence' or as an installed style of repression toward the native 
population until the present. Purdy’s (1996) study of the rate of imprisonment in 
Australia indicates that there has been an increase of imprisonment as a percentage of 
Aboriginal people and by now they make up 30% of the prison population. She 
(1996:412-3) finds the same in relation to the poorest population in Trinidad and 
Tobago having noticed that the major rate of imprisonment occurred in 1989 and 1990 
during the popular uprising against the intervention of the IMF. In Peru most of the
’These ideas are inspired by Fitzpatrick 1995 (a,b) See also Norrie (1993)
19 See Rubio and Eguiguren (1985:120)
20There is a wide bibliography on the role o f  criminal law within state modem law part o f which is 
summarised by Carson (1974) The basic idea is that historically the criminal law was designed to 
repress poor people and protect the interests o f the wealthy (in a process that it is well explain by 
Foucault 1978) and that until present criminal law is ‘formulated and administered by those segments of 
society which are able to incorporate their interests into the creation and interpretation of public policy’ 
(Carson 1974:70)
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intervention against peasants has been ‘naked repression’. The criminal law has 
provided the legal framework to declare peasants’ protests as illegal but very few 
people have been prosecuted by a criminal court.
2.1.2 Human Rights.-
Esteva and Prakash (1998:10-11) qualify Human Rights as one of the ‘sacred cows’ of 
modem thought and nowadays as one of the expressions of ‘think global’. With other 
terms, Gaete (1995:113-116) expresses the same idea unveiling the process in which 
Human Rights have become a ‘political conditionality on aid-receiving’ for the third 
world countries. The assumption is that the signature of human rights convenants 
combined with the strength of other democratic state institutions set the necessary 
stability and formal legal framework for the operation of the international market. 
Gaete (1995:114) comments; ‘Human rights provide universal standards of governance 
and political rationality’21.
Central to the debates on human rights is the tension between one unique standard of 
values -suspiciously Western- that countries holding a variety of cultures have to 
accept. In these debates, there are those who take sides with the cultural relativism 
and others who have become human rights ‘fundamentalists’22.
For his part, Santos (1998a: 180-244) is concerned with the state’s monopoly of human 
rights. In other words, the state performs both roles, as the infractor but also as the
granter. It is the entity which ‘concedes’ the human rights either by incorporating
2lFrom 1975 the US government conditioned its external aid to the acceptance of human rights 
convenants Contradictorily, the US government has not signed some of these documents This is not 
the only evidence of its 'double standard’ in relation to human rights There is also the fact that the US 
government has not hesitated to overtly support leaders committing gross human rights violations, as it 
did with Pinochet in Chile. (Santos 1998a: 184, Gaete 1995:113)
22There is a wide literature on the subject Gaete (1995) summarised main arguments in debate Esteva 
and Prakash (1998) are an example o f a critical position of the whole issue of Human Rights and Santos 
(1995,1998a) supports some of these critics but believes in the emancipatory capacity o f the international 
human rights activism
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them into the domestic laws (e.g. the Constitution) or making the international 
convenant part of the national legislation. The human rights can be both defended or 
violated by the same protagonists: the state’s representatives. In principle, the state 
can be challenged through the international system, for instance, in the case of Peru, 
through the Inter American Court. Santos (1998:188) assesses, however, this court has 
had ‘a very scant activity’ because the level of resources needed to take a case there 
makes this an unlikely possibility. Consequently, human rights enforcement is 
inescapably linked to the features of the nation-state and its legal system.
2.2 Legal pluralism.-
As a general idea, legal pluralism refers to the recognition of the existence of other 
sources of ‘legal norms’ apart from the state21 *3. Legal pluralism has been a main 
subject of interest particularly for the legal anthropology and the sociology of law. For 
anthropologists, the study of law has been central since it was constituted as an 
independent discipline in the second half of the nineteenth century. Particularly Great 
Britain 'funded and supported ethnographic research' to obtain information to facilitate 
'the task of imperial governance' (Conley and O'Barr 1993: 41-55). However, it is 
with Malinowsky, in the middle of this century that an anthropological perspective in 
law became especially influential. Malinowsky focused his attention on identifying 
sources of social control, that is, of institutions responsible for the management of 
considered deviant behaviours in a given society24. The impact of Malinowsky’s work 
is such that until recently legal anthropologists have continued with almost the same
21 There are three ‘classics’ in the conceptualisation of legal pluralism Santos (1977, 1985 writings
compiled in 1995), Merry ( 1988) and Griffiths ( 1986)
24Especially in his work ‘Crime and custom in the savage society’ (1926)
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enquiries into 'what behaviours perform the functions’ that are possible to be classified 
in our understanding o f ‘legal’ (Conley and O’Barr 1993: 47)25.
What was central in the observation into the ‘legal regulations’ in ‘primitive societies’ 
was the process by which the introduction ‘of European colonial law created a 
plurality of legal orders', that is, a different set of norms by which colonised people 
were ruled (Merry 1988:869-70). Scholars denominated this situation as ‘legal 
pluralism’. However, this was a ‘juristic legal pluralism’, as defined by Griffiths 
(1986), which focuses on the recognition of the central state of the existence of so 
named ‘customary’, ‘personal’ or ‘religious’ law as legal ‘sources with a special field 
of application.’(Bentzon 1997:168). This recognition involved making these ’bodies of 
law’ (Woodman 1997:182,188) enforceable through the courts.
2.2.1 Semi-autonomous social fields.-
The subject of legal pluralism did not stop at the study of former colonies, neither in 
the ‘juristic legal pluralism’. The work of Sally Falk Moore came to widen the 
perspective in the issue, and although she did not use the term ‘legal pluralism’, her 
concept of semi-autonomous social field  (1973) contributes to the observation into the 
so called ‘complex societies’. What defines a semi-autonomous social field is its 
capacity to ’generate rules and customs' and 'to induce or coerce compliance' (Moore 
1973:720). She (1973:721) adds:
'..the formal legal institutions may enjoy a near monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force, they cannot be said to have a monopoly of any 
kind on the other various forms of effective coercion or effective 
inducement. It is well established that between the body politic and the 
individual, there are interposed various smaller organised social fields 
to which the individual "belongs". These social fields have their own 
customs and rules and the means of coercing or inducing compliance"
25 For an example among Peruvian legal anthropologists see particularly Peña (1998)
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Moore (1973:723) takes an example from the dress industry in New York and finds 
that its activities were imbued with 'legal, illegal, and nonlegal norms' that conditioned 
people's behaviour in that particular sector. In the end, it was not just that people 
follow other rules than that of the formal legislation but that 'the external legislation 
has not had, and could not be expected to have, the apparently intended effects, 
precisely because of the semi-autonomy of the social field' (Griffiths 1986:30).
Moore's ideas have been very inspirational for the so called ‘Women’s law’ approach 
because they emphasise the different areas of regulation which inform women's lives. 
In fact, very few aspects of women’s lives develop around courts or interacting with 
other legal system’s representatives, consequently, the other source of ‘norms’ and 
space of negotiation for women are basic to understand women’s position in society 
(Helium 1995). We come back later to this point. Additionally Moore’s semi 
autonomous social fields help us to understand how the legal system is reproduced in a 
particular local setting and it influences by a diversity of cultural elements of that 
particular locality producing different consequences than those expected by the formal 
law. In the present work, this will be evident in the role of the judges of the peace.
2.2.2 Justiciability and rhetoric
The inspirational work of Moore has the ‘danger’ of suggesting that every other 
normative element in a relationship is ‘law’ or ‘legal norms’ too. Santos (1994:28) 
warns us about it and having researched extensively in other producers of ‘law’ apart 
from the state, he arrives at the conclusion that there are two fundamental elements 
that make a particular event one of legal pluralism: normative standards, and 
justiciability, this is ‘the capacity of a third person to adjudicate a conflict that arises
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through the practising of such norms’. Consequently, Santos (1995:112) describes 
‘law’ out of the state as:
'. . .a body of regularised procedures and normative standards, considered 
justiciable in a given group, which contribute to the creation and 
prevention of disputes, as well as to their settlement through an 
argumentative discourse coupled with the threat of force.'
The ‘justiciable body’ is able to mediate and settle disputes. It can be made up by an 
individual or a group, either lay persons or persons with legal formation. He adds: 
‘this is a fundamental idea, the possibility of the intervention of a third party to resolve 
in normative terms, that is, with reference to some norms’. The threat of force refers 
to sanctions that can be organised or diffused. The non compliance with a norm 
should have a cost and this cost involves a diversity of social sanctions. Santos 
(1994:28) adds ‘a community can not have prisons but it can sanction in other ways’. 
The loss of reputation, for instance, is a typical diffused sanction because it can 
negatively affect the survival of a person within his/her community.
In more communal-oriented societies, like those studied by Santos, the ‘main
structural element’ performed in these kinds of setting is the ‘argumentative discourse’
or rhetoric. For Santos, rhetoric is the ’art of persuasion by argumentation' and in the
communal oriented societies the truth is rhetorical or as he expresses:
‘a mythic moment of rest in a continuous and endless argumentative 
struggle among different discourses of truth’ it is the ever-provisional 
result of a negotiation of meaning within a given relevant audience...’ 
(Santos 1995:38)
Additionally, the conflicts are evaluated by the ‘judge’ in their social dimension. They 
are de-privatised, or in other words are not strictly considered as an affair between two
54
individual parties. It takes into account how particular disputes affect the existence of 
the group itself. The ‘judge’ holds, then, a different ‘neutrality’ (Santos 1995:130-2).
The rationality of this kind of law is completely different to the ‘modem law’, which 
under the influence of positivism lost its original rhetoric to become legal science 
(Santos 1995:39). It reflects on these issues when analysing the role of the judge of the 
peace as main forum for conflicts resolution.
2.2.3 The Peruvian experience.-
The interest in the diverse normative regulations of a multicultural country like Peru 
appears as a sustained subject of reflection between legal scholars by the end of the 
1970s. There are two perspectives: from legal anthropology (called in Spanish 
antropología jurídica) the focus has been on recognising sources of norms and 
institutions similar to those in modem law (as 'Malinowsky's style') and consequently, 
to analyse the discrepancies between this legal plurality and the formal legal system26. 
These scholars stress the lack of attention of the legal system to this phenomena and 
its failure to incorporate these 'informal' legal sources within the official law. The 
concept of state law is not questioned and the sources of'extra-legality' are assumed as 
a more or less coherent set of norms Still, these efforts are quite remarkable within 
the positivist Peruvian legal academy.
From the sociology o f law the focus has been on the so called paralegality or 
extra-legality27. The interest is in the possibility of the social movements to create 
alternative forms to those of the official law that have failed in reflecting the interests 
of the disadvantaged groups in society. These phenomena are described by Tamayo
and Vasquez (1989:140) as: ‘the emergence of alternative practices linked to an idea
26 See for instance Vidal (1990), Trazegnies (1993), Revilla and Price (1992), Urteaga (1993), Urquieta
(1997) and Peña 1998
27Terms used as synonymous
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of popular justice generated by the oppressed'. These groups are also those with the 
least possibility to access to the official legal system.
Confronted by this situation the state has had an attitude of'laissez-faire' providing that
these ‘alternative practices’ do not threaten its interests. Santos (1994:29) evaluates
this indifference of the state as very convenient for its own purpose. He argues:
‘The existence of the legal plurality can be functional for some aspects 
of the development of the State, in fact it is a way to dispense the State 
of the functions that it was performing before or to maintain the 
populations quiet but excluded. The acknowledgement of parallel legal 
orders is progressive if they are part of a political configuration -as it 
would say in English, of empowerment-, of given power, because there 
are forms of legal plurality that in fact means disarm. Consequently, a 
progressive way is the one which contributes to arm the people, not in 
the sense of an army revolution- but of having more competence to 
reclaim more of their rights, of having a stronger cultural identity, more 
positive, that it does not allow them to think of themselves as inferior, 
as illegal, as marginal, and because of that place them in a situation of 
natural fatality as nothing could be done'.
The paralegality tolerated by the state also brings us to the problem of who has the 
power to decide when this ‘paralegality’ becomes 'illegality'. This depends on the 
political agenda of the state. In the 1960s, the famous ‘Huayanay case’ struck the 
consciousness of sensitive legal scholars. An isolated community of the highlands of 
Ayacucho was devastated by the constant incursion of rustlers who not only stole the 
animals of the community but also had murdered men and raped women. The leaders 
of the community went to the official authorities to intervene. The authorities did not 
intervene but received money from the rustlers to free them of prosecution. Indignant, 
the community captured the criminals and killed them. The police took prisoner the 
leaders of the community and sent them to court. They were found guilty of murder 
and sent to a prison in Lima. In prison they fell ill and died shortly afterwards. The 
attitude of the state was different during the internal conflict with the Maoist group
Shinning Path (the 1980s-early 1990s) when the state encouraged the formation of the 
peasant guards and enacted a special law which recognised the rights o f ‘self-defence’ 
against the subversives.
Additionally, the extra-legality is often encouraged by the same official representative 
to avoid performing their legal functions. It was very common in the Women’s 
police stations, as in other police stations, to listen to how the police men and women 
encouraged the complainants to retaliate against their husbands. While this could be 
common sense advice in such a situation nothing protected women from being 
prosecuted themselves in the case that they are the one who produced bodily harm or 
even killed their partners. In this situation they have to face a legal system that 
commonly fails to acknowledge the right of self-defence for women in 
gender-violence situations.
2.3 Women’s Law.-
The term ‘Women’s Law’ refers to a feminist approach in theory and research 
developed originally in Norway by Tove Stang Dahl who looked into ‘women’s actual 
life experiences and life situations’ in contrast with a law and a legal system which is 
fundamentally male2*. In the present work, the term ‘women’s law’ is used in a wider 
sense, including those studies which have as starting point women’s experience when 
dealing with the legal system, in societies marked by legal pluralism.
In these studies special attention is paid on how 'customary law' has been informed 
and reproduced until present. A historical review reveals that the so called 'customary 
laws' were negotiated between the colonial administration and the original authorities, 
as a way for the first one to control the population that the second ruled but also as a
28 Dahl (1986), also see Bentzon et al (1998)
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way for the original authorities to keep a level of control that by imposition of a 
colonial administration they were loosing2''. A general principle was established: 
colonists were ruled by their 'metropolitan laws' while the colonised could retain their 
own customary or personal laws unless they were 'repugnant to morality or public 
policy' (Stewart 1996:29-31). In this process a ‘permanent’ character was assigned to 
customary laws, in order to level them to the colonial system based on precedents 
where permanence and predictability were particularly important (Helium 1995:26). 
The reality is that customs are in permanent change and as Woodman (1997:195) 
states:
■Many customary laws are the product of the exercise of power by 
particular interest groups in the societies concerned -by the elderly, the 
priests, the members of a particular caste, the members of particular 
families, the men'.
This ‘permanent’ character and the belief in customary law as main expression of 
cultural (or national) identity has contributed to preserve certain power relations in 
society, such as those between men and women"1. Consequently, when a greater 
advance in women’s non discriminatory law is achieved at the level of the national 
laws these are 'overruled by discriminatory practices at the local level' (Helium 
1995:16). An important question is who 'has the discretionary power to choose the law 
which will govern a case’ (Woodman 1997:195). Ann Stewart (1996) analyses cases 
in which women unsuccessfully went to the courts basing their claims on the national 
law as being more beneficial to them and ended being accused of acting against their 
own culture for challenging ‘traditional’ practices as held by customary law. 29
29For instance Chanock (1982)
Baxi (1986) presents other cases in which ‘non-state legal systems’ aim to preserve ‘repressive’ and 
‘exploitative’ practises
58
However, it has also been suggested that very few aspects of women's life are 
developed through the courts. Feminist scholars such as Helium (1995:16), much 
inspired by Moore’s ideas, are particularly interested in the :'elaborate and complex 
rules which affect the position of women' and that emanated from 'other institutions 
than the state-courts such as the family, the church, the employer, the housing agency 
or the traditional healer'.
On the other hand, and what is particularly relevant about this approach for this work, 
is to consider how women take decisions based on the different aspects which inform 
their lives and configure their identities. As will be seen in this work, a beaten woman 
in the Andean communities, assesses her personal situation from her position as a 
runa, as a member of her community. Her problem is not a strictly individual 
problem which is the way that the legal system tackles these cases, but has different 
facets. In this sense, the judges of the peace are able to include the different elements 
which make up the context in which the conflict takes place.
Women’s law approach widens Santos perspectives when talking about ‘normative 
standards' as rules that are commonly known in a particular group. It calls our attention 
to who produces such norms and to whom they are applicable and if such normative 
standards, as a body of generalised rules, in fact exist at all. The answer is not always 
clear as will be explored later in this work.
Conclusions:
A literature review in the area of feminist approaches on domestic violence reveals 
that feminists have come to see and use the law as a means to improve women’s 
situation. While within academic reflections the failure of law to provide justice for 
women became evident, at the level of international activism there was a tendency to
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treat the law uncritically, relying on the law’s self-proclaimed qualities of objectivity 
and neutrality, in such a way, that feminists often have believed that just changing the 
contents of discriminatory laws with no discriminatory devices could effectively 
improve women’s status. In this process feminists also have failed to address the 
plurality of women’s social and cultural backgrounds.
The feminist aspiration for addressing domestic violence in the public agenda has 
caused them to overemphasise it as a crime, losing other political dimensions of the 
problem. With this perspective, domestic violence has easily been accommodated in 
conservative agendas that are open to opportunities to increase crime control whilst 
being resistant to other feminist demands considered indispensable for a real change of 
women’s status in society. All these shortcomings have been reinforced within the 
women’s human rights discourse which has homogenised domestic violence with other 
gender-based violence in an undifferentiated scenario of victims and perpetrators.
Contradicting some feminist ideas on law, the exploration of the nature of the post 
colonial countries reveals the authoritarian features of the state and the functionality 
that modem law has had in perpetuating asymmetrical relations and even being used in 
much repression and exploitation of indigenous populations. Because of this process, 
disadvantaged groups are resistant to seeing the law and the legal representative as 
protectors of fundamental rights but rather as infractors.
The reflection on legal pluralism has been useful to acknowledge the different 
engagement of people with law and the recognition of other ‘legal landscapes' (Santos 
1995) which differ from the rationality of modern law. There are other producers of 
normative standards, apart from the state and there are other bodies of justiciability 
apart form the official judicial system. These bodies are going to fulfil the function
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that these social groups do not recognise -or do not accept- from the state law. 
Women’s law approach however, warns us how women do not necessarily participate 
to create these ‘normative standards’ in their societies because they are subordinate to 
the structure of local power which creates them In that sense, women can be in 
permanent negotiation to achieve their right ends within such a structure and when 
necessary can even use the official law challenging more traditional rules.
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Santos (1995:125) writes: ‘a personal account of one’s own research is necessarily 
something of an autobiography and self-portrait’. Certainly, in my case, this statement 
is close to the truth. The reason is because I am a feminist lawyer and this thesis is 
permeated with self-criticism and a re-examining purpose, and maybe in the end with 
a reconciliatory tone motivated by my interviewees voices and experiences. In 1987, 
once graduated in law, I began to work in the largest feminist organisation in Peru, the 
self-denominated Women's Peruvian Centre ‘Flora Tristan’. I worked for two years in 
an interdisciplinary project called ‘Women’s Organisation, Violence and Legality’ and 
in 1989 I was made responsible for the legal office and other projects at the first 
women’s police station in Peru, a post that I left to start these PhD studies. 
Consequently, 1 explain events and arguments as first hand information (because I was 
there), although whenever possible I support my narrative with secondary sources. 
The subject of this thesis was not new for me and I have accumulated questions 
throughout all of these years.
In Peru it seems impossible to separate a feminist reflection from the situation of 
social differentiation that we face, however, this very often happens. The necessity to 
consolidate a claim for ‘all women’ in a public space where women are much
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overlooked makes us ignore how varied Peruvian women are. In 1988 when asking the 
women in shanty towns what they considered as violence, all sorts of answers came 
forward and these were much related to the situation of poverty in which they were 
living. Violence within the home barely appeared compared to the enormity of the 
unsatisfied basic needs and the daily struggle for survival. This is also violence, a 
tremendous violence. If poor urban women were part of the umbrella of ‘all women’, 
certainly women belonging to different ethnic groups and speaking different languages 
were even more ‘invisible’ in the feminist discourse. This work intends to bring the 
situation o f Quechua women of the South Andean region into the discussion on 
domestic violence.
The ‘omission’ of the Andean reality is not the only omission that exists in the 
literature on domestic violence in Peru. Systematic data even on urban realities is 
scant and normally very limited in its scope Two psychological studies on people’s 
experiences of poverty and violence were carried out in shanty towns in Lima but 
these did not address specifically domestic violence1. Two anthropological papers 
rethinking the issue of domestic violence within Andean culture were published by 
Harris (1994) and Harvey (1994). These reflections are based on the authors' 
fieldwork during the 1980s, which did not have as an objective the study of domestic 
violence. Specifically in law, studies of domestic violence have been almost 
non-existent. In the 1980s there was an institutional report of Tamayo, Loli, Vargas2 
on the experience of paralegality routes in a shanty town in a Limefian peripheral 
district (San Juan the Lurigancho). I have two empirical studies on domestic violence, 
Estremadoyro 1993 and Estremadoyro 1995. The first was based on our experience in
the legal advisory office in the first women’s police station of Peru. This work is still
1 Rodrigues Rabanal (1989) and Pimentel (1988)
2 Within Peruvian Women’s Centre 'Flora Tristan’.
quoted in the official reports. My data in 1995 has not been published although I have 
circulated some information whenever I have participated in seminars, conferences or 
workshops. In addition to these studies I have collected material on domestic violence 
in Andean communities since my first ‘formal’ contact with women from South 
Andean communities in 1986, when I was invited to a seminar on women’s rights by 
the Episcopal Social Action Commission. Throughout these years I have gathered 
data which has contributed to this thesis. Part of my data collected during 1995 has 
been fundamental in writing chapter five.
In spite of the fact that domestic violence in rural realities has not been the subject of 
any specific study, reference to episodes of domestic violence appears in many 
narratives writing by regional academics. From the compilation material of the 
anthropologists Valderrama and Escalante (1992) to other internal reports of local 
NGOs on their training work within Andean communities, it is possible to find 
evidence about episodes of domestic violence. These texts were very helpful 
because, as far as is possible, they let the reader enter into contact with the 
protagonists. 1 felt inspired by these narratives, and in my own work I tried to be as 
loyal as the interference of an academic work permits, to the words of my 
interviewees.
Consequently, the study of domestic violence in Andean communities from a 
socio-legal perspective was an unexplored subject until this work.
1. The research approach.-
The research has mainly been inspired by the ‘women’s law approach’, which looks 
into actual women's life and experience to interrogate the ‘law and society’ (Bentzon 
et al. 1998:91). In this work, Andean women’s perceptions of domestic violence are
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the main area of observation (I include men’s perception but in a more reduced 
scope), how they place domestic violence in their lives, how they value and in which 
forums they resolve these problems, paying particular attention to the judges of the 
peace because this is the space where Andean people ‘meet’ the legal system. At the 
same time, the thesis relates this reality with the feminist legal approaches that mainly 
used the official legal system for their strategical achievements. With that purpose, 
the methodology of the research (particularly that of the fieldwork): ‘maps individual 
interactions with various informal dispute resolution and mediation practices as well 
as collecting so called conventional legal data’ (Bentzon et al. 1998:93).
2. The research enquires.-
i) Gender and domestic violence. -
From a feminist perspective, marital violence is an expression of gender hierarchy. 
Anthropologists add that the problem is found world-wide although the incidence and 
severity vary (Brown 1992). These studies support feminist claims in the sense that 
there is less violence in societies where women perform a major ‘contribution to 
subsistence’, consequently increasing women's value in society. Andean studies, 
however, were concentrated on the Andean concept of ‘complementarity’ between 
couples (qharrwarmi or chachawarmi the Quechua and Aymara words) that:
appeared able to recall and explain the marked division of tasks 
between sexes in Andean communities; the strong ideology of the 
couple as elemental social units, insoluble, and relatively isolated 
within the extended family, the ayllu and the local community; and the 
execution of the economic strategies based in the tight co-ordination 
between husband and wife and the differentiated contribution of both 
spouses.’ (Anderson 1991:30)
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In the last decade there has been an effort to move forward from this approach when 
analysing gender in Andean culture looking at other sources of gender identities and 
hiearchisation. Studies such as those from Cadena (1991) and the compilation of 
Arnold (1997) are examples of this new trend Despite these efforts, domestic 
violence is still an unexplored subject. In understanding the relationship of gender and 
domestic violence in Andean groups this work has paid particular attention to 
Moore’s (1994:142) ideas:
‘...cultures do not have a single model of gender or a single gender 
system, but rather a multiplicity of discourses of gender which can vary 
both contextually and biographically. These different discourses on 
gender are frequently contradictory and conflicting’.
Overcoming the myth of a coherent set of gender sources, this work interrogates the 
contradiction and paradox of domestic violence with the important place that Andean 
women have in their societies and the Andean egalitarian practises.
u) Not one but many laws?
Within traditional law schools we learned that law is exclusively produced and 
managed by the state and its institutions. Law, as a discipline, is a closed corpus 
knowledge with self-regulating principles. This way of thinking about law masks the 
difficulties that people face when dealing with the legal system and the inappropriate 
nature of law as a means to achieve justice. It masks as well other social arenas that 
perform regulatory functions and particularly operate when certain conflicts arise. As 
was mentioned in chapter two, legal anthropology and sociology of law have been 
interested in this phenomena and have assigned the status of ‘law’ to other regulatory 
devices. But how much is it possible ‘to read law’ from other normative bodies? Is 
there in fact ‘law out of the state’, or are certain social norms ‘framed’ by the
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researchers to hold similar characteristic to those of the legal system? Santos (1995) 
proposed certain criteria to understand regulatory devices as ‘law out of the state’: 
normative standards and justiciability. This means, customs, values or any other 
social norm just handled within the learning and socialisation process are not law 
(despite the impact that this can have on women’s lives). Forums of intervention 
without the capacity of enforcing any kind of coercion of their agreements are not 
producing law.
This work provides evidence that there is not necessarily a dichotomy between state 
law and the ‘law out of the state' when investigating the role of the no letrado (rural) 
judge of the peace These judges are a state jurisdictional organ that due to a historical 
process hold a different rationality than the rest of the judicial pyramid. This is not a 
native or a ‘traditional’ institution. Their characteristics, however, make them closer 
to the Santos concept of ‘justiciable bodies’ than to state judicial officers. On the 
other hand, not necessarily communal-based societies such as Andean communities 
are producing ‘law’ or assuming their capacity to manage certain conflicts. 
Sometimes the fact of being small social groups results in them not looking with 
sympathy at any other commoner adjudicating in a conflict. In these cases, judges of 
the peace have been accommodated to perform a social function not fulfilled within 
Andean communities: the justice management. This is important when analysing the 
relationship of women with law because while in other societies informed with legal 
pluralism, women acting outside customary law risk losing social support In the case 
of Andean women to attend a judge of the peace is not perceived by the rest of the 
social group as an aggression, since it is an acceptable forum of intervention to 
‘amend’ what is disrupted.
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5.- It has the intention of ‘giving voice’.- This is the research does not pretend just to 
Team more' about Andean women but to incorporate their opinions in a discussion on 
domestic violence within a wider audience (Ragin 1994:43).
4. The fieldwork3.-
In this work, it is possible to contrast two contexts in which domestic violence is 
observed. The first one, within the urban settings (presented in chapter five) in which 
it was possible to gather conventional legal data: court cases, judicial and police 
records and a wide range of official regulations. Even though this data is approached 
from a non conventional legal perspective, the legal formal sources were available to 
be studied. The rural context presents a completely different geographical, cultural 
and economic reality. Formal legal sources are not produced and justice management, 
even though it is carried out through a judicial organ such as the judge of the peace, 
holds a different rationality. The following paragraphs explain the fieldwork 
performed in this setting. This data was gathered based on qualitative methods of 
research (individual interviews, group interviews, informal conversations, observation, 
participant research and scrutiny of judges’ records and questionnaires). The 
information was collected to understand the ways and reasoning of the people when 
facing domestic violence with particular reference to judges of Peace as the main 
forum to deal with these cases.
’ 1 have read on research methods since as far back as my first research experiences in Peru From the 
literature published in the UK I found very useful on a general understanding of the research process: 
Allen and Skinner (1991), Blaxter et al (1996), Burgess (1993) and Ragin (1994) Atkinson (1998) was 
published after my interviews but has confirmed my ideas on how to explore into people’s lives The 
book edited by Toft (1985) presents various studies approaching the subject o f domestic violence in 
Papua New Guinea I read it avidly when planning my fieldwork as well as Paliwala (1986)
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4.1 The setting.-
The research is based on eight months field work in the department of Cusco (January 
- August 1997), in the South Andean region of Peru. Previously I spent two months 
(November and December 1996) in arranging my visit and in co-ordination meetings 
with my sponsors in Lima, the Judiciary Academy4. They were interested in gathering 
up to date systematised data on judges of the peace and found the opportunity of my 
PhD fieldwork as the ideal occasion. The last systematised data within a judicial 
research context was carried out in the 1980s (Brandt 1990).
At almost 4,000 Mts. above sea level, Cusco is a well known place because it is the 
site of the main tourist attractions in the country. The city of Cusco, the capital of the 
department, is provided with a wider range of services and infrastructure than other 
South Andean areas, however, still it does not compare with the city of Lima, the 
capital of the country. The urban central area of the city of Cusco is quite small, the 
rest of the city, as the rest of the department, is basically rural. Most of the rural 
inhabitants in Cusco belong to the officially called 'peasant communities’. In the 
present work I prefer to use the terminology suggested by anthropologists like Ossio 
(1992, 1995) naming them as 'Andean communities’, stressing their ethnic dimension. 
The communities of Cusco are Quechua speakers as a first language and they 
self-denominate themselves as runukunu which refers to their particular category of 
'human’. Any women or men living in communities in the highlands of Peru are 
runakuna others living outside the communities are not. There is an extensive 
literature on the communities present and past lives and some of these are mentioned 
in chapter six.
An institution of the Judicial Power responsible for the training o f the judges
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Peru is politically divided into ‘departments’ which are divided into ‘provinces’. 
Provinces are divided into districts. The department of Cusco has 13 provinces5 6. My 
research has a representation of 7 of these provinces. 1 visited 27 judges of the peace. 
23 were district judges. 2 were judges in Andean communities. 1 was a judge in a 
parciahdcuf’ and another in a ‘rural town’. I chose these judges because they were 
located in ‘zone 1’, that is, in an area which it is possible to access within 10 hours 
journey by road7 8. This was in order to make the study feasible within an eight months 
period. In two of these provinces (Paucartambo and Quispicanchis) however, it was 
necessary to spend some days in the area since the buses did not make the journey 
every day.
Andean communities are dispersed through these districts but their numbers vary 
significantly from one place to another. In the district of Yucay (Prov*. Urubamba) 
there is just one Andean community but most districts have not less than 8 Andean 
communities in the area. Individual and group interviews were taken in communities 
within judges territorial jurisdiction. Maps and demographic information on the area 
of the fieldwork appear in the appendices 1 and 2.
4.2 The language.-
The language was my first difficulty in working in Andean communities. In Peru, 
Spanish is the official language. The 1993 National Census shows that 80.3% of the 
Peruvian population has as its mother tongue Spanish, while 16.5% have Quechua as 
their mother tongue and 3.0% learn Aymara or other native languages as first
5 See appendix 2
6 Parc ¡alidades have basically the same associative form as the Andean communities but without 
communal land
7 See appendix 2 e
8 Prov. is used as an abbreviation o f ‘province’ and Oisl as ‘district’
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language However, in the Andes where the indigenous population is concentrated, the 
rate of people declaring the Quechua as mother tongue are in the majority. In Cusco, 
63.7% of the population has as mother tongue Quechua and in other departments like 
Apurimac it reaches 77%9. I have a basic knowledge of Quechua that permits me to 
partially understand people’s conversations, however, I can not express myself in 
Quechua, just basic sentences. At present, the majority of runakuna have a good 
command of Spanish, however, women, because they are less involved with the ‘larger 
society’, have more difficulty in speaking Spanish fluently. They could understand but 
sometimes it was very difficult for them to hold a conversation in Spanish. Harvey’s 
( 1991a:227-30) study on language competence in the Andean region concluded that 
46% of women were Quechua monolingual or the use of Spanish was very limited 
contrasting with just 10% of men in the same situation.
61% of women that I interviewed understood my Spanish but preferred to use 
Quechua to answer me, either because they did not have a good command of the 
language or because they felt more comfortable expressing themselves in their mother 
tongue. I was assisted in these cases. My main assistant in the field was the 
anthropologist Clara Moscoso, ‘Clarita’, although on most of my visits to judges of the 
peace 1 was alone. When necessary, I was assisted in the translation by other people 
including some judges. Sometimes my interviewees switched into Spanish when they 
wanted to emphasise a particular idea and probably they thought Clarita was not 
translating the ideas as they wanted them to be expressed. Some women in the judges' 
place made an effort to switch into Spanish when they became aware of my presence. 
39% of my female interviewees did not have any problem in understanding my 
Spanish and to answer in a good or intermediate standard of language. Those were the
Source: 1993 National Census, Peruvian National Institute of Statistics (INEI)
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cases of women fully involved in the market economy or those who had spent part of 
their lives living in Lima.
All of the men that I interviewed used Spanish in our communication. I noticed, 
though that some of them were making significant efforts to talk in Spanish or hardly 
could understand me. This was the case for two judges of the peace. Some 
commoners started to talk in Quechua with Clarita but switched to a precarious 
Spanish when they noticed that I was a lawyer from Lima.
Gender differences in the use of language reveal the different arenas in which women 
and men develop their lives and the relationships that they establish through those 
spaces. Harvey (1991:230-1) noticed that men use a particular register of Spanish 
when they give a speech in public or formal settings. Sentences are longer, with plenty 
of adjectives and clichés. Women do not have the same command of the language and 
for this reason prefer not to talk publicly.
Judges of the peace are legally required to know the local language and women 
manipulate this situation. I noticed that even the more ‘mestizas’ (more urban 
acculturated) prefered to use Quechua. 1 use the term 'manipulate' because 
sympathetic judges tend to be more protective in front of monolinguals. It gives the 
impression of a greater vulnerability, Harvey (1991a:234) even called the Quechua: the 
'language of subordination'. For instance, during my observation in the Pisac judge’s 
office, I witnessed the case of a couple of craft makers, from the AC Maska, who 
were unable to finish certain products requested and paid for in advance by another 
couple who were sellers in the local market. Luzmila, the judge, asked the sellers, a 
married couple, to use Quechua in the conversation because the other party were 
reticent to switch into Spanish (Harvey 1987:115-6, mentioned a similar case in her
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work). In using Quechua the debtors were trying to suggest their lack of market skills 
in defining the terms of their commitment in the commercial transaction, and it 
worked.
In the elaboration of the present thesis, ‘language’, has also been an issue to consider. 
Part of my fieldwork data was gathered in Quechua and translated to Spanish, and 
other parts were originally in Spanish. Additionally, a significant amount of my 
secondary sources and official documents were in Spanish. I am exclusively 
responsible for the translation of all of this material into English.
4.3 Physical and relational access
The physical accessibility to some Andean communities and judges of the peace was 
the most challenging part of the work. As was mentioned, to make this study feasible 
in 8 months I chose the judges in zone 1. However, to reach the judges from the bus 
station could take me hours of walking through the mountains. The most difficult of 
all these experiences was the visit to the Colquepata judge who Clarita and I insisted 
on visiting from the town of Paucartambo. We approached by motorbike as far as ‘the 
bridge’, a trip of 20 minutes that a kindly school teacher provided for us. From then 
we started to ascend the steep mountain. We thought after this we would arrive in 
Colquepata It took us four hours to climb the mountain, it was already completely 
dark, we hardly could see where we were walking, we did not have appropriate 
footwear and not even a torch. After two hours of walking two young peasant men 
passed by and Clarita asked them to take our rucksacks as far as the town. They 
disappeared in front of us. After two hours we met them in town, they had been 
waiting for us for two hours in the freezing cold demonstrating a degree of honesty 
that I as an urban inhabitant would not have expected. The most absurd situation was
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the visit to the Maras Judge (Prov. Urubamba). Maras has a new road towards the 
centre of the town but there are hardly any people with a car and no public transport, 
consequently I had to walk one hour there. Most times my visits were rewarded by the 
warm welcome of the judges, in others like in the judge of Carhuayo after walking two 
hours I found that the judge was not there and I had to return.
Regarding the ‘relational’ access the presence of Clarita was fundamental when 
visiting Andean communities10. She was bom herself in a village in the South Andes 
of Apurimac, a neighbouring department to Cusco. Her mother tongue is Quechua. 
She was adopted by school teachers and was able to study anthropology in a public 
university in Cusco. Clarita has worked her whole life in the South highlands, knows 
very well most of the region of Cusco and has strong links with some communities 
which is particularly important since, based on their past negative experiences, Andean 
people are not necessarily very welcoming to outsiders. These are societies strongly 
based in ‘reciprocity’ and believe in spiritual categories of kinship. Clarita was 
involved in this kinship and being myself a lawyer I could assist people in different 
circumstances fulfilling the requirement of ‘reciprocity’. The judges were also 
invaluable in favouring my contact with the people attending their offices. However, I 
also managed to do some interviews with Andean people, particularly with women, 
without any special ‘presentation card’.
10 I had two initial levels of contacts in the area Firstly, with women linked to the Cusco office o f the 
Women’s National Network with whom I was familiar from my previous feminist work They introduced 
me to gender teams of NGOs working with Andean communities in the area o f my study Secondly, with 
the Cusco Superior Court which facilitated my relationships with the judges o f the peace At both levels I 
managed to extend my network of contacts and got to know Clarita
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4,4 Composition of the fieldwork database
As was mentioned, this fieldwork was based in qualitative methods of research. 
Complete details of all my interviewees and events of participant research are included 
in appendix 4. The photographic gallery is a sample of some special people and 
moments during the fieldwork.
4.4.1 The interviews.-
This was the main method of research. I used ‘semi-structured’ interviews in all cases 
(Blaxter et al. 1996:154). 1 had a set of main questions that covered the areas of
information that I wanted to gather but the context was more close to an open 
conversation. To get the most of what my interviewees were willing to say I did not 
set time limits for my interviews. I took notes of my interviews. I had a tape recorder 
that proved to be unsuccessful with my interviewees and with m yself. Andean 
people tend to speak in a very low voice and when they realised that I was going to use 
a tape recorder it was obvious how uncomfortable they felt. I also felt uncomfortable. 
From my years of contact with domestic violence cases 1 understand that it is 
necessary to create a certain ‘intimate’ atmosphere with the interviewee and certain 
gadgets just seem to me completely inappropriate. When the interviews were in 
Quechua 1 confirmed that Clarita understood what people were saying by coming back 
to certain points and confirming that my notes were according with my interviewees 
views. 1 always double checked my notes with Clarita when not in the presence of my 
interviewees.
"For the advantages and disadvantages o f the tape recorder see Baxter et al (1996:153-4)
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a. Interviews with Andean people.-
I have learnt from my past experience that to enquire into other’s people lives requires 
to care for them. It should not be done just for the sake of gathering information. To 
talk about violent events is moving for the interviewee and on the other hand I do not 
have ’neutral’ feelings about the subject12. With both women and men I expressed my 
sympathy and even my opinion when asked, switching into other areas if they felt sad 
about talking of certain issues.
a.l Individual interviews with women and men.-
The objectives were to enquire about their perception of domestic violence and also to 
know more in general about the communities lives and sources of gender 
differentiation. My questions were designed to answer the following issues: 1) Is 
there domestic violence in Andean Communities? 2) What are the characteristics of 
this violence? 3) Is there a violence exercised by husbands toward wives that is 
socially acceptable in Andean communities, that is, is domestic violence a component 
of gender hierarchy (to control women or in other words to make women ‘keep their 
place’ in society’)? 4) Is domestic violence a ground for complaint in any social 
forum: kin, communal bodies, judges of the peace? 5) What is the social sanction for 
domestic violence in Andean communities?
I held interviews with 31 women and 12 men from different Andean communities in 
the areas of the judges jurisdiction. The selection of my interviewees was defined by 
the feasibility of access to quality interviews, in the case of my study this meant 
meeting people able to talk to an outsider about their most personal problems such a
domestic violence. My contacts in the area facilitated these propitious meetings” .
l2See Yllo (1988:42).
13 See note 10
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The range of age was not predefined although I had a good balance of representation 
between generations. I was able to obtain more in-depth interviews than I originally 
envisaged in my fieldwork proposal. I value every one of my interviews as a 'life 
story’, that is, every person provided me with his/her unique personal perspective in 
the common context of the Andean community’s life. In this sense, my interviews 
were not designed to provide a statistical analysis but rather a trend of representative 
opinions of the runakuna of the area.
I was in some ways surprised when I asked women if there were problems of violence 
in their communities as they referred directly to their own experiences making the 
interview a very personal story. For their part, men refer to their personal stories 
through remembering the experience of their mothers. Both women and men were 
moved remembering events of violence during their childhood.
1 also held interviews within the judge’s offices but these were fewer (4 cases). In 
these spaces I preferred observation. My idea was precisely to talk with people who 
were not at the time of the interview involved in a moment of 'crisis’ to get a more 
balanced picture of peoples perception of violence in their communities.
a.2 Group lnterviews.-
1 had three group discussions, two with Mother’s clubs and one with the members of a 
Steering committee. I called them interviews because my intention was similar to that 
with my individual interviews14. In the case of the Mother’s club of AC15 of Q’enqo 
(Prov. Calca) I was introduced by an NGO working in the area. My experience with 
the Mother’s club of Taray (Prov. Calca) turned out to be particularly lively. I was
l4See Baxter et al (1996:154)
lsAC is used in this work as an abbreviation of 'Andean community’
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introduced by the judge of the place. With the Steering Committee of AC Carhuayo 
(Prov. Paucartambo) I focused on forums of intervention and their managerial role.
b) Judges interviews.-
I held interviews with 27 judges about their perception of domestic violence and their 
role, the nature of their intervention and general information about their jobs. I was 
very much welcomed by the judges because I attended two training courses organised 
by the Cusco Superior Court where I also applied questionnaires. I was introduced 
there as a representative of the Judiciary Academy. Consequently, most judges 
remembered me when I came back to visit them, inviting me to meals, and on one 
occasion Clarita and I were provided with accommodation by the judges of Carhuayo 
(Prov Paucartambo). Additionally they facilitated my work as much as they could. 
They did not hesitate to show me their records and let me stay to witness conciliatory 
meetings. On more than one occasion they also acted as my interpreter.
c) Interviews with governors and lieutenant governors.-
I interviewed 3 governors and 2 lieutenant governors. Governors are the 
representatives of the Internal Affairs Ministry in a district and lieutenant governors 
fulfil the same representation in front of their communities. I was interested in 
knowing whether they had a significant role in intervening in cases of domestic 
violence but I found that this was not the case.
d) Interviews with Cusco judicial members.-
I received much support from the Cusco Superior Court particularly from the president 
of the Court Dr. Abelardo Olivera who I also interviewed on his perception of the role 
of the justice of the Peace. I also interviewed the President of the Criminal Division of
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the Superior Court and one provincial criminal judge about processing domestic 
violence cases.
el Other interviews.-
I was interested in the perception of the situation of domestic violence in Andean 
communities by people involved with communities but who were not part of them. I 
found it particularly interesting to interview one woman mayor of a district (Taray, 
Prov. Calca) who is recognised for her great dedication to women’s organisations in 
the area. 1 also interviewed one chief nurse in a district health centre (Tinta, Prov. 
Canchis), and three members of gender training teams in NGOs.
4.4.2 Scrutiny of the judges of the Peace’s records.-
A very challenging research activity was to review judge’s records. Processes before 
judges are basically verbal. Conversations are mainly in Quechua. Quechua is the 
academic word for runasimi the language of the runukuna. Quechua has a written 
alphabet developed at academic level but very few people know how to write in 
Quechua including Clarita. When Andean people go to school they learn to read and 
write in Spanish and not in Quechua. Any written agreement then is in Spanish. 
When the parties want a written agreement it often occurs that the judge has to 
translate the agreement from Quechua to Spanish to give it a written form and then 
verbally translate it back to Quechua before the parties sign it.
I could scrutunise 21 records, in other cases judges did not keep records at all. 17 of 
these records had a consistent and systematic sequence. When records were available 
these consisted of notebooks with the conciliatory agreement. In other cases, 
complaints and agreements were mixed together in one book, just in a few cases there
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were separate books for each case. These records are taken in handwriting and I went 
through them with great difficulty. None of them had a ‘record entry’, a categorised 
source of reference as in other judicial offices. To know what the case was about it 
was necessary to go through the whole agreement. Just in one district, Pisac a tourist 
place, the town council had a photocopying machine, in the others I took notes by 
handwriting. I include one of these photocopies in the appendix 5.
4.4.3 Questionnaires:
I prepared a questionnaire formulating twenty questions to judges of Peace, eight were 
general questions and twelve questions focused on their role in intervening in domestic 
violence conflicts. 149 judges of the peace who attended two training courses 
organised by the Superior Court answered the questionnaires. One course was held in 
Cusco city and the other in Sicuani (Prov. Canchis) during February 1997. I include 
one of these questionnaires in the appendix 6.
4.4.4 Observation.-
The site of the judges was the source of invaluable information both on the diverse 
facets of Andean life and on their interaction with the legal system. It was of great 
interest to me to get to know this other judicial rationality. I especially took the 
opportunity to observe when scrutinising judge’s records because this activity could 
take me several hours and more than one visit. This became the perfect opportunity 
to observe the dynamics of conflict resolution without my presence being so intrusive, 
although, on more than one occasion, the same judge made me evident introducing me 
as a judiciary academy representative. Some judges even asked my opinion on the 
cases. To sum up eight months of observation at judges places was extensive. I was
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impressed by the number of women who attended the judge to make a complaint about 
different problems (and particularly of domestic violence) and by the dynamic of the 
conciliatory meeting. I took notes of my observations at the same moment and in some 
cases I asked the judges to give me extra details about the parties. Some of these 
experiences are related in chapters seven and eight.
During my trip I had also many opportunities for ‘casual’ observation of Andean 
community life, including witnessing two incidents of discussion between couples. I 
was also a guest at a wedding. Additionally, I participated in some festivities such as 
Cruz Velakuy, Carnival and Corpus Christi. It was very interesting to see how people 
interact in these celebrations.
4.4.5 Participant research.-
During my fieldwork in Cusco I was invited as a speaker at conferences or seminars, 
as co-ordinator of a workshop or advisor in the area of law and domestic violence. 
These events became an excellent source of information because of the composition of 
the participants, on some occasions Andean community members, on others members 
of NGOs working in the field and on others state representatives. The dynamic was 
very useful to gather information especially through the opinions and questions of the 
participants but also because of the opportunity to hold informal conversations with 
the participants during the intervals. Details of these events are in appendix 4.
Conclusions
The general objective of the research is to bring the perception of the Andean 
communities and their main forum of conflict resolution, the judges of the peace, into 
a wider reflection on domestic violence. Within that purpose the thesis starts by
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considering the nature of the law and the legal system to re-examine the legal 
strategies on domestic violence, reflecting in particular on the real benefit that women 
obtain from them. This analysis comprises looking into the legal data in a non 
conventional way. Having set the scene, the thesis moves forward toward the 
exploration into Andean life and people’s perception of domestic violence. A 
reflection on the forums of intervention takes us to a study of judges of the peace 
holding a rationality on conflict resolutions different from that of the state legal 
system. Once there, the level of satisfaction of women’s needs achieved in this forum 
is also evaluated.
A variety of qualitative methods of research have been used to cover the areas under 
exploration. If there is a major practical contribution of the research (apart from 
another possible contribution into the debate on law and domestic violence) it is to 
have collected data in an unexplored area of study such as domestic violence in the 
Andean region, and to have obtained up to date data on judges of the peace. Because 
it is not always possible to carry out research in the Andean region due to the great 
deal of time and effort that it demands, I hope that these finding can be useful to a
wider audience.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE POST COLON IAL LAW
Introduction.-
This chapter unveils the post colonial nature of state and the legal system in Peru to 
understand the different ways in which sectors of the population evaluate and engage 
with the legal system and other state representatives.
It begins by examining how the colonisation process reshaped social relationships and 
established new social categories in a hierarchical way. It also observes how the legal 
system was used to facilitate exploitation and to control the native population. An 
infrastructure, of judges and colonial officers was appointed with that purpose. The 
law was also used to shape other disadvantageous relationships like that between 
women and men.
After independence, the maintenance of the asymmetrical relationships was the basis 
on which the new nation was established. This chapter suggests how the abstract 
premises of modern state law have contributed to maintaining these inequalities at the 
same time as claiming equality between citizens. In current neo-liberal times it 
reflects on the contradictions between the liberalisation of the economy which 
negatively affect the majority of the population while at the same time significant 
legal reforms have been carried out acknowledging fundamental women’s rights.
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The objective of the chapter is to understand the creation of Andean communities and 
the process by which they came to live a peripheral existence in relation to the 
mainstream of Peruvian life developed on the coast. The observation of this process 
provides explanations of the different roles of the state, the law and their 
representatives in these two socio-greograhical spaces (coast and Andean highlands). 
The main proposition is that only by understanding this reality is it possible to have a 
realistic evaluation of emacipatory agendas, such as the eradication of domestic 
violence, which based their success exclusively in the law and the state agencies.
1. The colonial law.-
'Colonialism implies the rule of one people by another. The dominant 
image is that of a clash between two vastly different "worlds" - two 
peoples separated by history, language and culture. The result subjugates 
a colonised race or people, defined as degraded and inferior, to the 
economic, political, and cultural forces of an expansionist, imperial 
people. The legacy of this process is dramatic in Latin America, where 
there once flourished great indigenous civilisations -the highlands of 
southern Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia- today resides an 
impoverished and oppressed Indian peasantry. One people or "world" 
now defined as "nationals" of white or mixed racial ancestry, continues 
to rule another’ (Stem 1982:33).
Until 400 BC the human groups which populated the Andean region were isolated 
communal based societies of subsistence production. Between 400 and 200 BC was 
the age of ‘tributary state-based societies’, that is, self-subsistence gave way to a form 
of production for the generation of surplus to support the chiefs and religious elite. 
Those were centuries of great technological advances necessary to control the variable 
and discontinuous Andean landscape and to obtain resources from the coast to the 
jungle (Spalding 1974:92-102, Patterson 1991, Murra 1975).
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The Incas were the last of these tributary state-based societies which managed the 
unification of the different ethnic communities under their centralised rule. Their 
dominance in the region lasted for 100 years The Incas never destroyed but rather 
assimilated groups, religion, language and knowledge in their new state'
The basic social organisation before and during the Inca’s time was called ayllu. The 
word ayllu could allude to three different realities: I) an extended family, 2) a 
descended kinship of a community, 3) a political group or local ethnic group 
(Silverblatt 1990:160, Spalding 1974:193). The most important characteristic o f the 
ayllu was the linkage through common ancestry which conferred access to communal 
property and reciprocal labour assistance (Wightman 1990:76). These groups were 
lead by a kuraka (chief)- They were religious authorities and guardians of the social 
values and the last instance in solving conflicts between the community members. As 
compensation for their function kurakas had special access to communal goods and 
resources (Spalding 1974:36).
The conquest of Peru occurred in 15321 2. At the very beginning of the invasion the 
kurakas kept the communal control and their power increased because they were no 
longer dependant on the Inca central state, this permitted an advantageous alliance 
with the Spaniards. For the conquerors to grant kurakas traditional prominence over 
their territories was useful for their purpose of collection of tribute and access to 
native labour (Patterson 1991:3, Varon 1980:28-31).
The legal institution in which these early colonists sustained their power was called 
the encomienda. This was a typical medieval institution. The encomendero was
entitled to receive the economic rent of that place under his defence and protection.
1 On the Inca State see Patterson (1991)
2 The literature on the history of Peru is abundant, for a current analysis o f the process of conquest 
and colonisation see especially Pease (1994)
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(Wightman 1990:14) Encomienda was a private benefit and encomenderos were 
largely , 'uncontrolled' by the metropolis who received tribute from them and not direct 
from the native population (Commision 1989:72, Moore 1954:224). In 1542 the 
Crown decided to abolish this system to assure their own revenues. A wave of protest 
by the encomenderos triggered a civil war which lasted until 1554 (Moore 1954: 
244-8).
Diseases, exploitation and army conflicts brought about a demographic collapse. It is 
estimated that in 1520 the population of the territory which is now Peru was nine 
million inhabitants. Half a century later the native population had dropped to one 
million and reached six thousand by 1620. This means a decline of 93% of the 
population after one century of colonisation. On the coast the demographic collapse 
was total. The native population was swept away and replaced by Spanish colonisers 
and African slaves. (Comisión 1989:74)'
This event transformed radically the agrarian landscape because of the sharp reduction 
in the amount of land under cultivation (Assadourian 1987:23) As a consequence, 
between 1572 and 1576 there started a process of radical reordering of the forms of 
exploitation of the native labour under the command of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. 
The tribute was no longer paid in goods but in silver, consequently the native 
population was obliged to work under direct control of the Spaniards, in the towns, in 
the mining centres and in agrarian enterprises (Assadourian 1987:24).
In order ‘to facilitate their social control and manipulation by crown government' 
(Watters 1994:55), Viceroy Toledo established the reducciones (reductions) this
Based on Cook, D (1982) Demographic collapse Indian Peru. 1520-1620 Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
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consisted in forcing whole ethnic groups, living separated in many villages, to come 
together into two or three large towns. The aim was to force the Indian population to 
leave their dispersed dwellings and move into compact reducciones. The land that the 
Indians were leaving behind was declared 'vacant' and reallocated to the Spanish 
colonists in a system called 'composicion de tierras' (land composition, Assadourian 
1987:24)
Of all colonial institutions the Corregidores de Indios (Indian corregidors) had the 
greatest impact on the indigenous population. They were responsible for administering 
the native population by collecting taxes and overseeing the mita labour. Mita was 
the word that in ancestral times expressed the obligation of the ayllu members to 
cultivate the land of the Inca state. Spaniards established an 'extended' mita which 
included to work in mining centres creating the most important revenues for the 
Spanish Crown. Male Indians between the ages of eighteen and fifty were required to 
work two months of mita labour, followed by twelve months of rest. In reality the 
period of work was greater. The Indians detested services at households and obrajes 
(textiles workshops) but they despised and feared above all the mita of mines. This 
mita was probably the exploitative practice with the most deleterious effects over the 
indigenous population. The abusive conditions of work affected the health of the 
natives and was one of factors of demographic decline (Wightman 1990:49-50, 
Comision 1989:81-2).
1.1 In defence of themselves.-
The Viceroy Toledo's attempts to order the colonial system in the Viceroyalty of Peru 
involved a wide legal reform. The ordering of the colonial administration obliged the 
Crown to 'define legitimate and illegitimate rules of exploitation' (Stem 1982:115).
Toledo 'Ordenanzas' (Viceroy’s law) opened the formal possibility to native 
populations to use the legal system to restrict exploitation. In this sense, from 1570 
the figure of the 'Protector de Indios’ (Indian Protectors), as the formal ‘legal defenders 
of the native’ acquired relevance (Stem 1982:115).
There is a wide documentary data in the Peruvian regional archives of suits and 
complaints presented by kurakas in representation of their ayllus. There were two 
main areas of indigenous litigation: actions against the expropriation of their land and 
the reduction in mita quota and tribute. Unfortunately, Andean people managed to 
achieve few victories, particularly, when claiming back their land from the 
conquerors4.
1.2 The local justice:
Colonial procedures to establish ‘Indian towns’ or reducciones was copied from the 
Spanish towns5. The foundation of a reducción was left to a royal officer called 
visitador. This officer chose the location and traced the division of the urban area 
‘into streets and squares’, a place for the church and the cabildo and juzgado6 (Moore 
1954: 225-8)
The visitador also reallocated land for the native population, dividing communal areas 
and individual plots. The native population was entitled to retain their original land 
only if their plots were within a league of the reducción, otherwise they should sell or 
exchange their property.
The visitador o adelantado was also responsible for appointing the governing body or 
cabildo of the village. Moore (1954:229) comments:
4 See Stem (1984: 114-137)
5 On Spanish towns and their adaptation to the New World see Moore (1954)
6 The judge’s place
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‘The nature of government in the reductions was likewise prescribed. It 
was ordered that these functions should be shared by the cacique 
[kurakas], mayors, regidores, and alguaciles, so that the Indians might 
rule themselves in a manner approaching that of the Spaniards’
The alcaldes (mayors) were the judges of their towns having civil and criminal 
jurisdiction (Gonzales and Lozano 1983:572-3). They could intervene in petty crimes 
and, civilly, in cases involving small sums. Moore (1954:233) comments:
...Indian judges7 secured excellent results in the administration of law, 
citing as proof o f their ability the speedy settlement of many disputes, 
without recourse to tedious, sometimes costly, lawsuits, universally 
recognized as the course of the Spanish legal system. In upper Peru 
alone (...) over two thousand controversies among the natives were 
resolved in this expeditious, praiseworthy manner.'
These judges, however, were powerless when Spaniards were involved in disputes or 
criminal offences. They did not have the authority to intervene in these cases.
This judicial function of the alcaldes was recognised for first time at legislative level 
in the Constitution of Cadiz of 1812. This institution was the origin of the judges of 
the peace.
1.3 The birth of patriarchv.-
Colonialism meant the redefinition of the man-woman relationship shaped in the 
requirements and values of the coloniser and of the new society. (Mannareli 
1994:31-22). The ‘ethical’ justification for the conquest of the New World was 
provided by the Catholic Church which was responsible for rescuing the native 
population from their paganism and ruling over the instincts through the full 
observance of the Catholic doctrine (Manarelli 1994:20)* . However, a double standard
of morals occurred with a clear articulation between gender and ethnicity (Radcliffe
7 Moore ( 1954) uses the world judge’ and ‘mayor’ alternatively
* On the role of the Catholic Church in the conquest see Urbano ( 1999)
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1995). To the white women was assigned the responsibility of the ‘purity of blood’ 
while some Indian women became mistresses of Spaniards and priests, bearing 
illegitimate children* . These women lost their land and all link with their original 
communities. (Radcliffe 1995:194, Silverblatt 1990:87-98).
Additionally, in a patriarchal society where men were considered head of household 
and women legal minors under the male tutelage, ancestral women’s property and 
inheritance rights were undermined. Noble Inca women obliged to marry Spaniards 
were seriously affected as well as women forced to marry outside of their original 
ayllus due to the demographic collapse (Silverblatt 1990: 87-98).
1.3.1 Family and violence.-
The patriarchal Iberian family was strict in the criteria of command and obedience to 
the head of the family by the wife, children, servants and slaves. (Manarelli 
1994:32-3). The Catholic Church had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage since the 
eleventh century. Particularly important was the Concilio de Trento in the sixteenth 
century because it consolidated the sacrament of marriage and the exclusive 
competence of the Church (Tuchle 1966: 188, Alberigo 1993:286-90).
The Concilio de Trento did not especially mention the submission of women to men 
but this appeared in other documents which derived from it, such as the 'Roman 
Catechism under the Trento Council'. This was designed as a guide for the priests in 
the exercise of their functions, especially in parishes. Under the title: The principal 
husband's duties’ was stated:
'[the wife] is formed, not from the feet but from the side of the 
husband' she was not formed by the head in order to understand that 
she was not superior to husband but the contrary she is subject to him. 
[the husband| has also to govern with rectitude his home, correct the
9 See Manarelli (1994)
91
customs of everybody and make them fulfil their duties.’ (Catecismo, 
number 26).
In the title The duties of the wife' was written:
'Women be obedient to your husbands , living subjected to them, in the 
way Sara obeyed Abraham to whom she called his Lord. (...) Be happy 
in your home, ... never go out of the home without your husbands' 
permission. Additionally, and this is the basis of the conjugal union, 
you should always take into consideration that after God to nobody you 
should love and estimate more than your husband, to whom you should 
please and obey promptly in everything..." (Catecismo, number 27)
The right of correction granted to husbands included the use of physical violence. 
The limits of this right were 'blurred and uncertain’ and many women were subjected 
to much cruelty (Lavalle 1986:437). Despite the precariousness of their position in 
society, there was a legal way to be free of a cruel marriage: to apply to the 
Ecclesiastic tribunal (Tribunal Eclesiástico) for annulment or a ‘divorce’10.
Lavalle (1986) and Flores and Chocano (1984) researched in the Archbishop Archive 
of Lima to find these court files. One of the studies focused on the files from 
1650-1700 while the other looks at the period between 1760-1810.
Lavalle finds that the main cause of complaint in divorces and marriage annulments 
was violence. In the divorce cases this ground appeared in almost all of the cases 
initiated by women. In the case of nullity, violence was alleged to prove ‘will’s vice’, 
performed in order to oblige women to enter into marriage by the husband’s and/or 
bride's relatives. The cases brought by women were a ‘repetitive litany of a suffered 
humanity and violence’ (Lavalle 1986:436). The husband of Maria Collado (case 
D. 1657) broke her arm and in the case of Lucia Juares (D. 1667) the husband left her 
one-handed. Manarelli (1990:240-2) claims that men perceived women as a master to
10 It was the authorisation to live separate not the dissolution of the marriage
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a servant. In the same way that those men punished their slaves, they did the same to 
their wives. There are numerous testimonies of women who manifested being 
whipped frequently and being treated with such a 'cruelty’ as if they were slaves 
(Lavalle 1986:438). In the study o f Flores and Chocano which corresponds to a century 
later, the cruelty was the same. They ( 1984:411 ) opine about these processes:
the menace of violence was not enough ground for the prosecutor’s 
admission of the claim for divorce; it was also not enough that the 
woman proved to have been beaten once. For this 'justice' the violent 
acts should be repeated, only then was it considered enough evidence of 
hostility from husband against his wife'
The ethnic origin of the claimants represented the whole range of races, social levels
and occupations that were identified at colonial times in urban settings. There are no
similar studies referring to the Indian communities. Andean people rejected the
Catholic marriage, arguably, such legal processes were irrelevant. If any dispute arose
between partners probably this was resolved at local level: in front of alcaldes
(mayors) or kurakas. In this sense, Flores and Chocano (1984:403-4) suggest that in
colonial society violence was a 'component of daily life and normality', a violent social
order which necessarily had to affect the life of the native people. This is noticeable in
the following comment of the acculturated indigenous chronicler Huaman Poma de
Ayala" (1980,11:804) who in the sixteenth century expressed the deterioration of life
and interpersonal relationships in this way:
'At present, in this life, more Indian drunks exist than in the old times. 
In the epoch of the Incas there was no man and never existed such a 
man because of the good justice that existed. To those who drank or 
idly chatted or gossiped or blasphemed, or who slapped his wife in the 
face or who fought with anyone or with his wife the Inca brought 
him to justice. They killed the drunk. In that kingdom, to be a drunk 
had capital punishment. In this way there was never a drunk.' (My 
highlight)
i i Original manuscript transcribed by Pease (1980, II 804)
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2. The Post colonial law:
2.1 Peru between 1821 and the 1960s
Thumer (1997:3-5) states that Latin American republics were the result of a 'Creole 
nationalist project'. Landed colonial elite endeavoured to be free from a 'decadent 
metropolis' whose representatives 'monopolised political and economic privilege in the 
colonies and delayed the economic development of the country’.
Peru was declared an independent country in 1821 by the leader of the South 
American emancipation, Jose de San Martin His first decree abolished Indian tribute 
and all forms of personal service, especially the mita. His aim was to make the native 
population 'citizens’ of the new nation. All references to their ethnic origin (’Indians' or 
‘naturals’) were eroded from public declarations. Years later, in 1825, Simon Bolivar, 
the Venezuelan leader, was elected president of Peru. He dissolved the communities, 
with the aim 'to integrate the Indians into the nation'. His intentions were to 
redistribute their lands 'converting them into yeoman farmers' (Watters 1994:60). 
Contradictorily in 1826 the Congress re-established a tribute affecting the castas 
(indigenous, mestizos'2, and blacks) because it was considered an essential state 
revenue (Watters 1994: 60, Radcliffe 1995:197).
All of these legal measures coincided with the expansion of the larger estates 
(haciendas) which reached its peak around 1870. Copper and alpaca fibre became 
leading export products motivating the ambition for the acquisition of more Indian 
lands by private landowners while on the coast the rapid agricultural development 
around the production of cotton produced the necessity for cheap labour. In a system 
known as enganches, highland inhabitants were obliged to undertake extensive work
12 Mixed race people
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periods on coastal plantations. This was not the only forced labour modality imposed 
during this period. Road construction was also based on the exploitation of the 
Andean labour force (Watters 1994:61).
Despite the devastating effects of the 1879 war between Chile and Peru, the rest of this 
republican period was characterised by the massive foreign investment and 
government’s credits from the international financial market which determined the 
transformation of the coast by a ‘massive capitalist development’. In the highlands 
instead, the income per capita was far below the national average (Watters 1984:62-5).
As a consequence, since 1918, a series of Indian uprisings occurred with the objective 
of containing the expansion and exploitation by landowners. The government 
response to this situation was to develop an extensive programme of ‘Indian 
legislation’, in particular the Constitution of 1920 included article 58 which 
recognised the legal existence of Indian communities. Many other formal gestures 
were performed to calm the uprisings but landowners remained untouchable, having a 
sound influence on the government (Watters 1994:67).
1919 and the 1920s were also years of other political mobilisations (e g. the fight for 
the eight hours), and the consolidation o f new political forces, especially left wing 
parties. The political situation polarised with both extreme left-wing and even Fascist 
groups emerging. Violence escalated and the military intervened supported by the 
aristocratic sector in 'the interest of peace and stability'. This started the subsequent 
periods of military rule 1930-9, 1948-56, 1968-80 (Watters 1994:68-9).
The period of Manuel Odria (1948-56) was particularly tyrannical. He purged the 
unions, universities and armed force of all suspected subversives There was so much
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discontent that in 1956, Odria was forced to enfranchise women who represented more 
than double the size of the electorate.
In 1963 a more populist government headed by Fernando Belaunde represented the 
last, pre-Revolutionary attempt by a reformist administration. The oligarchy of the 
country was their great enemy. Incapable of dealing with the pressure of the powerful 
elites Belaunde disenchanted the majority of the population triggering a wave of 
protests. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Peru moved closer to a general social 
revolution. The failure to achieve widespread social reform made that prospect a real 
possibility. The coup d’etat o f 1968 erupted as an alternative to reform the country 
(Watters 1994:80).
2.1.1 The legal system
The advent of the Republic did not produce a radical change in Peruvian national life 
and colonial institutions remained a long time afterwards (Loli 1993:201-2). This was 
also reflected in the law. In the Provisional Statute of October 8th 1821, Jose de San 
Martin manifested that laws enforced by the previous government kept their force and 
effect when they were not in opposition to the independence of the country and the 
decrees enacted by the new government (Rodriguez 1993:195).
The liberal ideas of the French revolution arrived in South America more to give 
ethical support to the independence processes than to be constituted as a driving force 
for a societal change. Trazegnies (1980a) claimed that in Peru a kind of ‘traditional 
modernisation"3 process happened in which the dominant elite intended ‘to 
modernise’ the country. They incorporated some capitalist features without changing
the social stratification. The law supported by the doctrine ofjusnaturalismo'* in most 134
13 The author is inspired by Unger (1976:224-31)
14 Rationalist natural law’ (Santosl995:61)
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of the ninetieth century defined the individual liberties but based in the ‘tradition’, this 
is in the inherited historical values of privileges and social differentiation. All 
Peruvian jurists distanced themselves from the main liberal thinkers (e g. Hobbe, 
Locke, Rousseau). Toward the end of the ninetieth century positivism became 
fashionable amongst Peruvian philosophers. The debate reached the law too but in the 
process ethical claims were lost and the scientific rationality was reduced to the 
formalism of the written law.
Consequently, the law played the important role of giving coherence to the 
contradictory process of ‘traditional modernisation'. Trazegnies (1980a:54) describes 
these events as ‘social schizophrenia' in which the law took the task of conciliating:
the tradition with the novelty, the established privilege with the 
capitalist principles, the ideas of freedom and equality with the 
existence of a society with enormous social differences in which few 
persons were more free than the majority’.
The legislative task was focused on the elaboration of Constitutions, and no effort was 
given to a different codification until the second half of the nineteenth century 
(Trazegnies I980a:55). Throughout these Constitutions enacted during the nineteenth 
century, egalitarian principles were proclaimed but at the same time more power was 
granted to some social groups in demerit of others. Loli (1993:202-3) claims: 'Despite 
any logic, in our country has coexisted the equality as a right and the preservation of 
hierarchies as simultaneous objectives of the legal system'.
Reflecting these contradictions, the Catholic Church held its importance within the 
national life. The Political Constitutions from 1823 until 1839 consecrated the 
’transcendence and validity' of the Catholic religion in our country, ratifying it as the
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official religion of Peru (Rodriguez 1993:196-7). As a result, all the freedoms were 
promulgated except the religious freedom (Loli 1993:202).
The 1823 and 1826 Constitutions declared equality between citizens, although the 
requirements for accessing citizenship, such as to read and to write, to have property, 
being in the exercise of a profession, not to be subject to the status of servants or 
labourers15 excluded the majority of the population: 'to the poor, indigenous, blacks 
and women' (Loli 1993:204) The 1828 Constitution continued excluding black people 
and women although indigenous populations were recognised as ‘citizens’ but in a 
very reduced category. They did not have the right to vote in the political elections or 
to being elected. The exclusion of women from citizenship was made implicitly, 
through the requirements of the citizenship. However in 1856 the new Constitution 
overtly defined the citizens of the country as ‘male Peruvians' (art. 36). This exclusion 
of women lasted 100 years until the Law No. 12391 (September 1955) which 
recognised to women the exercise of their political rights (Loli 1993;203-8).
At judicial level, the Reales Audiencias, the highest justice management of the 
colonial state became the Alta Camara de Justicia and their same oidores remained in 
their posts and were renamed as ‘judges'. In 1823 a kind of criminal courts (Comision 
de la Acordada) were appointed to deal with crimes like murder, bodily harm and 
robbery These ‘courts' were made up of three ‘honourable men’ who were even able 
to apply capital punishment. It was not until 1823 that the new Constitution created 
the Supreme Court of Justice to represent the judicial system at the highest level and 
make it equal with the legislative and the executive powers.
This started to change in the second half o f the ninetieth century with the expansion of 
capitalism. Then the necessity to provide the country with a new legislation became
13 art 17, 1823 Constitution
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evident. In 1852, the first Peruvian Civil Code and the first Civil Prosecution Code 
were enacted. In 1853, the first Commercial Code. Additionally, in 1863 the first 
Criminal Code and the first Criminal Prosecution Code came into force. In 1855 was 
enacted a law to reform the judicial system, amongst other important legislative events 
(Trazegnies 1980b: 162). Until these years the management of justice was made up of 
a variety of modalities: cojudges, juries, judges of the peace. Press Courts, Public 
Order Courts, Tribunates de la Acordada in which non-lawyer magistrates had an 
important role This second half of the nineteenth century marked the transition from 
one way of judicial rationality based on 'common sense’ to the logic of modem law in 
which the state’s monopoly of justice management and the professionalisation of the 
judicial function were indispensable (Loli 1993:211).
Trazegnies (1980b: 162) claims that: 'this impressive framework of legislative 
production suggests the implementation of a formal juridical system based in the 
property assurance and in the freedom of contract' which were the requirement for the 
development of a modem capitalist society. The Codes were imported almost literally 
from European codes only adjusting them in some details to be applied in the Peruvian 
context.
However, the winds of modernisation just reached the appearance of the legal system 
and the judicial career reflected all the contradiction of these republican times. Until 
1870, the post of judges was permanent. To be ‘judge of law’ it was a requirement to 
be a lawyer with at least six years in the legal profession. The requirement to be 
member of the Advocate Association was to be ‘old Christian', this meant to be 
Spanish or a Spaniard’s son. In the provinces, judges were clearly associated to the 
landowners. Pasara (1982:53) writes:
99
'(...) the young lawyer who was appointed judge in the province 
belonged to a landowner family or was associated by marriage (...) the 
landowners had a place where the judicial appointment decisions were 
taken’ (...) ‘this mechanism excluded -through the system of periodical 
judicial ratification- anyone who dared to challenge the power of the 
‘lords’ through an adverse judicial resolution, and complementary, [the 
landowners] promoted to the yearned posts in Lima those who had 
proved to be ’reliable’ in the [landownersj’s eyes’.
Toward the end of the century, the aristocrats were easily accommodated in the
government, their moral claims to justify the independence process were dismissed.
Within the law, the ‘positivism’ facilitated, ‘to free the Law of any ethical claim which
became the government’s will expression’ (Trazegnies 1980a:53). The laws and the
legal forms were the means that the dominant elite used to satisfy their political and
economic ambitions. In the highlands of Peru, tiiulos supletorias (land property
documents) permitted the ‘expansion and consolidation of the traditional land state
through the dispossession of indigenous communities land', all done with much
complicity of the Judicial Power (Pasara 1982:55). Arguedas (quoted in Pasara
1982:55) described these events in this way:
‘...year by year, the principales were taking out papers, documents of 
all means, claiming that they were owners of this spring, of this 
echadero, of the best pastures (...). With the mistis, came the Court 
judge {jne: de Primera Inslancia], the sub-governor (sub-prefecto), the 
Provincial captain chief and some policemen’.
a> Judges of the Peace.-
The history of the judges of the peace, however, is different from the rest of the 
judicial pyramid. As was mentioned, mayors were responsible for local justice. After 
the independence, the Constitution of 1823 confirmed this position and established 
mayors were ’judges of peace’ of their population in cases of minor patrimonial civil 
problems and in minor criminal offences which demanded a ’moderate correction’.
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During the early republic, the mayors were elected by the 'Electoral School o f the 
Parish' that joined all the voters of the district or town. For being a voter and for being 
elected it was a requirement to be a citizen. As we know the status of citizen was 
granted to those men having a specific amount of properties and incomes. There is not 
any information available to understand how the institution of the ‘native judges’ (held 
by the native mayors) evolved after the independence and if it was affected by the 
requirement of the ‘citizenship’, since citizenship was not recognised to the native 
population until 1928.
The Constitution of 1826 removed from the mayor the function of justice management 
to appoint a specific officer: the judge of the Peace. It was also an obligation to 
appoint a judge in any small town of more than one hundred inhabitants. The 
Constitution of 1826 reinforced the conciliatory role of the judge of the Peace. 
Article 112 established: ‘there is a judge of the Peace for conciliation in every town’. 
Article 113 defined the conciliatory role stating: 'the ministry (the function) of 
conciliation is limited to listening to the petitions of the parlies, informing them about 
their rights and to procure between them a prudent accommodation'.
The Constitution of 1828 gave a different treatment to the Justice of the Peace 
considering it under the title of'Justice Administration', as other levels of the Judicial 
Power. This was repeated in the Constitutions of 1836 and 1839. However, for many 
years judges of the peace had an ambiguous position. It was part of the town councils 
but linked to the judicial system. In 1836, the town councils were dissolved and far 
from meaning the withdrawal of the judges of the peace, it permitted their independent 
survival supported by the judicial power. On the 29 November of 1839 a new 'Judges 
of the Peace regulations' was promulgated. It reinforced their conciliatory capacity
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and their intervention in the 'minor extent processes' Judges of the peace coexisted 
with other courts at the same level of legitimacy.
By 1855 the modem features of the justice management reached also the judges of the 
peace. They were incorporated to the lowest level of the judicial pyramid within the 
new hierarchical structure of the modem judicial system. Their candidates started to 
be appointed by the respective courts. However, the post of judges of the peace 
continued to be unpaid. This contrasts with the treatment of judges in higher levels 
who were paid (Loli 1997:87). In summary, status was removed from the justice of the 
Peace and economic recognition was not granted. On the other hand, the requirement 
of the judges to prove certain incomes was no longer demanded. The poverty of some 
zones and the necessity to appoint ‘local judges’ obliged that decision. For Loli 
(1997:88) this was the way in which the Justicia of the Peace became an institution 
with an unexpected characteristic: to support the needs of the poor people. The 
general consensus in the Judicial Power's representative was that the judges of the 
peace were a 'necessary evil', an institution to be maintained until a different one could 
be established. Their lack of knowledge of modem law was regarded as ignorance. 
Many manuals were written with the hope of providing them with, at least, a basic 
knowledge of legal ideas and rules.
In 1924, it was established by law (No. 4871) that the judicature of the Peace of Lima 
and other province's capitals, site of Superior Courts, were performed by lawyers 
(letrados). This law created a new institution, the justice of the Peace letrada. These 
judges were incorporated in a superior level to the non professional Justice of the 
Peace. A salary was awarded to them like any other level of the judicial system. They 
were appointed to deal with conflict of a higher patrimonial extent and became a
non-specialist court, this is, with the same function of a court but without division of 
the legal subject areas. This was a way to clear ordinary courts of an overburden of 
cases which retarded the administration of justice In the background to this situation 
was the development of an aggressive centralism around the capital. All the state 
incomes were directed toward Lima and Lima was the place of the main economic 
operations.
bf The criminal svstem.-
It is clear that the law during the colony and early Republic was instrumental to 
facilitate the exploitation and repression of the native population. During the 
government of president Leguia however attempts were made, at least on the surface, 
to bring some protection to the native population. For instance, the Constitution of 
1920 established the inviolability of the indigenous land and in 1921 the Directorate 
of Indigenous Affairs was created. Within this spirit, the 1924 Criminal code 
established some 'special considerations’ to the indigenous populations (Ballon 
1980:74). In the code was written:
'Article 44.- In criminal offences committed by savages, the judges take 
into account their special condition and they can substitute the penalty 
of penitencieria for prison [different categories of jails] by the 
collocation of the infractor in an agricultural criminal colony, for a non 
determinate time which should not exceed 20 years.
Having served two third of the time ....the offender can obtain his
conditional freedom if his assimilation to civilised life and his morality 
make him capable of behaving properly.
Article 45.- In criminal offences committed by semicivilised Indians or 
Indians degraded by servitude and alcoholism, the judges should take 
into account their mental development, their grade of culture and their 
customs and should prudentially repress them (....)
There were two clearly opposed categories: ‘the Western-civilised’ and the 
‘savage-semicivilised-indians’ and within the Indians a differentiation which rank for
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his grade of involvement with the ‘Western-civilised’: the savage was the man (or 
woman) without any relationship with civilisation (in the case of Peru this referred to 
the jungle native groups) and the semicivilised, those whose degree of contact with 
civilisation permitted the judges to measure his mental and cultural attitudes (referring 
particularly to the Andean communities) . The ‘civilised’ was, instead, a category 
without definition but also without controversy (Ballon 1980: 70-3,89). Article 44 
makes clear that what is sanctioned is not the crime but the fact of being savage’. In 
this case, the penalty given to a ‘civilised man’ for the same offence is not taken into 
account, the savage will be jailed until providing evidence of his ‘conversion’ to a 
‘civilised being’ and this can take as long as 20 years.
The Criminal Code of 1924 was in force until 1991. In the wide judicial decisions 
produced during these decades the concern of many judges, was not to identify the 
author and the criminal offence but rather to prove that the offender was 
‘semicivilised’ and not a ‘savage’ in this way they could reduce the penalty and even 
free them (Trazegnies 1993:20-5, Ballon 1980).
These articles have been replaced by article 15 of the current Criminal Code of 1991:
‘Who because his/her culture or customs committed a punishable act 
without understanding the criminal character of his/her act or behaved 
in accordance with that perception, should be exempted of 
responsibility. When for the same reason this possibility [of non 
understanding] has been reduced the penalty will be reduced’
The pejorative categories like ‘savage’ and ‘semicivilised’ have been removed, 
however, there subsisted the belief that the only valid behaviour is that which follows 
the state law. As Trazegnies (1993:23) claims: ‘The rights based in other cultures are 
not valid if they are opposed to the norms of the official law: simply they are not law’.
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b.l) Police role
During colonial times there were different bodies which assumed the police function 
but none of them were an organic body. In the cities there were alguaciles and 
celadores which fulfilled a very secondary role. The real responsibility for the 
'internal order’ lay with the army, especially in the case of indigenous revolts. There 
were also 'private organisations’ promoted by the 'lords’ of the region to repress 
native uprisings. During the republic period, these 'private organisations’ were 
institutionalised under the name of 'National Guards’ their functions remained the 
same. This experience was translated to the cities under the name of Urban Guards 
organised by the town councils. In Lima, particularly they had an important role in 
controlling workers strikes (Vegas 1990:25-6).
Through the peak of the capitalist development in the country the state apparatus 
significantly expanded. ‘Next to roads and trains, police stations, judge’s places 
\juzgados\ (...) were erected’ (Vegas 1990:27). In this context the 'modem Peruvian 
police’ was created and it was called: Civil Guard (Vegas 1990:27). There was also the 
intention to remove the control of the 'internal problems’ from the Army and entrust 
this function to a more ‘professional’ body. These ‘modem’ intentions collapsed when 
successive military governments erupted on the political scene of the country from the 
1930s. The police were conceived by the army as an auxiliary force. The legislative 
support was the 1933 Constitution that confirmed the Army as responsible for the 
preservation of 'public order’, the police were not even mentioned. The militarisation 
brought more authoritarian features to the police, the police station often performed as 
a juzgado where all kinds of controversies were decided under the discretion of the
police.
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2.2 Changing the country: Peru in the 1970s
Peruvian society was characterised by the exclusion of the majority of the population 
from the mainstream of political and economic spheres. The dominant elite continued 
in power with support from the military apparatus. The Army did not hesitate to 
overthrow democraticly elected government which pursued different policies to those 
of the oligarchy. However from the 1930s and under the influence of the socialist 
international movement, an organised social protest started to emerge (Vega 
1990:33-4).
During the 1960s, however, the military began to grow discontent with their traditional 
role as an ‘agent of the dominant class’ (Waters 1994:69). By the end of that decade 
there was a general consensus that the oligarchy was ‘preventing a more egalitarian 
society from emerging’ and that in the highlands the ‘archaic’ landowners were the 
main obstacle to economic development in the provinces. The military also concluded 
that no changes could be achieved democratically. (Watters 1994: 74).
In 1968 the military forces lead by General Juan Velazco overthrew the democratic 
president Fernando Belaunde and started a radical programme of social and economic 
changes. The government was primarily committed to an anti-oligarchic ideology and 
to an economic plan in which agriculture would finance industrial growth. 
Pre-capitalist forms of exploitation had to be eliminated; the coastal oligarchy had to 
be broken since they monopolised the country's wealth and were too much the 
accomplices of powerful foreign interests. It was thought that a reduction in the 
concentration of land held by landowners would lead to a redistribution of income that 
would expand the internal market, encourage industrialisation and reduce social
tensions (Watters 1994:165-7).
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The expropriation of the land aimed to eradicate landowners and all types of servile
relationship derived from them The state also established a tutelage over land
property (Watters 1994:167). There was no redistribution of land between the peasant
families. 'Co-operatives’ were established with the aim of production on a large scale.
The indigenous communities were re-baptised as ‘peasant communities’ stressing their
class component and dismissing their ethnic one. Andean people:
‘...encouraged to transform their traditional forms of economic 
organisation and internal government into entrepreneurial or 
co-operative forms, which could assist their economic and political 
integration into the nation.’ (Watters 1994:168)
The state kept control over land use, wages, marketing and investments in the 
co-operatives. By the end of 1978 practically all land states in Peru were expropriated 
and almost 50 per cent of the agricultural land was involved in the transfer (Watters 
1994:169). However, the bureaucracy behind the co-operatives denied the Andean 
communities a direct management of the land. Watters (1994: 172) states that 
ironically, although it was intended to destroy the landowner class, the reform 
worsened the concentration of territorial property by combining between 5 to 15 
former land estates in enormous co-operatives. Many of these far from being managed 
efficiently.
The peasants soon felt discouraged about the whole process and conflict arose between 
the co-operative bureaucracy and the Andean communities. Additionally, no 
independent peasant organisation was permitted. Watters (1994:173) concludes: ‘Even 
in the name of the Peruvian Revolution, the dominance of coastal mestizos would be
perpetuated over Indian peasants’.
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Finally, the objectives to increase the rate of economic growth and to improve the 
distribution of income were never achieved. Income distribution worsened in Peru 
during the period 1961-1975. Velasco was overthrown in 1975 by a coup of right wing 
officers, lead by General Francisco Morales. New fiscal policies of austerity were 
designed to assure the improvement in the national accounts while new loans were 
applied for from the IMF. A general social protest erupted again and the government 
answered by suspending the constitutional guaranties. Andean peasants tired of the 
bureaucracy running the cooperatives started a process of land invasions (toma Je 
tierras). In Cusco Department the main land invasion occurred during the years of 
1978 and 1979.
2.2.1 Women in the land reform.-
The ‘Land Reform’ in Peru was enforced by Decree No. 17716. One of the most 
disadvantageous aspects of this legislation was to define as ‘beneficiaries’ of the land 
reform the 'head of household'. In the Civil Code of 1936 ‘the head of the household’ 
referred exclusively to the husband. In the rural areas of Peru, and even though civil 
marriage was not an extended practise, male partners were understood as the 
representative of the 'family unit'. Exceptionally, single mothers with dependent 
children and widows were recognised too. As a consequence just 2% of women were 
‘officially’ members of the cooperatives (Huber 1990).
Peasant communities were obliged to assume a new organisation that meant the 
dispossession of women's traditional posts (Isbell 1978). Andean women were 
excluded both from the new co-operatives and from the communal management. 
Women’s agricultural chores, however remained the same. Women were also 
excluded from the official peasant organisation: the CNA, (Agricultural National
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Confederation). In 1972 they were enrolled in a parallel organisation -just for women- 
called ACOMUC (Association of Co-operation with Peasant Women) with the 
objective ‘to promote fundamental values of the peasant family’. The participation ‘in 
society’ of peasant women was understood in a traditional domestic role and mainly as 
child-carers (Radcliffe 1993:197:206).
When the process of land invasion started in the late 1970s, women had a leading role 
Armandina Quispe, leader of the toma Je tierras in the Anta Province, Cusco 
department told me16: ‘Women were the ones who took the land with the flags (the 
Peruvian national flags), men were hidden, women headed the action with their 
children’. This protagonistic role did not favour women to consolidate a political space 
within the peasant organisation. On the contrary Armandina explained: ‘when the 
problem of the land was resolved women were sent back home while men continued to 
be organised’.
2,3 Contemporary Peru. 1980s-1990s
Fernando Belaunde was elected president for his second administration in 1980 and he 
overtly declared his intention to reverse the legal reforms of the previous military 
regime. His government had to face two great problems: a very severe economic 
crisis in 198317 and the beginning of the armed operations of the Maoist group Shining 
Path in Ayacucho (South Andes). The immediate causes of the crisis were the 
deteriorating prices for Peru's exports in 1982, the enormous expenditure on the public 
works programme and the increase in the military budget. By 1983 the real gross 
domestic product (GDP) fell by 10.7 percent. ‘Comedores Populares’ (communal
16
17 I interviewed Armandina Quispe in Ocongate in July 1997.A detailed analysis o f the Peruvian economy of the last thirty years in Ugarteche (1998).
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kitchens) ‘became essential for the survival of people in the shanty towns’ (Watters 
1994:180-1).
Alan Garcia became president in 1985. His heterodox economic programme was 
qualified as 'suicidal'. Initially they achieved spectacular results through reactivating 
the economy, including a mass employment programme in the shanty towns. However, 
inflation reached about 110 percent in 1987 and galloped away in 1988. The real 
salaries fell to 80%, the contraction of the national income was 32%. There was a 
negative impact on the national saving, investment, export, indices of the stock market 
and more. The accumulated inflation led to a change of four successive money units 
(soles, intis, intis millon, nuevos soles). The ‘dirty war’ caused by the Shining Path 
cost the country 26 thousand lives. At the end of the 1980s a sense of collapse and 
chaos pervaded the Peruvian population (Ugarteche 1998:109-110)
Contradictory to its populist discourse during Garcia’s government the military 
incursion in the rural zones led to the greatest human rights violations. It is estimated 
that six hundred thousand Andean people fled to the cities for fear both of the Shining 
Path and of the Army incursion. A significant number of Andean communities and 
towns especially in the South Andean regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and 
Apurimac disappeared (Ugarteche 1998:155). Some areas were declared under 
military jurisdiction. In the city of Lima, the control of subversion was left to the 
police (Vegas 1990:37).
The performance of the police in these years contributed to an even greater 
deterioration of its image. In 1987, a survey revealed that 53.4% of the population 
considered the performance of the police ‘negative’, with 30.8% as ‘very negative’ 
(Vegas 1990:37). During Garcia’s government, night raids by the police were
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common in poor neighbourhoods or shanty towns. These raids involved breaking into 
houses under the excuse of persecution of subversives or ordinary criminals (Vegas 
1990:39).
The police had a well established record of abuse against 'individual liberty’. Out of 
all people arrested by the police just 1 in 19 had sufficient merit to be sent to the 
criminal system. Additionally, police arrested twice as many people for ‘minor 
offence’ charges than for criminal offences (dehtos). The worst of this situation was 
that in most of these detentions, incidents of torture were involved (Vegas 
1990:39-40).
Bribery was an endemic problem too. This situation worsened with the deterioration 
of the police salaries in the last two decades. However, the illegality of police 
intervention did not stop there. Regularly, the command of the police force had to 
expel a good number of its members because of their participation in criminal 
offences. The most common offences in which the police force were involved were: 
murder and bodily harm 52.92%, robbery 24.41%, abuse of authority (11.66%). In all 
of these offences, particularly in bodily harm the main motive was robbery or the 
obtaining of a material profit. 80% of these offences were committed in poor zones 
while just 20% were in middle and upper classes areas. (Vegas 1990:40-1)
2.4 Peru toward the new millennium.-
Alberto Fujimori became president of Peru in 1990. In an incredible event, a 
candidate who had appealed to his modest origins as a son of a Japanese migrant 
family and had used a populist discourse to win the majority vote, changed radically 
once elected, establishing an alliance with the right wing sectors. Significant was the 
meeting that the elected candidate had with the Army forces days before his formal
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appointment. The army was still the ‘supervisor’ of the democracy (Urgarteche 
1998:110).
Inflation had reached 400% when Fujimori assumed power, it was understood that the 
stabilisation programme should be applied immediately and it was 'designed and 
managed’ by the international officers (Ugarteche 1998:110-1). The adjustment 
programme was designed on the same pattern as for other Latin American countries: 
elimination of all subsides, reform of the tax system, liquidation of the majority of 
public enterprises, 'labour flexibilisation’18, change of the financial system with the 
elimination of the Central Bank as a regulatory agent of the interest and currency 
exchange rates (Ugarteche 1998:111). However, there was a main problem for the 
implementation of the programme: the government did not have a majority in the 
congress. The capture of the Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzman, in September 
1992 generated a massive support for Fujimori’s administration and he was able to 
close the Parliament without producing any social unrest. Ugarteche (1998:103) 
defines these events as an ‘antidemocratic coup functional to the neo-liberal economic 
reordering’.
In Peru the programme of stabilisation has basically achieved the results expected by 
the experts. The cost to the population, however, has been worse than in other Latin 
American countries because in Peru, the adjustment programme had to be applied 
without the money of the World Bank to relieve some of its effects. The money of the 
World Bank was used to pay the World Bank itself (Ugarteche 1998:108).
The neo-liberal programme has deepened the social differentiation of Peruvian 
society. It is estimated that just 10% of the Peruvian population has benefited from the
18 e g elimination of the protective labour laws, such as the so called ‘stability law’ and the ‘eight 
hours' maximum journey length
new economic management: those able to obtain credit, ‘employees, well educated 
(professional or entrepreneurs)'. The number of poor has increased from 49% in 1991 
to 52% in 1996 The social distances are even greater now between women. Despite 
that the national average women’s incomes have worsened a more detailed 
observation of the phenomena shows that women in city centres have slightly 
increased their incomes. There is an even more substantial improvement for women 
who belong to the top 10% of the population, well educated and well employed. A 
significant event is the increment in the families headed by women at the two 
extremes of the social pyramid. The upper social sector of women heads of home 
have increased from 19. 8% in 1985 to 24.7% in 1991, whilst in the poorest sector, 
there is an increment from 16.2% to 23.6%. This is explained by two different 
circumstances. The increment in the upper sector expresses a greater economic and 
social autonomy reached by women who are able to live independent from men. Just 
one fact, the rate of women professionals in the 1990s, has reached 69 women per 100 
men. In relation to the poorest sector, especially those in the South Andean highlands, 
the extreme poverty obliges men to migrate for more incomes. Some of these men 
never come back, leaving their original families behind (Ugarteche 1998:19,171-3).
The poorest zones of the country continue to be concentrated along the Andean 
mountains, (Huancavelica, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Puno and Cusco in the South Andes, 
Cajamarca, in the North Andes, Huanuco in the Central Andes, and Amazonas on the 
border between the south Andes and the Amazon jungle). Just one piece o f evidence 
of the dramatic effect of poverty in these areas, is the 67% of children suffering from
chronic malnutrition.
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2.4.1 The legal svstem.-
As happened in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 1990s has also been 
characterised by the impressive legislative production. The entire law framework of 
the country has been changed: in 1991 a new Criminal Code, in 1992 a new Procedure 
Code which includes some modification to the 1984 Civil Code, a new Judicial 
Organic Law has also been enacted amongst others events. This time the argument has 
been the necessity to adapt the country to our reinsertion in the international financial 
market. In 1993 a New Constitution defined the current features of the Peruvian state. 
In this time, of ‘contradictory impulses’, as Ferraro would say, other important laws 
have been passed such as the new Domestic Violence Laws.
The judicial system, with its endemic problems of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of 
political independence1'', has been the object of new attempts for its re-modernisation. 
New judicial divisions have been created such as the Family judges and prosecutors. 
The new procedural code has given a great importance to conciliation and arbitrage as 
ways of processing conflicts with particular reference to commerce and industry. The 
Judiciary Academy for the ‘professional’ training of the judges recovered a new 
importance. Two other institutions came into operation to give the Peruvian state 
more democratic features, such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the Defensoria del 
Pueblo (the Peruvian version of the Ombudsman). A little time later, when such 
institutions began to clash with the government the promises for a more democratic 
Peru came to an end. Of most significance has been the destitution of the members of 
the Constitutional Tribunal for rejecting the amendment to the constitution approved 
by the Congress which permitted the third re-election of President Fujimori (Ugarteche 
1998:168)
19 A detailed analysis o f the judicial system until the early 1980s in Pasara (1982)
On the other hand, after the end of the ‘dirty war’ against the Shining Path and since 
their more protagonist role in family violence, the police have slightly improved their 
image in the eyes of the population. Their low salaries and lack of resources, 
however, have not contributed to eliminate bribes, nor have the police removed their 
authoritarian behaviour.
2.4.2 Andean communities.-
It was not until the Constitution of 1920 that the indigenous communities were 
formally recognised and their communal land received legal tutelage from the state. 
To receive that special treatment (not always effective in practice), the community 
had to enter into a ‘legal existence' and be shaped in the requirement and definition 
created from ‘above’, that is, from the state. In this way, the ‘Indigenous 
Communities Statute’ of 1966 defined the community as: 'an association of individuals 
linked by tradition, practises and customs holding a communal possession of lands'. 
This statute created a special register in which the already existent communities 
formalised their situation.
In the 1987 ‘Peasant Communities General Law’ (No. 24656). The definition of 
Peasant communities is:
’[these] are organisations of public interest, with legal existence and 
juridical status, integrated by families which live in and control defined 
territories, linked by ancestral, social economic and cultural bonds, 
manifested through communal property of the land, communal work, 
mutual aid, democratic government and development of sectors 
activities. Their aims are orientated to the full development of their 
members and the country'
And in the 1984 Civil Code the Peasant and Native communities are defined as.
'...traditional and stable organisations of public interest, conformed by 
natural persons and with aims which are orientated to the best profit of
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their own patrimony for the general and equal benefit of the communal 
members and for promoting their full development', (article 134)
From 1960 an evolution of the elements that ‘make up’ a community is noticeable 
Since the ethnic category was eroded, the legal requirements of their existence 
increased, in order to justify that these associations deserve a special protection of the 
law.
After the 1984 Civil Code the legal treatment of the Andean communities did not 
experience a fundamental change until 1993. It is in our current Constitution o f 1993 
-under the Fujimori government- that Andean communities are the subject of a 
‘renewed’ legal treatment. There are two major new elements:
1) The ‘jurisdictional function’.- Since Peru entered into the ‘modernity’ during the 
ninetieth century, the Constitution has consecrated the exclusivity of the jurisdictional 
function to the Judicial System. This last constitution is not an exception. However, 
article 149 established:
'The authorities of the Native and Peasant Communities with the 
support of the Peasant Guards (Rondas Campesinas) could exercise the 
jurisdictional function within their territory and in conformity with the 
customary law, if this does not violate the fundamental rights o f the 
person. The law established the way of co-ordination of the especial 
jurisdiction with the Judges of Peace and other instances of the Judicial 
power'.
This norm could be explained in three elements: Firstly, the recognition of the 
important role that the indigenous organisations and particularly the peasant guards 
played in the control of subversive groups. The law then, gives them ‘autonomy’ to 
decide over certain cases, always in co-ordination with other authorities. Secondly, the 
Constitution recognises the cultural diversity of the country (art. 2-19), in accordance
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with other international documents signed by Peru, such as the Convenant 169 of the 
1LO. Thirdly, this is a provision emanating from a State in the process of 
'privatisation' promoting the ‘self-managing’ of fundamental social activities.
The legal scholars interested in legal pluralism in our country welcomed the norm. 
Immediately, the possible application of such a disposition was the subject of debates 
about the nature of this special jurisdiction and the degree of co-ordination with other 
levels of the judicial power20. Until today this article has not received further attention 
and no regulations have been designed to clarify its implications (Castillo 1997:144).
2) Land Tenure.-. In Chapter VI on 'Agrarian System and Native and Peasant 
Communities' the law still granted certain protection to the communities but also adds 
in article 89:
‘[the native and peasant communities] are autonomous in their 
organisation, communal work and in the use and free disposition of 
their land, and also in the economic and administrative function. 
Everything within the framework that the law establishes’. (My 
highlighting)
This is a radical change in the perspective on communal land. It means that the 
community may distribute or sell the land even to non members. This approach was 
confirmed two years later by the same government with the ‘Land Law’ (No. 26505, 
July 1995). Article 11 states:
'To sell, to mortgage, to rent or to exercise any other act over the 
communal land of the highlands (sierra) or jungle, it is necessary to 
have the agreement of the General Assembly...’
For Castillo (1997:145-6), this could mean the end of many communities. Aroca 
(1997:150) adds:
20 See Yrigoyen (1996) and Urquieta (1997)
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‘...the new Land Law...can lead toward the division and disappearance 
of the peasant and native communities of the country. ..., [the 
communities] expect in the future a major demographic explosion, a 
diminishing of their productive resources, an increase in their 
poverty...’
and probably the compelled necessity to sell to survive such a situation.
Urquieta (1997:138) claimed that the ‘Land Law’ redefined the ‘scenario’ of the 
communities. It consecrates 'entrepreneurial freedom’ and the ‘legal equality of the 
property’, contradicting basic principles of the communal land, in the end, contributing 
to the breakdown of the Andean communities.
2.4.3 Women’s rights.-
In 1955 women over 21 years old and married women over 18 years were enfranchised 
in Peru, provided that they knew how to read and write. This meant than a significant 
number of Peruvian women, mainly indigenous, were not enfranchised until the 1979 
Constitution which gave full political rights to the illiterate people. This Constitution 
also consecrated the legal equality between women and men (article 20, 2). However, 
married women had to wait for five more years, until the promulgation of the 1984 
Civil Code, to observe any substantial change in their legal status. This will be 
commented on in the following chapter.
One of the important events of the 1980s, was the signature of the UN Convention of 
the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against Women (approved by R.Leg 
23431 of 1982). However, it is during the government of President Fujimori that a 
significant number of legal reforms have been carried out to improve women’s legal
status. These can be summarised as follows:
1) In march 1991 a new criminal Code was enacted. Rape within marriage was 
recognised as a criminal offence.
2) In the 1992 Civil Procedure Code the ‘cruel maltreatment’ as ground for divorce 
was changed to physical and psychological violence.
3) The Constitution of 1993 recognises in article 2, 24-h, the right of a life free of 
violence including within the private sphere.
4) Two laws on domestic violence have been enacted addressing for first time the 
problem.
5) In March 1996 the Interamerican Convention to prevent, punish and eradicate 
violence against women, the ‘Convention of Belem do Para’, was signed by the 
government.
6) In October 1996 the ‘Ministry of the Promotion of the Women and Human
Development’ was created having the objectives of:
‘. .the formulation and development of programmes which promote the 
equality of opportunities for women and other sectors which require as 
a priority assistance towards human development’ (Dec. Leg. 866)
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Additionally, in the UN Fourth Conference of Women (September 1995) , President
Fujimori addressed the public in this way:
‘I am convinced that in Latin America and in other parts of the world 
the time has arrived to finish for ever with the old mental schemes 
which hinder the full development of women , and as a consequence 
the whole humanity (...)
The women of my country have been the engine of the solidarity and 
the fight for life when one of the most severe economic crises of the 
century hit Peru. They are, then, the true authors of the so called 
Peruvian economic miracle’, (quoted in Red: 1996)
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Nobody can deny that the issue of women’s rights was on the government agenda, but 
the good intentions can not be more contradictory when the economic reforms are 
mainly affecting the interest o f the majority of the population and particularly of the 
poorest women. Additionally, just one month before of the presidential discourse in 
Beijing, the ‘Law of the Promotion of Employment’ entered into force, derogating 
basic labour rights. Under the excuse of giving equal opportunities to women to 
compete in the labour market, the law derogated protection on the ground of 
motherhood like the 'breast feeding hour’ and the special compensation for dismissal 
in case of pregnancy. Also removed was the obligation of the employer to provide 
crèches. Women increased their weekly hours from 45 to 48, and also the age of 
retirement was increased for them.
On the other hand, in July 1996, President Fujimori addressed the nation in the 
following way:‘...the Peruvian women have to be owners of their destiny, and 
progressively being, agent of modernisation and of the productive revolution’(Red 
1996). The discourse was made on the occasion of announcing that surgical 
sterilisation for men and women was declared national health policy and was provided 
free by the National Health System. The announcement delighted the Peruvian 
feminists who were always campaigning for the free availability of all safe birth 
control methods. A little later, they regretted it. The focus for such an operation was 
the poor women in shanty towns and in the highlands. In 1997 alone 110 thousand 
women were sterilised. A good number of them were ‘threatened, forced or bribed in 
an attempt to meet state quotas for sterilisation’ (Lamb 1999:24) After international 
coverage and pressure, the government announced its regret for the incidents. The 
minister of Health was sacked. Free surgical sterilisation is still available. 
Demographic control is still on the political-economic agenda as a priority.
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Conclusions.-
The current features of the Peruvian state are strongly conditioned by its colonial past. 
The violent imposition of conquerors over the native population configured the 
establishment of an unequal relationship in which male, white, European colonists had 
to justify their supremacy over the native people. The main role of the law was to 
regulate the conditions of the exploitation. New social, economic and political rules 
were constructed. With the conquerors, came also the patriarchy which affect in a 
differential way women depending on their ethnic and social status.
The independent campaign during the ninetieth century was not based on a wide social 
movement. This was a liberal, Creole, aristocratic project which once in power 
assured through the support of the military, social, political and economic power for 
themselves with the exclusion of the social majorities. This situation lasted until the 
1960s, in which in the context of generalised social protests throughout the country, a 
sector of left wing Army officers took power and carried on radical social and 
economic reforms. This marked the end of the oligarchy. The agrarian reform defined 
the end of the land state but was a project designed and commanded ‘from above’, the 
peasant had a marginal capacity of decision about this event. The process negatively 
affected women's traditional position. The Andean communities were no longer 
‘ruled’ by landowners but by the bureaucracy of the co-operatives. However, despite 
the social reforms, the military rule confirmed an authoritarian characteristic of the
state and their institutions.
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Throughout these centuries a strong centralism was developed in Lima, the main site 
of the economic transactions. This has resulted in the state representatives holding 
different features depending their relationship with the different socio-geographic 
realities of the country. For instance, judges of the peace were differentiated between 
letrados and no letrados, reflecting the different treatment for capital and provinces, 
the urban and the rural settings Police and army have continued their repressive role 
against the Andean populations and other disadvantaged groups in society.
President Fujimori came into power in 1990 and assumed the task of stabilising the 
country’s economy and applying the structural adjustment programme under the 
international banks recommendations. The programme has succeeded in reaching 
their objective of stabilisation but at higher cost for the poorest sectors of society. As 
a consequence, the social distance between Peruvians has increased as well as the 
geographical difference, making the South Andes the poorest region of the country.
Contradictory, President Fujimori’s government has been receptive to the Peruvian 
feminist movement’s campaigns on women’s rights and great achievements in this 
area have been reached. However the events surrounding surgical sterilisation give 
evidence that it is not possible to take the state uncritically and that the formal 
achievement of rights does not guarantee fair treatment for women. The thousands of 
women sterilised in negative conditions reflected racism and lack of respect for the 
integrity of the poorest women and shows that in countries like Peru, the state and the 
law have differential ways in which it engages with the population and these 
‘differential ways’ are based in intertwining categories of class, ethnicity and gender.
This historical review raises questions about the validity of the Peruvian feminist 
proposals to challenge domestic violence which rely on state agencies such as the
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police and court judges. These legal representatives are negatively valued by Andean 
people and arguably they are not regarded as granters of a ‘life free of violence’. In 
this sense, the benefits reached for ‘all women’ are not necessarily beneficial for the 
‘indigenous women’.
The next chapter will consider in more detail the legal reforms relating to domestic 
violence.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEGAL REGULATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Introduction.-
The previous chapter reflected on the nature of the state and the legal system in Peru. 
It showed how colonisation established a new style of relationships between men and 
women and other hierarchical relationships such as those between colonisers and the 
native population. These conditions of subordination persisted and were reinforced in 
the following centuries. Also apparent was the unequal social and economic 
development between urban and rural areas and the development of a strong 
centralism around the capital of the country where social and economic resources were 
concentrated. As a consequence, people have come to see the law and the state in a 
different way depending on their social and geographical location. In this context, it 
showed how new women’s rights have been achieved as part of a process of 
improvement of the democratic features of the state, linked to the reinsertion of the 
country into the international financial market. Since the disadvantageous conditions 
in which people related to state agencies have not changed some of these proclaimed 
rights have had negative effects for women. Understanding this general context, we 
now focus on the legal provisions relating to domestic violence.
This chapter starts by analysing the historical role of the state law to regulate and 
enforce the rules of patriarchy in Peru. It explores the ways in which legal definitions
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of family relationships have contributed to reproduce a male system of power, 
confirming the husband as the highest authority in the family, with the attribution of a 
'right of correction’ in case of disobedience. These historical antecedents serve to 
understand the ambiguous legal treatment of domestic violence in Peru which went 
further after women achieved legal equality. The chapter discovers in the performance 
of judges, police, and legislators an ideology of implicit recognition of a legitimate 
violence exercised by men against women in relationships.
The main objective c f this chapter is a critical assessment of the legal treatment of 
domestic violence in Peru until the present. While chapter one presented the reasons 
and motivations of the Peruvian feminists to include domestic violence on the legal 
agenda of the country, this chapter focuses in the rationality of the law when dealing 
with domestic violence. This assessment, made through an analysis of the legislation 
and a review of police and court cases, will reveal the limits of the legal actions in 
cases of domestic violence. It will also reveal the deep urban nature both of the legal 
system and of the legal reforms. Particularly, the new legislation is developed over a 
notion of a legal structure non existent in rural areas. Consequently, the central 
proposition is that although the legal reforms can be considered a great achievement 
for the defence and enforcement of 'women’s rights’ from a feminist perspective, 
these achievements neither completely benefit urban women, because of the 
complexity of the legal procedures, nor take into account the reality of rural women in 
the country.
1. Regulating the patriarchy; Marital authority and the right of correction.-
The notion of marital authority was inherited from Roman law and German law and 
gave origin to the legal definition of family. In both systems, women and children
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were placed under the absolute dependency of the head of the family’. Despite the 
antiquity of these norms, until recently, the family was defined by the jurists as:'...the 
collective formed by people linked by blood kinship or in marital relationship subject 
to the same authority: the head of the family’ (Mazeud and Mazeud1976:p.l, vol.I, 
6-7,26)
The correlation to the marital authority was the duty of obedience by the woman, 
clearly established in the legal codes. For centuries, the non fulfilment by the woman 
to her duty of obedience was punished with physical violence by the husband, who 
exercised his right and duty 'o f correction’. The brothers Mazeud, French jurists 
(1976:p.I, volIV, 6-7) mention: ‘The person of the woman and her patrimony are 
under the husband’s authority, the woman should obey her husband who has over her 
a right of correction’.
In Peru, the 1836 Criminal Code 1 was the only piece of legislation which expressly 
mentioned the 'right of correction’. Article 447 sanctioned the husband who seriously 
injured his wife abusing this right. Legal doctrine and judicial decisions, however, 
made plenty of references to it. Additionally, the 'duty of obedience’ by the woman 
was enforced in the Peruvian legislation until the middle of the present century. This 
left open the possibility for the husband to legitimately compel his wife to accept his 
commands, even using physical punishment (Mazeud and Mazeud 1979:p.I, vol. IV, 
14).
1.1 The Civil Code of 1852
This piece of legislation ruled the country for 84 years, until the promulgation of the 
1936 Civil Code. Family regulations reflected mainly the precepts of the Canonic
Enforced for just two years
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Law, although some articles were literal translations of the French ' Napoleonic’ Code 
of 1804. Article 28, numeral I, established that married women were under the 
authority (potestad) of their husbands. This was understood as: '...the right and 
authority that the husband acquired over the woman and her patrimony from the day 
of the celebration of the marriage’. (Cornejo 1921:26). It was also recognised that 
within the marriage women lost the capacity of exercising by herself 'most of her 
civil rights'(Pacheco 1872:208)
In the Title VII Rights and Duties generated by marriage' was repeated article 213 of
the French Code: the husband should protect the woman and the woman obey her
husband' (article 175). Cornejo (1921:236) commented in relation to this:
‘Without expressed statement, in this article was consecrated the 
marital power and recognised the man as natural chief of the legitimate 
family, providing him with the moral, social and economic tutelage of 
his wife and children...’
This tutelage' included the use of the physical violence. However, this right was not 
unrestricted. Cornejo (1921:237-8) stated that ‘the exaggeration on the right of 
correction...and the implacable severity that uses insults instead of advice and 
persuasion' could give ground for the ‘divorce’. The ‘divorce’ was understood as the 
separation of the spouses (suspension of sexual cohabitation and common residence) 
without the dissolution of the marriage link (article 191). It could be obtained on the 
following grounds:
‘1) The woman's adultery, 2). The concubinage or public incontinence 
of the husband, 3). The sevicia or cruel treatment, 4) The attempt 
against the life of the other spouse, 5) The capital hate manifested in 
frequent severe fighting or for repeated serious moral offences, 6) The 
incorrigible vices o f games or drunkenness, dissipation or prodigality, 
7) The denial of the husband to provide maintenance to the woman, 8) 
The woman's denial, without severe or fair excuses to follow her 
husband, 9) To abandon the common residence or the obstinate denial
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to perform the conjugal duties, 10) The absence without fair ground for 
more than 5 years 11) The craziness or furore permanently which make 
dangerous the cohabitation 12) The chronic and contagious illness 13) 
The condemnation of any of the spouse to infamy punishment’. (Article 
192)
The numerals 3, 4, and 5 referred to a violence that could be considered as
illegitimate. There was not a uniform criteria to delimit it from the violence
legitimately performed by the husband. This was left to the judges every time that a
woman applied for divorce. The jurists discussion on the issue is very illustrative:
‘The facts should be valued by the material injury produced or by the 
moral severity depending on the circumstances. The flagellation, for 
instance, it does not have any possible excuse and would produce the 
divorce, even though the guilty husband protested the most deep 
affection and the most sincere regret in excuse or satisfaction of his 
inexcusable and brutal act.
Instead, the repeated fights and even the most severe insults 
sometimes are products of an exacerbate character, of an imperfect 
education or a scarce cultural environment, they do not always reveal 
the capital hate...
The serious moral offence...the maltreatment at physical level...should 
constitute a deep despise, a humiliating outrage something serious that 
gives fundamental reason for the separation, making the common life 
distressful, dangerous or impossible...’ (Cornejo 1921:288-9)
Next to all of these limitations there was the fact that if a woman applied for divorce 
the judge or the husband decided over her place of residence. A woman could never 
by herself choose her place of residence if she did so, the husband could ask the 
judges to place her under ‘security’ and he could refuse to give her maintenance 
(article 203 to 206). Consequently, the divorce could worsen the already deprived 
status of a woman beaten ‘in excess’ by her husband. It is not difficult to imagine 
this situation discouraged many women from applying for divorce.
128
1.2 The Civil Code of 1936.-
This code was enforced until 1984 and established a lessened' women's 
subordination to their husbands (Cornejo Chavez 1986:VI, 46). The code did not 
expressly mention the duty o f female obedience but this was implicit in the regulation 
of the spouse relations. A woman had the obligation to accept the marital authority 
except in the cases when she could prove ‘abuse of the Law’ (articles 161 and 163). 
It was a woman's obligation, as well, to help her husband and be personally' 
responsible of the housework. If she wanted to work outside the home she only could 
do it with the express or tacit’ consent of her husband (art. 173). She had the 
obligation to follow him where he fixed his residence. Additionally, she should add 
her husband's surname to hers (article 171).
This Civil Code recognised divorce with dissolution of the marriage link (article
247j2. The sevicia and the severe moral offence were recognised as grounds for
divorce in numerals: 2 and 4. Both situations involved incidents of physical violence
that, as the inheritance of previous legislation, should be qualified and graded to find
enough merit for the divorce. Cornejo Chavez ( 1986: V.1.327) defined the sevicia as
physical maltreatment which produced physical injury:
It is not very important the intention to morally hurt but rather to 
produce a physical suffering. Consequently, it is not possible to classify 
as sevicia maltreatment, insults or disputes if not involving a material 
outrage'
This criteria was followed by judges and prosecutors. In a 1961 divorce case the 
Supreme Prosecutor (Exp. 610/61, Lima) stated: ‘...the sevicia has not been proved
2 This code incorporated the contents o f the 1930 ‘Divorce I .aw’ which produced a great 
controversy
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because the ground should be expressed in physical maltreatment and should be 
valued by the material injury produced’.
Another element considered was the 'intention' to produce suffering. A Supreme
Prosecutor (Exp. No. 51/53, Piura) opined in 1953:
‘...the ground of sevicia consisted of degrading acts, performed with the 
intention of producing a suffering and that it reveals a brutal inclination 
that surpasses the limits of common respect implicit in common life’
However, the most difficult element to prove was ‘repetition’ because the probatory 
means were much restricted. It was claimed that just a continued sequence of physical 
maltreatment justified that the common life became unbearable. The Supreme 
Prosecutor stated in this case ‘The sporadic fights can not be regarded as sevicia and 
cruel maltreatment... a singular act without consequences can not be evidence of 
sevicia...' (Exp. 392/55). This supreme judgement also illustrates this unfair situation. 
(Exp. 2187/78, Lima):
‘...that the evidence acted such as the certified copies of page 39, the 
police report of pages 28 and 29 and the witnesses declarations of pages 
18 and 19 are insufficient to prove the divorce’s ground; the police 
complaints of page 28 and 29 were not subject to investigation or legal 
processing and they lack of probatory evidence; the witnesses’ 
declarations of pages 18 and 19 did not prove to have seen the 
respondent committing acts of sevicia against his wife, they 
[declarations] just referred to the physical injuries that the spouse 
suffered; the certified copies of page 39 referred to a police report on 
/alias [minor offences] against body and health [minor bodily harm] in 
front of the Judge of the Peace in which it claims the existence of the 
physical injuries on the plaintiff, is lacking the legal medical 
certificate, additionally the judicial procedure was stopped and the 
objective of the action was not finished because the complainant 
desisted in the action. It declares: HABER NULIDAD (the nullity) of 
the Superior Court decision (sentencia de vista) of page 88 that 
confirmed the judgement of the judge of the first court (primera 
instancia) on March 1st., which declared fundada (sustained) the plaint 
of divorce on the ground of sevicia
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In relation to the other ground, ‘serious moral offence’, it referred to the ‘outrage to
the feelings or to the dignity of one of the spouses’ (Cornejo 1986:V.I, 328). Events of
physical violence have been used regularly by plaintiffs' lawyers as additional
evidence to make up the ‘serious moral offence’ ground. The judges and prosecutors
have normally accepted such argumentation. The opinion of the Supreme Prosecutor
in a case of 1958 (Exp. 221/58, Lima) was as follows:
‘...the constant insults against the wife, whom the husband classified as 
crazy, idiot and a slap committed in public, this in a social gathering, 
constitutes the ground of serious moral offence regulated by law’.
In fact, the slap was not regarded as deviant itself but the fact of being committed ‘in 
public’ contributed to the claim o f ‘serious moral offences’.
1.3. Domestic violence and criminal laws.-
At criminal level the situation was quite obscure. The 1863 Criminal Code, article 
245 established:
‘The physical injuries [lesiones] inflicted between spouses are not 
prosecuted without the accusation of the other spouse [the victim]; with 
the exception of the articles 246, 248 and 249 [removing eyes, 
castration, mutilation, or serious damaging of any vital function]’
However, the husband was exempted from criminal prosecution if he caused physical 
injuries to his wife while she was committing adultery and the physical injury did not 
produce more than 30 days of incapacity to the woman. If it produced more than 30 
days of incapacity, the woman could accuse him. (art. 256).
The 1863 Criminal Procedures Code, however, contradicted the Criminal Code, 
establishing in its article 20: 'Accusation is not possible between: ....[numeral 3] The 
spouses with the exception of adultery’. This created an uncertain situation in which
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it was not clear if a woman could accuse her husband at all. It is possible to assume 
that many judge’s applied the most beneficial interpretation for the accused 
(following the criminal principle) and did not accept such an accusation. In any case, 
this ambiguous situation remained until 1920 when a new Criminal Procedure Law 
clarified the issue in the terms of the article 254 of the former Criminal Code.
2. Achieving formal equalitv.-
2.1 The Constitution of 1979.-
Legal equality for women was reached finally with the promulgation of the 1979 
Constitution. Article 2, subsection 2, states:
‘Every person has the right to:
2.- Equality in front of the law, without discrimination for causes of 
sex, race, religion, opinion or language.
Man and woman have the same opportunities and responsibilities. The 
law recognised to women not lesser rights than those of men.’
In the last paragraph our legislators recognised that women should be entitled to 
‘more rights' in some cases, particularly relating to motherhood. This disposition 
was used by the feminist groups to advocate for positive discrimination. 
Unintentionally, the Peruvian constitutional article was very advanced in relation to 
other statements about equality. It established that ‘equality’ does not mean that 
men’s rights are the measure for women’s rights. Unfortunately this statement was 
dismissed by the 1993 Constitution which enacted the article 2 is these terms:
‘Every person has the right to:
2.- Equality in front of the law. Nobody can be discriminated against 
by cause of origin, race, sex language, religion, opinion, economic 
condition or any other cause.’
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2.2 The Civil Code of 1984.-
This civil code, enforced at present, had as its main task to adapt the principle of legal 
equality to family regulations, abolishing the rules of ‘marital authority’. In the 
‘General Statements’ of the ‘Family Book’ article 234, 1st paragraph is written: ‘The 
husband and the wife have the same authority, considerations, rights, duties and 
responsibilities at home’. However, the application of the constitutional principle 
consisted basically in replacing the words ‘husband’ or ‘wife’ by ‘spouse’ or 
‘spouses’ depending on the case. This is especially evident in articles 287, 288 (on 
common duties of the spouses) and article 160 (obligation of cohabitation) of the 
1984 Civil Code which were literally copied from articles 158, 159 and 289 of the 
1936 Civil Code. Article 290 is a modification of the previous article 161. This 
article regulates the duty and right of both spouses to participate in the government of 
the home and cooperate in its good development. It adds the shared responsibility for 
fixing and moving the marital residence and to decide about the household economy. 
This article replaces the word ‘husband’ by ‘both spouses’.
In article 291 our legislators attempted to protect the rights of women who remain at 
home performing as housewives but under the formula: ‘if one of the spouses’. This 
is explained by the same legislator, the late Dr. Cornejo Chavez-' (1986:V.I, 263-6) 
who commented that the code had acknowledged the reality of women as those 
mainly responsible for the housework and child rearing. This article has an evident 
origin in article 164 of the former civil code which ruled the husbands ' obligation of 
providing maintenance to the family and the second part of article 161 which 
consecrated women's obligation of attending the household ‘personally’.
1 Dr Cornejo Chavez, a conservative Catholic and a famous jurist, was the MP responsible for the 
Commission of Reform of the Book of Family of the New Civil Code
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Article 293 establishes the possibility of every spouse' to perform any job with the 
express or tacit consent of the other spouse, repeating the statement of the former 
article 173 which referred to the possibility of women's work with husband's consent. 
In the chapter about Sociedad de Ciananciales (Common Patrimony) article 306 is a 
new version of the former article 182 which referred to the husbands administration 
over women's own patrimony. In this new article the word women' has been 
replaced by spouses' again and the word husband' by the other spouse'.
Finally the first part of article 24 of the current Civil Code in the title 'Name' 
reproduces the text of the former article 171 which consecrated the woman's 
obligation to add her husband's name to hers. In this new article the imperative add' 
has been changed by the phrase ' has the right to add'. Dr. Cornejo argued that to add 
the husband’s surname is a ‘privilege’ that women should not lose.
Through the provisions of the ‘Family Book’ we are informed with a concept of 
family structures that although applying the constitutional principle remain the same. 
Dr. Cornejo Chavez (1986:V.I., 253-4) strongly believed that the law exercised a 
normative vigilant action of the personal relationships between spouses', but that this 
sphere was better ruled by the domestic authority'. Consequently, there is a strong 
belief in the family as a structure in which somebody has to command and others 
obey. The new egalitarian notion has just removed from the surface a hierarchical 
notion of family relationships.
2.2.1 Domestic violence in processes of divorce.-
The grounds for separation and divorce are established in article 333. The grounds 
remain almost the same as in the former 1936 code. There are just two new features: 
the addition of the ground of homosexuality after marriage' and the modification of
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the ground of'malicious abandonment' by unjustified abandonment'. This was an 
important change since the ‘weight’ of the evidence moved from the plaintiff, this is 
from the abandoned spouse who had to prove that the other left the home 
‘maliciously’, to the respondent, who had to ‘justify’ his abandonment. The majority 
of plaintiffs in these cases are women.
The grounds of sevicia and severe moral offences did not undergo any modification
and the judicial criteria also remained the same. In the Supreme Judgement of 24
April 1991 (Exp. 1704-90, Arequipa), the prosecutor opined:
‘The doctrine sustained by our jurisprudence has consecrated that the 
sevicia is configured by the continuous maltreatment which produces a 
suffering in the spouse and makes unbearable the common life breaking 
the limits of good treatment and mutual respect. It should be merited 
by the judge in accordance with the circumstance and personal 
condition of the spouses...’
The probatory requirements of the ground were based on the gathering of material 
evidence which proved the physical and reiterative maltreatment. In this Supreme 
Judgement (Exp. 1794-90) appears:
‘...the sevicia ground is proved by the copies of the police files of the 
maltreatment produced by the offender in grievance of the plaintiff, of 
pages 19 and 22, corroborated by legal medical certificate of pages 23 
and 26; personal guarantees application followed by the plaintiff, of 
pages 27, and the witnesses declarations of pages.40, 42 and 51; the 
criminal case offaltas against ‘body and health’ of pages. 59/83 and its 
respective sentence of page 102.’
Instead, a Prosecutor opined in a similar case on 16 August 1991 (Exp. 1434-88, 
Lima) the following:
‘...the ground of sevicia claimed by the plaintiff, sustained in the 
judgement at first and second instance is not accredited; the husband's 
aggression to produce injuries in his wife, as medical certification of 
page 69 resulted in no days of medical assistance for 4 days of work
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incapacity, date of 4th July of 1986, is not enough merit to constitute 
degrading actions constitutive of the ground of sevicia.’
As happened with the ground of sevicia, the 'severe moral injury' continued to be 
enforced under the same criteria until the modification by the 1992 Civil Procedure 
Code,
3. State recognition of domestic violence: the criminal jurisdiction,-
3.1 The legal background.-
The confusion created by the 1863 Criminal Procedure code was amended by the 
1920 Criminal Procedure Code. Consequently, a husband could be charged for 
causing physical injuries to his wife (article 254, 1893 Criminal Code). In the 1924 
Criminal Code (enforced until 1991) there was also no restriction to the accusation 
between spouses, and if a woman was beaten she could accuse her husband. This was 
possible depending on the results of the injuries caused by him. The evidence should 
always be physical and should fulfil the requirement of the forensic examination.
There were two procedures available for a woman, as for anyone who suffered 
physical aggressions: a) Delitos (serious criminal offences) against the life, body and 
health procedure and b) Fallas (minor offences) against the life, body and health. In 
practical terms the difference between these criminal situations was the gravity of the 
injuries produced. The forensic office was responsible for defining the gravity of the 
physical injuries. An injury qualified as requiring more than 10 days of resting 
constituted a delito, otherwise it was considered a /alia. Criminal judges were 
responsible for the prosecution of the delilos while judges of the peace had 
jurisdiction on/alias.
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The ideology behind these processes working against women’s interests could be 
summarised as follows4: Firstly, the police underestimated the complaints of women 
and often dissuaded them from presenting a complaint. Secondly, the doctors in the 
forensic office tended to understate women’s injuries. If the injury to a woman 
required ten days of resting (or even more) they reduced it below this limit. In this 
way, the case followed the procedure of ‘faults’. The doctors were very aware of 
their important position and that their criteria was definitive. They refused to 
‘aggravate’ cases that happened ‘in the family’. Finally, the same attitude was found 
in the judges who tried not to open the cases even for investigation or, if they did, 
tried to use the ‘conciliation’, non existent in criminal procedure, to finish with the 
case.
3.2 Women's Police Stations.-
In this context of a general state indifference towards the issue of domestic violence, 
the first Woman’s Police Station of Peru was bom on 17 of August 1988, becoming 
the first public policy on domestic violence.
A decisive element for its foundation was the creation in 1978 of the Female Police
School within the ‘Civil Guard’ (now National Police). Immediately after the first
women’s police class was graduated the police head office created the ‘Minors
Centre and the Women's Police Station of Lima’ (August 1978) for the custody and
security of women who were prosecuted for criminal offences. In September 1979,
its denomination was changed to ‘Women's Preventive Centre No. 1’, becoming a
sub-unit in support of other police stations. However, these women police were not
satisfied with their role and inspired by the Spanish precincts, proposed to their
4 Loli, Tamayo and Vasquez (1985) analyse cases o f domestic violence under the former Criminal 
Code.
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command a police station exclusively to handle complaints of domestic violence5. 
The project was accepted On 12 of June 1988 by Resolution 1694-88-GC, the first 
Women's Police Station with special functions for the reception and investigation of 
complaints o f ‘physical and psychological maltreatment’ that women suffered in their 
relationships was created.
This was a complete new perspective: a space exclusively for women that recognised 
not only the physical but also the psychological violence. Unfortunately, no specific 
legal procedures on physical and psychological maltreatment to women existed. 
There were general procedures in offences related to physical injuries Consequently, 
the first women’s police station appeared without legislation to support such an 
initiative. At the start of its activities, the police station received complaints of 
psychological maltreatment. Unfortunately the judges of the peace rejected these 
files arguing that there did not exist any legal type in the Criminal Code defining 
psychological maltreatment as a criminal conduct. In this way, after one year these 
kind of complaints were no longer processed.
The achievement of these pioneer experiences in the treatment of domestic violence 
can be summarised as follows: firstly, although it was not an integral state 
programme to tackle domestic violence but rather a police institutional initiative, it 
constituted an important effort to recognise domestic violence as a serious social 
problem, affecting a large number of Peruvian women. Secondly, this first women's 
police station made ‘visible’ the problem of domestic violence by providing accurate 
data on the issue and revealing the urgency for new legislation to support state 
actions. It became an important base for the elaboration of the laws on family 
violence. Thirdly, the creation of this special public space for women, acknowledged
5 Sub-officer Beatriz Escudero was responsible for this proposal I interviewed her in April 1993
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the limitation of the state institution in intervening in women’s rights issues. The 
features of the national police, authoritarianism, machismo and corruption were 
challenged by these police stations. The personnel were trained and their actions 
publicly recognised. Thousands of women arrive every year to these police stations 
to make complaints that they would not have done otherwise.
However, as was commented in chapter one, in more recent times there has been a 
tendency among feminists in Lima to work with the state ‘uncritically’. In this sense, 
a subsequent law on domestic violence enacted in 1997, No. 26763, ignores the 
existence of women’s police stations stressing the legal obligation of any police 
station to handle complaints of domestic violence, subtly questioning the existence 
of ‘especially appointed’ women’s police stations. These laws have also been 
enacted by the government in a context of reduction of state direct services for the 
population. However, in the provinces, women’s groups continue to acknowledge the 
importance of the women’s police stations. After a long campaign of the South 
Andean women’s groups network, a Women’s and Children’s police station was 
created in 1997 in the city of Cusco. This firm attitude by some groups of women has 
contributed to the fact that in the 1998 ‘Reglamento’ of the domestic violence laws, 
which will be commented on later, the importance of the specialised units with 
trained personnel to handle complaints of domestic violence was reconsidered.
3.3 T he 1991 C rim inal C’ode.-
This Criminal Code was enacted in June 1991 and replaced the 1924 code, enforced
for 67 years6. In the previous years a ‘Commission for the Reform of the Criminal
Code’ was installed in the congress. This Commission opened a public debate and
some proposals were received for discussion. In relation to domestic violence, the
6 The 1924 Criminal Code was the subject o f  partial modification during its existence
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feminist position influenced the articles on ‘Fallas against the person’. Additionally, 
the Commission already had taken position for the criminalisation of rape within 
marriage.
3.3.1 Violence in relationships.-
The 'Delilos against the life, body and health’ and ‘Fallas against the life, body and
health’ of the former Criminal Code were replaced by the 'Delito of lesiones (bodily
harm)' and 'Fallas against the Person’. Although with some variations the logic of
both criminal figures remain the same, graduating the criminal situation by the
gravity of the physical injuries. Bodily Harm is defined in article 121 as:
‘A person who causes to another serious injury to his/her body or health 
will be punished with prison of not less than three years and not more 
than eight years'
Faltas against the Person is ruled in article 441:
A person who in any way, produced in another an intentional physical 
injury [lesion dolosa] which required up to 10 days of assistance or 
resting, as medical prescription, will be punished with communal 
service work of between 20 and 30 days provided there are not 
aggravating circumstances otherwise the case will be considered as a 
serious offence [delito]'. (first paragraph, article 441)
Peña (1986:158-60) states that in ’bodily harm’ of most importance is the injury 
produced and not the act in itself. The injury has to ’reduce' the physical integrity: 
(e g a twisted nose) and has to remain after the act which produced it (e g. the 
offender twists the arm of his/her victims but if later there is not an appreciable' 
damage it is not a bodily harm). In relation to the health damage, this has to alter any 
physiological function in a permanent and measurable way.
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In the bodily harm procedure it is obvious that the legal medical certification will 
define the offence. The same criteria is applied, in cases of ‘Fallas against the 
Person’ and the forensic doctor’s certificate is considered indispensable. Up to this 
point, the situation in relation to the former criminal code was no different. However, 
under the pressure of the feminist groups who were campaigning for the recognition 
of domestic violence as a specific criminal offence, the new code brought a new 
feature which was intended to acknowledge the issue of domestic violence. The 
article 442 states:
‘A person who physically maltreats another person without producing a 
lesion (physical injury) will be sanctioned with communal service 
work of between 10 and 20 days'.
When the agent is a spouse or cohabitant the punishment will be of 
communal service work between 20 and 30 days or between 30 and 60 
days of fine7’.
The article covers two relevant aspects. Firstly, it takes into account physical 
aggressions which do not leave physical evidence. Secondly, it increases the penalty 
in cases of domestic violence. In reality, this article was never used at police level. 
The police work under the logic that they intervene if there is something to 
‘investigate’. They expect an ‘evidence’ of the event and -in the police 
understanding- this is done by a forensic certificate. Consequently, in police stations 
only cases under article 441 have been processed. Additionally, the letrados judges 
of the peace normally reject police files in which the forensic certificate is not 
enclosed. This was the main problem when the first Women’s police stations tried to 
process complaints of psychological maltreatment.
7 In Peru, the fine is calculated by assigning a monetary cost per day
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The other difficulty for the application of article 442 has been the lack of
effectiveness of the sanctions established. The ' community service work’ has not
been implemented until now. Article 199 of the Criminal Execution Code states:
‘The sanction of community service work obliged the offender do 
unpaid work in assistance institutions, hospitals, schools, orphanages 
and other similar establishments or public works.
The Penitentiary Administration co-ordinates with the above 
institutions to asses their necessities in order to allocate people in 
service’
The inter institutional co-ordination has never been carried out and it has not been 
possible to implement these measures.
In rural zones, however, the police used this concept of ‘community service work’ but 
without a judicial order. It is a police practise to oblige offenders to perform certain 
activities, like cleaning and painting the police station, and helping with other tasks. 
Once the offenders finish with the assigned task they are released. In other cases, the 
offender is allowed to go back home but he comes back the following day to finish the 
task. I also found some no letrado judges of the peace who add in the conciliatory 
agreement that in case of breach o f the agreed compromise the penalty will fie to fulfil 
community services in town council building works.
3.3.2 Rape within marriage.-
One of the significant improvements in the criminal legislation was to eliminate from 
the definition of rape the phrase ‘outside the marriage'. In the former code a husband 
could ‘legally’ rape his wife. This situation contradicted the basics rights on personal 
freedom, devaluing a campaign on eradication of domestic violence. There is no logic 
in a legislation which on one side condemns a husband who maltreats his wife but 
permits him to rape her Additionally, forced sex is accompanied by physical and/or
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moral maltreatment. To overcome that situation the current Criminal Code defines 
rape in article 170 as:
‘Anyone who with violence or great threat obliges the other person to 
practise the sexual act or other analogous act will be prosecuted with a 
privation of freedom penalty of not less than four years and not more 
than 8 years. ’
3.4 Operating the criminal laws:
3.4.1 The police.-
Faltas against Person and Bodily Harm have different judicial routes. At police level, 
both complaints are presented locally, that is, in the police station of the district of the 
complainant or in the police station corresponding to the place where the offences 
were committed. The women’s police stations are the only non-territorial 
jurisdiction, that is, they receive complaints from any district. The police stage is 
made up of the following steps:
1) The police station receives the complaints o f the affected person and gives him/her 
an order to the forensic office.
2) The police give both complainant and offender an appointment to make individual 
declarations. In the police practice this new declaration of the complainant is very 
important, they call it ratification'. If this is not made by the complainant, the police 
will not continue with the procedure.
3) Once the forensic report is received the case file is formed. The police add the 
conclusions of their investigation and define the criminal type applicable (i.e. faltas
or serious criminal offences).
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4) The case files are sent to the judges of the peace of the district of the complainant 
if they are fultas or, if they are criminal offences they are sent to the provincial 
criminal prosecutor.
These procedures demand the fulfilment of certain requirements that prevent the 
majority of women presenting a complaint. Our experience reveals that many 
physical maltreatment ‘at home’ do not leave any physical evidence. For instance, 
pulling hair, slaps without bruising, pushes and anything that constitutes a 
maltreatment at moral and psychological level. Additionally, there is a reluctance by 
the police to accept complaints of ‘¡-'alias against the person’ when the events have 
occurred more than 48 hours previously. They only intervene in 'immediate' cases. In 
1992, 9,216 women went to the Women’s Police Station of Lima to complain about 
violence at home but just 3,874 women fulfilled the legal requirements for starting a 
criminal procedure. Just 3,874 had something ‘to show’ to the forensic doctors 
( Estremadoyro 1993:71 ).
Additionally, most domestic violence cases do not reach the criteria of the forensic 
office for more than 10 days of resting or medical assistance and are processed as 
‘¡■'alias against the person'. 1 reviewed the cases sent to the judicial system from the 
Women's Police Station of Lima between July 1994 and February 1995. From 1,327 
case files just 5 of them reached the level of criminal offences and were remitted to 
the provincial criminal prosecutor. 1,322 were remitted to the leirado judges of the 
peace to be processed as ‘halias against the person’.
3.4.2 The Judges of the Peace.-
The 1991 Criminal Code establishes the competence of the letrados and no letrados 
judges of the peace in the trial of /alias (minor offences, articles 440 numeral 6). It
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is not the intention in this chapter to describe the process exhaustively but rather to 
point out some important characteristics in the performance of the judges which helps 
us to understand the way in which the legal system operates and the ideology behind 
the judges’ performance. It also concentrates on the letrado judges of the peace. The 
performance of the no letrado judges of the peace are the subject of examination in 
chapter eight.
In this analysis I have used the data obtained by Reinoso (1992) in 1991 on 4 Judges 
of the peace of Lima downtown (Cercado de Lima) on ‘Faltas against the Life, the 
Body and the Health’ (the former denomination of the 1924 code); and my own 
research on two judges of the peace of the district of San Miguel, Lima on ‘Faltas 
against the person’ in 1995.
Some clarifications are necessary before looking into the data.
The falta is considered ‘extinguished’ and it is not possible to continue the 
prosecution, after six months from the incidents which motivated the complaint 
(article 440, numeral 5, Criminal Code). This rule is applied even if the police or the 
judges are responsible for the delay. When the falta is "extinguished' at police level 
and is received by the judge in this state, the judge just signs a ‘No proceed’ 
resolution. When the falta is ’extinguished' during the judicial procedure the judges 
declare the prescripción (ie the extinguishing of the criminal action due to the elapse 
of the time). In most of these cases there is a clear responsibility of the police and the 
judge’s office in the failure to proceed with domestic violence cases.
Desistimiento is a signed declaration by the complainant expressing her intention not 
to continue with the procedure. This desistimiento is defined as a ‘forgiveness’
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which deletes ‘guilt and action’. This is supposed to be a free act by the complainant 
and she is not obliged to express any reason for such a decision.
The practice reveals that judges tend to promote 'conciliation' in the criminal 
processes. The conciliation is a procedure within civil cases but is used extensively 
by judges of the peace at criminal level. It involves the mutual compromise between 
complainant and aggressor, normally containing the promise of the aggressor to stop 
the violence and sometimes even to leave the home, depending on the circumstance 
of the case. The Criminal Procedure Code establishes that there are two ways to 
conclude a criminal case: by judicial sentence or by desistimiento (art. 391). 
Consequently, all conciliations are understood as desistimientos. If a married woman 
‘conciliates’ in a criminal case and later she decides to pursue a divorce because of 
physical violence this criminal process will be used 'referentially' but it will not 
constitute a full evidence, something that is never explained to the women.
Reserve/ del fallo condenatorio, penalty reservation, is an attribution conferred to the 
judges in the 1991 Criminal Code. It means judges can sentence the cases, (that is, 
they declare the commission of the faltas or serious criminal offences, identify the 
offender and the victim and assign the civil reparation), but they do not assign any 
sanction. Article 62 reads:
‘The judge can order the ‘penalty reservation" (reserve/ del fallo 
condenatorio) when the nature, the modality of the criminal action and 
the infractor's personality induce the belief that this measure will 
contribute to avoid that he/she commits a new offence.
The reserve will be ordered:
( . . . )
2. When the penalty to be imposed does not surpass 90 days of 
community services work...’
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Judges tend to use this option of the law (they are not obliged to apply it) in most 
cases of domestic violence.
In my data from the judges of San Miguel I also paid attention to the number of cases 
which proceed from the Women’s police station of Lima. Since this is a 
non-territorial jurisdiction it is interesting to see how many women from the district 
preferred to attend this specialised station instead of attending their district police 
station. I have classified the data as follows:
1) Data obtained from 4 Judges of the Peace of Lima in 1991:
Total cases: 258
Results Number of cases Description
1)Sentenced 12 5 ‘guilty’
7 ‘not guilty’
2) By complainant's will
a) conciliations 16
b) desistimientos 34
3) By procedure rules
a) ‘No proceed’ 18 Insufficient merit to qualify 
the /alia
b) ‘No proceed’ 34 The faha was ‘extinguished’ 
on arrival
c) Prescripción 144 The faha ‘extinguished’ 
during the judicial process.
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II) Data obtained from the First Judge of the Peace of San Miguel:
Years: 1993, 1994, 1995 (January to July)
Total cases: 162
Cases proceeding from the Women's Police Station of Lima: 61
Results Number of cases Description
1) Sentenced 6 ‘guilty’
with penalty reservation
2) By complainant’s will
a) conciliations 9
b) desistimientos 19
3) By procedure rules
a) ‘No proceed’ 5 Insufficient merit to quality 
the fat ta
b) ‘No proceed’ 62 The falta was ‘extinguished’ 
on arrival
c) Prescripción 50 The falta ‘extinguished’ 
during the judicial process.
4 )In process 11 at July 1995
III) Data obtained from the Second Judge of the Peace of San Miguel"
Year 1995 (June to August)
Total cases: 26. 25 were in process. 1 concluded by conciliation.
Cases proceeding from the Women's Police Station of Lima: 2 cases
In this court 1 scrutinised 14 files (more than 50% of the domestic violence cases) to 
obtain more details about the cases. 1 have classified these findings as follows:
a) In relation to the complainants:
a. 1.- All of the complainants manifested to have been beaten on other occasions
8 This court was installed in April 1995
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a.2 11 complainants lived with the aggressor at the time of the complaint The
aggressor was the husband in 6 cases. In 5 cases the cohabitant.
a. 3.- In the other cases there was never a cohabitation relationship. One woman was 
beaten by the father of her daughter, another was a pregnant woman beaten by the 
father of the future baby and the third case was a boyfriend who hit the complainant.
b) In relation to the procedure -
b. 1- In 5 cases the judicial investigation (instrucción) was opened
b.2 - In 7 cases the Judge appointed the parties to attend a conciliation meeting'. In 4 
cases the meeting never took place because of the absence of one of the parties. In 3 
cases the meeting was going to be held after my review.
b.3 - In one case the conciliation was successful and an agreement (acta) was written 
in which the partner promised to stop the violence against his cohabitee.
b.4 - The other cases were waiting for the ‘opening of the investigation’ resolution.
In this court the total cases processed on the ground of ‘Fallas against the person’ 
was 54. 26 of these cases were domestic violence, almost 50%. The total files
processed in front of this judge was 112.
The data obtained in the judge's places merit the following comment. The first 
noticeable aspect is the low average of sentenced cases compared to a high average of 
cases ended by prescripción. This is a serious situation since, by law, all criminal 
cases should be processed de oficio, that is, as solely action of the legal 
representatives. There is a clear responsibility of the legal agents in the extinguishing 
of the criminal action. The practise reveals that there is a lack of interest in domestic 
violence cases, in this way, if a woman, sometimes misinformed about the process, is
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not personally attending the judge’s place to insist in the prosecution of her case, this 
is neglected by the judge’s office.
The 'penalty reservation’, a novelty of the 1991 Criminal Code, is an attribution of 
the judges It depends on their evaluation of the case and the position of aggressor 
and complainant. In many cases of domestic violence it is obvious that a previous 
situation of maltreatment existed. Even more, in some instances previous police 
cases involving the same couples reached the same district judges. Precisely, it is the 
aggressor's personality’ which makes clear that he will continue to beat his partner 
but judges insist on the penalty reservation'. There is an idea in our judges that 
violence between partners does not deserve a sanction, not even a fine. I found some 
cases like this in my review. This makes an important difference between the data 
obtained by Reinoso (1992) and mine, obtained after the enforcement of our current 
Criminal Code.
As was mentioned, conciliation is not a stage of the criminal procedure. The judges 
of Peace are non specialised judges, they deal with both jurisdictions: criminal and 
civil. This can produce certain misunderstandings of their attribution that are 
reinforced by some legislation. For instance, article 185 of the Judiciary Organic Law 
establishes the authority of judges to favour the conciliation of the parties at any 
stage' of the process. In the same law, article 64 establishes:
‘The Judges of the Peace are essentially Judges of Conciliation.
Consequently, they have the authority to propose alternative solutions
to the parties to favour a conciliation, but it is forbidden to impose an
agreement.’
In almost the totality of the case files reviewed the procedure started from a citation 
for the parties to a ‘conciliation’. That is, the criminal investigation was never
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opened as it corresponds to a process by faltas. This gives to the process a very 
different feature. In some way, the parties were induced, especially women, to 
believe that this was the only way in which the process could conclude.
In this conciliation the judge urges the aggressor to abandon his attitude. If 
performed in an atmosphere of understanding the conciliation could work. The 
problem is that in urban settings, impregnated with a 'macho’ culture, one can 
observe men accepting temporarily anything that frees them from criminal 
responsibility. 1 even found cases in which the same man had made the same 
promises in front of the same judge on previous occasions.
All of these circumstances of criminal processes produced diverse feelings in
women who complained. Our experience reveals that many women who had made
similar claims, had the idea that nothing was going to happen’ with their complaints
because after so much effort the case reached the judges and they 'did not do
anything’. Worse is when the offender has the same impression. As Pablo Cardenaz
told me in January 1993 (No. 45. Legal advisory Office record):
‘She just complains in vain. The last time she denounced me we 
finished before the judge. Now she denounces me again, we spend our 
money on buses, lose our time, she should remain quiet at home’
From the data, we realise how the lelraJo judge of the peace used the 'legality’, in 
this case the rules of procedures, to avoid prosecution in cases of domestic violence.
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4. New directions, new perspectives.-
4.1 Women’s rights as human rights? : The Constitution of 1993
The current 1993 Constitution consecrates as a fundamental right the right to peace 
and the prohibition of the use of any kind of physical or psychological violence. 
Article 2, subsection 22 states:
‘Every person has the right: to the peace, the tranquillity... to enjoy of 
an equilibrate and adequate environment for the development of his/her 
life'
The same article, numeral 24 letter h reads:
‘Every person has the right: to freedom, and to personal security. 
Consequently, nobody should be victim of moral, psychological, or 
physical violence nor be the object of torture or inhuman or humiliating 
treatment...’.
The law does not make distinction: no person should be the victim of violence. 
Additionally it does not discriminate who is the perpetrator of the violence. 
Traditionally, this article intended to protect citizens from state acts against personal 
freedom. The main revindication is that the state recognised that so much violence is 
committed by private individuals and offers the same guarantee of protection as in 
other human rights violations. It also recognises moral and psychological violence.
The article was considered a great advance toward the objectives of the international 
feminist campaign on women’s human rights but it was also an article written in 
response to a period of political violence, that is, there is the intention to make 
responsible for their actions the subversive groups operating in the country and which 
had committed gross violations of human rights.
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4.2 Domestic violence as divorce ground.-
In this context of legal reforms, the enactment of a new Civil Procedure Code was 
considered of the greatest strategic importance. An urgency to modernise the civil 
processes was recognised, especially to give them swiftness and certainty and to 
provide with alternative ways of solving disputes such as conciliation and arbitrage. 
The result was the ‘ Texto Unico Ordenado of the Procedure Civil Code’ (‘The Unique 
Ordered Text’) named in this way because of the various previous drafts elaborated in 
the preceding years. The last version, currently in force, brought important 
modifications to the Civil Code and were placed in a special section at the end of the 
document
The modification of the ground of sevicia in divorce cases is a clear consequence of 
the new public discourse on domestic violence9. The modifying dam e  of the sevicia 
ground established that it is possible to obtain separation and divorce for: ‘The 
physical or psychological violence, that the judges evaluate depending on the 
circumstances'
This change is a fundamental new legal perspective. The sevicia, as was discussed 
before, ‘qualified’ the violence. That is, it needed a whole set of requirements: e g. 
cruelty, repetition, physical and evident injury. With the new legislation, incidents of 
violence are sufficient argument to apply for divorce. Consequently, it is enough for 
a woman to prove suffering physical or psychological violence to accede to the 
ground. It is no longer necessary to prove ‘cruelty’ or ‘physical suffering’.
9 In August 1995 I interviewed Dr Nelson Ramirez, member of the Commission responsible for the 
modification of the Civil Procedures Code He confirmed that the draft of the law on domestic violence 
(which became law 26260) influenced the change of the ground of sevicia by the physical and 
psychological violence.
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4.2.1 Operating the ground.-
In 1995, I investigated how this change in the divorce ground had been processed by 
our courts. I mainly found cases in which judges, prosecutors and even the lawyers of 
the plaintiff- failed to realise that the ground of sevicia had been changed or that the 
physical and psychological violence is not the same as the sevicia ground 
(Estremadoyro 1995). The following is one example of this situation:
In the divorce case No. C93-6803, processed in front of the 27 Special Civil Judge 
of Lima, Huberta de Guerrero presents a plaint for divorce on 8 December 1993 on 
the grounds of sevicia and ‘dishonourable behaviour’ against her husband Rufino 
Guerrero. She based her lawsuit on the fact that her husband had become an 
alcoholic who stole from her, beat her and destroyed the few things that she had. He 
also frightened the children and produced scandals that brought complaints from the 
neighbours. As evidence she presented five complaints in front of judges of the 
peace of the district of El Agustino processed between 1985 and 1992. She also 
introduced two neighbours as her witnesses. On 16 of December 1993 Judge Nino 
Neira (a woman) admits the plaint.
On 2nd of February 1994, the civil prosecutor Maria Valverde from the Fourth Civil 
Provincial Prosecution Office submitted her opinion10. She wrote: ‘the ground of 
sevicia (physical or psychological violence)’ should be declared improceilente 
(inadmissible) because the time that had elapsed since the judicial procedures on 
Fallas were carried out ‘extinguished’ the evidence. In relation to ‘dishonourable 
behaviour’ she opined that this should be declared ‘without merit’ because the
10 In all legal processes involving family issues, the civil prosecutor is commanded by law to intervene 
'as party’ representing the state
154
'habitual practise of shameful and immoral acts which make the common life 
unbearable' was not proved. The defendant did not appear in this stage of the process.
At the ‘Conciliatory and Proof Meeting’ held on 15 September 1994, the evidence 
was admitted. On 14 December 1994, the witnesses declared that the defendant had a 
serious problem of alcoholism and produces scandal at any time of the day. One of 
the witnesses declared: ‘I have not seen very precisely the maltreatment suffered by 
the plaintiff; but I have heard her screaming and the children screaming’.
The plaintiff also submitted a medical certificate by the psychiatric hospital 
‘Hermilio Valdizan'. In this report of 17 December 1994 it is certified that the 
defendant suffered from a ‘serious psychotic syndrome’.
The judge gave her judgement on 13 February 1995 considering that the ‘grounds of 
sevicia (physical or psychological violence) and dishonourable behaviour’ were 
sufficiently supported because it is evident that the defendants behaviour is vigente 
(it occurs at present) and declared: with sufficient merit the plaint, declaring the 
divorce.
The defendant now appeared in the process and apela (petition for revision in front of 
a court of higher rank) the judgement. The file was sent to the Sixth Civil Division 
of the Superior Court on 8th May of 1995, the vocales declared that the ‘sevicia ha 
caducado', the ground is extinguished, and that the 'dishonourable behaviour’ is not 
proved. They 'revocaron la s e n te n c m rejected the judgement, and modified it 
declaring it without merit.
The attitude of the legal system representatives deserve the following comment. 
Firstly, at the time of the submission of the plaint the modification of the ground of 
sevicia was already in force, however, the plaintiffs lawyer did not take this into
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account. For him the modification simply did not exist. Secondly, both the courts and 
prosecutor use the terms sevicia and ‘physical and psychological violence’ as 
synonymous. Particularly, the requirements on the evidence demanded by the 
Superior Court and the prosecutor correspond to the former sevicia ground. They did 
not pay attention to the new criteria in the modification of the ground. Only the Civil 
judge Niño Neira recognised that, independent from the legal requirements of the 
evidence, it was fully proven that the behaviour of the defendant still occurred and 
that acts of domestic violence were committed against this family.
These diverse and discordant opinions of the judicial representatives could be 
explained by two facts. Firstly, the endemic institutional crisis of the judicial power 
that is reflected both in the lack of preparation of their members and in the incapacity 
to work as an organic body in which judicial representatives generate consensus in 
relation to certain issues. Secondly, although it is true that the modification is a great 
advance it also gives to judges the attribution to 'evaluate [the violence] depending on 
the circumstance'. The apparent flexibility of the ground is not such if women have 
to face a judge with gender bias or simply with narrow criteria.
5. Family Violence Laws.-
5.1 The law 26260.-
This self-denominated law on State and society policy against family violence' was 
enacted in December 1993. Despite the feminists involvement, it is important to note 
that this was not a law on ‘domestic violence’ but rather a law on ‘family violence’. It 
is intended to cover a wide range of situations of violence between family members. 
In this sense, it had the risk of taking the ‘family institution’ as the main focus of 
attention to the detriment of the problematic aspects of gender relationships which
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are at the base of the problem of domestic violence. It also merged the different 
problems of children’s rights and women’s rights.
The law had two clear objectives. Firstly, at the level of ‘state policies’, the law 
intended to define some lines of action targeting specific state institutions. Secondly, 
it intended to open procedural routes to apply for protective measures to benefit 
domestic violence victims. These processes were of a civil nature with all that this 
involved (e.g. payment of judicial aranceles (tariffs) and the obligation to hire a 
lawyer’s services to enforce the action). However, the most impressive failure of the 
law was that it did not take into account the judges of the peace neither letrados nor 
no letrados. This was a serious omission since most cases of domestic violence are 
processed in the criminal jurisdiction at the judges of the peace level, as previously 
mentioned.
5.1.1 Re-conceptualisation of violence and family relationships
The law brought a new legal understanding of violence between family members. 
Article 2 reads:
‘Acts of physical and psychological maltreatment between spouses, 
cohabitants or people who have procreated children in common even 
though not cohabiting and parents or tutors in relation to minors under 
their responsibility, constitute a manifestation of family violence’
The law uses the word ‘maltreatment’ that in the Spanish language it is a derivative 
of the verb ‘maltreat’, ie. ‘to treat others badly by words and by actions’". 
‘Maltreatment’ refers to the actions and not to the results. This is very important in a 
conventional legal analysis since it changes the perspective on domestic violence. 
Civil processes (ie divorce and separation) and criminal actions {/alias and bodily
n From the ‘Real dictionary of the Spanish Language'
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harm), as explained before, take into account the physical results of the violence and 
not the action itself.
The law also recognised psychological violence. That was a completely new feature 
in Peruvian legislation However, this recognition has had until now very few 
practical effects. Civil judges have not accepted processes for ‘protective measures’ 
in which psychological maltreatment is alleged, mainly because there is no legal 
consensus on the appropriate means to prove psychological maltreatment (Rojas 
1998, Loli 1993:16). There is a belief that the psychological maltreatment should be 
measured by the damage produced, which is not what the law states. Authors like 
Loli (1991:4) claim that threats, insult, recrimination, scorn, and permanent 
disqualification constitute psychological violence. A woman can prove psychological 
maltreatment simply by witnesses’ declarations such as neighbours who often hear 
shouts and insults by the offender against the complainant. The law does not require 
evidence of how much these acts perturb the mental health of women, just that these 
acts are performed.
The ‘Family’ in the context of the law is also a new concept. Rubio (1980:6) states: 
civil marriage is the way of constituting a family with legal effects before the State'. 
There is explicit legal recognition of what constitutes the type of family that the law 
protects in detriment of others forms of family that exist in a multicultural country 
like Peru. The law brings a new understanding here too. It defines as acts offamily 
violence those which happen between cohabitants and non cohabitants who have 
procreated children together. There is a new concept of ‘family’ and ‘family 
relationships’ protected under this law.
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5.1.2 State policies
The law established in article 3 the actions that the State should develop to eradicate 
family violence with emphasis on the ' formative aspects and society awareness’ The 
state policies on the ’eradication of family violence’ mentioned by the law are as 
follows:
a) At educational level, to strengthen the children’s formation of ethical values, 
particularly in the unrestricted respect of human dignity and women and children’s 
rights’, (article 3, a)
b) At media level, to develop campaigns on the awareness of family violence and the 
explicit condemnation of family violence (article 3, b)
c) At academic level, to promote study and research on the causes of family violence 
(article 3, c)
d) At legal system level, firstly, to establish ‘efficient legal mechanisms’ for the 
protection of family violence victims (article 3, d). Secondly, to establish Women’s 
Police Stations throughout the country and to strengthen the current police stations 
with specialised personal training on dealing with cases of family violence (article 3, 
0- Thirdly, to train the police force, prosecutors and judges in the issue (article 3 h).
e) At governmental level, to establish a co-ordination between the ministries of 
Education, Justice and Internal Affairs for the development of the action suggested by 
this law. (article 3, last paragraph)
f) At council level, to establish shelters for the victims of violence and the 
development of the institutions for the treatment of the aggressors (article 3, g)
159
g) At NGOs level, to promote the active participation of all organisations specialising 
in the protection of children, women and in general ‘family affairs’ for the 
development of preventive activities and the control of protective measures, support 
and treatment of the victims and aggressors (article 3, e).
S.1.3 Legal processes for the victims protection.-
Law 26260 was generic and neither defined clearly the legal mechanism to apply for 
‘protective measures’ nor the protective measures themselves. The law referred to a 
process of ‘protection in favour of the victims of domestic violence’ that could be 
started before the civil judge and enforced by the following people:
‘a) The victim
b) Either parent of the mistreated child
c) Any close relative of the maltreated pierson
d) the Public Prosecution Office
e) Any person who knows of such acts’ (article 10)
The civil judge had the power to ‘decide on the measures most convenient for the 
pacification and permanent eradication of all kinds of violence’, and consequently 
could order the 'temporary suspension of cohabitation and even any visits to the 
affected person’, (article 9). The law did not say more.
The law also mentioned the civil prosecutors, stating that ‘[they] intervene seeking a 
permanent conciliation between the couple and other relatives in conflict’ and that 
they ‘could apply the necessary protective measures’. It did not give more details. It 
was understood that it was also possible to apply for protective measures to the civil
prosecutor (article 7).
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In relation to criminal judges it was simply stated that they could order protective 
measures within the process of their competence (ie criminal offence) related to 
domestic violence.
5.1.4 Operating the law
During 1995 I carried out research to evaluate law 26260 almost two years after of its 
promulgation. My main discovery was that the only people who knew and used the 
law were the feminist organisations Months had passed and the media had given 
some coverage to the law, however, just a few legal actions were performed using this 
law and all of them by feminist lawyers (Estremadoyro 1995).
As was mentioned the law was not clear. It established special procedures for the 
protection of family violence victims which involved a petition in front of the civil 
judges or the prosecutors applying for protection. The only characteristic that the law 
mentioned is that this procedure had to be’extremely brief (summansimo). This 
created a confusion in the judges because there is a civil process ruled by the Civil 
Procedure Code with the same denomination, however, the law uses such a term in its 
literary meaning (ie ‘as short as possible’, Rojas 1994:4). This appears clearer in 
article 30, inciso d) of the same law :
‘[It is objective of the law] To establish effective legal mechanisms for 
the victims of family violence, through procedures characterised by 
minimum formalism and the tendency to order preventive measures.’
Even the feminist lawyers were not in agreement as to which procedures to use for 
the best. The following are examples of three different interpretations that feminist 
lawyers gave to the procedure available under the law. All of them were processed 
before civil judges of the city of Lima.
Case No. 1: Generic Protective Measure
On 12 February 1995, Elsa Becerra introduced a plaint in front of the civil judge for 
the suspension of the family violence acts' performed against her by her husband. 
This was the main demand. Within the same procedure, protective measures were 
applied for but under a parallel procedure based on article 608 of the Civil Procedure 
Code which rules the ‘generic preventive measure’ (medida cautelar generica). This 
means the opening of a secondary file (cuaderno separado) with the objective of 
assuring the efficient result of the main demand. This procedure should be resolved 
independently from and in advance o f the main demand. Its advantage is that it is 
processed in a very quick way because it is decided without ‘listening’ to the 
defendant who is just informed about the judge’s decision a few days before the 
protective measure is carried out. The measure is enforced by the secretary of the 
court and if it is necessary, with police support.
In this particular case, the judge Iris Pasapera of the 24 Specialised Civil Court of
Lima accepted the petition of protective measure on March 3rd 1995, and:
‘...order the expulsion o f the defendant don Ricardo Masias Carrasco 
from the spousal home until the present process is decided, the 
retirement should be effective within the third day after receiving the 
judge's notification...'
In this case it was not necessary because the defendant left home just with the 
notification of the measure. This was a successful end to the legal action in which 
the defendant accepted the judge’s decision without the necessity of any other form of 
coercive intervention.
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Case No. 2.- Plaint on Suspension of Cohabitation,-
In this case the protective measure' was the main demand of the plaint and the 
process was followed under the rule of procesos sumarisimos (‘extreme brief 
processes’) of the Civil Procedure Code (articles 546-559).
The demand was for temporary suspension of cohabitation and visits' before the 
civil judge who declared without merit the plaint of 6 June 1994. This court file (No. 
3884-94) was appealed to the Sixth Civil Division of the Superior Court of Lima who 
by resolution of the 7th October 1994 stated that the elements required by the law' 
were fulfilled (ie it was true that the situation of physical and psychological 
maltreatment against the plaintiff occurred). The vocales re-evaluated the evidence 
(complaints of ‘Faltas against the person’ and psychiatric report on the aggressor) 
and:
Rejected the judgement of pages eighty four to eighty five dated 6 of 
June 1984 which declared without fundament the plaint: Reformed it 
declaring fundada (sustained) it and it orders the temporary suspension 
of cohabitation and visits between the spouses Mrs.... and Mr....'
The time elapsing between the judgement of the civil judge and of the superior court 
was four months. This is a standard time that it takes a case to reach a revised 
judgement by a higher court in Peru. It reveals that the idea of the law to provide 
efficient protective and preventive mechanisms does not correspond to the reality of 
the Peruvian judicial system.
Case No. 3: Plaint demanding the end of the physical and psychological violence
Here the demand is wider and the central request is the eradication of all acts of
family violence. Protective measures were requested as part of the main demand12.
12 Under the Peruvian process law a meJiJa cautelar generica that we reviewed in the first case has to 
be applied by the plaintiff s lawyer The judge is not obliged to apply it without this request
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Maria Sotomayor introduced a plaint against her husband to abstain from performing 
any type of physical or psychological violence against the plaintiff. It also requested 
that the judge order her free entrance and departure from the home' and the 
expulsion of her husband. In this case it was the plaintiff who had left home because 
of the violence she suffered and wanted to come back. The 14 Specialised Civil 
Court of Lima, after scrutinising the amount of evidence presented, (mainly police 
files about the plaintiff s complaints of physical aggression) stated by resolution No. 
14 of 21st April 1995 the following:
‘...the request that the defendant stops performing any type of physical 
or psychological violence against the plaintiff, and stop preventing her 
free entry to her home and attending of the common shop should be 
accepted (...) instead the request to expel the husband from home 
because it is extreme and not justified by the circumstances is not 
accepted, mainly because in this case the violence also has been 
performed by the woman (...) F ALLO (it decides): to declare funJada 
(sustained) in part the plaint of page 22, consequently, the defendant 
Herless Braga Loza should abstain from any kind of violence against 
his wife, permitting her the free access to her home as well as the 
common administration of the grocery shop..’. The plaintiff should for 
her part, abstain from any manifestation of family violence against her 
husband...'
5.1.5 Evaluation of the law.-
a) Pifficulties.-
The main difficulty was the ignorance of the law. This lack of knowledge was 
general and included judges, prosecutor, lawyers, maltreated women. People had 
never heard about the law or having heard about it they did not know how to 
interpret or use it. Additionally, the procedures to obtain protection of the victim 
were not clearly established The law was generic and judges and prosecutors did not 
assume an active role in deciding how to process this request. In this sense, the 
petitions requesting the end of violence could not fulfil the objective for the effective
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and immediate protection of the victim. To act at the judicial level, especially in the 
civil area, takes time and money and this wrests merit from the protective intention 
of the law.
The law recognised psychological maltreatment as an expression of family violence 
but failed to define it. Because it had not been a previous practise in the issue, judges 
required that 'psychological damage’ was proved without a clear idea of the 
probatory means which could achieve this objective. In this sense, civil judges were 
not processing the MeJidas Cautelares (protective measures) in which just 
psychological maltreatment was alleged (Loli 1995:4).
The law simply ignored the criminal jurisdiction. It mentioned and highlighted the 
role of the Women’s police stations but it did not affect or improve the criminal 
procedures. Finally, it did not give the attribution to the judges of the peace to 
provide protective measures for the victim.
b) Achievements.-
The greatest achievement was its promulgation. It is the first time that a law tackling 
violence between intimates was enacted. In this sense, the law recognised, although 
not in an express way, women and children as the main victims of violence. The 
emphasis on the role of the Women's and Children’s police stations gave evidence of 
this.
The law was a public condemnation of domestic violence, and although not very 
effective in practise from a legal point of view, it could have many levels of impact 
on society. Additionally, it was never before possible to request from judges the 
expulsion of the aggressor from home or to prevent his entry to the family’s house by 
means of legal actions.
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5.2 The Law 26763 and the PS 006-97-JUS:
It was soon recognised that law 26260 was never going to be used effectively and that 
something needed to be done to tackle its shortcomings. This came in the shape of a 
law No. 26763 enacted on 25th March 1997. What the legislator also did was to 
modify concepts and to adapt the law to the new legal structure of the country. The 
changes are such that in fact it is a ‘new law’relating to domestic violence.
In order to avoid more confusion on the issue, the second ‘Final Disposition’ of this 
law gave authorisation to the Executive Power to publish a ‘Unique Ordered Text of 
the Family Violence Law’ in the following months. The executive had to merge the 
contents of both laws, that is, this new law with the few articles surviving of the 
original 26260. This happened on 2nd June 1997 through the Supreme Decree No. 
006-97-JUS, self-denominated 'Texto Unico Ordenado of the Law of protection on 
Family Violence’. It was a genuine merging, it did not add anything to the laws but 
the contents are better ordered.
There were two important events which influenced the promulgation of law 26763. 
Firstly, the creation during 1996 of the Ministry for the Promotion of Woman and 
Human Development and, secondly, the appointment of the judges and prosecutors 
of family matters within the judicial system. These judicial members were the 
original ‘Children and Juvenile’ judges and prosecutors who changed their name in 
order: ‘to be adapted to the new modem proposal legal trends, since the family in its 
condition as the basic cell o f  society deserves the protection of specialised courts’!RA 
No. 025-CME-PJ, 10 January 1996).
Two tendencies were repeated and even reinforced in relation to the previous law 
26260. Firstly, the law equated the abuse and abandonment of children with that of
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maltreatment of women. This ‘merging’ of areas is even more ostensible at the level 
of the activities carried on by the Ministry for the Promotion of Woman and Human 
Development. Secondly, it continues a strong ‘familist’ ideology. Here there is a 
clear intention to protect the ‘family’ and not the individual in family relationships. 
This is confirmed by the addition of article 3, to include as content of the school 
curricula, the teaching of the ‘unrestricted respect of. the family’, next to the respect 
of the human beings dignity and women and children’s rights.
5.2.1 State policies.-
As with the original law 26260, the law 26763 has two clear objectives: to promote 
state policies on the issue and to establish protective procedures. It, however, brought 
some new features that it is necessary to comment on. Firstly, the most relevant 
aspect of the modification was to endorse the Ministry of the promotion of Woman 
and Human development with most activities related to the law, while in the original 
26260 there was an effort for multi sectors co-ordination (article 3, h).
The other significant innovation is the relevant role that is assigned to the Demunas 
(Local government office responsible for children and juveniles). The Demunas are 
legal advisory offices part of the ‘National System of Integral Attention to Children’ 
and were legally regulated in 1993 with the enactment of the Children and Juveniles 
Code. The Demunas were created based on the experience accumulated by NGOs 
working with shanty town organisations on children’s concern (Alvarado 1997). The 
law has also given them the power to intervene in cases of family violence. 
Particularly, important is its role in conciliatory processes. Article 48 letter c) of the
Children and Juveniles Codes states:
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‘[its functions are] To promote the strength of the family links, [to 
achieve this objective] it can carry out conciliation between spouses, 
parents and relatives, fixing norms of behaviour, maintenance and 
provisional custody [colocación familiar], as far as there are no judicial 
proceedings.'
Article 30 of the TUO of the Family Law establishes: 'Demunas can in exercise of 
their attribution, carry on conciliatory meetings with the objective to resolve conflicts 
originated by family violence’.
There has been a serious intention from the government to provide the Demunas with 
all the necessary formal and legal coverage. The Ministry for the Promotion of 
Woman and Human Development is responsible for the registers of the Demunas. The 
Demunas can be installed in any town council and in any public or private institution 
as far as they fulfil the legal requirements. One of these requirements is that the 
Demunas should be made up of graduate lawyers and other support professionals such 
as social assistants and psychologists. In December 1998, Law 27007 was enacted 
which gives the conciliatory agreement signed in front of a Demuna an ‘executive’ 
merit. Thus, it has the force of a judicial agreement or decision.
As was mentioned in 3.2 a significant contrast of this law with the original 26260 is 
its absolute silence in relation to the role of women’s police stations. On the 
contrary, it stresses: ‘The National Police, in all police stations, receive the 
complaints of family violence...’ (article 4). This ‘silence’ has been justified by the 
fact that many police stations were not receiving complaints related to domestic 
violence under the excuse of the existence of the women’s police stations. Another 
reading of this fact may be the tacit refusal by the authorities to create more
specialised units.
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5.2.2 The processes on family violence.-
While the other law was vague, this law is complex and to understand it a good legal 
training is indispensable. On the other hand, the law is very ambitious, trying to 
regulate different jurisdictions at the same time, creating a confused spectrum of 
possibilities. What are the processes and what are their nature, a beaten woman has 
to go to the prosecutor, to the police, to the civil judge, to the Demuna? The law 
‘offered’ to the beaten women all of these possibilities of intervention:
a) The Demuna. is a legal advisory office in which extra-process conciliation can be 
carried out under the tutelage of the state. The nature of the action is civil and the 
agreement enforceable through the Family judge in the case of non compliance by 
any of the parties.
b) The Family prosecutor is the one whose role is more difficult to understand. In the 
criminal area, the prosecutors are responsible for starting the investigation of the 
crime. All police files on criminal offences are sent to the prosecutor. It is possible 
also to go directly to the prosecutor to report a crime. At civil level, their main role 
has been in family issues, especially in divorce and maintenance intervening in the 
process in representation of the state. In that case, it is the civil judge who appoints 
the civil prosecutor.
Under the law of family violence, a beaten woman can go with ‘a petition’ to the 
prosecutor to seek to ‘stop the violent act’ and can apply for a ‘protective measure’ 
(articles, 9-11). The process finishes with a conciliation between the parties. If any 
of the parties does not comply with the conciliation, this can be enforced before the 
Family judge. On the other hand, if the parties do not reach a conciliation, the 
prosecutor presents a ‘plaint’ in front of the Family judge, referring the case (articles
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15 and 16). It is possible to understand that this is a special jurisdiction although the 
legal terminology used for the law is clearly civil.
c) The Family Judge has a special jurisdiction, though the nature of the action and the 
law terminology is civil. The action begins with a plaint to stop the violent acts in 
which protection measures can be applied. The action can be interposed directly in 
front of the judge or can be a derived action from the Family prosecutor.
d) Criminal Jurisdiction. At a first reading it is not clear whether the law creates a 
'special criminal figure’ involving ‘family violence’. However, a deeper reading 
reveals that the law is just adding some elements to accompany processes of 'Fallas 
against the person’ and Bodily Harm when they have a component of family violence.
e) The concept of family violence. This law changes the definition of violence of the
original 26260 law. There is a more technical style in its phrasing. Article 2 states:
'To the effects of the present law, is understood by family violence any 
action or omission which produces physical and psychological injury, 
maltreatment without lesion and including threats or serious coercion...’
The law comes back to the notion of the ‘produced’ injury. This in order to clarify 
that although this is a special law, it does not enervate the actions for Fallas and 
Bodily Harm. The law is about summing up elements ‘to protect’ people affected by 
the violence. The terminology in accordance with article 444 and 445 of the Criminal 
Code which refers also to ‘maltreatment without lesion’. The law also mentions moral 
and psychological violence, offering channels to process these kind of complaints.
f) The people involved in family violence. The acts are those produced between:
‘a. Spouses
b. Cohabitants
c. Ascendants
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d. Descendants
e. Collateral relatives until the fourth grade of blood link and second by 
affinity (in-law relatives)
f. People who live in the same home or if they do not are involved by 
contractual or labour relationships.’ (Article 2)
The modification reduces the scope of people under its protection. It does not 
recognise violence between people who do not cohabit but have children together and 
excludes the ex-cohabitants. These are cases which were included in the former law
26260.
hi The protective measures. Both procedures, those in front of the Family prosecutor 
and those before the Family judge, seek to apply for protective measures. These 
protective measures are: the temporary suspension of the cohabitation; the temporary 
expulsion of the aggressor from the family home; the temporary prohibition of any 
kind of visit by the aggressor and any other form of harassment; inventory of common 
property and assignment of maintenance (arts. 10 and 21,a). The law adds ‘and any 
other measure of immediate protection which guarantees the physical, psychological 
and moral integrity’ (art. 10).
In both procedures, advanced protective measures can be processed as medidas 
cautelares, already mentioned, these are resolved independent of the main demand. If 
the Family prosecutor is deciding over any protective measure these should be 
communicated to the Family Judge. An outline of the ‘processes for family violence’ 
is as follows:
I) Before the Family prosecutor:
1) Starting action: An oral or written petition by any of the persons mentioned in 
article 2. In the case of children, the action can be initiated also by ‘any person who
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knows about the events. The prosecutor also initiates a process after the submission of 
a police case file (article 9)
2) Protective measure: Prosecutors decide over any necessary protective measures and 
communicate their decisions to the judges (article 10).
3) Process: This has a central act which is the ‘conciliatory meeting’. The aggressor is 
appointed under apercibimiento. This means that he can be forced by the police to 
attend the meeting (articles 13 and 14).
4) The end: The conciliation ends the process having the value of a ‘decided case’ 
(icosa juzgada), this means the pretension is finished and a new action can be 
interposed just for new events. The conciliatory agreement can be enforced before the 
Family judge in case of non compliance by any of the parties. If the conciliation fails, 
the prosecutor presents a plaint before the Family judge (articles 15 and 16).
II. Before the Family judge:
1) Starting action: A plaint by the victim or their legal representative or a plaint by the 
Family prosecutor. Here the law restricts the scope of the people who can introduce a 
plaint.
2) Protective measures: The same rules as with the prosecutors (article 23).
3) The end: A judgement which determines if acts of family violence have occurred 
and establishes: the necessary protective measures, the ‘treatment’13 for the people 
involved, the civil reparation and the maintenance orders in the cases established by 
the law. The process can also finish by conciliation (article 23)
The law does not define the kind of treatment It understands a psychological one The question 
remains which institution will provide the treatment
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5.2.3 Criminal jurisdiction.-
The law creates some confusion when referring to the criminal jurisdiction. At a first 
reading it gives the impression that the law is creating a ‘new criminal type’, that can 
be called ‘family violence’ or ‘acts of family violence’. The confusion comes from 
article 4: ‘The National Police in all police delegations, receive the complaints for 
family violence and carry out the preliminary investigations...’. However, article 8 
states: ‘The police case will be sent to the judge of the peace or the criminal 
prosecutor as appropriate’, in which case does such a differentiation operate? It 
operates in cases of 'Fallas against the person’ and Bodily Harm.
It is possible to understand that what the law is doing is adding some elements to be 
taken into account when these processes are related to family violence. During my 
fieldwork in 1997,1 was invited by the Cusco Women’s and Children’s police station 
to explain the scope of the law because it had created so much confusion at police 
level and my opinion was as mentioned above. In any case, if we lawyers are confused 
by the law, it is not difficult to imagine how difficult it can be for non-lawyers.
a) The police.-
The articles that the law dedicates to the police role suggests the recognition of 
‘special’ attributions when intervening in cases of domestic violence. A more 
detailed reading reveals that what the law does is to assure that the police use their 
normal attributions when intervening in family violence. The law establishes:
1) All police stations should receive complaints of family violence (article 4)
2) The police are responsible for the case and not the complainants. It is has been a 
police practise not to continue with the investigation if the complainants do not 
pursue directly their cases. This is in fact, against the criminal laws (article 6).
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3) The police continue to process the cases as usual. The /alias are sent to the judge 
of the peace while bodily harm goes to the Criminal prosecutor. The law adds that a 
copy of all file cases involving family violence should be sent also to the Family 
Prosecutor to follow the procedure described in the paragraphs above (article 8).
4) In case of in fragrante offences or extreme danger of its perpetration, the National 
Police has the attribution to enter in the aggressor's house, or into the place of the 
commission of the violence. They can also force the aggressor to attend the police 
station (article 7).
The law adds nothing new to the police attributions. However, in general, the police 
are very cautions to break into houses in Peru without a special order from their 
command or without a judicial order. Consequently, the problem is more complex 
than just to deny to family violence cases their real importance In Peru, as Ugarteche 
(1998:27) comments, the law is for everybody except for those who have power and 
the police can be accused of ‘abuse of authority’ in the most unfair circumstances 
depending on who are the offenders14. The most serious case that I came across 
happened in 1989. A high functionary of the government was beating and threatening 
his wife with a gun. Alerted by the shouting, a police patrol broke into the house and 
took the man to the police station and the following day, they sent the offender to the 
criminal prosecutor. The man was freed the same day, the officer who commanded 
the police patrol was accused of abuse of authority. The young officer responsible for 
the patrol faced expulsion from the police force. Fortunately he had some influential 
friends who spoke in his favour. The declaration of the victim was also very 
important. Only in this way, could the police officer avoid being expelled from the 
police force.
14 Vegas (1990) and Ugarteche (1998:27) provide examples
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In all the years that I worked in the first Women’s Police Station in Lima I witnessed 
that most men who were jailed for one night for maltreating their partners and who 
could pay a lawyer would later complain and threaten the police accusing them of 
abuse of authority. At the other extreme of the problem occur cases like this one 
related to me by Sergeant Garcia in 1990. A very poor woman who lived just around 
the comer came to the police station. Her husband, a drunkard, had expelled the 
woman and their children by beating and kicking her. Sergeant Garcia, took her gun 
and went to the dilapidated house and kicked the door. The aggressor was already 
sleeping, but she awoke him saying: ‘you have one minute to stand up from this bed 
and come with me to the police station’. The man replied that he did not have his 
trousers on. Sergeant Garcia told him to put on his trousers immediately. ‘In front of 
you?, asked the man, ‘yes, in front of me’. He was taken to the police station. The 
aggressor was so poor that Sergeant Garcia was not afraid of reprisals.
The unwillingness of the police to break into houses contrasts with the repressive role 
that is assigned to them in certain circumstances (e.g. massive police raids in shanty 
towns). In addition to this ambiguity of the police role in society they face a lack of 
resources. The police work in poor conditions without appropriate budgets for 
maintaining police patrol vehicles. The Women’s Police Station of Lima had two 
vehicles, both were broken. The police mechanic could repair one but there was no 
money for petrol. They did not receive any stipend for public transport and having 
such low salaries they could not move from the station. Their investigations were 
reduced to receiving the declarations of the parties in their offices.
b) Criminal judges and letrado judges of the peace.-
As was established in the original 26260, criminal judges have the power to order 
protective measures within the processes of their competence when events of family 
violence are happening (article 25 and 26). The important new feature brought by 
law 26763 has been to confer the same power to the letrado judge of the peace. As 
already mentioned, this was a serious omission of the original 26260 since most 
related domestic violence cases are processed as '’Faltas against the person’.
The law also, in its first 'Final Disposition’, is leaving open the possibility that some 
letrado judges of the Peace could, eventually, be able to receive petitions for 
protection measures under the special procedure established by the law. That is, 
could do the same as the Family judges do. The phrasing of this 'Final Disposition’ 
though, is such, that it makes this possibility a very unlikely one. It writes: 
’Exceptionally and when the overburden of cases’ can justify it, the Judicial Power 
could confer this function to some letrado judges 'depending on the reality of their 
respective districts’. This decision should be subject to a previous study by the 
Superior Courts. So far, nothing like that has happened.
5.2.4 The Reelamento of the Family Violence Law.-
The reglamento, is a law of lower rank which specifies the 'operative’ dimension of a 
general law. It is prepared and enacted by the executive power. It can be described as 
the 'rule of procedures’ of the main law. It is well known in Peru that the reglamento 
are used to manoeuvre over key issues of a law, something that should not in fact be 
done. From that practise came the expression, 'what could not be done through the 
law, could be done through the reglamento'. On 25 February 1998, a reglamento of 
the Family Violence Law was enacted by Supreme Decree 002-98-JUS. In this case,
176
amendments have continued to be made, some are very positive. For instance, it 
reintroduces ex-spouses and the ex-cohabitants under the law’s protection. It also 
establishes that in all police stations should exist a section exclusively responsible for 
receiving complaints of family violence. Personnel especially trained in the issue 
should handle such complaints. In this sense, it recognised the reasons underlying the 
creation of Women’s police stations.
a) The intervention of the no letrados judges of the peace.-
Under the title the 'covering intervention of the Judge of the Peace’, it mentions: ‘In 
the places where there is not a lelrado judge of the peace, the [no letrado] judge of 
the peace would assume his/her functions’. The document does not say more. This 
could mean that non letrado judges of the peace could also order protective measures 
within formally opened cases on ‘Fallas against the person’ which, as will be 
reviewed in chapter eight, is a rare occurrence among judges in rural areas.
This reglamento was enacted 6 months after to my fieldwork although by the time 
that I left the zone not even the role of the letrado judges of the peace had been 
clarified after the recommendations made by the law 26763 described in the 
paragraphs above. There is one dilemma to resolve first and it is in which cases the 
no letrado judges of the peace are considered to have a covering role of the letrado 
judges of the peace considering that these judges fulfil different functions and are 
independent from each other, in such a way, that they report directly to the 
'Specialised or Combined’ courts of the capital of the province. Additionally, there is 
the fact of the flexibility of the no letrado judges of the peace appointments. They 
can be appointed in a district, in a ‘rural town’, in a partial ¡dad, or in an Andean
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community. This element also makes difficult the understanding of this ‘covering’ 
role.
However, the real fact which makes this possibility a very unlikely one is the demand 
to the no letrado judges of the peace of a level of formalism and legal knowledge that 
corresponds neither to their rationality nor to the practices of the Andean people, as 
will be examined in chapter eight
Conclusions.-
Historically, the law has been used to regulate patriarchy It has contributed to the 
construction of a gender system with different values for men and women. Within 
marriage, the law supported the predominant position of husbands over wives and 
children and recognised the ‘right of correction’ in case of disobedience. This 
‘correction’ included physical punishment. Consequently, the domestic violence was 
a constituent element of marriage, condemned only in extreme circumstances.
The criminal jurisdiction, however, recognised as a criminal offence bodily harm, 
independent of the relationship between aggressor and victim. In theory, a man who 
injured his wife could be punished. In practice, the notion of ‘legitimate’ violence 
exercised by the husband permeated the criteria adopted by legal representatives who 
obstructed women’s complaints against their husbands. By analogy, women who 
were not legally married suffered the same discrimination.
In 1979, women achieved legal equality in Peru. Discriminatory family regulations 
were replaced by gender-neutral provisions. However, the understanding of what is a 
‘family’ in legal terms remains deeply male and urban. Additionally, domestic 
violence remained an insufficient ground to apply for divorce if aggravated
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circumstances such as ‘cruelty’ and repetition’ could not be legally proved, thus some 
violence performed by husbands was still legitimate.
In 1987 the first Women’s Police Station commenced operation in the city of Lima. 
The level of complaints about domestic violence showed that a good number of 
women would opt for the legal system if this offered a more appropriate means of 
intervention. Women’s police stations defined themselves as specialised places for 
the reception of domestic violence cases, despite that the only legal support they had 
was the ordinary procedures offaltas and bodily harm.
From the beginning of the 1990s, domestic violence entered into public debate. In 
December 1993, law 26260 was enacted and was considered the greatest recognition 
of domestic violence. However the law failed in its application due to its lack of 
clarity. Additionally, it can be argued that a law self-denominated on ‘family 
violence’ has ‘family relations’ rather than gender relations as its centre. This 
approach was reinforced by a subsequent law, No. 26763 which ensured the 
‘unrestricted respect for the family’.
While 26260 was obscure, 26763 is an extremely complex piece of legislation which 
demands a professional legal training to apply it. Many claims are lost in the 
labyrinth and complexity of the judicial system, the differential jurisdiction and the 
lack of resources.
The law is rooted in a legal structure that is deeply urban, excluding the reality and 
resources available in rural areas, such as the no lelraJo judges of the peace. This 
structure does not even work well in urban settings. For instance, it has as main 
protagonist the family judges and prosecutors. These legal representatives are not 
appointed in all provincial capitals. It is also a structure that does not work for all
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urban women, but rather for those who have the resources and information to obtain 
legal aid. The ‘family violence laws’ show that the effectiveness of any legal reforms 
are conditioned by the characteristics of the legal system in which they operate and 
that their success should be measured by the number of women who, in real terms, 
benefit from them.
180
CHAPTER SIX:
GENDER RELATIONS IN ANDEAN COMMUNITIES
Introduction:
The previous chapter concentrated on the law designed and negotiated from the 
‘centre'. The law had incorporated some feminist demands but when applied to the 
reality of the legal system failed to meet its objectives. It was also argued that it was 
designed to be applied in an urban environment. The three following chapters will 
contrast this deeply coastal-urban approach on gender relations, domestic violence and 
conflict resolution with the Andean communities’s position.
This chapter has two main purposes. Firstly it looks at the sources of gender identities 
in Andean communities, finding the elements which inform women’s lives and 
ultimately their decisions in relation to domestic violence. Secondly, it looks at the 
limits and possibilities of the Andean communities social organisation to manage 
conflicts such as domestic violence.
It understands by ‘creation of gender identities' the following:
'The social construction of gender is the process by which the 
categories of male and female actors are organised and reproduced in 
subsequent generations, and the social institutions by which gender is 
expressed (for example, marriage, inheritance, ritual).’ (Radcliffe 
1986:106)
181
However, it also assumes that this social construction is a dynamic process that in the 
case of Andean societies is affected by the 'larger' society which influences the Andean 
women and men in their personal choices (e.g. the size of their families) and also 
influences the organisational form of the Andean community itself and the way it 
relates to the state institutions.
The chapter also pays attention to the degree of ‘autonomy’ of women within their 
social groups (ie women’s possibilities and capacity to take decisions by themselves 
and not subordinated to ‘family, kinship and community’1) to understand how they 
negotiate their demands and in which forums. These ideas are contrasted with the 
vital importance of the married couple as central to the survival of the group and the 
importance for women of their membership in their groups.
1. Andean communities.-
As was mentioned in chapter four, Andean communities have their origin in the 
pre-Inca ayllus, as groups of people of common lineage under the lead of a kuraka 
During the colonial times these ayllus experienced a great transformation. The 
dramatic demographic collapse of the indigenous population during colonisation 
justified a policy of resettlement of the ayllus. Sometimes in this process their original 
composition was respected but most of the time these original ayllus were joined to 
others to favour concentration of the labour force. Spaniards were responsible for 
giving these former ayllus characteristics closer to the Spanish peasant communities.
During the expansion of the land-states, the communities were more restricted to the
higher valleys as large amounts of their communal land were seized. During the
Republic an official register was created to give legal recognition to these ‘Indigenous
1 ie conceiving themselves as 'separable from other people', so ‘she can assert rights as an individual’ 
(Whitehead 1984:189, Yural Davies 1996:24)
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Communities’. With the Agrarian Reform of 1968, the state changed the 
denomination of the communities to ‘Peasant Communities’. The restructuring of the 
land-state system led to the creation of new communities through association of new 
peasants individuals, although most communities have a long existence. Some of 
them can trace their roots to before the Spanish conquest.
In the present work the term ‘Andean communities’ is used. This denomination is 
preferred by some anthropologists like Ossio (1992, 1995) because it highlights 
communities’ identities as members of larger ethnic and cultural groups located in the 
Andes mountains. There are two main ethnic groups living in the Andes mountains at 
the present time, the Quechuas extending along the territory of Peru and the Aymaras 
populating the region of lake Titicaca on the border with Bolivia. The Quechuas 
grouped in communities denominate themselves with the word: runakuna.
There are almost five thousand communities legally registered in Peru and it is 
estimated that there are one thousand more without registration (Revilla 1994: 209). It 
is possible to define an Andean community as an association o f families within a 
collective territory dedicated to agricultural, pastoral and craft activities. They are 
located between 2,000 and 4,000 metres above sea level. The major ambition of a 
community is to have access to terrain along the ‘ecological floors’, this is extending 
across a range of altitudes in order to have access to the different agricultural crops, 
appropriate to a variety of climatic conditions. Different families can have plots 
across the ‘ecological floors’ and it is here that the Andean concept of reciprocity and 
barter became fundamental for the survival of these groups. Life in Andean mountains 
is hard. The agricultural techniques are rudimentary without the employment of 
machinery such as tractors and for some poor farmers even without animals.
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The communities are mainly self-sufficient and families are units of consumption and 
production. However, the demand for cash produced by poverty (understood as the 
exhaustion of the communal land for the younger generation) and a major exchange 
with the larger society (expressed by the demand for new goods) obliged their 
members to a major incorporation into the market economy, mainly as seasonal 
workers but also through commercial activities. The process o f ‘private accumulation’ 
between families is not a uniform one, resulting in some peasant families being 
wealthier than others. This situation in some cases jeopardises the reciprocity between 
neighbours. At present families who are able to have a means of transport (e g. trucks) 
are counted as being the wealthiest. Additionally, it is observed that in the lower 
communities, more linked to the ‘larger society’ women are experiencing an erosion of 
their traditional role as being mainly responsible for management of the domestic 
economy, becoming more subordinate to cash earning husbands. In higher 
communities, more isolated from the market economy, the forceful role of women is 
still respected and the traditional reciprocal relationships are indispensable for their 
survival (Villasante 1990:33).
2. Socialisation.-
Andean communities show clear patterns of sexual differentiation. Gender
differentiation starts before the birth of the child in the ways people guess the sex of
the future baby2. This differentiation, however, does not place the feminine gender in
a subordinate or undervalued relationship with the male gender On the contrary
every couple expects the first child to be a girl because it brings luck and prosperity.
The woman is considered tuque (larder) and this means accumulation, caring, and
permanence (Valderrama and Escalante 1997:153, Ossio 1992:216-7). In some 
" See Valderrama and Escalante (1997:153).
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communities it is desirable to have more daughters than sons because women 'help' 
more and when married bring sons-in-laws who at the beginning of the relationship are 
expected to join the bride's family labour force (Ossio 1992:216).
Knox-Seith (1995:132-133) claims that children in Andean communities learn through 
observation and participation in cultural practices 'both that they are gendered and how 
to be gendered’. Dressing is one of the ways that is easy for children to learn to 
differentiate between men and women. Women’s and men’s dress emphasise gender 
difference ’giving them a very different appearance and shape’. Children also leam 
that women sit on the ground with their legs close to their body hidden by their skirts, 
men instead sit on the ground with their legs stretched out, otherwise they sit in chairs 
or on benches.
Gender differentiation is also emphasised by the division of labour. In the pastoral 
communities a baby girl accompanies her mother to graze the llamas and sheep. From 
that time she ’is learning’. When she is 6 or 7 years old she grazes the sheep herself 
(Valderrama and Escalante 1997: 155).
Ossio (1992) and K.nox-Seith (1995) understand these marked gender differences in
Andean culture as very positive for women. Ossio (1992:216) even claims:
‘The sexual differences are a common characteristic between all 
societies, however, in Andean society it achieves the extremes such as it 
provides a system of parallel transmission of rights and attributes. It 
gives the impression that the sexes are two parallel and complementary 
worlds, that they are equally balanced, consequently it’s not possible to 
claim that one dominates the other’.
3. M arriage.-
Andean culture is based on the conjugal pair. The wide production of Andean 
ethnography has strongly focused on the complementarity between husbands and
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wives in Andean communities. They conclude that the concept of 'qhariwarmi', the 
Quechua word to name the conjugal pair, gives the idea that men and women are parts 
-opposite and interdependent- of the same unit. This 'dualism' has been revealed as the 
basis of the Andean cosmology: 'tunkuy uma qhanwurmt (everything is man and 
woman) and provides a model of Andean society as a whole (Platt 1986:241; Harris 
1978:22)' . As a counter idea, singleness is negatively regarded by these societies 
(Ossio 1992:218).
Young people are expected to have sexual experiences before marrying. Normally this 
happens after a pre-arrangement between boys and girls. There exists abundant 
ethnography explaining these encounters and the variation between communities3 4. In 
the Quechua communities of the Southern Andes these teenagers 'games' are called 
vida michiy (vida michiq) or tusuq. In those encounters, boys normally steal a piece of 
cloth from the girls (normally their woven belt) and if girls do not recover them, it 
means an acceptance of a later sexual encounter possibly while the girls are grazing 
the animals and late in the evening. If they get on well together, and especially if she 
is pregnant, the boy and his parents enter into a conversation with the girls family to 
arrange the future cohabitation of their children. This includes specific rituals and 
stages. When there is not a 'good understanding' between the two families, it 
frequently happens that the new couple 'escape' either to pressure their families or to 
establish an independent life3.
Feliz (25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray) related to me his experience in this way:
3 See Platt 1986 for Andean dual symbolism.
4See Harris (1994: 52-4) and Ossio (1992:)
See Isbell (1978:119-136), Valderrama and Escalante (1992: 33-4, 63-4), Ossio (1992: 224-332) and 
Harris (1989, 1994)
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We knew each other since children, ¡¿iter we 'met’ [as boyfriend and 
girlfriend] in the community so we had a plan: we hud to tell our parents 
but i f  they would have not accepted we were going to escape. My 
parents went to meet her family, they entered in a ’good understanding’. 
1 was 20 and Sonia ! 7 We followed the old custom, we took baskets o f 
food, chiriuchu, fruits, beer. At 10 p.m., in the night my parents took all 
of these things. All the parents together lit a candle and prayed to God. 
They asked us if  really we wanted to live together and how we had met 
each other. After that we started to live in my mother-in-law’s home. It 
could he also in my parents’ home but since l  had still two younger 
brothers and two younger sisters it was more convenient at her parents*. 
During 1993 we finished our own home, and during 1994 we came to 
live here. We are civil and religiomly married. That happened in 1995. 
My mother in law required us to and l had to work hard to have money 
for the marriage.
Another Andean custom related by anthropologists is called chahua manta orqoy or 
chawachan and it literally means to take the women 'in row1 (Ossio 1992:227, Isbell 
1978:120). In other South Andean regions it is called hanku tapukuy (asking in row, 
Valderrama and Escalante 1992:146-7). In this case, the boy’s parents decide on 
suitable candidates (consulting the coca leaves). Sometimes the boy refuses the 
candidates but the family locks him up until he accepts. The boy's family take food, 
coca and alcoholic drink to the house of the first candidate. In a positive negotiation 
the girl’s parents accept. The last to know of this decision is the girl who is forced to 
stay in a room with the boy until she accepts him. It has been documented that many 
girls refuse and shout and beat the future bridegroom, in this case, she is no longer 
forced. But some of them accept the parents' will since it is allowed for a couple to 
split if they do not get on well. Most of my interviewees were in agreement that this is 
an ‘old custom' and that the new generation has challenged it. Armandina (35, AC 
Tamacalla, Dist Limatambo, Anta) told me:
In most Andean communities, there is not a fixed pattern o f  residence Depending on the circumstance 
could be virilocal or uxorilocal in the beginning of the marriage, later most couples decide for a neolocal 
residence
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One day I found my parents drinking with wealthier people. They were 
entering in agreement to make me live with their son. 1 was just 13. 1 
had a godmother in the city who had explained about the menstruation 
and the possibility to be mother i f  I  'give myself to any boy in the fields. 
I was listening to the arrangement. They were drinking 'trago' (cane 
sugar alcohol) and eating food I suddenly started to shout to everybody 
j  am not going to live with him' and I told my mother 'you live with him'. 
She treated me with beating but 1 did not mind. I stood up for my opinion.
Encamación (25, AC Maska, Dist Pisac, Calca) had been sent at 12 years old to work
in the cities, first in Cusco and later in Lima. She was not aware of such a custom:
When I came hack to the community after working as a domestic servant 
in Lima I met my husband. My husband took me to his home and in front 
o f  his dad he introduced me to him. From that we have just started to 
live together. He had told to his dad: 'Dad l want to live with a girl that I 
have already met'. When he took me there he locked me in the room l 
tried to escape but he locked it. To my dad he also had told it and they 
had drunk and cooked. They had already talked that we were going to 
live together and in this way he locked me in the room.
Encamación freely chose her boyfriend but as it happened in a more urban setting this 
did not necessarily have to lead to a major commitment. She felt trapped in that 
situation, disappointed with the fact that she was not consulted regarding future 
cohabitation.
For Lucia (26, AC Cuyo Grande, Dist Pisac, Calca) this custom is fully in disuse:
/  met my husband in my town. He was my neighbour. In this way we fell 
in love. At present young people live together since they are girlfriends 
and boyfriends. There is no longer this custom that parents enter in an 
agreement. At least in my family something like that has never happened 
since l  remember.
In Andean culture marriage is a process made up by ritualised stages. Firstly, there is a 
'conversation' (rimaykuy) between the two families, from that process the couple start 
to live together. This period of cohabitation could last many years. The civil and
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religious marriage come later, when the couple have saved enough money for the 
celebrations and when they are sure of their future cohabitation. In the past, as Ossio 
(1992:226) relates, the religious wedding preceded the civil one and in some cases 
there was never a civil wedding. Nowadays, the Catholic Church refuses to marry any 
couple without the civil certificate.
Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist Chincheros) expressed in this way:
/  have cohabited since I  was 19 years old but afterwards we got married. 
We always cohabited first and after we marry. I f  you don't get on very 
well you can separate, when there is no understanding. He gives you 
maintenance or we separate the children, the boys for the men and girls 
for the women1. We have to join money for the party o f  marriage. When 
we are married it is very difficult to split. Husbands change character 
sometimes they are bad when single but when married they get better on 
some occasions it is the contrary.
And Victoria (47, AC Maraspaqui, Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchis) told me: When / was 
16 we 'compromised' (started to live together) and we got married when we had two 
children.
Even those who have migrated to more urban settings try to comply with the customs.
This is the case of Aquilino (24, AC Mahuaypampa, Paucartambo):
In 1992 1 met Flor. She was working as a domestic servant in Cusco. 
From that house she left to live with me. We went to her community in 
Paruro with my unde as representative o f my parents. It took us two 
days to arrive there. It is very beautiful her community, they know how 
to live well (nice).
The women of the Mother's Club of the District of Taray, (Prov. Calca) were 
unanimous:
Kinship in Andean culture has been bilateral since pre-Colombian time (Silverblatt 1990) . It is 
developed in two parallel lines male and female which produce particular rights and duties Men inherit 
from their fathers and the daughters from their mothers (Anderson 1990:82-3). One aspect o f these lines 
of maleness and femaleness is this separation of the children (Ossio 1992: 230-1)
189
In this district most old couples are married and the younger 
cohabitants, later they marry, when they have enough money for the 
party. Here we like big parties. Women always have partners. In this 
district sometimes women marry between 16 and 17 but normally when 
they are IS or 20. In very high communities it is earlier than that.
4. Division of labour
The sexualization of the cosmos is connected both as cause and effect to 
a strong sexual division of labour ... you might see women working with 
their husbands in the fields; in one courtyard you might see a woman 
weaving fine textiles, and in the next you might see a male weaver 
working on a similar piece with similar designs. In the evening you 
might stop at a house where a man is preparing dinner while his wife 
stays out to guard a partially harvested field But if you talk to Runakuna 
about what they are doing, you will find that in their minds these tasks 
are associated with either one sex or the other- and this affects how the 
job is done, its relationship to other jobs, and the attitude with which it is 
undertaken.'(Allen 1988:73)
Knox-Seith (1995:136-7) reports that in the papa yapuy (potato plough) it is the man 
who deals with the whole range of agricultural tasks while women provide the meals. 
Other ethnographers, however, point out that this sexual division is not strict, and 
household and agricultural tasks are normally interchangeable (Harris 1978:30, Allen 
1988:73). In my own observation I saw frequently women and men working together 
in the fields or either I saw exclusively groups of men or groups of women, especially 
in faenas (communal work). 1 also saw husbands taking care of the children or 
cooking because women were doing faenas (communal works) for the Mother's Club 
or because they were available to prepare the breakfast while the woman was busy 
with other activities. Men normally cook when women are out grazing the animals. A 
typical South Andean division of labour is presented in Appendix 7.
Casos (1990:32) states that it has been a progressive specialisation of women to be 
exclusively responsible for the domestic chores where the husbands now do not have
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any direct participation. Before, she says, they partially participated, now with the 
increased necessity for cash, men are continuously away from home thus breaking the 
complementary relationships in the domestic environment. In these cases the domestic 
work is shared with their daughters when they are old enough. In peasant communities 
domestic chores are carried on with so much constancy and effort that there is no 
moment to rest. There is no running water, drainage or electricity. In more isolated 
communities (higher communities) husbands still carry on with tasks considered 
feminine such as cooking, taking care of the children and tending the animals (Casos 
1990:32, Villasante 1990:33).
In terms of self-value of their work, Andean women differentiate between “Hank "ay" 
that refers mainly to men’s work in agricultural activities from “runway” that can be 
translated as ‘housework’ ( in Spanish it will be translated with the world quehacer 
that includes housework and other daily activities, Villasante 1990:12-3). 
Consequently when we asked Andean women about ‘their work’, they referred 
immediately to those large agricultural activities such as some communal works or 
those activities in which they can earn some money8. Hilda (20, AC Chitapampa, Dist 
Taray, Prov Calca) told us:
Women always work in 'business' (selling things). When they perform the 
faenas o f  vegetables, women cook, they also sell frozen potato. Women 
sell this. [After I asked about the domestic chore she replied] yes women 
sweep, cook, take care o f the children, [she added while laughing] 
women work a lot!!
Radcliffe (1986:112) in an ethnography taken in the early eighties finds that men think 
of the agricultural activities, that they mainly perform, as ‘to work’ while activities 
not connected to this labour as ‘not work’. Bourque and Warren (1981:118) found that
8 c.f. Cadena (1991: 10-1).
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Andean people see the 'men's ability to work' as more important because of the use of 
physical strength. They can carry heavier tools and 'engage in more strenuous labour1.
We see, in Hilda’s statement that this opinion is still prevalent. Women ‘work’ in the 
vegetable cultivation. She had also told me: Men work in the agricultural chores, in 
the barley harvest. Men work more, because they are stronger. Additionally, it is 
evident how the incorporation to the cash economy has affected the notion of work. 
Hilda -as other of my interviewees- acknowledges as ‘work’ when they can earn 
money, for instance, selling frozen potatoes. After this answer in which she did not 
recognise domestic chores as ‘work’, I asked her ‘who awakes first and goes to bed 
later’, after thinking she added Women wake up first and they go to bed in the end. 
Children and husband go to bed first. Women are the latest in going to bed. In a 
society were the capacity to work ‘hard’9 is very important this sudden recognition of 
her own contribution gave Hilda a reason to be happy. In my conversation with NGOs 
in the Cusco area, they let me know that one target of their training ‘on gender’ with 
Andean rural women is to awake a greater awareness of ‘women’s work’. It is 
estimated that women in Andean communities work an average of 16 to 17 hours per 
day (Villasante 1990:13)
For women living closer to the tourist centres, craft production has become an 
important part of their lives. Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chincheros, Prov. 
Urubamba) told me:
Everyday l sell craft, the whole day, I am going just to have lunch at 
noon. The whole week from Monday to Sunday. I sell things that 1 make 
myself.
See Radcliffe (1986 111).
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In other cases this involvement with the tourist market is just seasonal. In our data this 
was the most common case. Encamación (25, AC Maska, Dist Pisac, Prov Calca) 
told me:
When from Pisac we have contracts we paint little pieces o f ceramic or 
leather. I did hut there is not so much selling, I don't know why, maybe 
there are not many tourists. Most o f us in Maska, we work on our 
lands, in the hills we cultivate.
Valentina (32, AC Chuquimarca, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta) related to me the
hardships that peasant populations face to be incorporated in the market economy.
On Sundays we sell our products between 9 and II in the market. We 
sell 'tostadores' (a ceramic pan to roast corn). The Women's Committee 
make them, we know how to make them since our grandmothers. We 
cultivate potatoes and the arroba (12 kilos) can cost 4, 3 even 2.50 soles 
pay the 'rescatistas' (agricultural products traders), also wheat, broad 
beans we sell them in the market by arrobas. We sell them to the 
'rescatistas', we think that they have an 'arranged' scale. Those who 
have studied don't permit to be tricked and they bring to Cusco to sell. 
We bring an arroba to the market and it is not enough to buy anything. I 
have to carry on my back the 12 kilos, by necessity we don't have horses 
or donkeys. Sometimes we work as Jornaleros on other's land because 
we have to buy the school stationary and books (’utiles') for our children. 
The 'jornal' is from 4 to 5 soles per day and for harder works 7 soles.
5. Reproduction.-
Current Andean peoples views on sexual reproduction differ radically from their 
perception of two decades ago. In the ethnography gathered by Bourque and Warren 
(1981:88) between 1974 and 1978 the following is reported: ' Having children is very 
positively valued by both women and men in Chuchin and Mayobamba. Both men and 
women say that children are the reason that people work'. This situation has changed 
because of the increased poverty but also because of the influence of aggressive state 
birth control campaigns. The argument used in the past to support a large family
(children bring wealth) now is used to reduce its size (children bring more poverty). 
Casos (1990:30) comments:
..the previous generation regarded that 'with more children it is better1 
At the present time the extreme poverty produces a constant 
preoccupation to limit the demographic growth...'
In Andean communities, there is not enough land to share with new members. To 
have more children means to see them migrate and look for their future elsewhere 
Additionally, the access of peasants to education also means an extra economic burden 
to fulfil with the school requirements (stationary, supporting activities, etc.)
Knox-Seith (1995:154) states that Andean women regard having children as an 
overburden on top of all the other peasant hardships and regard birth control as a
relief:
'Women inquired about birth control, saying: “I've had enough small 
children. (...) a woman's work is never done. Men go to the fields, 
tranquil, peaceful, they come home, and are done with their work. 
Women, they must rise early to cook. At night, they cook and wash up 
while the men rest. And all day long, they [women] have to put up with 
the erqekuna (small children)’”
My interviewees were unanimous about the necessity for birth control. Most Andean
women have a good degree of autonomy in reproductive decision and also have a
positive support from their partners. However, there are still men against birth control
who pressure women to avoid it. My interviewees opine:
/  don't want more children. ! get controlled in the 'posta' (National 
health centres), my husband is in agreement. But there are husbands who 
are opposed, they are bad, they want women to have children every year. 
However the majority this year are controlled (se cuidan), now they have 
2 or 3 children before they had 10 children. There has been a campaign 
o f the Health Ministry, especially in the last years (Alejandrina, 30, AC 
Kuper, Dist Chinchero).
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There are no 'posta' near hy, but nurses from the Wanchaq's posta come 
over. We control ourselves even myself. There are men who are 
opposed, they reject because there are women who have used the Cooper 
T (IUD) and they have damaged their health . There are cases in which 
women got pregnant even with the Cooper T. I know two cases. I have 
been sterilised (ligado) and I feel well (Faustina, 30, AC Yungaypata, 
Dist Cusco).
We have to walk one hour or one hour and a half to the town. Yes there 
is a 'posta' in the town, two people give attention, two nurses. Women 
'take care' [control] because now they have just had two children, I don't 
want to have more children, 3 maximum. To have children means to 
educate them well and to educate them you need to have money (Lucia, 
26, AC Cuyo Grande, Dist Pisac, Prov Calca).
Women in our communities use birth control. I take care o f myself with 
'ligazón' [sterilisation] (Encamación, 25, AC Maska, Dist Pisac, Calca).
Most men understand and they permit their wives to use birth control, 
some don't. We have seen cases in which the husband because o f 
jealousy did not accept it (Mother’s Club Dist. Taray, Prov Calca).
Feliz, a young man from the AC Chitapampa (26, Dist. Taray, Prov Calca) was very
much in agreement about birth control but he regarded women as incapable of dealing
with the health officers by themselves:
In Ccorao there is a posta. Women control and husbands permit them, h  
is better when the partners go with the women. I went with my wife 
because rural women are closed and sometimes it is necessary to ask 
and dear our doubts.
The last national census held in 1993 shows that the fertility rate in rural areas was 6.2 
children on average per woman (while in urban zones it is 2.8). However the national 
percentage for age range in the same category is 0.8% in women between 20-24, 1.8% 
in women between 25-29. Women with more children are concentrated in the age 
range of 35-39 with 3.8%, 40-44 with 4.6% and 45-49 with 5.2%. This confirms the
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idea that younger women are really considering the reduction in the size of their family 
even in rural zones.
However, Ruiz (1995:457) suggests that although the fertility rate has substantially 
decreased, Peruvian women still have more children that they would like to have. She 
claims that while the global national fertility rate is 3.5 the 'ideal' fertility rate (this is 
how many children women declared they would like) was 2.5. In the rural area the 
gap is even bigger, while the real rate is 6.2 women declared to want just 2.7 children. 
This result appeared despite the fact that 95% of women stated that they knew about 
birth control.
One reason is the lack of confidence in the health services provided by the state. 
There is a hierarchical relationship between medical practitioners and women in rural 
areas and women do not receive the necessary information that they need to be sure 
about safe birth control methods. Even more, in many of these services nurses and 
doctors do not talk the native language and Andean women do not understand well 
Spanish or are fully monolingual. On top of the daily problem with the health 
services, the last birth control campaign by Fujimori’s government regarding surgical 
sterilisation proved to be disastrous for some women, as mentioned in chapter four.
6. Formal education.-
The illiteracy rate is still high in the rural zones of Peru, and even higher among 
women. 29.8% of the rural population is illiterate (compared to 6.7% in urban 
zones)10. From that percentage, 42.9 % is made up by women whilst 9.8% are men. In 
a 1981 study in the Cusco zone it was found that 34% of rural men were illiterate 
compared to 70% of women (Fernandez 1990: 373).
10 1993 National Census Peruvian National Statistic Institute
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The average years of study in the rural zones are 3.1 for women and 5 for men whilst 
in urban zones they are 8 5 for women and 9.6 for men. It has been estimated that just 
4% of the rural population complete secondary school Knox-Seith (1995:205) found 
very low success rates for Andean children In the community of Chuchin (Prov. 
Calca, Cusco) 77 students enrolled in the two first grades classes of them just 31 
passed (got the grade). 24 dropped out and 22 did not pass.
This is explained by the appalling conditions of the educational system in rural areas. 
There are few teachers, they are extremely low paid and 65% of them are without 
formal qualification. Materials with which to teach the children are almost non 
existent. Additionally, the few materials that are available are written in Spanish. 
Teachers in first grade normally use Quechua to talk to the children but education is 
mainly in Spanish. The educational curriculum is not adapted for rural zones. Little 
of the educational content in the school is useful for rural children. In other words, 
there is a 'homogenous' curriculum for the whole country, this includes the school 
timetables that do not take into account the agricultural calendar During busy rural 
periods many children do not attend school as they help their parents in the fields. 
(Knox-Seith 1995:203, Harvey 1988:108)
For Andean parents to send a child to the school means less help at home and more 
investment of cash. Additionally, communities are expected to build their own school, 
medical posts and other public buildings 'in an effort not expected of urban dwellers, 
especially of the middle class and above’ (Carazas 1989:25-28).
The permanence of children at schools is not the same for boys as for girls. Knox-Seith 
(1995:206-8) finds that the percentage of enrolment of boys and girls in the first grade 
of primary school is quite similar but as school progresses there is a significant decline
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in girls enrolment. This, despite that there is a similar proportion of girls and boys 
passing their grades. By the fifth grade this difference is considerable, from 48% of 
girls attending in the first grade just 28% remain in the fifth grade. This despite that 
-as Casos (1990:31) documents- peasant women forcefully defend their girls school 
education. They send their daughters to the school even though this means less help 
with the domestic chores. My interviewees were of the same opinion, for instance, 
Valentina (32, AC Chuquimarca, Dist Limatambo, Prov. Anta) told me: 7 send my 
little children to tend the animals when they are not in the school time. When they are 
in the school 1 tend the animals myself or my husband does'. However, when a serious 
problem arises, it is the girls who are deprived of being sent to school. Victoria (47, 
AC Maraspaqui, Ttinque, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi) told me proudly about 
having sent their children to the school although her oldest daughter could not 
continue because Victoria had twins and needed extra help at home: 7 have educated 
all my children. Just I did not send Delfina to the school because I gave birth to twins 
and she had to assist me'. Delfina was illiterate and monolingual. However, the 
children she sent to the school included another three girls.
A positive value is given to formal education by Andean people, especially by women 
who did not have the opportunity to be educated themselves. Women actively 
participate in any school activities generating more funds while men have a more 
passive attitude their involvement being at the beginning, with the building of the 
school (Casos 1990:31-2). Andean peasants have a particular understanding of the 
concept of 'improving' Ansion (1989:46) states: ‘the attitude seems to be: there's no 
rush, the important thing is to advance’. Victoria’s experience (47, AC Maraspaqui, 
Ttinque, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi) reflects this feeling:
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I have not entered to the school hut later /  have learnt in the literacy 
programme. Before, when my children did the homework /  used to do it 
the same, I copied and after ...I went to the programme.
1. Access to propertv.-
In Andean communities there are two types of property: individual and collective. 
Individual property is acquired in a process of accumulation. It starts at birth through 
gifts of different kinds Later, a girl or boy receives cash at the baptism and rutuchikuy 
(haircutting) ceremonies. In the ceremony of'marking of animals’ children receive a 
calf from their godparents. When they marry they receive a 'donation' from their 
parents and later they receive their 'inheritance', normally when their parents are still 
alive but getting too old for the agricultural work and having to rely on their children 
for survival (Ossio 1992:133-4).
The rights to access to a process of'individual accumulation' are the same for men and 
women although the opportunities to acquire goods can be different. In Andean 
communities women are the ones mainly responsible for herding. Already when they 
marry, women normally are the owners of variable numbers of animals received as 
gifts throughout their lives. The management of the herd permits women access to 
their own capital that they normally use to buy cloth for themselves and their children. 
Some widows are so successful in this 'enterprise' they are capable of remaining alone 
and supporting themselves without difficulties (Skar 1979:455). Men instead have 
been able to obtain cash income as waged labourers, working on others’ land in 
neighbouring communities or travelling to lower valleys in the collection of main 
crops such as coffee. This money is normally saved or used in a major investment for 
the family.
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7.1 Land Tenure.-
The land system in Andean communities is a very complex subject being the result of 
a historical process, described in chapter four, in which ancestral forms have survived 
next to a continuum of contraction and expansion of the communities land. 
Additionally, Andean communities have been subject to general state policies in 
agriculture and others more specific such as the Agrarian Land Reform. The result is a 
plurality of property modalities and forms of land transactions (Ossio 1992:129)“ .
Andean communities are based in territorial extensions legally recognised as collective 
property, this is the 'material basis for the communal organisation' (Plaza and Francke 
1985:61). Within this territory exist three forms of land tenure:
1) The land privately possessed by families: most of the irrigated land is held 
‘privately’. This land can be inherited, rented, cultivated with others and sold between 
community members. This produces a process of 'plot accumulation' in which some 
commoners have many plots and others just a few or even none. This accumulation 
depends on the commoner’s personal history and conditions which have permitted him 
(or her) more access to land. Access to the cash economy is important (getting better 
wages, being a craft-maker, having children who have migrated and who send money 
regularly) but probably the main condition is being part of a smaller family without 
many brothers and sisters to share the inheritance^. Men and women -individually- 
have right to access to this kind of property. Just looking into this form of land tenure 
the Andean communities look more like having an associative form of family property,
1' Ossio (1992:129-153), Plaza and Francke (1985), Urquieta (1993) and Peña (1998) try to clarify the
issue.
For a study of income and differential process o f land accumulation see Watters (1994 134-145) 
Ossio (1992:134) refers in his study that the average of private plots in the Community of Andamarca 
(Ayacucho, South Andes) is 8 95 per commoner However, he found one case o f  a 'landless' commoner 
and another who held 95 plots Normally a plot is o f one hectare
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however, even this private land is under the control of the community as a whole. It is 
the community who manage the resources such as water and commoners have a set of 
duties toward the community that they have to fulfil.
2) The land of collective use: forest (wood) and natural pasture are of free access for 
all members who pay an annual 'quota' to the communal "box'
3) The communal land is adjudicated by quotas to the registered commoners 
(empadronados). This type of land is normally the one called secano (dryness) located 
around 3,000 Mts. It is called this because the only source o f irrigation is the rain. 
This land is divided by sectors which are alternately cultivated. They are of rotational 
use: every sector is cultivated for about 4 years after that entering into a period of 
'resting' for 5 years to 8 years (to naturally recover nutrients). A sector ‘in production’ 
is distributed between the families by plots of equal size. The usufruct is for the 
family.
Over this land the community has full control. If the commoners are absent or are not 
fulfilling their communal obligation they can be deprived of their plots. Additionally 
when a commoner dies without direct heirs the plot returns to the community and is 
distributed again between new members. In this form of land tenure as well as in the 
previous one, women do not have a direct right over them because it is adjudicated to 
the head of the family that under the Agrarian Reform legislation was understood to be 
the man.
At present, most of my interviewees recognised that the main form of acquired land 
within the community is by means of inheritance. As Feliz (25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. 
Taray, Prov. Calca) told me: 'The land is just inheritance from the parents. Lucia (26, 
AC Cuyo Grande, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) expressed a similar situation: ’My father
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gave me my inheritance. The community now don't give anything although my 
husband is registered (empadronado). There is little communal land'. Lucia mentioned 
that it was her 'father1 and not her 'mother' who gave her the land as would have been 
the traditional pattern of inheritance. This supports the appreciation made by Cadena 
(1991) who gives evidence of unequal patterns of inheritance between sons and 
daughters among Andean communities. Her study reveals that 60% of men inherited 
land compared to 40% of women, consequently women have become more landless 
than men. Francisca (49, AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian Prov. Cusco) expressed this 
unfair situation to me:
/  don't have my own plot, 1 help my mother and she shares with me. We 
are all alone, my sister is also a widow... Our sons help us with the land. 
The 'comuneros' should have the same portion o f land but it is not the 
case. For instance, to me they have not given me a piece o f  land 
however all o f commoners we have the same obligation.
The parents o f my mothers have a good amount o f  land and after my 
mum got married with a man from San Gerónimo (another community) 
they decided to give less land to my mother because she was a woman, 
because they said she was not going to work as a man. To her brother, 
the only boy in the family, they gave him more and the authorities 
support them in that decision. So, the grandchildren o f the women have 
every time less.
This situation has been reinforced by the main problem of the Andean communities: 
the scarcity of land. Plots have become even smaller because of inheritance. There is 
now an over division of the plots (Tamayo 1992:99). Additionally, very few 
communities still have secano land to share between the new members. Aquilino (26, 
AC Mahuaypampa, Dist. Paucartambo, Prov. Paucartambo) expressed to me his views 
on this process and the impact on the young generation and on the situation of women. 
In his personal history some of the dilemmas affecting the survival of Andean 
communities come across. Aquilino’s father is a drunkard who until now maltreats his 
mother. His father is considered a ‘bad commoner’ and the little land that they hold is
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low in production since his father does not care. When children, they starved and
survived by other commoners charity. At 14 years old Aquilino migrated to the city of
Cusco to work as a domestic worker and later left for the Concepcion valley (low
jungle) to work in the coffee and coca crops. After he met Flor he decided to establish
his family back in his community. He found it so difficult to get a piece of land and
even though he got some land from the community he can not see a certain future for
their own children. In relation to the land tenure system he related the following:
One part o f the widows land -when the husband dies- returns to the 
community (the same happens with the male widows). My grandfather 
(his mother's father) did not have any small children and his wife was 
dead too. AH the land came back to the community.
Children do not inherit. When they register as commoners they obtain a 
portion o f land. They say that a 'comunero' can not eat from two plates. 
To the new people they do not even give us a small piece o f  land. We 
have to wait 5 years to receive a piece o f land and we have to pay 100 
soles and give 'trago' (sugar cane alcohol) in order to be registered.
When a person steals or you fight with the 'comuneros' they make you 
problems. They put you in the second shift and in the third one they 
expel you from the community.
The old commoners instead, mainly those in the Steering Committee got 
the best land, there is just poor land for us.
The scarcity of land produces many conflicts in the Andean communities. I observed 
on my visits that the young generation were expecting the elders to die or were willing 
to push for the expulsion of a member with the expectation of getting more land 
allocated. In the community of Mahuaypampa (Prov. Paucartambo) I came across 
Francisca who was threatened with expulsion by the other community members 
because her husband had raped her 13 year old daughter (daughter as well of the 
rapist). The husband was sent to prison but Francisca was considered a 'bad woman' 
for having failed to protect her daughter from the abusive father. Her husband was 
definitely expelled from the community since this kind of criminal offence -very rarely 
reported in Andean communities- had provoked the community’s indignation.
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Francisca claimed in her defence that as soon as her daughter told her she called on her 
in-laws to intervene but they did not do anything. The atmosphere was of deep 
resentment against her but the possibility of her expulsion -without taking into 
consideration that this attitude was affecting Eva and her siblings- was exacerbated by 
the necessity for land. I listened to people speculating about the future reallocation of 
this possession. The expulsion of Francisca did not happen but she left the community 
taking her children because she felt rejected and isolated.
8, Widowhood.-
The case of widows is significant since it gives evidence about women's autonomous 
position in a particular society. What can women do without a man?. In Andean 
Communities, the conjugal pair is basis of the organisation and the cultural 
representations. 'Singleness' is outcast. Remarrying is an alternative but is not always 
feasible, in a society where to marry is almost compulsory there are few older men and 
women 'available'. Widows or separated mothers (who have not 'remarried') are in a 
disadvantageous position especially to fulfil their commoner requirements. The 
communal work, so called faenas has to be done by men as Lucia (26 AC Cuyo 
Grande, Dist Pisac, Prov. Calca) informed me: in the 'faenas' a woman can noI 
replace a man. In that case, if widows do not have a grown up son they have to hire 
somebody to represent them in the faena causing a detriment to their own economy. If 
they do not have enough money to pay the community quotas (a fixed cash 
contribution to a communal fund) they have to pay with other goods. There is no 
exemption for widows (and neither for widowers). Francisca (46, AC Ccorao, Dist. 
San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) told me her story:
There are many abuses against women when they are alone with their
children, when they are trying just to get bread and to behave correctly.
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All the comuneros made war against me, they almost threw me o ff my 
land, they were causing conflict, the same authorities, because /  was 
alone they wanted to take advantage.
When a woman is alone nobody helps her and on top o f  that she has to 
fulfil alt the tasks as a commoner and in this way they have to fulfil the 
hardest tasks. I had to participate in everything even without money they 
asked me for something. 'You have grown cuys (guinea pigs) so you have 
to give for the 'inauguration de las obras' (opening celebration of 
finished communal works) they told me.
Men are the ones who are against women, no women were against me. 
And this situation has not happened just to me they have tried to abuse 
other women too.
We are many women alone or widows like me. In 1989 we were 30 
widows and now this number has increased to 40.
The conflictive situation against Francisca could be aggravated by the fact that at 13 
years old she was sent as a domestic servant to Lima coming back to the community in 
her middle twenties already married to a man from the coast. However, she was not 
exaggerating about the hardship that widows have to face, as other interviewees 
confirmed to me, but it is also well known that some widows are well respected in 
their communities (although they are not exonerated from the community obligations). 
In fact, all widows and widowers are treated ‘as equal’ as another commoner but it is 
precisely this ‘equal treatment' that has a tone of gender discrimination, since in these 
societies there is a strong division of labour.
There are no systematic studies on the condition and quantity of widows in Andean 
communities. My interviewees informed me that there are more widows than 
widowers in their communities but the number varies significantly from one
community to another.
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9. Communities social organisation.-
9.1 Kin networks.-
The Andean families are essentially ‘independent economic units’, however, 
self-sufficiency is achieved not by isolation but rather from the mutual-contribution 
networks that Andean families develop (Mayer 1977:72). The concept of 
‘reciprocity’, that is, the social institution in which every service should be returned in 
an equivalent manner, can be traced to pre-Inca times and has constituted the basis 
and survival of Andean people. In summary, the real wealth of a commoner is his/her 
relatives and the aid network that he/she can establish with other neighbours. In this 
extent Mayer (1977:72) comments: ‘...each household is the focus of a variety of 
labour and ceremonial exchanges with closely related households within the village, 
with people living in other communities, and so forth’.
Two factors favoured the consolidation of networks. In Andean communities kinship 
is bilateral, that is, can be traced from both parental lines in such a way that most 
Andean communities members are related. The other factor is that the communities 
are mainly endogamous. Statistics point out at least 60% of marriages occur between 
people of the same village. In the past endogamy was even higher (Mayer 1977:62).
The ritual or ceremonial relationship most important is the institution of godparents 
(padrinos). This generates a system of duties and obligations between godparents and 
godchildren and between godparents and godchildren’s parents. A person gets 
godparents at baptism, the haircutting ritual and marriage. Godparents are very 
important in the process of individual accumulation. They provide different goods and 
even cash at these events. Padrinos are also spiritual guides of their godchildren and 
have an important role in the intervention of domestic disputes. One or both spouses
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call the godparents for advice and guidance in serious disputes and their opinion can 
be very influential on the future behaviour of the couple (Peña 1998:162).
Amongst forms of'reciprocity', the ‘ayni’ is the most practised. It means that services 
are returned in the same manner. The most common of the aynis are the agricultural 
ones. For instance, a godson goes to his godfather's plot to work with him to help with 
the harvest, later the godfather will pay with his work (or with a hired worker) exactly 
the same number of days that the godson worked for him. The same happens in other 
areas such as religious activities in which the majordomo, the person responsible for 
the celebrations, receives help in the form of food and drink from other community 
members. It is expected that the majordomo will return the same contribution to every 
one of these people when they have to hold the same post . There are other types of 
reciprocity that differs between communities. Mayer (1977:63), for instance, 
comments on voluntad, waje-waje, and minka.
9,2 Com m unal O rganisation .-
Until the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law, the traditional hierarchical structure of the 
Andean community was held by a combined system of religious and bureaucratic 
positions. The highest bureaucratic official in the village was the municipal mayor 
who was elected by all married residents, both male and female. It was followed in 
importance by the Junta Communal (Communal Board) made up by a personero 
(main officer) and six other members democratically elected for a period of 4 years by 
all community members. They had as their main responsibility the defence of the 
communal land. The lieutenant governor was the representative of the government
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authorities of the provinces and dependent on the district governor. His main function 
was to keep public order -a responsibility that remains until present (Isbell 1978:83-4).
As was mentioned in chapter four, the Agrarian Reform was carried out with the 
objective of eliminating pre-capitalist forms of productive exploitation such as the 
latifundio’ (land estates). Andean community people were intended to T>e rescued' 
from their historical backwardness. In the places where co-operatives followed the 
expropriation of land-states, the Andean population was organically incorporated into 
the new bureaucracy of the co-operatives. Little space was left to develop alternative 
forms of organisation or to keep some traditional forms (Watters 1994:166-7). In 1968 
the government suspended all types of election stating that all bureaucratic posts were 
to be appointed. In 1969 the Agrarian Reform Law abolished the Junta Communal 
and appointed a president of administration and a president of vigilance. In 1970 a 
government decree (D.S. No. 37-70 A) shaped the definitive internal structure of the 
community which was later ratified by 1987 Law No 24656 (‘General Law of the 
Peasant Communities’). Women were displaced from traditional posts of prestige and 
authority (Isbell 1978:30,216).
The communal structure which remained after the Agrarian Reform and was 
confirmed by subsequent laws is as follows:
a) The General Assembly, made up by all the community members 'head of the 
households’. It is the highest organ of decision.
b) The Communal Steering Committee, made up of a president, vice-president and 
four more members. It is responsible for the management of the community. The 
president is the legal representative of the community.
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c) Other specialised committees such as the Vigilance Council who receive the 
commoners complaints in relation to community affairs.
Women’s participation, however, has improved noticeably in the last years. Casos 
(1990:45-6) comments on the substantial increase of women's presence in the general 
assemblies in some communities. One common case of women’s participation is 
when women represent their husbands in their absence. In other communities, instead, 
it is expected that women participate with their ‘voices’. Other communities have 
gone further and women, as well as their husbands, can vote. In the community of 
Kjunucunca (Prov. Quispicanchi) the women's presence in the General Assembly is 
more than 60%.
However, women's participation in the General Assembly is far from being as active 
protagonists. Casos (1990:46) reports that women attend the assemblies mainly to 
avoid being fined because of the absence of their husbands. This is a new space where 
women have always been excluded, consequently, they express a lack of confidence in 
giving their opinion and in talking in loud voices. Women normally talk between 
themselves at the back and have an opinion on many subjects. On other occasions, it 
is difficult for them to follow the discussion because they are distracted by their 
children, or they have not been informed in advance about the agenda or because of 
the constant switch to Spanish terms15. Casos (1990:46) observes, that women 
overcome their shyness and speechlessness when communal decisions affect the 
survival of their family. Then, women in complaining tones, challenge the assembly.
The language of 'the public domain' and the 'language o f law1 is Spanish In communal assemblies 
when the themes have to do with the 'larger society' (e g market decisions, legal requirements to fulfil) 
Spanish terms have to be used In these cases it has been reported that women feel incapable to  intervene 
because the use of the 'official Spanish' is not in their domain and they feel excluded.
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In my field study I found the following cases of women’s participation in the General
Assemblies:
a) All women participate in the General Assemblv-
Women go to the Assembly and when they have to talk they talk. When 
voting, both husband and wife vote. I f  my husband votes different than 
me it does not matter. Some time we make shifts, when he is going l don't 
go. But in the faenas' a woman can not replace a man. (Lucia 26, AC 
Cuyo Grande, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca)
In the account of Lucia, we observe a community which has opened to women's 
participation. Without asking however, Lucia pointed out women have achieved a 
considerable egalitarian participation up to a certain point. They still can not replace 
their husbands in the communal works, while men can replace women in similar work 
within the Mother’s Club14. Additionally, Francisca (46, AC Ccorao, Dist. San 
Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) opined that there is resistance by the male members to value 
women’s contribution: 'In the Communal Assembly all the women have 'voice and 
vote' including the wives but when a woman gives her opinion, they comment: how 
are you to follow a woman’s talk ’.
Women have gained space within the 'male sphere' and this is probably after training 
themselves in their own organisations, but there is still a deep gap. As Valentina (32, 
AC Chuquimarca, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta) told me: 'In the Assemblies women 
do not talk and they are the same who go to the Women's Committee'
b) Widows participate in the Assemblv.-
Just the widows participate in the Communal Assembly and just in order 
to be present because they don't participate talking. The wives don't go. 
The ‘dirigentes ' (steering committee officers) don't want the women to 
go. They say that women don't talk and they d<m V know how to talk....[in
,4Failure to participate in faenas are sanctioned with a fine.
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fact] Women talk, they know how to talk but sometimes they get confused 
because they don't know what are the concerns o f the assemblies (Hilda, 
20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov Calca).
In the widows’ cases no effort is made to facilitate women's participation or even 
understanding. Many widows participate because there is nobody else to represent the 
household but they are systematically ignored. Feliz (25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, 
Prov. Calca) explains this situation:
In the General Assembly, l  demand, why they are going to marginalize 
the women. The widows are obliged to go but not the wives. All o f  
them should participate in this way they know what is going on with the 
community and its problems. Sometimes husbands don't tell them so it 
is good that they attend.
The widows have voice and vote i f  they are empadronadas (in the 
community registers/ Women don't talk very much, they feet afraid to 
talk when they are in front o f people. They talk behind but they don't 
ask to talk
Encamación (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) explained:
In the Communal Assembly just the widows participate. /  have a 
husband and I can not participate. Women do not know anything, they 
don't listen, do not speak. They say that women can gossip. Men don't 
let women talk became they say that women are gossiping.
c) No women’s participation,-
Nufiez (1975a:397) reports that in some Cusco communities, as part of their 
socialisation process, sons attend the General Assembly with their fathers and they 
occupy their post when their fathers are incapable of attending. In these cases if a 
male member died it is expected that a son would replace him. The data of Nufiez was 
taken in the 70s in the same geographical area as the Casos’ study in which the author 
registers an increased women’s participation in General Assemblies. It is noticeable 
how the communities attitude in relation to women’s participation has changed. The
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data of Casos was taken during the nineties and the researcher herself was still 
working in the zone at the date of publication. 1 came across just one case of 
non-participation’ Victoria (47 AC Maraspaqui, Ttinque, Dist Ocongate, Prov. 
Quispicanchi) confessed to me that in the general assemblies not even the widows 
participate In her own case, her husband was an alcoholic but 'not even fo r  that they 
accept me'. Victoria belongs to a high community five hours walking distance form 
the District of Ocongate (Prov. Quispicanchi).
Anthropologists have insisted on the formal aspect of the male representation in the 
General Assembly15. They claim that the General Assembly never take a decision the 
same day that a matter for voting is presented at the meeting. Important decisions are 
expected to be taken at the following meeting. It is understood that heads of 
household have to go back to their families, but especially to their wives for 
consultation. In this sense, decisions reached are expected to express other family 
members’ concerns. Feliz, one of my interviewees however, did not think that all men 
discussed communal affairs with their wives and because of that, women’s active 
participation is important The increased incorporation of women into General 
Assemblies reflects that communities are gradually understanding the importance of 
women’s political representation into the main communal body.
9,3 Women’s Organisations.-
Many authors identified as the main factor for the proliferation of grassroots women’s 
organisations, the international economic crisis which hit the population from 1975 
and reached its peak during the eighties (Watters 1994:180-1). Guzman (1994:24-5) 
states that with the decrease in family incomes, poor urban women were compelled to 
enter the labour market -generally in conditions of great deprivation- and in
15 Ntiftez (1975a:391-401, 1975b: 623-30;), Casos (1990:45-5). Pefla 1998:137-141)
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developing collective strategies to reduce living costs. A significant percentage of 
women in poor urban zones were organised into survival organisations, such as 
Comedores Populares (communal kitchens) Mother’s Clubs, Committes of the 
Programme of Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk), health groups receiving support from 
NGOs and the Catholic Church. Some of these organisations were also promoted in 
rural zones.
In many Cusco areas, rural women were mainly organised by initiatives of institutions 
linked to the Catholic Church. This was not a spontaneous organisation of women and 
in the beginning was quite resisted by male members and women themselves as a 
reaction to an unknown experience promoted 'from outside'. Casos (1990:53) states 
that the new organisation broke the 'traditional rhythm of life' performed by women 
with the nuclear and the extended family. Some conflicts appeared as a consequence 
of this new women's role, especially because to participate in the organisation 
demanded from women time taken from other productive activities.
The main women’s organisations in the Cusco region have been Mother's Clubs and 
Women's Committees. They have had a variable development through the years but 
they are fully active at present. Additionally other organisations have developed 
around them, such as Health Committees and Communal Kitchens. Women’s 
organisations have also influenced women's participation at other levels such as the 
‘Parent’s association’ in the schools. (Casos 1990:54)
Most of these organisations have been mainly formed for survival activities receiving 
food support from the state and the church. These aid programmes have been many 
times qualified as ‘clientelist’. However these organisation are also spaces of 
socialisation and learning. Women have benefited enormously gaining confidence to
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leave home and to organise themselves. This represents a great deal of autonomy in
relation to their previous role mainly confined in their households. Victoria 47, a
monolingual women with 12 children (AC Maraspaqui, Ttinque, Ocongate, Prov.
Quispicanchi), has enthusiastically participated in women's organisations all her life.
She told me that they were organised' by a Catholic NGO lead by the Company of
Jesus (which still works in the zone). She has a very positive evaluation of the
organisation as a space of personal development and as an alternative to their
exclusion from the communal bodies. She comments:
In the Communal Assembly men do not let women participate...Men talk 
in this way because they are ignorant and because before women were 
confined in their homes. Women who just remain in their homes, they are 
not well. Sometimes women have a sad life, in our families we don't live 
well. There is always this sadness, but the women who go out they live 
very well.
Casos (1990:57) found the same in her research. She asked one woman why she went 
to the women’s organisation. She answered: ‘1 come to learn anything,..., to talk about 
anything, when we come to the organisation, we forget our problems and the anger of 
our home’. These organisations mean for women a refreshment from the hardship of 
daily life. A different space where they can learn or just simply perform different 
activities. On my visit to the Mother’s Club of the Dist. of Taray, 1 noticed that some 
women had not brought the knitting that is supposed to be an activity of the club. 
They just attended to sit down, talk with the others and from the expressions in their 
faces, simply to relax. On my visit to the Mother's Club of AC Q’enqo (Dist. Coya 
Prov. Calca) I met women walking slowly toward the place of the meeting (an open 
green area), chatting in groups, when they finally arrived they sat down in peace, still 
talking between themselves. They looked like they did not bother so much about who
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was going to talk and who was going to start the meeting. Just one of them had 
brought potatoes to peel.
Also evident is the necessity of women to make themselves ‘visible’ and be taken into
account by the men of their communities. In a society where to ‘work hard’ is highly
valued these women celebrate the possibility of increasing their productive role and
contributing even more to the families (Villasante 1990:30-1, Casos 1990:55).
Encamacion (25, AC Maska, Dist Pisac) told me:
All Maska's women belong to the Mother's Club. It is good that there is 
a Mother's Club because we all participate and meet in the Assembly. 
The women work well, I think better than men.
There is also the aim to emulate the men’s protagonistic role. This woman said when
asked her reason for attending the Mother’s club: ‘To learn, to know, to know what
happens ‘outside’, we are no longer like babies just in the home, as the men we walk'.
Most women have been successful in this objective and nowadays the work that
women perform in their organisations is well appreciated by the men of their
communities. There are even husbands who encourage women to participate.
Encamacion (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) expressed:
/ am the Health promoter. I call the women for the vaccination, l  go to 
the communities. My husband is in agreement that I am the Health 
promoter. He told me you have to continue you can learn and you can 
assist other women.
The 'comuneros' have said that it is better that the health promoter be a 
woman in this way she can help pregnant women when giving birth. 
Sometimes commoners don't trust in men. In the Mother's Club they have 
told me ‘being a woman you help us more
In Casos’ opinion (1990:54) the firm attitude of women has forced the communities 
steering committees to recognise the benefit of their work for the development of their 
communities. However, there are still a few men who are opposed to women’s
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involvement with these organisations. I even found one case in which the man beat his 
wife to prevent her attending these groups Dominga (38, AC Tamacalla, Dist. 
Limatambo, Prov. Anta) told me that her niece, a girl of 17, was seriously beaten by 
her drunk husband (a man in his early twenties) every time that she attended the 
Women's Committee. Dominga was the president of the Women’s Committee of her 
community and visited them to make it clear that it is an obligation for women of the 
community to attend those meetings but Dominga found him completely drunk. 
Dominga believes that Juan always beat her niece whether there was an excuse or not. 
Another woman, Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Ollantaytambo) 
acknowledges some men’s disagreement on the issue: 'Some husbands do not want 
their wives to come to the Mother's Club because they say a  woman wastes her time 
there'. This is expressed in women’s desire to show the product of their efforts. This 
woman confessed: 'if  we don’t work well men are going to laugh about us, they are 
going to say “where is what you have worked?, we want to see, just because you are 
lazy you go to the meetings’” (Villasante 1990:30).
Such an exigency discourages some women from participating because they feel that
to participate in women’s organisations is an excessive burden of work on top of their
household responsibilities. For instance, Lucia (26, AC Cuyo Grande, Dist. Pisac,
Prov. Calca) told me: 7 don't participate in the Mother's club, we have to make so
much 'faenas' [communal work] and 1 don't have time'. For other women, this extra
work that they perform in the organisations is a challenge that they take with
enthusiasm. As Encamación (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) told to me:
/  participate in the Mother's Club. There are different programmes. For 
instance, in the Pronamachs ( ‘Programa Nacional para el manejo de 
cuencas hidráulicas’, a state agency for the development of rural areas) 
we have to sow pines, eucalyptus, capuli, peach (within a regional 
reforestation plan).
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In many cases, the material compensation that women receive for their work is not in
proportion to the contribution that they make to government programmes and
development projects. The same Encamación comments: 'We gel 'herramientas'
(agricultural tools) picks, spades, wheelbarrows from the Mother's Club. /  got a spade
and / have to work otherwise /  will lose it. After seven months working then /  got the
spade'. Anderson (1994:40) comments:
‘Women's voluntary labour has been used to cushion the crisis in other 
ways. They have helped to maintain community organisations when 
male leaders tired of campaigns whose objectives were continuously 
frustrated. They have become intermediaries between the local 
community and municipal governments as these latter attempt to 
distribute what little resources they have for infrastructure and public 
sanitation.’
Despite that the experience reveals that women have been able to recreate a space and 
develop more 'deeper1 expectations (Casos 1990:54), these organisations have almost 
dwelt on their productive contribution and it has been difficult to see them moving 
toward more gender onentated strategies. This is recognised by Villasante (1990:31) 
who claims that women have concentrated on looking to themselves as ‘people who 
work and give an economic contribution toward their families’. There are some 
advances in the area but this is being done gradually16. As my interviewees confessed 
hardly any women take personal problems like domestic violence to women’s 
organisations and this gives an evidence of the priorities that Andean women have set 
in their agendas.
16 See Villasante (1990) who reports on Women’s Committees in Cusco. Among these organisations 
there were Mother’s clubs which decided to rename their organisation This change has not just been on 
the surface and some of these committees have started to include workshops in self-esteem and even the 
subject of domestic violence has also been included by NGOs working in the area
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Conclusions:
Andean society is strongly ‘gendered’, however such a differentiation between male 
and female roles in society does not bring a negative valuation of women, on the 
contrary, women are associated with prosperity and good luck. The Andean world 
vision is based on the conjugal pair. It is around a married couple that the life of the 
communities is based. Singleness deserves social exclusion. Kinship is bilateral, based 
in both parental line and generates important networks of mutual aid. ‘Reciprocity’ is 
the language of survival in Andean communities. It means affection and fraternity but 
also generates links of control and harmonisation. Some ‘spiritual’ relatives such as 
godfathers are going to have a great influence over their godchildren and especially 
over the married couple. They will be called on to intervene in domestic disputes and 
their opinion can influence the behaviour of both members of the couple.
Andean women have always been forceful members of their communities, one 
evidence of that is their principal role in the household economy management. 
Another is their own economic autonomy expressed in the accumulation of a personal 
patrimony separate from their husbands. Their presence as widows or separated 
women is also socially acceptable, although in these cases, women’s situations can be 
more or less precarious depending on their economic position with makes them 
capable of fulfilling all ‘commoner obligations'.
At the level of political representation, women held important posts within the 
traditional structure of the communities and used to participate in the general meetings 
of the communities the same as men. However after a process of ‘modernisation’ 
carried out by the Agrarian Reform women were displaced from those ‘visible’ 
responsibilities within the mainstream of community life. It was legally stated that
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households were represented by the ‘head’, this is by husbands This jeopardised the 
economic independence of women making the husband representative of the land 
holding. The Agrarian reform also made difficult the process of ‘private 
accumulation’, affecting mainly women who were as capable as men to be owners of 
goods and land. It has been documented, however, that Andean communities managed 
to resist some kinds of ‘modernisation’ and property continued to be transmitted by 
‘parallel line’ leaving women with their private rights over ownership intact and 
emphasised the ‘representative’ character of the ‘head of the household’, encouraging 
the members to discuss the Assemblies concerns with their wives.
By the 1970s women had developed a protagonistic role through their own 
organisations. As a consequence, in the last years women have started to regain a 
place within the General Assembly but still their participation is not very active, 
incapable of dealing with a domain for decades confined by men in a men’s language. 
This surprises the women who whilst feeling confident in their own organisation, feel 
less able to understand the way in which community issues are decided. A decisive 
element for such a secondary place is that most women have a low command of 
Spanish (or are fully monolingual) and the language of the larger societies and the 
public affairs is Spanish. The result is that women can not understand many issues 
discussed in the Assembly and/or regard themselves as incapable of dealing with 
official authorities and procedures.
The important place that women have in Andean households, however, is suffering 
some modification in those communities more incorporated in the market economy. 
The Andean family has been basically a unit of production and consumption and 
women have had the main role of managing the family resources. A major need for
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cash means for women a major dependence on the husband earning money (mainly as 
waged labourer) since she remains in the community taking care of children and land 
In these cases symptoms of subordination have been reported.
An important aspect that appears in a review on Andean communities life, is that the 
communal bodies and women’s organisations were created with specific agendas. The 
first one to deal exclusively with all community management aspects, the second one 
was bom around survival activities. Particularly, since the Agrarian Reform, 
communal bodies are exclusively concerned with organising land and labour in the 
community and for ensuring that all members fulfil their commoners’ obligations. 
They are not spaces for wider conflict resolution.
In relation to women’s organisations, it has been a great achievement for women to be 
able to organise themselves. However, women’s organisations are very much 
concentrated in productive activities and in the creation of women’s political 
leaderships within their communities. It has been a long journey to win these spaces 
‘for women as women’. This is being achieved gradually. Still these organisations 
are not spaces in which a woman can bring a ‘personal’ problem, such as domestic 
violence into the agenda.
2 2 0
CHAPTER SEVEN:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ANDEAN COMMUNITIES 
Introduction.-
The previous chapter reviewed the general position of Andean women in their 
societies. In this sense, Harris (1978:32) concludes that if there are elements of social 
relations that should be considered as ’patriarchal' in Andean communities these are 
not located primarily in the household as a ‘unit’1 and that Andean women are forceful 
members of their communities. Nowadays they are excluded from the communities’ 
managerial bodies. This situation limits the ways in which women can reflect their 
interests within their communities but at the same time, it observed that community 
organisations are not designed to fulfil the role of justice management for those issues 
considered ‘personal’ problems such as marital conflicts.
Domestic violence does exist in Andean communities. Contradictorily, these events 
are very rarely presented in anthropological studies. For instance Allen (1988:79) who 
spent some years in a Cusquenian community noticed the permanent lamentation of 
women for being beaten by their husbands, contradictorily, men deny this accusation 
and Allen herself, claims that she was never a witness to an incident of wife beating. 
In a more recent publication, two anthropologists, Harvey (1992) and Harris (1992) 
rethink the issue of domestic violence based on their data taken in the 1980s. Both 
fieldworks did not have as an objective the study of domestic violence, consequently 
there was not a methodology designed specifically to raise the issue. In relation to the
1 See also Ossio (1992)
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Peruvian studies, it is only in this last decade that it is possible to find a sustained 
publication on ‘gender’ issues in rural zones. Reports like Casos (1990) and 
Villasante (1990) in the context of development projects bring important information 
about the women’s lives in their communities. References to domestic violence 
appear but they are very marginal and are not articulated into a discussion on the issue. 
Consequently, the present research can not rely on a a substantial body of existing data 
on the subject, and this has been the main challenge o f this chapter. Its main enquiry 
concerns the way in which people perceive domestic violence. If domestic violence is 
a ground for complaint then to which forums are those complaints referred. The 
interviews were structured with these aims in mind. In the background of this enquiry 
was a wider question, whether the Andean women’s experience of domestic violence 
is comparable to other Peruvian women’s cases and how much is it possible to think in 
a national strategy to challenge the problem in accordance with Peruvian feminist 
proposals. The chapter is structured at two levels, the first one deals with the scenario 
of domestic violence and the second one focuses on the forums for intervention.
1. Recognising domestic violence.-
It has always been an impossible task to find out how much violence women 
experience in real terms. It is widely understood that the official statistics on domestic 
violence are just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of the problem and most cases of domestic 
violence go unreported (Tamayo 1991). Consequently, it was not the focus of this 
research to know how much violence happens in the Andean communities of Peru, but 
how much violence the people think happens and how serious they consider the 
problem to be. All my interviewees acknowledged the existence of domestic violence
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in their communities. However, the degree, the extent and the circumstances in which 
a man can beat his wife are perceived in different ways:
a) Most women in CCorao are beaten (Francisca, 46, AC CCorao, Dist. San Sebastian, 
Prov. Cusco).
b) There are a lot o f  problems o f violence (Alejandrina, 30, AC Kuper, Dist. 
Chinchero, Prov. Urubamba).
c) There are many women who are beaten (Cristina 53, RT2 Ttinque, Prov. 
Quispicanchi).
d) There are many problems o f husbands who beat their wives (Hilda, 20, AC 
Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca).
e) There are some husbands who beat their wives. (Feliz 25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. 
Taray, Prov. Calca).
Most of my interviewees believe that domestic violence is undoubtedly linked to 
drunkenness:
a) There are a lot o f problems o f men beating their wives because the husband is a 
drunkard. (Hilda 20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca).
b) There are many problems o f  violence, because o f drunkenness, because o f alcohol, 
most o f  them are for jealously (Alejandrina, 30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. 
Urubamba).
c) Many men beat when they are drunk (Luz Marina, 19, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, 
Prov. Cusco).
e) Most men who drink beat (Faustina, 30 AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco).
Some of my interviewees emphasise the persistence of these practises through the 
generations:
a) There have always been these beatings. My mum says that her grandmother was 
beaten a lot by her husband. (Faustina, 30, AC Yungaypata, Cusco, Cusco).
2 RT = rural town
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b) Always have been maltreatment problems. When they make the 'chacra' 
(cultivating the plots) they come drunk and provoke these problems. When they are 
sober they just insult us, with the mouth and generally when they have another woman, 
they criticise us over everything they are not satisfied with, they say the food is not 
good and so on. (Women in the Mother's Club of Taray, Calca).
c) It always happens that there is beating, that the man beats. (Mother's Club, Dist. 
Taray, Prov. Calca).
d) Always have been beatings at home. I saw my mother being beaten. (Francisca, 46, 
CCorao, San Sebastian, Cusco).
However, there were some people who were convinced that this was a problem of 
older generations and that the new ones, mainly by education, have managed to 
overcome such negative behaviour.
a) In my age these things almost do not happen because we have studied completed 
secondary and also some institutions have trained us and have taught us how to live in 
the community... In the generation o f my parents it happened, they drink 'irago' (cane 
sugar alcohol) and ’chicha' (maize beer), because o f lack o f education people commit 
mistake, by ignorance, because they don't analyse the things. (Feliz 25, AC 
Chitapampa, Taray, Calca).
b) Younger people have less problems o f violence, the old couples have more 
problems o f violence (Alejandrina, 30, Kuper, Chincheros, Urubamba).
c) The old men were worse [more evil] (Faustina, 30, AC Yungaypata, Cusco, Cusco).
d) In the past people did not study because o f that they beat more. (Juan 33, AC 
Yungaypata, Cusco, Cusco).
In relation to this generational issue, it was not possible from the judicial records to 
elucidate if this affirmation was accurate or not since they did not always show the age 
of the parties. The Pisac judge believes that complaints come from all range of ages. 
For instance, in my visit to Tinta (Prov. Canchis), of the three women who came to 
complain in one afternoon, one was in her middle fifties, the other in her middle 
forties and one in the early twenties. The judge of the peace of Zurite (Prov. Anta)
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believes the same but he notices that 'younger people' are more willing to formalise 
their complaints about domestic violence cases in the judge's place. He told me: older 
people just come to tell me directly at my home about their problems but they don't 
want to present a complaint.
To contrast this overwhelming finding of male violence I asked people if there were 
women who beat their husbands. 1 received the following answers:
Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Urubambaj thinks that although 
women can have the same ‘excuses to exercise violence against men they never do: 
When the men get drunk or make wrong their works women never beat them. Others 
of my interviewees, instead, acknowledge that women can be violent in the same 
circumstances as men, that is when they are drunk. Faustina (30, AC Yungaypata, 
Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco) told me: Women who drink sometimes beat. Hilda (20, AC 
Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca) makes an important observation: some women 
drink and fight when both are drunk they fight more. So both beat each other, but the 
most injured is the woman.
For Agueda (26, Women’s mother club, Dist. Taray) women can be violent precisely 
to avoid being maltreated: women also beat when they are defending themselves when 
the husband is beating them. Sometimes they beat each other when they are 
drunk...sometimes men deserve to be punished, why women have to permit to be 
beaten? In Andean communities it is encouraged that women retaliate against their 
husbands if they are going to be beaten or should escape to avoid being beaten. Most 
of my interviewees who confessed to have been beaten did not receive such attacks 
passively. This is also reported by Harris (1994:48, 60) and Harvey (1994:66).
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2. The context of violence:
2.1 Drunkenness: ‘I am not me’.-
"My stepfather started to beat us, my mother and me. He beat us every 
time that he got drunk... When he was sober he loved me again: 'little 
boy just when I am drunk I am bad'...” (Valderrama and 
Escalante 1992:149)
From a feminist perspective, the link between drunkeness’ and violence is just 
contingent. Drunkenness is a state in which emotions are exacerbated and inhibitions 
lost. In this context it is easy that men who are anyway violent and disdainful toward 
their partners get into physical assaults. In Latin America, the most common scenario 
is men drinking between men. In this typical macho atmosphere remarks on gender 
hiérarchisation and gossip about each others wives are favourite subjects of the 
evening (Estremadoyro 1993, Harris 1994:52). However, in Andean communities the 
relationship between drunkeness and beating can not be discarded so easily for the 
following reasons: firstly, from the judge’s of the Peace’s records, in almost the 
totality of cases of domestic violence men are reported as being drunk or having been 
‘partying’ previously. This is a high incidence of drunkenness associated with 
domestic violence and it strongly contrasts with our data collected in the Women's 
Police Station of Lima where men beat their wives when drunk in just 32% of cases, 
while they beat them when sober in 68% (Estremadoyro 1993:71). Secondly, judges 
of Peace’s general opinion is that domestic violence in rural areas appeared because of 
drinking problems. Thirdly, my interviewees were unanimous in identifying 
drunkenness as the main cause of domestic violence. Consequently, in their perception 
these are two interconnected subjects. Hilda (20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. 
Calca), was radical and told me: nobody beat sober, all o f  (hem beat drunk. Francisca
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(46, AC Ccorao Dist. San Sebastian, Cusco) also commented: /  realise now that 1 have 
grown up that men are nervous and sulphuric when drunk.
For Juan (33, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco) the alcohol provoked 
problems not just at the level of domestic relationships but also among commoners. 
Consequently he thinks: there are fights and heatings because there are drunkards it is 
necessary to leave the alcohol. And Faustina (his wife, 30) added: the alcohol has to 
disappear. Both Juan and Faustina became evangelists some years ago. They are 
forbidden to drink by religious practise. They confessed to me that since they became 
evangelists and left the alcohol their relationship as partners and their relationship with 
their children has improved significantly. However, Juan was able to recognise that: it 
does not just depend on the alcohol, it also depends on the character o f  the people. 
There are people that have a strong character.
Feliz (25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca) told me that there are some 
commoners who drink a lot but they are just 'the 30%'. He also recognised that 
women also drink, they drink between themselves. Those women are the most that 
have problems. Lucia (26, AC Cuyo Grande, Pisac, Calca) was of the same opinion: 
some women have the vice o f drinking and the babies cry o f hunger. Both think that 
these women are more likely to have domestic violence problems.
Women of the Taray Mother's Club (Prov. Calca) believes that: most men drink but 
some o f them drink more than the others. There are many cases o f maltreatment 
became husbands are drunk. However, they were able to recognise: but there are also 
some men who beat sober when arguing for anything.
Francisca (46, AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) qualified her father as a 
normal man when sober but capable of major violence against her mother when drunk.
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Encamación (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) did not know what to do with 
her husband. When sober he was a supportive partner who even encouraged her to 
assume more responsibilities within the communities, such as accept the post of 
‘health promoter’. When drank, he was able to injure her to such an extent that once 
she had to be sent to the hospital. She expressed to me: my husband always beats me 
when he is drunk, sober he never beats me. The next day he excuses himself, 'because 
I was drunk I beat you'.
The ‘Andean drunkenness', la borrachera andina has been a concern of many 
anthropologists interested in Andean culture and it has been quoted in these studies. 
For instance, Harvey (1991, 1992, 1994) has concentrated her attention on the issue for 
many years and others have dedicated complete volumes to analyse the borrachera 
from different perspectives (e.g. Saignes 1993).
Heath (1993), Saignes (1993) and other authors, claim that the consumption of 
alcoholic drinks in the South American highlands is as old as the pre-Inca times. The 
moments for alcohol consumption were always collective and related to 
religious-magic celebrations. In this way, they entered in contact with the sacred. The 
arrival of the Spaniards also disrupted this aspect of native life. The ‘Catholic 
calendar' brought more 'occasions' for drinking because there was an increase in the 
religious celebrations. Drinking was also promoted in the places of tribute-labour 
particularly at the mining centres, in the belief that drunkenness gave the Indians the 
courage to enter to the shafts (Saignes 1993).
Drinking was also used to ‘to recover the collective memory’ (Saignes 1993:58-62). 
During the celebrations Andean people recalled the history of their past civilisation 
and their gods. Saignes (1993:61) suggests that the contact with the sacred enabled
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them to bring back 'from the unconsciousness’ this silent memory, although a more 
logical explanation is that in a drunken state people were less inhibited to express what 
they normally kept silent in front of the colonisers. Next to the collective and 
celebratory character of the Andean drunkenness, incidents of violence between 
commoners and of men beating their wives were reported from very early chronicles’.
Some of these characteristics remain until today. Drinking is socially acceptable in 
celebratory groups. Men drink more than women and often women and children 
become 'guardians’ of the man who is drinking. A man who drinks frequently or who 
drinks alone receives social reprobation. People fight when they drink remembering 
previous disagreements. In some places of the South Andes mountains exists the 
custom of ttnkus and chaxwas (‘ritual battles’) which mimic war confrontation 
between two different ayllus (or groups of communities). These fights are always 
carried out in a state of drunkenness (Harris 1994). After drinking on such occasions 
some husbands beat their wives, as Harris (1994:48) would say 'some frequently, some 
only occasionally’.
For Heath (1993:184) the link between collective drinking and wife-beating in 
Andean culture is certainly not clear. Harris (1994) has reflected on such an 
association finding some possible explanations. She looks at the 'ambiguity’ of the 
representation of masculinity in Andean culture. Andean society is strongly based on 
the conjugal pair who are thought of as a complementary and interdependent unit in 
which no part is more important than the other. This belief was confirmed by my 
interviewees. When I asked Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist Chinchero) who 
commands at home, she did not hesitate in answering me: at home commands the man
' Bernardino de Cardenas in 1630 pointed out about ‘drunk husbands' maltreating their wives (Saignes 
1993:51 ) and Huaman Poma de Ayala mentioned this event in the sixteenth century (Pease 1980, 11:804)
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and also the woman. They mutually command each other, otherwise i f  just the man 
command what would he the woman's function?.
Harris would argue that next to these egalitarian beliefs there is another set of 
symbolic representations providing different information on man-woman relationships. 
This is the image of bull, as the strongest, and the ‘condor’ as predator of women. The 
image of ‘bull’ is taken by the author from the tinkus battles. The bull is celebrated 
for its tremendous strength and drunk men on those occasions make explicit references 
to themselves as being bulls while their opponents are ‘feminised’. As we already 
reviewed in the previous chapter, there is a high value on men’s physical strength, 
celebrated both by men and women, since to survive in the Andean mountains but 
especially to plough the arid and hard soil of the mountains depends on a great amount 
of physical strength and this task corresponds to men.
However, it is the image of the ‘condor’ which really ‘breaks’ the symbolism of 
‘complementarity’ in the couple. Harris (1994) analyses a widespread Andean myth in 
which a condor abducted a girl to be his wife, the girl refused to accept him and 
became ‘dry bones’. The author related this myth to the teenagers sexual encounters 
in the mountains and the subsequent transfer of the girl to the boys house. As the 
condor, the boy takes his wife to his home (or to his parents home) The author 
suggests that although the girl is completely in agreement with such an ‘abduction’, 
the image of the ‘condor’ as predator of women is confirmed. In Northern Potosi, 
where the author’s study took place, there are resemblances of this condor myth 
during the marriage ritual This analysis has sense in places where the pattern of 
residence is virilocal, that is, the girl moves to the boy’s family house but it does not 
match with most of the Peruvian South Andean communities in which the pattern of
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residence is uxirolocal, this is husbands are incorporated to the women’s side (Ossio 
1992). This is one of the reasons why it is expected to have more girls than boys 
because it brings more labour force for the family. Most of my interviewees had a 
uxirolocal pattern of residence during the first years of marriage until the couple saved 
some money to build their own house, in other cases the pattern of residence was 
neolocal from the beginning.
However, further to claim that this myth or symbolic reference can be applicable to a 
particular region it is necessary to reflect on the relevance of such arguments to 
understand domestic violence in the Andean region. Without intending to be cynical or 
disrespectful but purely descriptive, in all my years in contact with Andean women 
facing domestic violence 1 have never heard any of them relate that her husband beat 
her because he thought he was a bull or a condor. The same author warns about this 
situation when she comments: ‘I have never heard an explicit connection made 
between the condor identity of the wife-taker and the fact that men beat their wives’, it 
is a deduction that she made from 'circumstantial evidence’ (Harris 1994:55). Maybe 
the most important point of such an analysis is to understand that in Andean 
communities with a strong emphasis on the unity of the conjugal pair, there are other 
aspects of this man-woman relationship that are more controversial and that break this 
image of complementarity. This confirms Moore’s (1994) ideas that ‘contradictory 
and conflicting’ discourses on gender can coexist in the same culture.
There is a second element that Harris (1994) analyses that contributes to make the 
'generic status of domestic violence’ in Andean communities ‘troubling’ and 
‘ambivalent’. It is the issue of drunkenness. Harris (1994:58) called it the state of 
‘otherness’, in which the level of alcohol consumption should be appropriate to enter
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into ‘contact with the sacred’ by producing an altered state of consciousness. Harris 
(1994:58) explains:
‘It is when they have separated themselves through collective drinking 
from everyday life and when normal inhibitions are lowered that men 
embody and enact the sacred powers on which the life of the 
community depends, which are given form in the bull and condor.’
Heith (1993:177-8) claims that a man who drinks stops to be himself ‘to be other’. 
The author quotes some phrases from his informants: ‘Please do not be offended, it is 
not Mamani who is talking, it is the alcohol who is talking’, or ‘do not blame him, it is 
the chicha (maize com) which obliged him to do it’. For Heith, this expresses a kind 
of'possession', the ‘other’ intrusive is the ‘alcohol’ itself. This substance can have a 
‘malign’ character and the drunkard can enter into a violent behaviour.
The violence is ‘split off from everyday life’ but it is part of a highly valued ritual in 
which ‘losing control’ is considered necessary as a homage to the sacred entities. 
Violence, then, the author will suggest is a risk to pay for perpetuating the ritual and 
the empowerment with the divinity. Consequently, domestic violence is not condoned 
by anybody in Andean communities but it is understood in such circumstances. Harris 
(1994:59) adds:
‘Violence in Northern Potosi in general is neither excluded nor denied, 
neither used as a source of legitimacy nor expelled onto a putative 
periphery, but is located in an ‘other world’ in which it is harnessed to 
social reproduction, but at the same time recognised in all its 
ambivalence’.
These ideas contribute to understanding why despite the fact that domestic violence is 
considered ‘deviant’ at a discursive level by Andean people, it is also tolerated in 
practice and why women hesitate to make husbands responsible in a more assertive
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way. These words of Harris (1994:52) expressed all of this contradictory status of
domestic violence in Andean communities:
‘..mostly people do not approve when men beat their wives, nor do men 
boast of it openly...In practice, a man is usually very sheepish the 
following morning as his wife gives full vent to her indignation while 
she prepares the breakfast, or as he finds himself alone with a hangover, 
his wife having gone to ‘visit’ a kinsperson. He says ‘I was drunk. I 
don’t know what got into me’.
2.2 O th e r scenarios:
My interviewees, however, provided additional information that permits clarification 
of the ambiguous features of domestic violence. When I asked Alejandrina (30, AC 
Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Urubamba) whether she had personal knowledge of a 
domestic violence case she immediately referred to her own case, and this is her story:
Before getting married we fought a lot, now my husband behaves well, 
he realised that he was wrong because o f our children. At that time 
when he was drunk he beat me. In the beginning o f our relationship 
there was no understanding. Between us we arranged, we never go to 
the judge. But now we don't fight like before. Our parents intervened 
and told us that we have to live well. He used to accuse me o f not 
selling enough (she sells their own handicraft in the market) but when 
he was sober he never complained just when he was drunk he argued 
with me.
Sometimes men make the ‘chacra' (agricultural work) and drink and 
help each other ('ayni') Now my husband paints [ceramic] at home. He 
has stopped drinking because his hand shivers and he can not paint. 
But even i f  he drinks he no longer makes problems, he promises me 
before drinking that he is not going to cause me problems. Even 
crying, singing he sleeps quiet. He realised that the children got 
worried and afraid. This was before we got married but slowly he has 
changed and now is a serious person.
We can see in this narrative, that the context of the violence is not set by the 
drunkeness but by the fact that the husband was resentful of his wife, demanding her 
to work even harder. After failing to arrange ‘between them’ parents are called to
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intervene convincing the man of his wrong attitude The man still drinks but has 
promised not to beat her more. If he would be in the 'uncontrollable state’ paying 
tribute to the ancestral deities, how could this arrangement made in a sober state work 
during the alienated state of drunkenness? A question that our anthropologist has not 
answered.
Having said that, it is necessary to clarify that this thesis does not attempt to find the 
explanation of domestic violence in Andean communities but rather to explore 
people’s perception of the issue and the decisions that they take to resolve this 
problem. With this intention in mind we find other scenarios in which domestic 
violence occurs.
2.2.1 Jealousv.-
Of all causes associated with drinking that my interviewees pointed out, jealously was 
the most common. It involves the violent protest o f husbands who accuse women of 
having affairs, usually without any basis in reality.
Francisca (46, Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) saw her mother being beaten 
by her father who when drunk, accused her of having affairs. Juana (43, Women’s 
Mother Club, Taray, Pisac) told me that she had to separate from her husband who 
drunk accused her of going out with other men. Victoria (47, AC Maraspaqui, RT 
Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi) told me that one of her neighbours is beaten by her 
drunk husband who while doing it, reminds her of a previous partner.
Complaints about imagined unfaithfulness by wives as the main pretext to beat 
women is also reported by Stolen (1987) in her study in the highlands of Ecuador 
while Harvey (1994:75) arrives at a similar conclusion in her work about the district of 
Ocongate (Prov. Quispicanchi).
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2.2.2 Male infidelitv.-
Another circumstance in which men beat women when drunk related by my 
interviewees is when a man is losing himself with another woman (Lucia, 26, AC Cuyo 
Grande, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca). That is, they are having an affair. Harvey (1994:67) 
states that in this case men become ‘vicious’ toward their wives ‘especially when their 
lovers are not really under their control’ Consequently, the wife pays for the other 
woman’s deeds’. For my interviewees the reason is more simple. Men who are having 
an affair feel bored with ‘everything’ that the wives do (Mother Club, Dist. Taray, 
Prov. Calca).
Additionally, Sanchez (1990:45), referring to the highlands of Ecuador, claims that 
men who are unfaithful tend to justify themselves accusing their wives of doing the 
same. In my experience as a legal advisor in domestic violence in an urban setting it 
was obvious that men who beat, beat more when they are having affairs.
2.2.3 The ‘demanding’ husband.-
Another circumstance in which men beat their wives when drunk is to reprimand them 
for not fulfilling their agricultural or household tasks Women told me that some men 
when they get drunk ’remember’ what they consider women’s faults. Victoria (47, AC 
Maraspaqui, Ttinque, Ocongate) told me that her husband did not beat her often but 
when he did it was because she did not perform her agricultural tasks: /  did not do the 
tasks that my husband left me because l preferred to look after my children I did not 
fulfil the agricultural tasks like sweeping the manure or cultivating in the plot. 
Because o f  that he beat me. Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Chincheros Ollantaytambo) 
told me that men argue with women because they don't perform the housework as they 
want so when drunk they beat them. Francisca (46, AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian,
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Cusco) told me: i f  a woman loses a lamb men gel very nervous and when drunk they 
beat the woman. Women from the Mother’s club of Taray (Pisac) were of the same 
opinion: Men also get angry when we are not cooking well.
In January 1997 I was travelling wdth an NGO team to the AC of Q'enqo, (Dist. Coya, 
Prov Calca) to participate in a 'training activity' when suddenly, in the middle of the 
road, two cows and one calf were suffocating and couldn't move. A pregnant woman 
was next to them shouting and crying for help. While this was happening she 
constantly repeated ‘what is my husband going to do to me?’. The cows had eaten a 
herb that becomes poisonous if, when still wet, it receives sunshine. It is a very 
common problem during the rainy season in the highlands. It demands extreme care to 
prevent the cows grazing when the herb has not dried out. This quite advanced 
pregnant woman, alone, was taking care of two cows, one calf and one bull. The team 
managed to save the two cows but could not revive the calf. Later in the day when we 
were coming back we found the husband on one side of the road with the dead calf, 
waiting for somebody to give him a lift to donate the dead animal for a festivity. He 
did not look angry or worried, on the contrary he was grateful to the team who 
managed to save the cows, however, some members of the team wondered what would 
be his reaction against his wife, especially if he got drunk.
2.2.4 Women's complaints.-
Sanchez (1990:35-6) claims that in Andean culture the ‘complementarity’ has a very 
special meaning in relation to work and men can become particularly vicious when 
their wives do not fulfil their expectation of ‘mutual help’. This could explain why 
Andean men get angry with their wives but does not explain why women, having the 
same grounds to complain against their husbands do not beat them and on the contrary
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they are many times beaten because they reprimand their husband for their wrong 
attitude. In this sense, my interviewees acknowledge that a woman can be beaten by 
her husband when she reprimands his wrongdoing while he is drunk. Hilda (20, AC 
Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca) told me: women complain when men do noI 
work and became o f that the fight starts. Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Chinchero, 
Urubamba) told me that between the couple are disagreements and this ‘bad 
understanding make men to beat
Other women confessed to me that when men are drunk they are very careful not to 
complain about their behaviour until the next morning in case the husband reacts 
violently against them.
2.2,5 Gossip.-
My interviewees would claim that ‘to gossip’ is often connected causally with the 
other ‘excuses’ for beating. To gossip, said my interviewees has to do with ‘to envy’. 
People gossip, ‘invent things about you and others because of envy’. The ‘gossip’ 
reveals the intervention of others in generating men’s excuses to beat their wives or to 
exacerbate their feelings and willingness to beat. It is mainly through the gossip that 
the excuse of jealously is reinforced or created.
Agueda (30, Mother’s Club, Taray, Calca) told me : ’what happens is that men listen to 
gossips. When they drink together they warn each other about how a woman was in 
her youth'. Dalmecio (27, AC Ampay, Pisac, Calca) confessed in front of the Pisac 
judge and me that he had beaten his wife because he had listened to gossip about her, 
so when he drank he got so angry'. Valentina (32, AC Chuquimarca, Dist. Limatambo,
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Anta) believes that there is gossip because o f envy, because we are living well with out 
partners so other men bad advise.
It was the same Valentina who told me that sometimes mothers-in-law can gossip too. 
She told me: there are some bad mothers-in-law, they tel! their son, your wife has 
maltreated your children, they have beaten them or she has not listened to my advice 
so when they get drunk they get angry. However, Valentina was the only one who 
mentioned ‘mothers in law’ as ‘gossipers’.
There is a common belief that in small communities to gossip and to envy have 
particular characteristics. Urbano (1992:x) claims that in social groups where the 
reduced socio-economic conditions are more or less equal between their members, 
people who envy express their incapacity to acknowledge other's success, and the 
deeds of their virtuousness and effort. They 'deny the individual the capacity to 
overcome the adversity'. (Urbano 1992:xii). In my interviewees’ opinion, 'to live well' 
with a partner awakes the other men's envy.
3. Personal narratives of violence.-
The following are personal stories of violence as they were conveyed to me. Of course 
they are already 'filtered' by my transcription and in some cases, also by the double 
translation from Quechua to Spanish and then to English. However, 1 want to offer to 
the reader a more vivid image of these women’s experiences. These stories were part 
of longer conversations as was explained in chapter three. I would like also to call 
attention to the forums of intervention. I choose four personal stories, one was a 
woman who suffered violence in the past and who never used any forum The others 
are three women of different ages (late forties, late thirties and middle twenties) 
suffering problems of domestic violence. Two of them never went to the judge before
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however they tried to use other forums such as kin and even communal representative 
without success. The last one did go to the judge. Judge’s intervention and the 
promises of the husband to stop the violence was successful but just for a certain time.
I) Victoria (47, AC Maraspaqui, P.R. Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi):
Twenty years ago my husband used to beat me, but always we arranged 
between us. 1 never went to the Lieutenant Governor or to the judge 
because I felt ashamed in front o f my family. When adult my sons 
intervened. He did not beat me frequently, and it was always because 
o f my children, because in order to look after my children 1 did not 
fulfil the agricultural tasks that he told me to do. For this reason he 
beat me. 1 am an orphan, I have neither father nor mother, 1 have not 
had anybody who gave me respect. I don't remember that my father 
beat my mother, I was the last one and since I remember they were old. 
They lived well, maybe my other brothers and sister have seen 
something. My husband used to beat me with the feet, hands, punch me 
but only when he was drunk, when sober he never beat me. I  also 
answer him back and beat him, but 1 feel afraid to take a stick or a 
stone as other people advised me to do. 1 felt afraid, 1 though that this 
could hurt him and could hurt me, the pain would fa ll over me and I 
would feel the same.
II) Filipa (late 40s, she does not know her age, AC Utapia, Dist. Tint, Prov. Canchis). I
met Filipa in the judge’s place. She looked bruised on her face, she cried while
speaking. She walked 40 minutes to the judge’s place. This is her story:
My husband has beaten me because my daughter in law was very bad 
in the health centre. She got an infection after giving birth and l  am 
taking care o f the new born. My husband got mad because I was 
assisting my daughter in law and the baby. He gave me a punch that 
made me fall down on the floor and with his knee he beat me in the 
stomach... /some days ago] My husband received 5 soles in advance 
for his work and gave it to my daughter. He kept this money to drink. 
So I asked to my daughter for this money to buy sugar for my daughter 
in law.
When he has agricultural work /faena/ he always beats me l  have 
always to hide. I have never complained before. My sons and daughter 
always tel! me not to denounce him, we all are married you would make 
us feet ashamed.
My husband is very rude, he has suffered an operation on the stomach 
and he heats on his stomach and says I am very 'macho'. When he 
beats me my sons stop him. My parents are dead and I don't have any
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relative to look to for help. The Lieutenant Governor is our son-in-law 
so my daughter did not want me to go to the judge's place.
I have gone to the president o f the community and he denied me help 
because my husband drinks with the President
My husband has never apologised to me, he accuses me o f making him 
become upset and o f not feeding him. His sister reprimands him 'how 
could you beat your wife in this way...
Ill) Dominga (38, AC Chilca Dist. Ollantaytambo, Prov. Urubamba). I also met her in
the judge’s place:
Every trip he beats me4, now he just throw me away during the trip. 
Last night he beat me. He beat me a lot when he came drunk at 1 or 2 
in the morning. Last Friday he was watching the television and he 
entered and tore all my clothes and threw me away from the home, he 
locked the house it was around 10 or I I  at night. Even with my son he 
feels jealous. Our godparents have called him but he refused to talk 
with them. He beats me as a man and he says that he is not going to 
come to the judge. Once he beat me and he broke my eyebrow and I 
got a scar. I  have lived with him fo r  24 years always he has beaten 
me... This is the first time that l complain in 25 years. People told me 
'how tong are you going to let him beat you’, that’s the reason that I 
have came. 1 want to separate from him because he has always beaten 
me.
IV) Encamacion (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca):
My husband beats me too much. We have gone to the 'juzgado' [judge’s 
place] , the judge has given us 15 days to think i f  we really wanted the 
separation. I did not come back. I fe e l ashamed now to enter again to 
the 'juzgado'. We have signed an act in order than he did not beat me 
more.
Once I  left him to go to Cusco (Department capital) leaving my 
children for 15 days, I would have left him for good i f  /  did not have my 
children. I think that maybe he can have another woman, but people do 
not tell me anything. His friends make him drink, they require him. He 
always beat me when he is drunk. Sober he never beats me. On the 
following day he does not tell me anything just that because he was 
drunk he beat me. Now he has suffered like a heart attack and he is not 
beating me because doctors have forbidden him to drink.
I am from another community Cuyo Chico, here in Maska the house 
belongs to him for this reason he throws me away and is jealous o f 
other men.
4 They come regularly from their community to the district because they have a 'chicheria' -place to sell 
maize beer
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The first time that he heat l did not say anything, I remained humble. 
iMter 1 reacted and for that l went to the judge.
When I went to the judge he stopped heating me for 6 months until May 
3rd. It was in Cruz Velakuy, here we had a party and / was dancing 
with a dancer and when we came hack from the party he heat me. he 
broke my head with a bottle and the neighbours took me to the hospital, 
and everybody reprimanded him, my aunt, the doctor who assisted me 
and from that moment he got sick.
3.1 Witnesses of violence.-
One striking aspect from the interviews is the constant narrative of people having seen 
their mothers being beaten. In some cases this violence also reached them as children. 
It gives the impression of truth to some of my interviewees opinion that violence was 
recurrent in older generations and things are changing in the communities.
Francisca (46, AC CCorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) told me:
My father insulted and beat my mother, once he took a stick and by 
treachery he beat her, he made her bleed, once he left her unconscious. 
We shouted desperately but nobody listened to us. At this time my 
mother stood up and escaped to the mountains bleeding.
When my father was sober he was a normal man.
He also beat us, sober and drunk for stupid things that he imagined.
He maltreated my mother for anything, he accused her' you are with 
other men.
Hilda (20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca) told me of a similar situation: / 
saw my mother being beaten by my father for nothing. After that I felt sad but it 
remained between them, my mother never went to the judge.
Lucia (26, AC Cuyo Grande, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) has similar memories:
When I was a child my dad beat my mum, l don't know why he beat her, 
/  think he was drunk without any reason. When he was drunk he also 
beat us, when we lost a lamb, a cow he beat us with lash and stick. He 
hurt us. When he heat my mum we were very worried and tried to 
avoid it...When my father beat my mum just between them arrange it. 
They apologised to each other. Until I was 15 he beat her hut later he
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didn't and it was always when he was drunk. He also threw out my 
mother from home and offended her.
Lucia could not remember 'any reason’ for this beating, in her understanding, there was 
no reason or maybe there was no logical reason that somebody could ’understand’. In 
view of this ’lack of cause’ , drunkenness is the only explanation for the behaviour.
Encamacion (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) was a beaten wife herself, but
also saw her mother in the same situation:
My dad heat my mum so much, because o f that she got sick and she 
died in the Regional Hospital. /  was 12 or 11 when my mother died. I 
don't have other sisters or brothers. I remember when he beat her a lot 
once he pulled her and my mother beat him with a stick. He just beat 
her drunk...My mum got hepatitis, pulmonary, my mother drank 
because o f her worries and she suffered a heart attack.
Encamacion thought that her mother died because she had been maltreated. Later in 
her narrative it appeared that her mother drank She is convinced that it was the fact 
of being maltreated which produced her mother’s sorrows.
Aquilino (26, AC Mahuaypampa, Dist. Paucartambo, Prov Paucartambo) had a hard 
life, trapped in an endless circle of violence which affected everybody in his home. 
This is his story:
When my father beat my mother she never denounced him. Once with a 
knife he cut her 'part' (he refers to the genital zone) because o f  
jealousy. My mum called the neighbours, the families came and took 
him to Paucartambo (the Province's capital) to send him to prison. Rut 
my mother ’stood' in his favour and in the evening sent a lamb to 
prevent him going to prison. We were maltreated and traumatised. 
Until now my father beats my mother when l try to avoid it he offend 
me....In her last pregnancy my father caused my mother to abort by 
beating her. He beats her all the lime when he is drunk which he is 
almost daily and when he comes back at any time o f  night he makes her 
cook.
We were completely abandoned, we did not eat well, we ate rotten 
corn, our clothes were torn we walked from house to house. My dad
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did no allow us to study, my mum registered us in the school hut my dad 
took us from there, and sent us to take care o f the lambs. I f  we lost any 
animal he beat us, with the horse lash he beat me, also to my brother, 
my mum. My mum treated us welt, hidden she bought things for us, 
notebooks, pencils, she paid the school fees. With my younger sisters 
and brother he was worse. When we were eating he threw us out, he 
completely maltreated us. When my sister Leonardo was just a child he 
hung her from the beam because he was furious with her. We had to 
call our uncle and in this way we rescued her. Whilst he hung her he 
sent us away.
He 'sold' my sister Leonardo when she was 13. He was drunk and 
drinking with other families he arranged it. She did not know the man 
who she was going to marry. He was from another community. Now 
she is living there. Her husband is not bad, he is young, she is glad 
now and lives happily. She always comes to visit us, to help us, and we 
share what we have between us, we live like in a family.
Aquilino used the term 'sold' to refer to the Andean custom of chawhua manta orqoy 
mentioned in the previous chapter Some ‘old’ customs conflict with the interests and 
sensibility of the new generation. In this case, Aquilino, as a maltreated child 
understood his father’s action as another form of violence against his sister.
Aquilino also says that now they are living as in ‘a family’ as if his father’s behaviour 
had deprived them of one. Now that they are in peace, they are a family. 1 spent some 
time with Aquilino and his family in the community. I knew more details of his life 
because Clarita had known him since he was 9, when she took him to Cusco to stay 
with her family because of his situation. Aquilino is a loving father and a kind 
husband as I could observe myself. Clarita confirmed my impression.
Other women have stories to tell about other relatives:
Francisca (46, AC CCorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) told me:
My sister's husband beat her terribly, i f  he continued to live he would 
have killed her. I f  my sister did not cook on time he beat her. Thank 
Gixl she is a widow now, she suffers with her children but is not beaten. 
She was widowed eight years ago, when she was 32. She had five or six 
years o f marriage, throughout these years she was beaten. Every year
2 4 3
she gave birth, with babies o f two months she was pregnant again. He 
did not allow her to use birth control, he wanted to have all the 
children. He beat her sober too. /  did not see him beating her. 1 
intervened after when I saw my sister and complained to him why he 
beat her. He answered me your sister is the guilty one, she does not 
follow what 1 am telling her, she did not cook on time. She never 
complained in front o f  any authorities, just with the relatives.
Victoria (AC Maraspaqui, RT Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi) was herself beaten in the 
first years of her marriage. Her husband is an alcoholic. Now she is worried about her 
daughter, Delfina:
Delfina's husband used to beat her because the fox ate a lamb and also 
he beat her because o f jealousy. He was jealous o f his own 
brother...once he punched her and made her nose bleed. She did not 
tell me the truth she told me I  fell o jf the horse I took her to the health 
centre but we did not go to the judge.
Delfina had been expelled from her own house by her in-laws during her husband’s 
trip to the lower jungle as a waged-labourer. When her husband came back his family 
told him that Delfina had affairs with other men and because of that they had thrown 
her out. He believed them.
Numerous people also brought to my attention cases from their communities. For 
example, Luz Marina (19, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco). She herself did 
not have problems of violence but she admitted that she did not like being married. It 
is better to remain atone. My husband and / do not understand each other very well, 
we always argue. She told me that the arguments are because he beats their child who 
is just 10 months, sometimes he slaps him. Their godparents have advised him but he 
does not change, when the baby cries he sometimes gets angry. When I commented to 
her that we were interested in knowing whether in her communities there are problems 
of husbands who beat their wives, she was willing to relate the following cases:
2 4 4
To this little girl's mum (she pointed to a girl o f 2 years who was 
playing around us) her step father heats her so much. They fight daily, 
sober, they don't drink. They have lived together five months. The man 
is very bad, his brother killed his wife with a knife. He killed her when 
drunk.
She also told us: the Lieutenant Governor always beats his wife. Last night he beat 
her. Always he beats her when he is drunk. While we were talking this man's 
daughter came to us. She is 10 years old and was carrying a baby on her back, in a 
keperma. She told us that her dad had beat her mum because somebody stole the 12 
litres oil container. Later they enquired to the 'paqo' (a kind of Andean magician) and 
he told them that it was one of the neighbours. Again appeared the attitude of blaming 
women for acts that are not even in their sphere of control.
4. People's reactions to domestic violence.-
Domestic violence is not viewed positively in Andean communities. None of my 
interviewees condoned it. For most women, violence is experienced with sadness and 
resentfulness and it is experienced in a very personal way, as part of their 'own 
destiny'. Some of my interviewees told me that they had prevented men beating their 
wives or had successfully helped others in the face of a threat of violence. However, 
an analysis of the communities’ institutions reveals a lack of a group attitude against 
domestic violence. This is one of the expressions of the ‘ambivalence’ in which 
domestic violence is placed in their communal life (Harris 1994).
Valentina (32, AC Chuqimarca, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta) told us:
Some people in the community feel sad because o f these problems but 
others laugh, they say women are so silly in her case I would have left 
my husband a tong time ago. Some other women advise: ‘ you have to 
cope with that for your children because this has happened since our 
grandmothers ’.
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It is common to listen to men referring a woman as ‘silly’ for continuing to live with a 
man who beats her. Women instead are more cautious of such a view, like Leonarda 
(28, Santa Cruz de Sallac, Urcos, Quispicanchi) who said that she always criticised 
men who beat their wives but she feels ashamed when sometimes her husband beats 
her.
In relation to beaten women’s reaction, Hilda (20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. 
Calca) expressed the following: Some women cry, other's fight hack. They don't want 
to he beaten more, they say is not good, some o f  them think o f separating others o f 
escape and others o f  drinking a poison. They think in this way because their husbands 
beat them so much and they can not cope with this life.
As a counter idea 1 asked people what they thought made a 'good marriage’. These 
were some of their answers:.
The pretty ( ‘bonito’, Spanish expression used in the highlands to refer to ‘the good’ or 
‘the best’) is to live without beating, just arguing with the mouth (verbally) 
(Alejandrina 30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero Prov. Urubamba).
To live well is to understand each other, to plan things together, without men drinking 
(Hilda, 20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca).
It would be good to live without beating. There are some couples who live well. 
(Women from the Mothers Club, Dist Taray, Prov. Calca).
I found the narratives of Faustina (30) and her husband Juan (33) in the community of 
Yungaypata (Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco) quite relevant because their conversion to 
'evangelists' has prevented them from drinking alcohol which normally people identify
as causing most problems of violence in the communities. The evangelic movement is 
becoming increasingly accepted among Andean people at present. Their opinions are 
as follows:
We don't live well fighting, i f  the drinking did not exist everybody 
would live well (Juan).
When there are no fights you find happiness, you live in peace 
(Faustina).
They don't know the Lord’s gospel became o f that they don't change 
but there are a lot who know it and became o f that they no longer beat 
their wives. For instance Helen (a neighbour) is no longer beaten 
became her husband has converted. Within the ( ’hurch (Evangelist) we 
are not allowed to drink (Juan).
For me it has been easy to stop drinking became God has chosen me. 
Some o f the community don't understand (Juan).
For others it is very difficult, but for us it has been very quick, we don't 
drink even 'chicha' (maize beer). Before both o f m  were drunk and my 
children were neglected. We have been in the Evangelic t 'hurch for 7 
years. We were Catholic first. (Faustina)
The Catholic priest doesn't talk deeply about the Lords gospel and 
became o f that they 'walk' commonly (Juan) [Juan referred to the lack 
of virtue in the Catholic priests’ behaviour that contradict their own 
Catholic dogmas].
We don't participate in the Catholic festivities but we do participate in 
the communal assembly meetings and communal work (faenas). We 
don't make ’earth payment' (an agricultural ritual) or something like 
that. Now they don't tell m  anything, they understand us, but in the 
beginning they made us problem5. They wanted to throw m out. Now 
almost the half o f  the community are Evangelist before we were just 3 
now we are like 30 (families).
We can see how Faustina and Juan were rejected for behaving 'differently from the 
'traditional pattern' of the community, but their lives have been an example for others. 
Many people have converted because they saw Faustina and Juan improve their lives, 
working together and living in peace. This has happened in other communities as
People who refuse to drink in communal festivities can be very badly thought o f by the rest o f the 
group since to drink is part of ritual to pay homage to saints and earth for good crops Harris (1994) and 
Harvey (1994) reported the danger o f isolation and even risk of expulsion that non drinkers in Andean 
communities faced
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well To give up alcohol is a sign of changing times within Andean communities that 
are able to ignore an ancestral custom in the belief that this will improve their life. 
After their conversion, Faustina and Juan have performed important posts within the 
community.
5. Resolving domestic violence: circuits of intervention
As was mentioned, cases of domestic violence are lived mainly as a personal problem 
and alternatives to stop the situation do not follow a pattern. On some occasions the 
situation is called to the attention of parents and godparents and 'in extreme cases' 
women go to judges and/or to lieutenant governors. There is no communal space to 
bring this problem to the group attention. This situation is clearly expressed by 
Valentina (32, AC Chuquimarca, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta): Women don't say 
when they are beaten. We hear that they are beaten because the houses are together. 
The most they do is call the parents-in-law and the parents. Only when it is very 
serious they go to the police station or to the judge. They never take this problem to 
the Assembly.
According to my interviewees the structure of the forums of intervention is as follows:
5.1 ‘Between u s \-
My interviewees were unanimous in recognising that most domestic violence cases are 
solved just between the couple. They commented:
People never go to the judge in these cases. Nor to the Lieutenant Governor Between 
them they solve the problem but now women are thinking o f  going to the 'ronda' to get 
justice7. (Victoria, 47, AC Maraspaqui, RT Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi).
Rondas, ‘peasant guards' were originally organised by the same landowners in the north Andean zone
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Some cases go to the police station some others ‘arrange pretty’ (arreglan bomto) 
(Alejandrina 30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Urubamba).
It is just like they manage to forget and when they are hurt (physically) between them 
they cure. With 'trago' (sugar cane alcohol) they put m the wound, with the wax, with 
crushed tile When they beat each other so much, they go to the godparents most o f  
them don't go to the justice. Between the family they arrange. ( Faustina, 30, AC 
Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco).
Between them just 'arreglan' (reach an arrangement). (Luz Marina, AC Yungaypata, 
Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco).
The problems are solved the following day after the beating and when not, they go to 
the lieutenant governor (Francisca 46, AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco).
Between us we just 'abuenamos' [make ‘good’ to each other] We enter in a good 
agreement... When there are beatings you remain one day upset but after is gone and 
you 'abuenas'. With too much beating they separate (a woman from the Mothers’ 
Club, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca).
Most o f these cases we resolve between us. I f  there is more understanding both 
change and they get along well after that (A woman in the Mother's Club, Dist. Taray, 
Calca).
of Peru They were responsible for the land state security, mainly against the actions o f rustlers After 
the Agrarian Reform, the peasant guards continued in operation to protect community land During the 
1980s government promoted rondas’ to stop the incursion of the Maoist group ‘Sendero Luminoso’ 
Cusco was a relatively safe zone from the action of Sendero, though the region of Ocongale (Prov 
Quispicanchi) faced high incidents of delinquency A NGO linked to the Catholic Church promoted the 
creation of peasant guards in the zone The peasant guards of Ocongate are made up of all the 
commoners, women and men They have a general meeting every month to bring complaints and also 
people who have been captured committing offences In these meetings the behaviours o f the offender 
are exposed in front o f all the members who decide what punishment to apply to them The sanction 
consists of beatings or cold baths in lakes No men who beat their wives are brought in front of the ronda 
in this area.
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5.2 Kin intervention.-
Andean communal life is based strongly in the extended family network. Pefla 
(1998:199-206) places the kin intervention as central in the resolution of 
private/family’ problems in the Aymaras communities of Puno. In the classification 
proposed by Pena, a case of ‘maltreatment’ can be resolved by the parents of each 
partner who performed as a representative of their children, the godparents who 
performed as mediators’, and the same parties in their search for a ‘good 
arrangement’ The means are dialogue and the opinion. In some cases, the 
arrangement' can be formalised by writing in front of communal authorities or the 
judge of the peace, in the present study, I did not find a strict pattern of family 
intervention although it is noticeable how important is the role of parents and 
godparents to prevent and solve cases of domestic violence.
Here are some of my interviewees opinions:
Some o f them [member of the couple] tell it to the godparents, to the parents. 
Sometimes they advise to separate others don V (Alejandrina 30, AC Kuper, Dist 
Chinchero Prov. Urubamba)
(Godparents reprimand them to stop drinking. Some o f them don't follow the advice 
and keep drinking. In this way the godparents finish feeling tired o f talking to them, 
they don't longer reprimand them (Faustina, 30, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. 
Cusco).
Parents or godparents also intervene i f  the couple ask them, in other cases just 
between them resolve. (Francisca, AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco).
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Also they told to godparents, sometimes. (Hilda 20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, 
Prov. Calca).
Parents intervene, i f  they don't exist then godparents, i f  they can’t then they go to the 
judge. (Feliz, 25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca).
My interviewees were in agreement that relatives intervene if the couple, probably 
more often the beaten women, ask them to intervene. However, I found cases in which 
parents or the wife’s mother went to judges asking for intervention because their 
daughter was being frequently maltreated by her husband.
5.3 The communal organisations.-
People were in agreement that communal organisations neither provide an opportunity 
nor the space to talk about 'domestic' problems. Steering committees can deal with or 
be involved in conflicts in the community but always related to land tenure 
management. I found in my review of the judge’s records only few cases in which the 
communal authorities presented a case of abandonment or maltreated children or 
wives to judges of the peace.
Women’s organisations are overtly dismissed by my interviewees as a forum of 
intervention. Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero Prov. Urubamba) 
vice-president of the Mother’s Club in her community was radical in telling me: In
front o f  the Mother's Club there are no denunciation about violence, women don't tell 
if the husband beat them. Neither in the Steering Committee o f the community. 
Women go straight to the police or to the judge.
1 enquired from Victoria (47, AC Maraspaqui, RT. Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi) if the 
rondas in Ocongate (Peasant Guards) intervened in these kind of cases. She confessed
251
to me: No the ronda don't take these cases into account, they just review stealing and 
'abigeatos' (rustlers), i f  there is this kind o f problem they go to the judge. Cristina (53, 
RT Ttinque, Dist. Quispicanchi) also told me the same This impression was 
confirmed to me by members of communities' steering committees in the sense that 
they don’t deal with ‘family’ cases.
In the study of Peña (1998:298) the communal authorities have a ‘passive’ role in 
relation to ‘pnvate/family cases Their main function is the elaboration of written 
documents containing the terms of the arrangement that the family has arrived at 
previously. Just on a very few and serious occasions the steering committee is obliged 
by the circumstances to intervene in family cases. Peña is in agreement that the 
communal bodies have as main role the management of the communities and 
eventually to resolve conflicts involving land tenure and commoners obligations. 
Harris (1994:59) mentions that women in Northern Potosi present complaints before 
communal authorities because of being beaten by their husbands and the authorities 
‘have to adjudicate’ Depending of the circumstances the husband is ‘fined or 
sanctioned’. She does not inform us further.
5.4 The legal representatives.-
5.4.1 A ‘serious case’.-
My interviewees were in agreement that just the ‘serious cases’ go to the judge and 
sometimes also to the lieutenant governor. 1 enquired of some of my interviewees 
what was their concept of a ‘serious case’. Women from the Mothers’ Club of Taray 
(Prov. Calca) told me: when it is not possible to hear with that because daily we are 
beaten (Mother’s Club, Taray). Juana (43), also from the Mothers’ Club, added that
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she was one of these ‘serious cases': It happened to me that my husband beat me so 
much. He is a drunkard, now he is lost, all the time drunk walking in the streets. The 
beat mg for me was daily. He just come straight, he though that l  was with other men, 
even he beat the chairs.
For Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero Prov. Urubamba) a case is 'serious' 
depending on the intensity of the injuries: When the beating is too much and he burst 
the eye or the face. For Francisca (46, AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian) this is a matter 
of personal situation. She told me that a woman goes to judges when she thinks that 
she can no longer bear it and there are women who can bear more than others.
5.4.2 Lieutenant Governors.-
Lieutenant Governor is the lowest representative of the Internal Affairs Ministry. He 
(always a man) is the police representative in their communities and fulfils some of 
their functions. Lieutenant Governors are appointed in a General Assembly and later 
officially confirmed by the Sub-prefecturas (district representatives of the internal 
affairs ministry). Lieutenant Governors work closely with judges' of the peace because 
they are responsible for judicial appointments. They can also report cases to the 
judges.
In places substantially distant from a judge's place, lieutenant governors can be 
considered a kind of 'substitute' of the judge. People’s confidence in lieutenant 
governors, however, depends on how impartial they suspect this authority will be in 
their case. Women who suffer domestic violence problems would not look for the 
intervention of a Lieutenant governor if this officer also beats his wife or is a close 
relative or friend of their husbands. Here are some of my interviewees opinions:
Faustina (30, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco) told me: they go to the judges 
o f the peace just when there are arguments with other families. First they go to the 
Lieutenant Governor and later i f  they don't reach an agreement they are sent to the 
judges o f Cusco. Francisca (AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco) was of the 
same opinion: When a woman is beaten very hard or has been badly punished she go 
to the lieutenant governor.... The lieutenant governor based in the law, in the article 
that he has in the hand, they call them the attention and they told them it should not be 
in this way. When is more serious it is remitted to the judge.
For Encamacion (25, AC Maska, Dist Pisac, Prov. Calca) this is a problem of 
individual choice: Some o f them go to the judge others to the lieutenant governor For 
Lucia (26, AC Cuyo Grande, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) lieutenants are the only choice 
available: There are some women who their husbands beat them, they go to the 
lieutenant governor.
5.4.3 Judges of the Peace.-
Most of my interviewees, however, mentioned judges as those mainly responsible for 
intervention As Alejandrina remembers (20, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. 
Urubamba) People go to the judge when it is serious and when they don't have 
anybody, they do not have parents. When they have them they just arrange between 
them.
Hilda (20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca) told me: some women go to the 
judge to complain or to separate. These are the less. When people fight they go to the 
judge when they fight drunk. They go to the judge o f Taray. Women from the 
Mothers’ Club of Taray (Prov. Calca) told me. they go to the judge with the 
seriousness o f the beating either to separate or to arrange in a good way. Feliz (25,
AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca) was very well informed of the last legal 
change: Sometimes in these fights they go to the judge. Recently it has been enacted 
a lerw and maltreatment should not occur at home. Women can defend themselves 
now.
My interviewees have a positive impression about judge intervention In domestic 
violence cases they consider that husbands attitude toward the judges is very important 
for a successful end. Encamacion (25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca) told me: i f  
the man listen to what the judge is telling him then he does not longer beat. Most o f  
them obey the judge and they don't beat more. Some o f them change their character 
but some don't. It is better to go to the judge.
Women from the Mothers’ Club of Taray told me: Most o f men change when they go 
to the judge, some o f them go to the police too, they make themselves to he taken there 
(it means that because of their actions they are taken there). However, they also 
acknowledge: there are women for whom it is worse, the husband threaten them 
'walking you go to the judge' (it means you have enough energy or time to go to the 
judge but not to do other things)
Alejandnna (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Urubamba) had a very positive 
opinion: In the judge o f peace they always arrange. When they are spouses they reach 
a pretty agreement. It is good that there is a judge o f  peace because all that provoke 
problem regret their behaviour and they realised what they are doing.
5.5 The endings.-
The most noticeable disparity that the domestic violence law has with the reality of the 
Andean people is that it presupposes that the normal ending of a domestic violence
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case is separation and that people who suffer domestic violence are in the position of 
‘victims’ this is vulnerable in the hands of perpetrators who are evaluated as 
permanent and dangerous aggressors As Harris (1994:59) has analysed, the violence 
in more Western cultures is regarded as a "breakdown of normality’, like an 'intrusion 
from outside’. In the Andean communities it is treated as ‘alternative state’, a risk that 
some men face because of drunkenness. For Andean people even marital violence can 
be 'repaired' or mended’ through dialogue and advice. Consequently, for the people of 
Andean communities, there are simply two ways of ending a case of marital violence:
1) the highly expected: ‘pretty arrangement’ or ‘good understanding’ and 2) when the 
situation is not 'controllable', the separation.
5.5.1 A 'pretty arrangement*
It is very common to hear about arreglar bonito (to 'arrange' in a smooth way), or 
buen entendimiento (good understanding) talking with Andean people in different 
situations. Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Urubamba) told me that 
'to arrange pretty, it is that between them there is an understanding. They apologise 
to each other. For the women in the Taray Mother's Club: this means to keep Irving 
together without beating.
The ‘pretty arrangement’ is the expected end in any kind of forum, even if it is just 
between the couple’ although it presents more formalities when the ‘amendment’ is 
between the extended family or in front o f judges. Pefia (1998:200) points out that the 
means to reach a ‘pretty arrangement’ are dialogue and advice. This can astound 
people working in domestic violence from a gender perspective since the principle is 
there is no ground to justify arry kind of violence against women. However, observing 
the dynamic of the ‘negotiation’ in these cases, we realise how the objective is the real
amendment’ of the situation and not the legitimisation of men's abusive behaviour. 
This is noticed also by Harris (1994:59) and Pefia (1998:201).
This was the way that Luzmila, the judge of peace of Pisac dealt with the case of 
Maria Eugenia and Dalmecio. Maria came to the judge to tell her that her partner beat 
her ‘so much’, for nothing, he did not even give her a reason to explain his behaviour. 
Her family had already intervened and ‘he apologised’ but continued repeating his 
action. The judge made an appointment for them to attend a conciliatory’ meeting. 
The judge started asking Maria to repeat her complaint, after she finished, she asked 
Dalmecio to explain why he behaves in this way. He said he beat her because he 
listened to ‘gossip’ about her and that she did not do anything to stop these gossips, so 
when he is drunk he remembers. Luzmila, then reprimanded the way that he is 
behaving claiming that since he compromised with her he had to forget what she was 
in her past, then she started to explain all the negative effects of beating his wife, her 
resentfulness and the possible effects on her health that could make her ‘a weak and ill 
woman': ‘You have to think of the consequences of your acts’ she adds. Luzmila was 
appealing to his ‘good understanding’ to make him aware of what he was doing.
The ‘pretty arrangement’ involves a kind of negotiation in which, despite just one 
party being injured, all the people involved are prompt to recognise their 
responsibilities in the events. This is not just applicable to domestic violence, this 
pattern is the same in other cases involving physical aggression. For instance, before 
the judge of Taray I witnessed an uncle who had been beaten by his drunk nephew. 
The uncle accepted the nephew’s apologies and promised to offer more moral and 
economic support to his nephew. Something similar occurred in another case before 
the judge of Pisac. I witnessed a woman promise not to continue a despising attitude in
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front of a poorer neighbour who, while drunk, had insulted her and threatened to beat 
her He confessed in front of the judge to feeling hurt because of the woman’s 
arrogant attitude toward him and his family, consequently, the woman promised to be 
more respectful to him.
What is clear from my interviewees is that in the ‘pretty arrangement’ in domestic 
violence cases it has as its objective stopping the violence For us as outsiders, it 
would be difficult to trust in the commitment of a man who merely explains away his 
action on the grounds of being drunk, but Andean people have confidence in such 
agreements, including women, as was the case of Alejandrina (30, AC Kuper, Dist 
Chincheros), mentioned previously. Every time that her husband got drunk he accused 
her of not selling enough products and beat her, when sober he did not even complain 
verbally. Their relatives intervened and he stopped beating her. He still joined the 
drinking bout but before going to drink he promises her not to cause her problems. 
Her husband come back home ‘crying, singing’ and goes to sleep in peace.
5,5.2 Apologising,-
‘To apologise’ is a very important step in the ‘arrangement’ between two parties in 
conflict. I observed this ‘ceremony’ of apologising many times in my visits to the 
judges' places. I was surprised by the formality of the event. It has the appearance of a 
ritual. It is called in Quechua 'disculpakunaquichis' (giving apologises). Judges of 
peace always finish a conciliatory meeting, in which a written or verbal agreement has 
been reached, with this 'procedure'. After the parties have signed the agreement or 
have ended the discussion with a clear commitment by each party, judges request the 
offender for a ‘disculpakunaquichis’.
The offender stands up and expresses in detail how ashamed he or she feels for his/her 
behaviour then acknowledges and values the affectionate relationship that he/she has 
with the injured person (normally a relative or a neighbour) and that in front of ‘Our 
Lord Jesus Christ’ promises not to do it again and ‘humbly’ asks for forgiveness and 
sits down. The judge then invites the injured party. She or he expresses how 
humiliated or injured he/she has felt because of the other party’s behaviour especially 
coming from a person with a 'close link' She or he reprimands and advises the other 
party for the sake of their relationship not to do it again, then the offender stands up 
and both parties give each other a strong hug. Minutes ago both parties could be 
arguing bitterly about terms of compensation, or were remembering bitterly the 
circumstances of the aggression and other offences that happened in the past that have 
accumulated resent between them, but after the ritual, everything is ‘mended’, and a 
sense of peace pervades the judge’s place.
The cycle of agression-reconciliation has been analysed in the study of domestic 
violence from a gender perspective. It is understood that a woman is in a way 
‘seduced’ again by her aggressor under the promise of a compensatory love proper of 
the reconciliatory stage, and that will last until the next beating. Between Andean 
people there is not such a seductive game, the violence does not disrupt the dynamic of 
the relationship Most Andean women are not afraid of their husbands when sober, 
they are afraid of being beaten when they drink. If they manage not to be beaten after 
a drinking bout they will not even bother to complain about the drunkenness as 
happened in Alejandrina’s case. There is really a sense of confidence in the other 
person, the conviction of the aggressor and beaten woman that the violence was
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performed in that state of ‘otherness’ and that a man’s genuine regret of his action 
could prevent him to being violent when drunk.
The Andean preference for the ‘arrangement’ (the arreglo) faces sometimes a great 
disagreement with the official legal system, especially when the injuries are ‘serious’ 
in the legal medical understanding. In Ollantaytambo, I came across a case from the 
community of Huilloc, one of the oldest Cusquenian communities. A young man had 
been seriously injured by his brother when both were drinking heavily during a 
festivity. The injured brother complained to the judge who, following the formal 
procedure, sent him to the legal recognition. The medical examination, performed in 
the Health Centre, reported more than 10 days of medical resting The judge called 
the parties to explain to them that he was obliged by law to send the case to the 
criminal judge because it had reached the level of a serious offence. The injured 
brother begged the judge not to do it. . He just wanted 'to arrange' with his brother, 
this involved payment for the medicine and some other compromises, and that his 
brother 'apologise' to him but he did not want hts brother sent to the criminal court.
5,5.3 S eparation  as an  option.-
A separation was perceived by my interviewees as a very remote possibility. They 
told me:
Most couples keep living together, very few o f them separate. And if  they do separate 
it is just for three months and they come back again (Alejandrina, 30, Kuper, 
Chinchero Urubamba).
Despite the beating they keep living together, on very few occasions they split, I guess 
it will be a /%. They say this is my luck and in this way they accept it. Just
commenting they say. 'It is my husband, I have to cope'. Others say / don't want to 
cope' and they split. Others say even i f  he kills me I am not going to separate 
(Francisca, 46, AC Ccorao, Dist San Sebastian, Prov. Cusco).
In some cases the ‘pretty arrangement’ is not followed by the husbands, and in many 
cases it takes more than one ‘pretty arrangement’ to see any real change. Maria went 
to the Pisac judge with the intention of separating from her partner Dalmecio. She 
thought that he was not going to change since he had apologised before for his 
behaviour in front of his relatives and although he stopped for some time, he had 
started to beat her again. After the judge’s intervention, Maria insisted on returning to 
her parent’s home at least for a period of time to evaluate whether Dalmecio really had 
the intention to change his attitude. After some weeks 1 knew from the same judge 
that they had got back together and so far she had not heard of any problem between 
them. They were still together three months later when I left the zone and the judge 
knew that they were living ‘well’ now. The case of Encamación was different. She 
had been in the court twice already and everybody, starting from the judge had advised 
her to separate that her husband was not going to change. Encamación explained to 
me that she still continues with him because doctors told her that he is ill and have 
warned him to leave the alcohol. She feels safe when he is not drinking. It is also 
reported by my interviewees and by Harris (1994) in her work, that women faced 
maltreatment from their husbands in the first years of their cohabitation or marriage 
but in one way or another the violence has stopped and they are able to live together in 
peace.
Consequently, when a woman goes to a ‘forum’ her wishes are for her husband to 
change. This will be the 'ideal' as women in Taray Mothers Club expressed to me.
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Case files confirm this situation This is when a woman turns to a judge most of them 
want a good understanding’ with her husband This differs from the attitude of urban 
women who when they reach the legal system, they really intend to end their 
relationship For instance, in the Women’s Police Station of Lima 41.8% of women 
expressed a desire for separation while just a 9.9% were looking for their husbands to 
change their attitude (Estremadoyro 1993:47). This does not mean that all these 
women manage to separate but that they were convinced that the only alternative to 
their situation was to finish their relationship. Instead Andean women evaluate the 
judge’s place as another forum in which it is possible to go for a ‘pretty arrangement’ 
because they do not have close relatives or because they are giving it a ‘last’ try after 
the relative’s intervention failed.
Conclusions:
Anthropologists like Harris (1994:48) suggest that the ‘generic status of wife-beating’ 
in Andean communities ‘is hard to evaluate’. There are some men who beat their 
wives, and there are many women who have faced beatings by their husband’s at 
some point in their relationship. However, at least at discursive level, wife beating is 
highly disapproved and explanations narrow down to the fact that most men (my 
interviewees would say almost all of them) beat when they are drunk.
Andean men do not have an overt attitude to use violence to ‘keep women in their 
place’. It appears that men need to hide their intentions and resentfulness under the 
excuse of drunkenness, culturally supported as a state of alienation, in such a way that 
most men who beat when drunk feel very ashamed the following morning exonerating 
themselves in front of their wives for the fact of being drunk: ‘I don’t know what got 
in me'. In an analysis of domestic violence from a gender perspective, the
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drunkenness' would be just a 'contingent explanation’ for a typical expression of 
gender hierarchy (Harris 1994:52) . In Andean communities, it is more difficult to 
disregard it because it gives the strongest explanation to understanding the tolerance 
of domestic violence occurring in such a state In this sense, Harvey (1994:66) goes 
further concluding that Andean women although they complain and fight back against 
physical attacks by their husbands, ‘do not make them directly responsible for the 
violence’.
This chapter has not attempted to provide explanations for the existence of domestic 
violence in Andean communities but rather to find out if domestic violence is a ground 
for complaint and in which forums this complaint is carried out. This enquiry reveals 
that the decisions to seek alternatives to facing domestic violence are deeply individual 
and depend entirely on the woman’s tolerance of the violence. Attending a forum is 
entirely at a woman’s discretion, as to how much she can ‘cope’ with In this sense, 
our interviewees are in agreement that most incidents of domestic violence are 
resolved between the couple. However, if incidents are repeated, it is a common 
practise to ask the relatives to intervene. This is the ‘first forum’ o f intervention and 
although in my fieldwork it did not show a formal and strict pattern, it is considered 
very important. Parents and godparents, would use "dialogue and advice’ to make both 
sides enter into a ‘good understanding’ which in cases of domestic violence has the 
objective of preventing the continuation of this attitude by the husband. Sometimes 
relatives can intervene without even being called by the same women. Another 
important aspect revealed is that communal organisations are not a forum for domestic 
violence problems. Consequently, if there are not relatives or these fail in preventing 
the violence, women will go to the judges of the peace for help. At the judge’s place,
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the high expectation of women is to prevent their husbands from beating them, in only 
a few cases will women go to the judge looking for separation.
Andean people do believe in ‘arrangement’ and ‘restoration’ and my interviewees gave 
evidence that the interventions of relatives and judges had worked with husbands who 
become violent when drunk. There is also the evidence that when some of them 
stopped drinking, for instance through conversion to the Evangelist Church, the 
violence stopped too.
There are some paradoxes in the situation of domestic violence in Andean 
communities, however, it is not an objective of this work to resolve them but rather to 
acknowledge the way in which Andean women perceive domestic violence and 
understand it should be resolved. On this point there is a major disparity with what is 
proposed in the domestic violence laws (which reflect the feminist perspective). In 
such approach the aggressor is a criminal and women and children are strongly 
recommended to separate themselves from such danger. Instead, in Andean 
communities, women are not afraid of their husbands when sober and it is difficult to 
imagine an Andean woman regarding her husband as a criminal. The fact that men 
express their confrontational aspect of the relationship in a ‘state of otherness’ 
‘exonerated’ them to break the idiom of ‘complementarity’ that keeps the Andean 
couple together even through the most difficult circumstances.
The following chapter will focus on the role of the judges of the peace that performing 
as justiciable bodies (Santos 1994:28) are identified by Andean women as appropriate 
to resolve domestic violence problems.
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C H A P T E R  EIGHT:
JU D G ES O F T H E  PEA CE AND D O M ESTIC V IO LEN CE
Introduction:
As was mentioned in chapter four, the judge of the peace, a typical colonial institution, 
came to fulfil a space left empty by the disintegration of the original communal 
organisation and the loss of the social legitimacy of the kurakas. Indigenous people 
accepted this institution and assimilated it to perform the function of conflicts 
resolution.
Centuries have passed and Andean communities have not re-institutionalised the 
justice management within their own social organisations. The communal bodies have 
a managerial function and if they have a capacity to adjudicate conflicts these are 
mainly concentrated around land tenure and commoners obligations. Additionally 
their decisions always have to be supported by the general assembly. Women’s 
organisations are concentrated in productive activities and do not constitute a space to 
which women can bring their ‘personal’ problems.
In relation to domestic violence, some situations are called to the attention of kin 
networks. However, in serious cases, my interviewees stated, it is the judge of the 
peace who became the main forum of intervention. The review of the judge's records 
reveals that these ‘serious cases’ of domestic violence are the highest cause of 
complaint in the judge’s overall work load.
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This chapter acknowledges the main role of judges of the peace in conflict 
management in Andean communities, and particularly analyses their intervention in 
domestic violence cases. It looks into the limits and the possibilities of these judges to 
reflect women’s expectations in relation to the issue. At the same time, it pays 
particular attention to their role in preserving social relations more than adjudicating a 
‘legal status’ to the cases. The final objective is to contrast the characteristics of such 
an intervention with the expectation that the formal legal system (including the 
expectation of feminist lawyers) has of the way domestic violence cases should be 
resolved at national level.
Before discussing the role of the judges specifically in cases o f domestic violence it is 
necessary to look into the general context of the Justicia of the Peace.
1. Formal characteristics of the Justicia of the peace.-
The Justicia of the peace in Peru constitutes the basic level of justice administration. 
It is exercised by judges not lawyers and it is an unpaid function. Its name expresses 
its function basically conciliatory, of 'peace makers', a characteristic that has not 
changed with time. In this sense, Loli (1997:83) claims that if the inhabitants of small 
towns in Peru were asked what kind of judges they know, their answer would be 'the 
judges of Peace of their district'. She thinks that a similar inquiry made one hundred 
years ago would have had the same answer.
Loli (1997:83) states that the judges of the peace, marks in our society the coexistence 
of 'two styles of justice administration, ostensibly contradictory, based in different 
rationalities'. In Brandt’s opinion (1995: 94) the judges of the peace hold ‘concepts, 
procedures, objectives, values and standards' different than those of the rest of the 
judicial system. For most of the Peruvian population the justice of the Peace is the
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only level of justice administration attainable because of the costs, distances and type 
of conflict in which they are involved Additionally, judges of the peace make up 
almost the totality of the judicial system of Peru. There are around 5,800 of these 
judges in the country representing more than the 70% of the judicial system (less than 
30% of the judges in Peru are lawyers) and resolving more than half of the judicial 
conflicts in Peru(Loli 1997:108, Brandt 1990: 87, Revilla 1994:81-2)
In spite of its importance, judges of the peace have hardly been in the focus of the 
state’s attention. The few times that it has been targeted is when some judicial higher 
representatives and lawmakers have been worried about their 'lack of coherence' with 
the rest of the 'professional'judicial system in Peru. Certainly, there has hardly existed 
a preoccupation to consider the Justicia of the peace from the perspectives, necessities 
and expectations of the users.
Studies such as those of Brandt (1990) and Revilla (1994) reveal that the population 
has a very positive opinion of judges of the peace which contrasts with the very 
negative evaluation in relation to the rest of the ‘judicial pyramid'. It is stated that in 
front of the judges of the peace, 'there is a search for an effective solution to the 
concrete case' (Revilla 1994:81), avoiding legalism and formalism that the population 
that they attend, mainly peasant, does not have the capacity to understand and which 
would not be useful. In this sense, Brandt (1990:368) finds that the 64% of the cases 
processed before judges of the peace finished in a conciliatory agreement ('arreglo'). 
Brandt (1995:96) suggests than privileging the ‘mediation’ more than the 
adjudication’ the judges are sharing the ‘values and interest’ of the ‘users’. He thinks 
that particularly Andean people, expect that the intervention of the judges will restore 
the ‘equilibrium’ that is expected to exist in such a small social group. In the judge’s
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intervention values such as ‘solidarity and mutual responsibility within families, 
neighbourhoods and communities’ are seriously taken into account.
This ambiguous treatment of the Justice of the Peace has conditioned the coexistence 
of a variety of statutes regulating their role. Some of these are as old as the ‘Rules of 
the judges of the Peace’ which were enacted in 1854. The following is an analysis of 
the characteristics of judges of the peace emanating from the legislation. It will be 
compared with the reality of judges of the peace ‘on the ground’.
1.1 Jurisdiction (CompetenciaX.-
Jurisdiction in the civil area has been traditionally defined by the patrimonial 
estimation of the main claim or by the importance of the rights involved in the civil 
transaction (e.g. divorce) and in the criminal area by the gravity of the unlawful 
behaviour. In this way, it has been assigned a hierarchical status between the judges 
and courts. The courts considered more important deal with higher monetary matters 
or with interests or rights which deserve higher state tutelage, both at civil and 
criminal level.
Judges of the peace has an assigned jurisdiction that has not changed radically from 
colonial times. This jurisdiction is defined by the low material estimation in the civil 
cases, and those cases which deserve a ‘moderate correction’ at criminal level (Article 
142 and 143 of the 1812 Constitution of Cadiz). Until the 1920s, judges of the peace 
were exclusively a conciliatory stage they did not have the capacity of adjudication. 
Within that decade judges were entitled to adjudicate both at civil and criminal level 
although in 1940 that attribution was removed for criminal cases and reinstated only in 
1991. Despite having the attribution to decide on cases, there is still a strong belief 
that in front of a judge of Peace cases will be resolved by conciliation. This
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conciliatory character of the judges is stressed in the article 65 of the current Judicial 
Power Organic Law (the ‘LOPJ’):
‘The Judge of the Peace, essentially is a Judge of Conciliation. 
Consequently having the attribution to propose alternative solutions to 
the parties with the objective of favouring a conciliation, although it is 
forbidden to impose an agreement’.
The law, however, has clearly entitled the judges of the peace to adjudicate in the 
following j urisdiction:
In the civil subject.- Article 65 of the LOPJ establishes:
‘If the conciliation is not successful the Judges of the Peace will know 
of the following procedures within the patrimonial appreciation 
established by the law:
1. - Maintenance only in the case when children are legally recognised 
by both parents [in other cases higher courts are responsible].
2. deshaucio and aviso de despedida [procedure of landowners against 
tenants].
3. Payment of money.
4. Interdictos: procedures to secure or recover goods.
5. Immediate interventions when children have committed antisocial 
acts and with the exclusive aim of making provisional and urgent orders 
about the custody of children abandoned or in moral danger situations. 
When this immediate intervention is concluded he/she should submit 
the case to the Children’s Judge [now called Family Judge] or another 
related judge.
6. In others in accordance with the law’
Judges of the peace also performed as notaries (Notario Publico) when there are none 
of these public representatives available within 10 kilometres (Art. 68 of the LOPJ).
This text of the law gives the impression that conciliation is a very wide attribution 
that can be applicable in any case and only when it fails can judges adjudicate those 
areas assigned by the law. However, article 67 of the LOPJ states that judges are 
forbidden from conciliation and decision in cases related to the marital link 
(separation, divorce) and nullity of juridical act and contracts, as well as, inheritance
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rights, constitutional rights and others established by law. In reality, judges have 
always preferred the conciliation even in cases which are, in theory, outside the scope 
of their jurisdiction (Brandt 1990, Loli 1997, 104, Peña 1998:175-186). Additionally, 
most rural judges avoid giving a case a formal procedural route Loli (1997:104) 
reports that just a few judges who have some knowledge of the law and main codes 
feel able to resolve a case, the rest preferred conciliation. On top of that, judge’s of 
the Peace performance is not supported by coercive bodies as in higher ranks of the 
judicial power (e.g. judicial police) and there is a conviction in the judges that the 
good will of the party is what really works. In my study, conciliation was preferred in 
all the cases.
In the criminal area, article 440, subsection 6, of the 1993 Criminal Code establishes 
that judges of the peace are responsible for Faltas procedures (minor criminal 
offences). These procedures are as follows:
Faltas against the Person (those affecting the physical integrity of a person, 441 to 443 
of the Criminal Code).
Faltas against patrimony (e.g. theft, 444 to 448 of the Criminal Code).
Faltas against ‘good habits’ (e.g. slanders, 449 to 450 Criminal Code).
Fallas against public tranquillity (452 of Criminal Code).
One of the most controversial aspects of the judges preference for conciliation is at the 
level of ‘faults’ (Loli 1997:104, Revilla 1994:86). As was mentioned when talking 
about letrados judges in chapter five, a criminal case can be finished by a sentence, by 
a prescription or by a desistimiento (the withdrawal of the action by the complainant). 
In criminal cases conciliation is not recognised as a procedure stage. Such an 
agreement is understood as a desistimiento. Loli (1997:105) believes that this
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situation enervates the ‘real access of the exercise of the rights’ since judges close 
themselves off from any possibility of coercion against the offender. This is 
considered particularly relevant in cases of domestic violence. Brandt (1995:96-99), 
however, suggests that the option for conciliation should be appreciated from the 
perspective of the users. In most cases, to conciliate matches the ‘values and interests’ 
of the people involved, including those of women.
In my study, all 149 judges who attended the training courses organised by the Cusco 
Superior Court in February 1997, believed that conciliation was the reason for being a 
judge and could be exercised and promoted in any cases, whether it is criminal or not 
does not have any relevance. These were their answers to the question ‘what are the 
judges of the Peace’s functions in cases of ‘Fallas against the person’:
120 judges believed that they had only the attribution of conciliation.
27 judges recognised that they had the attribution to deliver a sentence when the 
parties did not conciliate.
2 believed that they could conciliate but if this failed the case should be passed to a 
superior court for resolution.
A further enquiry, however, revealed that 138 believed those cases normally finish by 
conciliation (ie some judges who acknowledge the capacity to adjudicate did not 
perceive it as necessary in order to solve the cases), 8 believed that the cases could 
finish either by conciliation or by sentence, and 3 of them that the cases could finish 
by a conciliation followed by a desistimiento by the complainant (ie only these judges 
linked the conciliation with its real meaning within criminal cases).
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1.2 T errito ria l Jurisd ic tion  (JurisdiccionX-
There is not a strict criteria to establish appointments of judges of the peace They can 
be appointed in a district, small town, a peasant community or even a shanty town in 
urban zones. Territorial boundaries and appointments are the exclusive decision of the 
Superior Courts. The law simply establishes in article 61 of the LOPJ that all 
'populated centres’ (centros poblado.s) should have at least one judge of the peace. 
Demographic volumes to define a people’s settlement as a populated centre’ are 
established by the Judicial District Executive Councils. These councils are headed by 
the presidents of the Superior Courts (Arts. 95-97 LOPJ). On some occasions, the 
Councils accept the suggestion of representative sectors’ of the population to create 
new appointments of judges of the peace. A peasant community can have the initiative 
to negotiate the creation of a juzgado' through their district town council. Town 
councils then send the respective petition through the judicial channels (normally first 
to the provincial court judges and then to the Superior Court)2
The 13 provinces of the Department of Cusco have the following number of juzgados 
of Peace'
PROVINCES No. Juzgados
Acomayo 48
Anta 13
Calca 12
Canas 15
Canchis 14
Chumbivilcas 16
1 The Spanish word Jtagado  refers both to the physical place where a judge performs his/her function
and to the appointment itself
Interview with the President o f  the Superior Court of Cusco, Dr Francisco Olivera 
Based on the Cusco Superior Court records
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Cusco 6
Espinar 8
La Convencion 36
Paruro 37
Paucartambo 17
Quispicanchi 26
Urubamba 8
TOTAL 256
In reality, this number is just a reference. Some juzgados are not operative because 
judges are no longer in the post for various reasons. It is not possible to know exactly 
how many judges are actually functioning since there is not such a thing as ‘visiting 
inspectors’ in the Superior Courts, not only because of the lack of resources but also 
because of the difficulties in accessing some areas. For the 1997 election of judges of 
the peace, the Superior Court required the town's mayors to prepare a terna (a list of 
three candidates with the suggested names for a judge and two accesitarios4). 
Reviewing the Superior Court records this has not happened in 85 cases5 . In some 
places, I proved that there was a lack of interest by the town councils to promote 
candidates to judges of the peace and/or there were no people available in the district 
to perform the post, since it is an unpaid but demanding job. The lack of proposed 
candidates does not necessarily mean that the judge’s appointment was vacant, in most 
cases the former judge was still functioning.
One could think that the territorial jurisdiction is a quite straightforward criterion, 
however, I found all sorts of situations that could only be explained by this informality
' 'Accesitario' is a deputy judge, is legally obliged to replace the judges when the latter can not 
perform the post for any reason They can also work with the judges as secretary or assistant 
Anta 3, Calca 14, Canas 3, Canchis 3, Chumbivilcas 3, La Convencion 29, Paruro 12,
Paucartambo 15, Quispicanchi 3,
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surrounding the justice of Peace in Peru and its lack of connection with higher levels 
of the judicial pyramid. Since most of the cases are resolved by conciliation it does 
not have any relevance in practical terms by whom or in which juzgado a person 
resolves his/her case.
For instance, I found new juzgados of Peace which were relatively unknown by most 
of the population, especially in those places with distant pleasant communities. This 
was the case of the judge of Ccorao (Prov. Cusco). The population did not attend the 
juzgado and in 4 months the judge had dealt with only 10 cases. The same happened 
with the Yucay judge (Prov. Urubamba). The community of San Juan, two and a half 
hours walking distance away, had never attended the judge’s office.
Other cases were the judges’ lack of knowledge of their correct territorial jurisdiction. 
Sometimes judges are not familiar with the formal’ boundaries of their territorial 
jurisdiction. In my study, this happened with the judge of Ccorao (Prov. Cusco) who 
told me that his jurisdiction included the communities of the District of Taray. Taray 
is a neighbouring district that belongs to the Province of Calca. His confusion comes 
from the fact that NGOs and state officers based their work on what they denominated 
the 'Cuenca of Ccorao’ this is the population around the Urubamba River between 
Ccoaro and the ‘Sacred Valley’. This compromises 21 pleasant communities some of 
them belonging to the province of Calca. These communities are frequently calling for 
'joined work’ in the town of Ccorao this being of easier access for the training teams. 
This has generated the perception in the judge that these communities were also in his 
territorial jurisdiction. In other cases, there are pleasant communities whose communal 
land lays within two provinces boundaries.
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There exists also an informality promoted by the same legal system representatives. 
This due to the inaccessibility of some judges’ places or simply the lack of resources 
to send case files to the right judges. This determines that police stations prefer to 
work with the closest judge. There are few police stations in the highlands and these 
are almost exclusively located in the larger districts of the provinces (normally with 
more commercial activities). Consequently, if an incident has deserved the 
intervention of the police the case file would be remitted to the most accessible judge. 
For instance, in the whole province of Calca there are just two police stations, one in 
the capital of the province and the other in the district of Pisac All the police files of 
the zone are sent to the Pisac judge even though people involved are living in other 
districts with their own judges. The same happens with the judge of Chinchero in the 
province of Urubamba.
Another situation was the people’s preference to attend one judge to another. To 
establish the kind of relationship that Andean people have with the judge they need to 
trust him/her. We will come back later to this idea. In my study this happened for 
instance with the judge of Pisac (Prov. Calca) and the judges of Maras (Prov. 
Urubamba) the first one received cases from Taray and the second one from the 
Community of Mahuaypampa, places with their own judges. The judge of first 
nomination6 of Ollantaytambo (Prov. Urubamba) was the one who received almost all 
the cases of the district. The secretary of the judge of Second Nomination told me that 
they receive on average only one case per week while the first nomination received an 
average of 20 cases per week. Something similar happened in the district of Ocongate.
Depending on the amount of population and the kind of activities the superior courts can appoint 
two judges of Peace in a district In that case, the first appointed judge is called the judge of First 
Nomination while the other judge is named as the Second Nomination
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In other cases, the judge is simply not available on a regular basis to attend the 
population as I proved myself. I finally met the judge of Huayllabamba (Prov. 
Urubamba) and of Saylla (Prov. Cusco) after three visits, this was also reflected in the 
light case loads that these judges had. The San Sebastian Judge (Prov. Calca) 
abandoned’ her post, as I was informed In relation to this last district, it is the Pisac 
judge who deals with these cases. Additionally, people from the community of 
Mahuaypampa (Prov. Ollantaytambo) told me that the judge is never in his post, as a 
consequence, they normally go to the Maras judge The same happened with the 
judges of the Carhuayo District in the province of Quispicanchi.
1.3 The Appointment.-
Article 69 of the LOPJ mentions that towns councils, peasant communities, native 
communities, amongst other 'representative social sectors' are entitled to submit 
proposals for candidates to be judges. In reality, and in agreement with Revilla 
(1994:84), the people have little participation in appointing the judges. Some judges 
are personally invited by mayors to make up the terna whilst others are elected more 
democratically with the participation of the social organisations (e g. 'Defence 
Committees’, ‘District Committees’). In fact, and as most of the judges interviewed 
declared, the post of judges of the peace is not very much in demand because it is 
unpaid Consequently, it can happen as it did in Taray, Lamay and Pisac that it was 
not possible to find 'temas' to be submitted for the November 1996 election7. As a 
consequence, the previous judges had to continue in the post.
The ternas are presented by town councils, but final election is the competence of the 
judicial District Executive Council. In the November 1996 judge’s selection, the
Judges were elected for the period January 1997-December 1999
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president of the Superior Court, with an innovative spirit and/or knowing about the 
incorrect behaviour of some judges decided to amend the ternas of the proposed 
candidates. Consequently, in some cases, candidates proposed as accesilarios were 
appointed as judges and those proposed as judges were appointed as accesilarios or 
were not considered at all. This surprised the candidates themselves, especially those 
who were not expecting to be judges.
By law, the post of judge of the peace is for a term of two years. In reality, this period 
is just a reference. For instance, the judges elected in 1993 continued in their posts by 
a Superior Court resolution made during 1995. They were not ratified (which is a 
different procedure which includes the re-examination of the judge), they were ordered 
to continue in their function for 2 years more. In 1997 the 'old'judges were still in the 
post because new judges had not been appointed. The situation of my interviewees 
was as follows:
In 14 cases they were postulated as judges and obtained the post.
In 8 cases they were postulated as accesitarios but were appointed as judges.
4 were previous judges.
In one case the person appointed as judge was not part of any of the ternas prepared by 
the town council. The lernas were sent to the provincial court (Juzgados especiales o 
mixlos) responsible to submit the ternas to the Superior Court (as procedure). In this 
case, the court amended by his own initiative the ternas and a non candidate was 
appointed as judge. This generated great resentment in the population.
L-4 Requirements.-
There are two type of legal requirements for the post.: a) general for any judge, b) 
specific for the appointment of judge of the peace.
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a) General Requirements: article 177 of the LOPJ mentions:
- being Peruvian from birth.
- being citizen in the exercise and enjoyment of the civil rights.
- to have an irreproachable behaviour.
- not being blind, deaf, mute, mentally handicapped or, to have a permanent physical 
incapacity.
- not to have been condemned or not being prosecuted for any criminal offence.
- not being in a state of bankruptcy.
- not having any of the incompatibility established by law.
B) Specific Requirements: article 183 of the LOPJ mentions:
- being older than 30 years.
- being a resident of the place.
- to have at least completed primary school.
- to have a known occupation.
- to speak Quechua, Aymara or any other dialect of the zone.
When necessary, the District Executive Council is entitled to exonerate judges of the 
requirement to complete primary school and -inexplicably- of the knowledge of the 
native language. In practice, Superior Courts considered indispensable knowledge of 
the language of the area. However, there are other requirements in which the courts 
can be more flexible, like the age. In my research, I found that the judge of First 
Nomination of Ollantaytambo (Prov. Urubamba) was only 28 years old and the same 
applied to the judge of the adjoining communities of Collana-Chequerec also from the 
province of Urubamba. This could be explained by the fact that the former LOPJ 
established an age limit of 25 (art. 46 ex-LOPJ) but also, and according to comments
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of the Superior Court representatives, by the ‘necessity’ to have ‘more educated' 
candidates for judges*. In the rural areas the younger generations have had more 
access to formal education including university degrees. In the cases mentioned, both 
judges were university students, one was studying law and the other education.
The following shows the requirement that the judges in this study fulfilled.
Age: 2 judges were under the minimum age requirement being 28 years old. 11 
judges were concentrated in the age group 30-39 years old. 7 judges were between 40 
- 49 years old and 7 were 50 or over.
In the study of Loli (1997:92-3), based on data gathered in 1981 within a wider 
national scope, it was found that 61% of the judges were concentrated in the range of 
‘50 or over’. The rate was even higher when considering only more remote areas. In 
these places, due to the low formal educational level of the candidates, the Superior 
Court regarded age as indicating a higher acquisition of ‘common sense’ and 
‘prudence’ to resolve cases. When analysing larger towns, however, this rate changed 
to a major concentration of judges in the band between 31-50 years (44.3%). The 
percentage of judges under 30 also increased to 15.6%. Loli claims that the age 
diminished with the major ‘level of development’ of the towns. In this study I found 
more judges between 30-39 years old. This tendency probably will continue even in 
the highlands of Peru due to the increased access to formal education.
Formal Education: The level was higher than what is normally expected from judges 
of Peace in rural zones. 9 judges (32.2%) had undertaken some kind of university 
study: (two women had a professional degree: one was a vet and the other a Bachelor 
of Law, 5 were school teachers and two were university students). 2 judges (10.7%)
8 See also Loli (1997:92)
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had received a technical education after full secondary school (2 were farm 
technicians and 1 was a retired policeman) 10 judges (35.7%) had secondary education 
and 6 judges (21.4%) had just primary education. Loli (1997:94-5) comments that 
some years ago it was only expected that the judges knew how to read and write, 
though, because of the high rate of illiteracy in rural populations, it was difficult to 
find ‘qualified’ judges.
Despite that a judge could prove a high formal level of education it was obvious that 
this did not correspond to their real knowledge. The judge of Maras, for instance, had 
secondary studies but hardly could write. This situation was even worse for those 
with just primary school education. Even the more qualified, such as school teachers, 
demonstrated problems with written Spanish. This is explained by the poor quality of 
education in the provinces of Peru that results in access to formal education not 
guaranteeing a good training. Additionally, the school curricula does not take into 
account the reality of rural areas, consequently, the usefulness of these studies is very 
reduced. However, it is necessary to remember that the main language in use in this 
setting is not Spanish in this sense, it was more important for the judges to have a good 
command of the native language than of the official (and legal) language.
Residence: 23 judges were originally bom in the area of the juzgado and the other 4 
had spent most of their lives there. However while 22 judges were ‘full-time’ 
residents of the juzgado, 5 of them had more than one place of residence, normally due 
to their children’s education or to their own education or business which obliged them 
to have a place of residence in Cusco (capital of the Department) or in another larger
urban centre.
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Occupation: 12 judges declared themselves exclusively ‘farmers’. They use the 
Spanish word agricultores, which means people who work in agriculture regardless of 
their social condition. A peasant, campesino, can refer to himself or herself as an 
agricultor as does a person with a larger holding of land. All of these agricultores 
were members of Andean communities or parcialidades. For instance, the judge of 
Chinchero was a member of the community located in the district itself but he has 
managed to accumulate a significant amount of land as has his wife Instead the judge 
of the parcialidad of Yanama (Prov. Quispicanchi) was clearly of campesino (peasant) 
status. 8 judges were engaged in some kind of commercial activity, most of them had a 
small grocery shop in their town. 2 judges were retired. 2 were school teachers. 2 
judges had an activity linked to the legal profession: The judge of Yucay (Prov. 
Urubamba) who works for the province prosecutor and the judge of Pisac (Prov. 
Calca) who works for a notary. One judge was a craftsman.
Sex: 6 judges in my study were women (22.2%) of these 5 held a university degree. 
They were the best qualified in my sample. The other woman was a respected peasant 
leader. Loli (1997:108) comments that female judges based their ‘legitimacy’ on their 
level of education. In the 1997 election, the preference of the Superior Court of 
Cusco for female candidates is noticeable. This follows the general judicial tendency 
to include women within the judicial career. Most of the judges and prosecutors of 
Family are women. However an important reading of this data is that for women to be 
good enough to be elected as judges it is necessary for them to have a superior formal 
education compared to the male competitors.
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1.5 Conditions of the joh.-
1.5.1 Work hours.-
Article 62 of the LOPJ mentions that the judges 'dedicate the necessary time’ to 
perform their duties. The judges are not expected to be dedicated full-time to the post 
mainly because it is an unpaid activity. However, judges in this study spent a great 
amount of time in the juzgados or tried to be available most of the time. Sundays and 
other market days were considered very important by the judges since on these days 
Andean people come together in the main square of districts or larger towns to sell or 
barter their products. The judges in this study dedicated the following time to the 
juzgado:
9 judges worked from Monday to Saturday part-time and on Sundays the whole day.
9 judges worked from Monday to Friday either part time or full-time On Sundays the 
whole day.
8 judges work ’on demand’. These judges were agricultures or had a grocery shop in 
the same town. In these cases the parties look for them at their homes or in their place 
of work when necessary.
2 judges declared they just worked on Sundays.
1.5.2 C'harges.-
Article 70 of the LOPJ establishes that the judges of the peace are not paid, except for 
those legal activities that have to be performed outside the judicial site, however, 
judges are permitted -and advised- to collect some money from the parties as a kind of 
payment. In the 1997 training course in Cusco it was suggested that the request for 
money should be in accordance with the economic condition of the parties. In the
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peasant zones there was a consensus to charge 5 soles (approximately one pound9) for 
a conciliatory procedure (comparendo): 2.50 from each party. This was the criteria 
employed by most of the judges in my data. However, many peasants face great effort 
in paying even that small amount of money I observed that the judges did not compel 
the people to pay them in these cases.
It is when judges perform as notaries, legalising documents or elaborating commercial 
contracts, that they obtain higher incomes. Judges are allowed to charge in all of 
these cases although their fees are minimal compared to what is charged by a 
specialised notary.
Sometimes the judge charges fees as a kind of fine or punishment to the offender. I 
observed this attitude in the judge of Pisac (Prov. Calca). In cases of domestic 
violence, when there is a conciliation, she charged 5 or 10 soles exclusively to the 
violent husband and commented to him that to be ‘abusive’ to his wife had ‘a price’.
1.5,3 Work load. -
The amount of work in every juzgado is variable. It depends on the number of 
inhabitants, on the proximity to peasant communities, on the availability of judges, on 
the judge’s prestige, on easy communication or closeness to urban centres, on the 
town's integration to the market economy, on the closeness to other authorities (e.g. 
police station) and even on the life style of the inhabitants. For instance, the judges of 
Tinta (Prov. Canchis), Pisac (Prov. Calca), Ollantaytambo and Chinchero (Prov. 
Urubamba) have a very high case burden. They are well established districts with 
tourists and commercial activities and of easy access and a regular transport network.
In Peru 5 soles ‘buys’ 50 rolls o f  bread, or a gallon of petrol, or 2 minutes national phone call
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Brandt (1990) claims that judges of the peace each process an average of 100 cases per 
year and that this number made up more than a half of all the judicial cases in the 
country In my study and just based on documentary data (the review of judicial 
records) the number of cases processed is higher even though the records do not 
necessarily reflect the real amount of cases in which the judges intervene.
The following table presents the average of cases that judges assist based on two data: 
firstly, the amount of cases that judges calculated they assist (based on my interviews). 
Secondly, the information obtained from the judge's records. This difference is 
important. Except for one case, the judges acknowledged intervening in more cases 
than is apparent from the register. There is good reason to believe the judge's 
declarations. The justice of the Peace has traditionally used verbal procedures. In this 
sense, judges do not believe that the register should reflect all their work load. Judges 
do not record all the cases that they receive. The Pisac judge, for instance, could listen 
for half an hour to a person and just give him/her the notification for the appointment 
of the other party. In some cases people did not come back and in the judges’ register 
this complaint did not appear. In domestic violence cases, she listened to women and 
gave them a citation for their partners. Most of the time the appointment was attended 
by the couple. She spent not less than half an hour discussing the problems that they 
were facing and normally gave them a 'time to think’. She did not record any of these 
stages. If this couple did not come back for a written agreement nothing was 
registered. She always wrote down the conciliatory agreements but she only recorded 
a complaint if the complainant specifically requested her to do so. I observed the same 
attitude in other judges. Additionally, some judges did not even write out the 
conciliatory agreements. This mainly occurred when the judges were hardly literate.
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N U M B E R  O F  C A S E S  
SO U R C E : R eco rd s
N U M B E R  O F  C A S E S 
SO U R C E : In terview s
1) PROV. ANTA
Dist. A ncahuasi 3 cases per w eek,
78 cases in 6  m o n th s '0.
5 to  6 cases per w eek
Dist. L im atam bo reco rds no t availab le 5 cases per w eek
Dist. Z u rite 4 .7  cases per w eek ,
123 cases in 6  m onths.
10 cases p e r w eek
2) PROV.CALCA
Dist. C o y a 2 cases per w eek,
54 cases in 6  m onths.
2  to  3 cases per w eek
Dist. L am ay incom plete  reco rd s 2 to  3 cases per w eek
Dist. P isac 5 .9  cases pe r w eek,
154 cases in 6  m onths.
15 cases pe r w eek
Dist. T aray 1.3 cases per w eek , 
34 cases in 6  m onths.
2  to  3 cases per w eek
3) PROV.CANCHIS
Dist. C o m b ap a ta reco rds not av ailab le 15 to  20 cases pe r w eek
Dist. T in ta 7.5 cases per w eek,
195 cases in 6  m onths.
15 to  20 cases per w eek
4) PROV.CUSCO
C. C. C C o ra o records not av ailab le T h is  w as a  new ly  created  
juzgado, in six  m on ths it 
rece iv ed  10 cases
Dist. S ay lla incom plete  re co rd s ' ' 2  to  3 cases pe r w eek
5) PAUCARTAMBO
Dist. C o lq u ep a ta 1.4 cases p e r w eek, 
36  cases in 6  m onths.
2 cases per w eek
Dist. H uancaratiì 2 .3  cases p e r w eek , 
6 0  cases in 6  m onths.
7  cases per w eek
Dist. Paucartam bo incom plete  reco rd s 1 to  2 cases p e r  w eek
6) QUISPICANC'Hl
Dist. A ndahuaylillas 2.3  cases pe r w eek , 
73 cases in 6  m onths.
2  to  3 cases p e r w eek
Dist. C arh u ay o incom plete  reco rd s 1 to  2 cases per w eek
Dist. C ca tca 2.2  cases
58 cases in 6 m onths.
2 cases per w eek
Dist. O co n g a te  ( 1 st. N om ) 0 .8  cases pe r w eek, 
23 cases in 6  m onths.
1 to  2 cases p e r w eek
Dist. O co n g a te  (2nd. N om ) 3 cases per w eek ,
78 cases in 6 m o n th s
3 to  4 cases per w eek
RT T tinque 2 .9  cases p e r w eek, 
76 cases in 6 m onths.
6  to  10 cases per w eek
Pare. Y anaina reco rds not av ailab le scarce  cases, in o n e  m onth  
c o u ld  have 2 cases
10 This table and the following in 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are based on the scrutiny of judge’s records for a 
period of six months (January - June 1997). At the ‘old’ judges places I also looked into the 1996 
records (when these were available) and in some judge’s places I could review a further two months (July 
and August 1997) but 1 did not use this for the calculation only as complementary information
11 Despite that these records did not show a consistent sequence and I have not included them in my 
calculations they were valuable source of information to evaluate the criteria employed by these judges to 
resolve a case
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7) URUBAMBA
Dist. C h in ch e ro 6  cases p e r w eek 
156 cases in 6  m onths.
15 cases per w eek
A Cs C o llana /C hequerec reco rds no t availab le 1 case per w eek
Dist. H u ay llab am b a 1.2 cases pe r w eek, 
32  cases in 6  m onths.
5 to  6 cases p e r  w eek
Dist. M aras reco rds n o t availab le 2 to  3 cases p e r  w eek
Dist. OI lan tay tam bo 10.8 cases per w eek, 
282 cases in 6  m onths.
20  cases pe r w eek
Dist. Y ucay 3 .2  cases p e r w eek. 
84 cases 6  m onths.
1 to  2 cases p e r w eek
1.5.4 The judge’s place: el iuzgado.-
Article 63 of the LOPJ states that town councils provide an office for the judges of the 
peace and also that the ‘Judicial Power’ provides them with furniture and stationary. 
In reality, the appointment relies almost exclusively on the judges’ own resources. 
Most judges use their own home or a space in a relative's house as office. In some 
places the effort to adapt these spaces as close as possible to the image of a juzgado is 
evident. Others places, instead, were far from a 'proper'judge’s space. For instance, 
to enter to the place of the Taray judge it was necessary to cross the farmyard where 
they kept ducks and pigs. It was the only place that the judge had available. In 7 cases 
the judge’s place was clearly used for other purposes mainly as a storage room. 
Furniture and typewriters are not provided. Four years ago the Superior Court gave to 
the judges a pair of chairs and a table. However, some of the judges who received 
them did not pass them on to the new judges. The judges’s places in this study were as 
follows:
12 judges were using a space in their own house as office.
In 7 cases the town’s councils had provided an office for the judge.
5 judges were renting a room in someone else’s house as an office.
4 judges were borrowing a space from their relatives or acquaintances.
2 8 6
Additionally, the Juzgado, shares the living conditions of the town, district or 
community In most of the rural zones of Peru there is no running water or electricity. 
Houses are built with adobes and the floor is compressed soil. Few town councils 
offices are built of concrete.
2. The users.-
All the studies on justices of the Peace in Peru stress the general positive value that the 
rural population has to the intervention of these judges (Revilla 1994:214, Brandt 
1990:168, 1995:95). Brandt (1990:168) particularly found that 58.6% of people in 
the highlands prefer these judges as ‘first forum’ when a conflict with a 'neighbour, 
family member, or other person over a debt or some other dispute’ arises. This forum 
was preferred over others such as community leaders, lieutenant governor, the police, 
or the provincial court judges (Brandt 1995:95).
In Loli’s opinion (1997:97-102) there is a strong belief in the rural population that the 
juzgados are spaces where it is possible to ‘resolve a problem’ independent of its 
nature, in such a way that a great number of conflicts processed in front of the judges 
of Peace do ‘not even have a legal status’, however, the judge is open to intervene ‘as 
far as the parties are in agreement’.
2.1 Women as main users.-
One of the most revealing aspects when studying the Justice of the Peace is to find 
women as main users of this forum. In my fieldwork, 1 found that the rate of women 
taking their cases before these judges was as high as 59.8%. In a previous study, in 
1981, the percentage was of 58%. (Loli 1997:98).
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Loli (1997: 97-102) suggests that the nature of the problems that Andean women face 
makes the justice of the Peace a more appropriate forum to process their demands. 
Women’s main concerns are related to family affairs and only occasionally do these 
cases have a ‘legal status’. That is, the ‘women’s cases’ would not have any impact at 
higher levels of the judicial apparatus but are taken into account in the kind of justice 
management performed by judges of the peace. The language is also a great constraint 
since at other judicial levels Spanish is the used language and a large number of 
women in the highlands are not sufficiently fluent in Spanish or are fully monolingual.
Additionally, women often do not trust in the community authorities such as the 
members of the steering committees or the lieutenant governors. These functionaries 
‘drink’ with their husbands and sometimes also beat their wives too, as my 
interviewees related. Additionally, the same steering committees of some 
communities feel much apart from such ‘family problems’ and concentrate exclusively 
on managerial aspects of the communities. On only a few occasions the steering 
committees intervene, this is when the situation is affecting seriously commoner 
obligations or commoners have requested their intervention in extreme situations such 
as the abandonment of children.
In the present study we find women attending judges of the peace mainly for the 
following reasons 1) because they are beaten by their husbands, 2) because they are 
claiming maintenance for their children, 3) because they have been abandoned by their 
husbands, 4) because they have been morally offended by neighbours, 5) because their 
land has been damaged, 6) because their daughters are beaten by their husbands 
(sons-in-law). Loli (1994:91-102) presents similar conclusions in her work.
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Men, instead, made up 30.8% of claimants and they attended the juzgados for quite 
different reasons: 1) physical aggression (normally by other men) in drinking bouts, 2) 
payment of debts, 3) to sign agreements involving goods and property transactions. 
The last two causes reveal the representation of men in the market economy.
9.4% of the complainants were married couples acting as parents. For instance, to 
write 'permission of travelling' for children who are going to work as domestic 
servants in houses in the cities. Sometimes they subscribe 'marriage agreements' 
normally when their daughters are pregnant or they speak in the name of their 
daughters when they have been abandoned by their partners. I found also couples 
acting together in issues relating to common property but this situation was more the 
concern of those who were town district residents. The results are as follows:
W O M E N M E N P A R E N T S
I) ANTA
Dist. A ncahuasi 63% 2 8 .3 % 8.7%
Dist. Z urite 73% 16.2% 10.8%
2) CALCA
Dist. C oya 63 .5% 2 8 .8 % 7.7%
Dist. P isac 54.8% 2 2 .6 % 2 2 .6%
Dist. T aray 62 .5% 3 1 .3 % 6.2%
3) CANCHIS
Dist. T in ta 53.8% 3 8 .5 % 7.7%
4)PAUCARTAMBO
Dist. C o lquepata 6 3 .8% 3 1 .8 % 4.4%
Dist. Huancarani 4 3 .3% 3 4 % 2 2 .7%
5)QI!1SPICANCHI
Dist A ndahuaylillas 77.4% 13.2% 9.4%
Dist. C catea 6 3 .6% 3 1 .8 % 4 .6%
Dist. O congate  ( 1 st) 4 7 % 2 3 .6 % 2 9 .4%
Dist. O congate  (2 nd) 55.8% 4 2 .3 % 1.9%
Pob. Rural T tinque 62% 3 2 .8 % 5.2%
6) CRII BAM BA
Dist. C hinchero 4 8 .8% 4 6 .2 % 5%
Dist. H uayllabam ba 6 2 .5% 3 7 .5 %
Dist. O llan tay tam bo 6 7 .3% 3 0 .9 % 1.8%
Dist. Y ucay 54 .5% 3 4 .5 % 11%
T o ta l 59 .8% 3 0 .8 % 9.4%
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2.2 Relationships between the parties.-
Linked with the previous point, the main relationship between the parties in the 
context of the justice of the Peace is marital In this study, conflicts between couples 
made up: 37.3%. In a similar study in 1981 these made up 34.5% (Loli 1991:100). 
Women are the main complainants and the problems brought were: maltreatment, 
separation, and maintenance.
33.1% of the conflicts were those occurring between neighbours. In the rural 
communities the 'neighbourhood' can be very problematic and produce frequent 
disputes. If an animal of one neighbour strays on to a plot of another neighbour and 
eats part of the com crops this jeopardises the survival of the affected family. 
Additionally, the division of plots has been made without technical support so disputes 
about boundaries are very common. Problems of ‘envy’ are mentioned in these cases 
and are expressed through insults and slanders. Some of these confrontations even 
result in physical aggression. A good number of these complaints are presented by 
women and occurred between women too.
Relatives also have problems between themselves. They made up 12.5% of those 
attending the judge’s places. These cases normally involved situations of insults and 
physical violence.
Taking the total of conflicts that occurred between couples and between relatives 
reveals that 49.8% of the cases that judges resolve are problems between 'the family'.
The remaining 17.1% consisted of other types of relationships, normally with 
‘outsiders’ and involving commercial and labour activities. 1 have classified these 
under the category ‘others’. The results by zones as follows
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P R O V IN C E S : A N T A  an d  C A L C A
ANCAHUAS
I
ZURITE COYA PISAC TARAY
C O U PL ES 39.1% 32.4% 22.6% 22.6% 31.3%
R ELA TIV ES 17.4% 10.9% 17% 12.9% 12.5%
N E IG H B O U R S 32.6% 32.4% 47.2% 41.9% 37.5%
O TH E R S 10.9% 24.3% 13.2% 22.6% 18.7%
PROVINCES: CANCHIS and PAUCARTAMBO
TINTA C O L Q U E P A T A H U A N C A R A N I
C O U PL ES 30.8% 83.3% 36%
R ELA TIV ES 7.6% 16.7% 12%
N EIG H B O U R S 30.8% 36%
O TH ER S 30.8% 16%
PROVINCE: QUISPICANCHI
ANDAHUAY CCATCA OCO NGA TE 1 OCONGATE 2 TTINQUE
C O U PLES 41.6% 45.5% 53% 42.3% 50%
R ELA TIV ES 113% 4.5% 29.4% 3.8% 10.4%
N E IG H B O U R S 37.7% 36.4% 17.6% 38.5% 27.6%
O TH ER S 9.4% 13.6% 15.4% 12%
PROVINCE: URUBAMBA
CHINCHERO HUAYLLABAM OLLANTAYTA YUCAY
C O U PLES 30.8% 25% 32.8% 14.8%
R ELA TIV ES 7.6% 12.7% 1 12.7% 13%
N E IG H B O U R S 30.8% 18.7% 49% 48.1%
O TH E R S 30.8% 43.6% 5.5% 24.1%
Total: Couples 37.3%, Relatives 12.5%, Neighbours 33.1%, Others: 17.1%
2.3 The conflicts.-
Scrutiny of the juzgados shows a set of social conflicts in which violence appears 
frequently:
19.8% of the cases involved incidents of wife beating.
17.5% are general incidents of physical aggression.
12.9% are insults and 'defamation'12
The incidents with violent components made up 50% of all the cases processed These 
results are not exclusive to non letrado judges of the peace In front of letrado judges 
of the peace, ‘Fallas against the person’, that is, incidents of physical aggression 
made up almost 50% of the work load (Estremadoyro 1995).
'Insults and ’defamation’ made up 12.9% of the conflicts. People affected point out 
that the causes are ‘envy’ which generates gossip that discredits them in front of 
relatives and the community. Verbal aggression occurred mainly in a state of 
drunkenness. In the records it is also noticeable that in cases of physical aggressions, 
insults and provocation preceded the physical confrontation.
To classify the cases which reach judges of the peace is not an easy task. As Loli 
(1997:98) well points out, some of the cases do not even have a ‘legal status’ and even 
if they have, the judges do not use it. Additionally, every one of these causes finished 
with conciliation, in this sense it was even less necessary to include them in a legal 
framework. I have classified the cases trying to preserve the social dimension of these 
conflicts. This typology permits us to establish that 19.8% were cases of women 
complaining about maltreatment by husbands and also that 40.4% of cases had to do 
with family concerns. (Types I and II). The categories are as follows:
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'Defamation' is a term used by judges of the peace in simple cases o f ‘gossips' It should not be 
confused with the legal term used in Peruvian criminal law to refer to public false declaration in 
detriment of a person’s social image
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TYPE 1: Conflicts involving marital relationship:
a) Maltreatment.-1 included all cases in which women complained about being beaten 
by partners. 1 did not find any complaint in which men were victim of marital
violence.
b) Abandonment.- In my finding most women were abandoned by their partners but I 
found 2% of men complained of being left by women.
c) Separation - I included all complaints that finished in a separation agreement. In 
some cases that I include in the 'maltreatment' category women went to the Judges 
with the intention of separation but they were persuaded by the same judges to 
continue with their relationships. Consequently as 'separation' I look more to the 
results rather than the motivation for the complaint.
d) Marriage arrangements .- As already mentioned in chapter six, the beginning of 
marital cohabitation in the Andean society has an apparent clandestine character. The 
teenagers fall in love in the festivities and at the markets and then have sexual 
encounters in the fields. These relationships continue in this way until the girl 
becomes pregnant. When this happens the custom dictates that the boy should talk 
with his family to ask them to arrange the marital compromise with the girl's family. 
Some families attend the judges to sign formal agreements or to give permission to 
their daughter, normally between 16 and 17 years old, to start their life of cohabitation.
TYPE II Conflicts involving parent-offspring relationships.
a) Maintenance - The cases of women seeking maintenance for their children.
b) Missing children.- The complaints by parents reporting missing children. The 
explanation that I obtained was that sometimes children are exposed to hard work and
even maltreatment within their own families and escape to the urban centres with the 
promise of help from other adults who convince them to join them in the cities. In 
many cases resulting in even greater abuse for the children.
c) ‘Given’ children.-. In the judges' records 1 found some agreements related to 
parents giving permission to their children to travel to other cities in the company of 
godparents or relatives. In some cases, children are exposed to great labour 
exploitation.
d) Child recognition - Cases in which a pregnant girl, alone or accompanied by her 
parents, sought the recognition of the child-to-be. A situation that does not have a 
‘legal status’ since in Peruvian legislation it is only possible to legally recognise an 
already bom baby. Those cases were normally accompanied by a petition of 
maintenance for the future mother, who does not have legal rights to maintenance 
under Peruvian legislation.
TYPE III - Violent disputes:
In this type I include the whole range of violent situations that did not occur between 
the marital couple. Disputes between neighbours or relatives are included here.
a) Physical aggressions: Almost all incidents of physical assault in Andean 
communities occur in the context of drinking bouts, normally between men who were 
drinking on the same occasion. However, I found a significant number of women 
being physically attacked in their own house by drunk neighbours and I also found 
women beating each other in the same drinking context.
b) Insults and 'defamation': I include here those cases of verbal aggression that judges 
labelled as ‘defamation’ and threats of different kinds.
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TYPE IV - Patrimonial relationships
Cases involving disputes over money or agreements of buying and selling.
a) Land.- Under this title I join two main problems: boundary claims and damage to 
the plots.
b) Payment and buying and selling- Payment of monetary debts, loans and purchase 
of different goods.
c) Theff. I also include the illegal appropriation.
The general results are as follows:
1 %
MALTREATMENT 198
ABANDONMENT 44
SEPARATION 4 3
MARRIAGE
ARRANGEMENTS
1.2
II
MAITENANCE 6.3
MISSED CHILDREN 08
GIVEN CHILDREN 2.3
RECOGNITION 1.3
III
PHYSICAL
AGRESSIONS
17 5
INSULTS/
DEFAMATION
129
IV
LAND 7.7
PAYMENTS 12.6
THEFT 89
Total 100%
The following tables show the results by zones:
P R O V IN C E S : A N T A  A N D  C A L C A
ANCAHUA ZURITE COYA PISAC TARAY
1
MALTREATMENT 304 13 6 13.2 12.5 25
ABANDONMENT 2.7 113 3.1 6 2
SEPARATION 8.1 12.5
MARRIAGE
ARRANGEMENTS
4.3 3.1 6 2
li
MAITENANCE 2.2 5.4 6.2
MISSED CHILDREN 1.9
GIVEN CHILDREN 8 1
RECOGNITION 2.2 3.1
III
PHYSYCAL
AGRESSIONS
30.4 16.2 17 63 18 8
INSULTS/
DEFAMATION
8 7 5,4 15.1 15.7 12 6
IV
LAND 109 10.8 7.5 3.1 18 8
PAYMENTS 27 15.1 28 1 6 2
THEFT 109 2 7 18 9 12.5
TOTAL Too 100 100 100 Too
PROVINCES CANCHIS AND PAUCARTAMBO
TINTA COLQUEPATA HUANCARAN I
I
MALTREATMENT 23 8 33 3 24
ABANDONMENT 8 3 16 7
SEPARATION 1
MARRIAGE
ARRANGEMENTS
II
MAINTENANCE 3.1 33.3 12
MISSED CHILDREN 1
GIVEN CHILDREN 4.1
RECOGNITION
III
PHYSICAL
AGRESSIONS
7 2 16 7 24
INSULTS/
DEFAMATION
7.2 8
IV
LAND 17.5
PAYMENTS 22 7 28
THEFT 4 1 4
TOTAL 100 100 100
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P R O V IN C E  Q U IS P 1 C A N C H I
ANDAHUAY CCATCA OCONGATE-1 OCONGATE-2 TTINQUE
1 % % % % %
MALTREATMENT 292 27 3 17 6 19 3 20 7
ABANDONMENT 18 1.9 18
SEPARATION 3 7 13.6 118 3 8 6 9
MARRIAGE
ARRANGEMENTS
1.8 5.2
II
MAITENANCE 5.6 17 6 1.9 5.2
MISSED CHILDREN
GIVEN CHILDREN 3.7 3 8 6 9
RECOGNITION 5.8 3.4
III
PHYSICAL
AGRESSIONS
20.6 13 6 5.9 15 4 29.3
INSULTS/
DEFAMATION
5.6 22.2 23.5 13.5 6 9
IV
LAND \TA 4 4 118 l 5 l 3.4
PAYMENTS 18 8 18 9 118 9.6 3.4
THEFT 1.8 19.2 6.9
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
PROVINCE URUBAMBA
CHINCHERO HUAYLLABAMBA OLLANT ANT AYT YUCAY
1 % % % %
MALTREATMENT 12.5 12.6 16 4 5 6
ABANDONMENT 7.5 6.2 18 5 6
SEPARATION 5 7.3
MARRIAGE
ARRANGEMENTS
II
MAITENANCE 5 6 2 3.6
MISSED CHILDREN 2.5 3.6 3.7
GIVEN CHILDREN 126
RECOGNITION 2.5 5.4
III
PHYSICAL
AGRESSION
21.3 12.5 309 111
INSULTS/
DEFAMATION
16.3 12,5 22 24
IV
LAND 5 18 22.2
paym ents 8 7 6.2 3.6 5 6
THEFT 13.7 31.2 3.6 22.2
TOTAL 100 100 100 too
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These results deserve some comments. As mentioned, judges do not follow a strict 
written record of all the cases that they receive. The judge of Pisac is a good example. 
After scrutinising her register the category maltreatment gives a low rate: just 12.5%. I 
proved on several visits and observation of the judge’s work that this result does not 
reflect the reality. Cases of maltreatment arrived daily and judges were not keeping a 
written record. In just one day I recorded 3 cases of maltreatment whilst the judges 
register did not show anything. Additionally, she always gave the couple a ‘time to 
think’ about what they want to do with their relationship. Sometimes the couple never 
came back. Instead in the records of the Ancahuasi Judge the cases in the category 
‘maltreatment’ reach 29.2%. The judge is a former police officer and his register 
was meticulously maintained.
My data on the judges of Yucay should be used just as a reference because this district 
is just 10 minutes by bus from the capital province of Urubamba, and the same judge 
recognised that many townspeople prefer to deal with their conflict there. 
Additionally, the only peasant community linked to the district never takes a case to 
the judge. The register shows, however, a high rate of property related cases resolved 
there (22.2%). This conforms to the fact that it is a legal requirement to settle these 
kind of cases in front of the district judges. If these districts are not taken into account 
the average of the domestic violence cases taken before of rural judges increases to 
20.4%.
3. Judges social legitimacv-
As was mentioned, people have a very positive opinion about judges’ performance. 
Furthermore, over 50% of people consider judges of the peace as the main forum of 
intervention in a wide range of conflicts. A deeper look into the expectation that
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people have in relation to judges performance gives evidence of the relationship that 
they want to establish with the judges and what conditions are necessary to enter into a 
successful negotiation or conciliation with the party in conflict. To feel confident that 
the judges will help them to achieve these objectives is really important and for that, to 
know and have information about the judge is decisive in building such trust. What 
people think about their judges made up the judge’s ‘social legitimacy’. In this sense, 
one very important element for the positive relationship with the justice of the Peace 
in rural areas came from the informality or flexibility of the territorial jurisdiction, 
already stated. If people do not trust their district judges they simply will attend 
another one. Judges use this ‘informality’ to establish a positive relationship with the 
party, their philosophy is ‘as far as the parties are in agreement’ any intervention is 
right and fair.
In this study, I explore the sources of legitimacy of the judges and I asked people’s 
opinion about their judges. If their opinions were positive they normally answered me 
‘he/she is good, he/she make well the justice (hate hien la justicia)’, however, a richer 
source of information came from the ‘objections’ that they have to some judges 
performance and that I have categorised in the following way:
3.1 Objections to the excessive time of the judges in the post.-
One of my interviewees’ negative comments on some judges was of having been 
perpetuated in the post. In some places, judges served for several years and thought of 
themselves as 'owners' of the post. In people’s opinion this encouraged judges to 
behave arbitrarily. As was mentioned, judge’s appointments should be for no longer 
than 2 years, however, it is the official legal system which fails to call for new 
elections. Another factor is that the list of candidates is elaborated in most cases by
the town councils which insist on proposing the same person as judge. This has to do 
with the local alliances of power. To avoid these cases in the November 1996 
election of judges of Peace the President of the Superior Court in Cusco changed all 
the judges of the peace, despite the fact that some ‘old judges’ where again proposed 
as candidates. Here are extracts of my interviews:
In the peasant community o f Chequerec, Urubamba, Jacinto, 30, told me that the 
former judge had been about 6 years in the post. He used to impose 'his will' and also 
he charged too much money.
In the District o f  Carhuayo, Quispicanchi, the President of the community of Coya 
told us that he never goes to the judge because he 'does not make well the justice' and 
it has been the same judge for many years. Victor, 35, neighbour of the district, told 
me that the judge has been in the post for 5 or 6 years, and 'he does not resolve well'. 
He prefers to attend the Ocongate judges (the main district) Evaristo, 23, from the 
community of Casapata, related that the judge has been there for so long and should be 
replaced.
In the District o f Huancaram, Paucartambo, the current judge tells me that the former 
judge (a woman) had been in the post 10 years and committed many abuses because of 
that. Flor from the community of Q'eros confirmed the length of time the ex-judge 
remained in the post and that they had had many complaints against her. Armandina, 
32, a district resident agreed that it was too long a time and because of that it was easy 
to commit abuses.
In the District o f  Paucartambo, Paucartambo, Domingo, 49, a primary school 
teacher, told me that the current judge is the 'eternal'judge of the district. Enrique, 27, 
from the community of Mahuaypampa, added he should be there like 12 years'.
300
3.2 Objections to excessive payments.-
As was mentioned, this is an unpaid work and it is expected that the judges charge in 
accordance with the economic capacity of the people. Sometimes this does not 
happen and judges of Peace use the post to provide, if not a full income for their 
families at least a substantial source of income and also to benefit from the post in 
other ways.
In the ( 'immunity o f Chequerec, Prov. I /ruhamha, Jacinto, 30, informed me that the 
former judge was very incorrect. His sister had had a problem involving a discussion 
with her cousin and the judge had charged them 80 soles for the agreement (the 
normal charge was between 10 and 20 soles). He thinks that the current judge charges 
just 'the fair' amount.
In the District o f Huancarani, Prov. Paucartamho, Josefina, 34, a district resident, 
manifested that the former judge 'made her pay with a cow' (a cow costs between 300 
and 400 soles) when she went to the community for the ‘removal of the corpse’1' after 
a sudden death. She has heard that the current judge also 'likes the money'. Another 
informant, Luz, 42, told us that the former judge had been withdrawn for being 
'incorrect'. She charged too much.
In the Community o f Ccorao, Prov. Cusco, Francisca, 46, told me that three years ago 
a man who did not belong to the community 'make him to be appointed as a judge'. 
She had to visit him because of problems that she had with some neighbours. The 
judge asked her to invite him to eat and drink. Additionally she had a grocery shop 
where he took food 'on credit' but he never paid her back.
1'* Levantamiento de cadaver, removal o f  the corpse is the act in which judges or prosecutors produce 
an official report regarding the circumstance of the death At present, this function is exclusively the 
responsibility of the provincial prosecutors, generating many problems when incidents happen in far 
distant communities
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In the District o f Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi, Victoria, 47, from the community of 
Maraspaqui, Ttinque, says that the Second Nomination judge of Ocongate district 
receives a sheep' to favour a party Silverio, 36, told me that this same judge was 
judge some years ago too and he used to charge excessively for his work, for that 
reason there were a lot of complaints.
3.3 Objections to their partialitv.-
Linked to the previous problems is the lack of fair treatment that the judges provide to 
the parties:
In the District o f Ccatca. Prov. Quispicanchi, Máximo, 51, a carpenter and a district 
resident, comments in Quechua, the judge 'does not make well the justice' she favours 
the party who offers her more money.
In the District o f Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi, Delfina, 21 and her mother Victoria, 
47, from the community of Maraspaqui, Ttinque, were seeking 'justice' for more than 
one year. Delfina had been expelled from her marital home by her in-laws. She had 
been living with her partner for more than two years but when he travelled to work in a 
jungle town, her in-laws accused her of having affairs with other men. She had 
presented her complaint in front of the Ttinque judge but her in-laws did not want to 
attend the judge’s summons. By the contrary, her in-laws presented their own 
complaint in front of the judge of Ocongate, the main district. This judge, after 
receiving a a sheep as present, had accepted a complaint against her for 'home 
abandonment'.
In the District o f  Huancaram, Prov. Paucartamho, Ana, a district resident, told us that 
the ex-judge (a woman) showed partiality toward the party who offered her more
money.
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3.4 Objections to the 'legitimacy' of the judges election.-
Many of the problems mentioned have their origin in the way the judges have been 
appointed. For instance, the appointment of the Second Nomination judge of the 
Ocongate district (Prov. Quispicanchi) intrigued the people. The town mayor invited 
all the authorities of the zone (from the district and from the communities) to a general 
meeting. At this event, a list of candidates was proposed. However, a man who was 
not included on the list was appointed to the post. In this case the problem originated 
in the provincial court. The rules of procedure relating to judges’ appointments 
establish that the list of candidates be sent to the Superior Court through the provincial 
courts. In this cases, the neighbour's general opinion was that the judge ‘arranged’ his 
appointment because the secretary of the court of Urcos (the provincial court) was his 
cousin.
Something similar occurred in the Zurite District (Prov. Anta). The man who was 
appointed as the judge was not on any of the lists of candidates’ produced by the 
'Committee for the Defence of Zurite's interests' (a multi-sector committee). 
Comments were made that he 'arranged' his appointment with the Provincial court of 
Anta (capital of the province). The 'Committee for the Defence of Zurite's interests', 
however, dismissed him as judge and although this is not a valid legal procedure for 
removing judges, this particular judge felt so much pressure that he decided to resign 
of his own initiative.
The President of the Superior Court of Cusco, Dr. Abelardo Olivares, states that article 
69 of the LOPJ establishes that the candidates are subject to an investigation even in 
the case that they are proposed by the community. In the 1997 appointment for new 
judges Dr. Olivera asked for the criminal, police and judicial records of all the
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candidates. He also listened to ‘social organisations’ if they had something to claim 
about the judges’ performance After receiving all of these elements the Superior 
court decided to either follow the list proposed or to make a different one. But it is not 
just the Superior court which can alter the proposed lists, also to the provincial courts 
can make proposals for new judges.
In any case, a town's residents know the way in which the list was conformed and like 
in the case of the Ocongate judge, feel very disappointed if their ‘democratic will’ is 
dismissed. This generates great indignation and distrust toward the legal system 
representatives. Josefina (34, Dist. Huancarani, Prov. Paucartambo) expressed her 
views about the ex-judge of Huancarani in this way: 'who knows how the judge 
arranged to be appointed for so many years. I think she arranged with the provincial 
court of Paucartambo (capital of the province), at the end of the day who can you 
trust? In the police station they also ask you for money and sometimes they beat 
people too. Even the doctor of the health centre charges too much for certifying the 
death of a person'.
3.5 Objections to the use of violence.-
It is difficult to believe but in some places a small number of judges still use the lash 
(zurriago) to apply punishments, threaten the parties and especially 'to correct’ a son at 
the request of his parents. Violence of this type is not strange for the Andean people. 
At the time of gamonalismo (landowners, before the Agrarian Reform of 1969), 
physical punishment was a common method of repression against the peasant14. It 
would be easy to conclude that it is a backward attitude encrusted in the isolation of 
the Andes mountains, but this would ignore the fact that so much violence is exercised 7
77 See Poole (1994a:97-131, 1994b:250-l)
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against the population by the official legal system representatives themselves, 
especially by the police and the army.
In my study, 1 found two cases and surprisingly both were female judges. One was the 
former judge of Huancarani and the other a former judge of Limatambo who, at the 
time of my visit, still received cases as ‘judge' despite the fact that the Superior Court 
had only appointed her as an accesitaria (deputy judge) for the period 1997-1999. 
Additionally, in some judges’ places I saw lashes hanging from the walls but the 
judges informed me that it is just a tradition and that they do not use it nowadays. Here 
are the cases:
The former judge of the district of Huancarani (Prov. Paucartambo) proudly 
commented: whenever people were insolent I  lashed them. Or on other occasions 
parents asked me to do it against their sons: 'Mama (mum), gave him his 
comeuppance' and at the request o f their own parents I did it. 1 heat them with the 
lash that I have, a 'sanmartin' (a whip made o f rope) o f 4 knots, and they went back 
glad. I have a good hand, with this hand that I have they left happy and they didn't 
misbehave more. Later, Asuncion (39) who lived next door to the ex-judge’s place, 
told us her version: she used to beat the parties with a 'sanmartin' o f four knots. From 
my kitchen l  could hear how she insulted the peasants and how she beat them. Some 
o f them left gushing blood from the nose. I f  they did not bring money, she beat them. 
We found out in the end that this woman was the sister of the former judge but they 
had not spoken to each other for years, in any case except for some extreme details her 
comments matched with the ex-judges proud self-confession. Additionally, this was 
confirmed by the current judge of the district and by Luz, a street food seller, who
305
told me the judge was incorrect, for that reason, people have denounced her, she 
charged too much and she knew how to beat.
For her part, the former judge of the district of Limatambo (Prov. Anta) told me:
people come here because I have 'character', 1 have my whip and 1 intervene in the 
conflict i f  something happens. For instance, there are some sons who came back 
home drunk and beat their mothers and fathers. The parents come here bringing their 
children, l  send them for 2-1 hours detention in the police station after that I give them 
three lashes to teach them a lesson. The parents ask me 'put your hand on him, so he 
will not put his hand on his mother.
3.6 Objections to low educational level.-
As was mentioned in chapter six, Andean people have as an aspiration to access 
formal education. They value people 'who know more than themselves’ and that with 
good will can help them in resolving their problems. However, the 'objections’ about 
judges’ low level of formal education was a subject raised mainly by the men amongst 
my interviewees.
In the District o f Carhuayo, Prov. Quispicanchi, Victor, 35, told me that the judge 'has 
just a primary level of education, he does not know, he does not ‘make the justice 
well’, he does not resolve well'. The President of the community of Coya had the 
same opinion.
As a counter idea, most of my interviewees regarded it as very positive for the judges 
to have a good educational level:
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In the community o f Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastián, Prov. Cusco, I asked Francisca, 46, 
about the judge and her answer was: 'he should be a good judge because he is 
educated, professional. He should perform well’.
In the district o f Pisac, Prov. Calca, Encamación, 25, from the community of Maska, 
said 'the Judge attends well, she knows, is educated'.
Prom the district o f Ollantaytamho, Prov. llrubamba, Dario, (18, AC Patacancha) 
expresses yes, I have heard that the judge has a good performance, he has studied to 
be a lawyer'.
Binolia Porcel commented to me that in a workshop on Local Government organised 
by her institution15 in July 1997 a group of commoners from the Province of Acomayo 
highlighted the necessity of appointing a ‘more professional' judge in their zone. The 
reason stated was that the judges of the peace of their zone do not have an adequate 
knowledge to ‘fulfil the post’.
3.7 Objections to their constant absences.-
As was mentioned, the post of judges of Peace is not full-time. Because it is not paid 
it is expected that judges have another source of income. In that sense, people know 
that judges are not available every day and at every time. For Andean communities 
people the really important days for the judges availability are the ‘market days’. 
These are the days that all communities from the district get together to barter or sell 
their products. Most districts have two market days, one in the week and the main 
one which is normally on Sundays. Judges expressed to me that you can fail to be 
present any day but market days ‘were sacred’. 1 proved that too, because if my visits 
were on ‘market days’ the judges’ places had plenty of visitors.
15 CEA ‘Bartolomé de las Casas’ (an NGO in Andean studies)
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However, some judges are not available at any time in the juzgados. These were 
normally judges of communities or other small towns without 'market days’. Some of 
these judges explained to me they had a very light work load and people knew where 
to find them if they needed them. I proved myself that this was not necessarily true. 
Others were judges of larger towns who arbitrarily decided when to 'take holidays’.
In the District o f Huayllabamba (Prov. IJrubamba), and Sctylla (Prov. Cusco), I found 
these judges on my third visit. On my previous visits I was informed that they were 
away for a reason related to the office or working on their plots. I found the 
Huayllabamba judge after walking outside the town where he was working on his land.
In the district o f Paucartambo, Prov. Paucartambo, 1 could not find the Second 
Nomination judge because he was ’on holidays' in his city: Sicuani. Ana, 47, a district 
resident told me that the judge is regularly absent for some days. However, Juan, a 
retired school teacher, 67, stated that normally the judge of Second Nomination is 
there but the judge of First Nomination only attends after 5 p.m. and then not every 
day. Probably this is true because I found the judge in the town council workshop 
where he worked. This was a particularly serious situation since Paucartambo is also 
the capital of the Province, this is the reason why there are two appointed judges there 
but as we can see neither of them was available.
In the District o f Ocongate, Prov. Ocongate, I did not find either of the judges (First 
or Second Nomination) on my first visit. Ocongate is as well a large town 
consequently two judges were appointed. Not many people, however, know the judge 
of First Nomination, despite his having been appointed since 1993. His father 
confessed to me that his son does not have time to carry on with the ’juzgado’, 'for this 
reason, he replaces his son' (another situation with no ‘legal status'). The brother in
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law of the Second Nomination judge admitted to me as well that the judge travels 
frequently because he is originally from the capital of the province (Urcos).
Judges who are exclusive to peasant communities, are not always required. In my 
study this was noticeable with the judges o f Ccorao (Prov. Cusco) and Yanama (Prov. 
Quispicanchi). In the community of Chequerec I did not find the appointed judge on 
any visit, but I managed finally to find the first 'accesitario' (secretary)16 of the 
community of Collana-Chequerec who informed to me that they receive few cases. I 
knew from the neighbours that the appointed judge was constantly absent because he 
travelled to the city of Lima. The judge of the community of Yanama 
(Prov.Quispicanchi) admitted that he rarely received cases consequently he dedicates 
all his time to his land so if somebody needs him they have to look for him. People of 
the community prefer to go to the Ttinque or Ocongate judges.
In the District o f Carhuayo, Prov. Quispicanchi, Evaristo, 23, from the community of 
Casapata, was very clear in telling me: 'My family have taken problems between 
neighbours before him He did not give us a solution, he gave us an appointment for a 
Friday. We went there but he was not there. This situation had lasted for two years 
and we got tired of it’. He also told me that a friend had been beaten in a drunken 
bout. He went to the judge and his wife told him that the judge was too busy and he 
could not listen to him.
3.8 Objections to the age of the judges.-
As was mentioned, judges are concentrated in the age group between 30-49 years old.
In Andean communities in general, there is not a hierarchic status assigned to elders 
of the community, although their opinions are well respected. The 1969 Agrarian
16 The secretary is legally obliged to replace the judge if he/she is absent
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Reform also influenced this attitude since it made obligatory that the posts within the 
communities steering committees be filled on a rotating basis removing traditional 
patterns of self-governance and also favouring the loss of traditional prestigious posts. 
Additionally, at present, the value that peasants give to formal education means they 
entrust a lot of duties to the young people just because of the fact that they have 
completed secondary school. That is the case of Evaristo (23, CC Casapata, Dist 
Carhuayo, Prov. Quispicanchi) although being single he has been appointed secretary 
of the Parents Association in the communal school, in fact people appointed him as 
President but he refused the post.
I listened to complaints about the judges in the Combapata District (Prov. Canchis) 
for being ‘very old’ so he does not resolve the problems properly The judge of 
second nomination of Ocongate was ‘very old and deaf so did not listen to people’s 
problems well. I proved this myself because his wife asked me to sit down next to 
him for the interview. 1 had to shout in his ear. 1 wondered how he could listen to the 
parties? His wife is always sat knitting next to him. I suppose she is the one who 
'translates' what the parties are telling him.
4, Judges’ wav. Andean people’s wav.-
Loli (1997:101) claims that what the users of the justice of the Peace are looking for is 
not ‘legal solutions’ but rather’ fair solutions’ and this does not necessarily match with 
how the law (both as legal system and as concrete legislation) deals with the case. 
Being ‘fair’, she adds, is perceived as the 'restoration of the equilibrium’ that has been 
‘broken’ by the conflict. This restoration, or amendment can range from payment of 
the cost of the material side of the grievance, a modification of the attitudes and 
behaviours, a fine, or a combination of these. This 'amendment' is normally expressed
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in a written or verbal agreement in which every party assumes their responsibility and 
agrees to fulfil it.
The difference between a ‘legal solution’ and a fair solution’ is such that often 
people would avoid dealing with the ‘official legal system’. Loli (1997: 101-2) 
comments on the case of a peasant from whom bulls were stolen. He captured the 
thief himself and negotiated with him the return of the animals, the thief accepted but 
the police intervened and put him >n prison. In order to avoid being prosecuted the 
thief denied the offence. The thief spent time in jail waiting to be prosecuted and the 
peasant never recovered his bulls. Loli (1997:102) suggests that under a ‘fair solution’ 
the complainant was in control of his case, under the ‘legal solution’ he was no longer 
in control because being a ‘criminal case’ the prosecution is independent from the 
victim’s will. A similar situation was expressed before the judge of Ollantaytambo, 
when one brother was injured by another in a drinking bout and the ‘legal 
examination’ resulted in more than 10 days of medical resting. Consequently, it 
became a ‘criminal offence’ and was out of the control of the judge. The parties 
desperately begged to him not to send the file to the provincial criminal court. What 
the judge of the peace, a young law student did, was follow the procedure in cases of 
‘Fallas against the person’ The result was that the ending was no longer under 
anybody’s control but under the official legal system procedure. The judge deeply 
regretted it and faced the dilemma between going against the complainant’s will or 
committing the criminal offence of prevaricato17 for refusing to apply the procedure. 
Nowadays the people are practically obliged to go for medical examination. Judges 
were instructed in the 1997 training course to refuse to hear a case without this legal 
requirement. Neither the judges and even less the parties understand what the real
17 It is a criminal offence under the Peruvian legislation when a judge fails to apply the legislation and 
the procedures established by law It is understood that this perverts the course o f justice
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consequences are Often the complainants think that this is a normal medical 
examination and not a ‘legal’ medical examination.
In the official legal system everything is ‘mediated’ through the procedure, through 
lawyers through the written documents. There is no direct negotiation between the 
parties and the judge. At the Justice of the Peace level, the parties ‘shape’ their 
conflict and negotiate under their own terms. Paradoxically, this is one of the 
dimensions of the Justice of the Peace system that it is frequently considered obsolete. 
The parties are even in control of the judge through their choice to attend the judges 
that they consider ‘appropriate’, that is, who 'makes the justice well’. The judges are a 
fundamental element of the negotiation and parties need to trust in him/her. They put 
the judge in context’ and do not assume the judge as ‘impartial’ and ‘rational’ just 
because he/she is the judge. The mediation (or conciliation) needs to be done in 
particular circumstances in order to work.
Brandt (1995:95) summarises the difference between the ‘formal justice system’ and 
the judges of the peace as follows: Firstly, the justice of the Peace have ‘different 
standards’ than the ‘formal justice system’ has. People expect that the judge 
understands their cultural background and not to resolve the case 'based on laws that 
are foreign and based on a modem, urban reality’. They expect that the judge can 
intervene, as Loli (1997:101) would say even in problems ‘without legal status’. In 
Ttinque (Prov. Quispicanchi) a man could not attend a judicial appointment, so his 
wife came in his place to explain that one of his kin had died 2 days ago and so he 
could not come. In the Andean zone the mourning rituals last 8 days. The other party, 
a woman, got a bit annoyed, the judge noticed it and in a very assertive way reminded
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her of the importance of the mourning rituals to accompany the soul of the deceased to 
the ‘other life’.
Secondly, the conflicts are ‘broadly conceived’. The causes and consequences of the 
conflict -whatever they are- are examined and regarded as important. I observed that 
the judges will listen to the parties without scorn whatever their arguments whether 
about gossips, witchcraft, or superstition. Everything has a dimension and is taken into 
account if the parties bring it as a concern.
Thirdly, ‘the goals of conflict resolution are different’. Even in ‘offences’ the goal is 
not the sanction but the restoration, the amendment of a situation which disrupts not 
just the life of the people involved but the ‘common peace’ of the community.
Fourthly, there is a ‘heavier stress on conciliation’. For Brandt the judges of Peace, 
'do not dictate justice’ do not impose but work on the logic of mutual compromise. 
As the judges in the questionnaires expressed, they are peacemakers. For Brandt the 
sentence is an imposition and not a willing acceptance of a committed grievance.
Finally, the judge of the peace is a ‘preferred mediator’ and often the first and only 
forum for the resolution of a wide range of conflicts.
4.1 Domestic violence conflicts.-
As was reviewed women are the main users of the justice of the Peace and this study 
and Loli (1997) reveals that women considered the intervention of the judges as an 
adequate response to their demands. Loli (1997:101) suggests that women are not 
interested in other levels of justice management because it is inaccessible to them. 
There is a need for manoeuvre in ‘wide spatial terms’ more than in 'hierarchical
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terms’, this means to negotiate among different ‘actors of interventions’: family, 
lieutenant governors or judges of the peace.
In relation to domestic violence, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, women 
think that the judges of Peace role is beneficial if the man listens to what the judge is 
telling him’. Other women think that all people who go to the judge, change’. In this 
sense a good judge is the one who has the qualities to make himself/herself heard’ It 
is noticeable that what women considered as the ideal way of solving their problems 
and what the judges believe is their mission, -conciliation-, in some ways match. This 
produces not a few controversies since conciliation is regarded as an inadequate 
solution in most cases of domestic violence (Loli 1997:105, Revilla 1994). For Loli 
(1997:105) to conciliate denies to women a ‘real access to the exercise of rights’. It is 
true that judges do have a deep conviction in their role as conciliators in cases of 
domestic violence. ‘To promote conciliation’ was a general answer that I received in 
the 149 questionnaires applied to the judges. To the question what is the role of the 
judges of the peace in cases of domestic violence they answered:
‘To persuade and conciliate looking always for the well-being o f the family and better 
upbrmgmg o f  the children
'Reprimand the parties and re conciliate them...'’
‘Try to make them sign a conciliatory agreement for the well-being o f their lives
‘The judges o f  peace have the competence o f intervention trying to avoid more 
conflicts. ‘They call to the parties to reflect and conciliate
‘The role o f  the judges o f  peace in a family conflict should be that o f a paternal 
counsellor, trying to persuade, to make a peaceful conciliation in order that the family 
find a sound peace at home
‘To conciliate the couple. The conflicts generate a bad image 
‘The judges ofpeace are peace makers in family conflicts
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‘To call the parties to reflect, make them realise the fault that they are committing
‘The main role o f the judges o f  the peace -as father o f his/her town- is seek and reach 
to a family pacification, taking into account the compatib ility, the good customs o f the 
couple to reach happiness and looking to a good example for their children
‘To carry on with a conciliatory meeting in order that the husband refrains from 
maltreating his wife and give him dear and precise recommendations to reform his 
behaviour
The following paragraphs analyse characteristics of the judges intervention in the 
context of domestic violence cases. This analysis is based on judge’s recorded cases, 
observation, questionnaires and interviews.
4.1,1 Enquires about the 'reasons’ for the violence.-
Among Andean people the process o f ‘conciliation’ means that everybody recognises a 
level of responsibility in the conflict. This ensures that the 'amendment' works since 
everybody is involved in resolving the problem. The conflict then has a different 
dimension than the legal system would predict. Judges enquire into all the aspects of 
the conflict, firstly, to the affected person and later to the aggressor or person at fault 
as to what were his/her reasons for such a behaviour.
This pattern is reproduced in domestic violence cases also. As ‘outsiders’ it gives us 
the impression that just to enquire as to ‘why’ a man beat his wife and to make the 
woman assume a degree of responsibility is a way of legitimising domestic violence. 
However, the context is different and the judge’s own belief on domestic violence is 
very important too. On 20 April 1997 I attended a conciliatory meeting between a 
couple of the community of Ampay in front of the judge of Pisac (Prov. Calca). The 
judge asked the woman to explain the facts and after asked her partner: 'Let's see 
Dalmecio, up to what point is this maltreatment true?'. She let the husband explain 
but immediately replied to him: 'but this is not a justification, it is not a justification
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... You are abusive...It can't be Dalmecio, all that you explain it is not a justification 
for your behaviour. You are not going to use your naked force to attack your wife'.
In the applied questionnaires, a general opinion of the judges to the question what is 
the procedure that they use when dealing with domestic violence cases was thus: firstly 
I enquire about the reason for the maltreatment. If this enquiry has the intention to 
oblige the aggressor to explain an ‘inexplicable’ behaviour or a disproportionate 
reaction this should be followed by a strong reprimand, as the judge of Pisac did. 
However, some judges fail to strongly condemn domestic violence, and although men 
are obliged to recognise their ‘faults’ the responsibility assigned to the woman in the 
incident appears to devalue her own claim. For example, in the records of the judge of 
Ancahuasi (Prov. Anta) a case from June 1997 read that a woman presented a 
complaint at the police station after suffering a physical attack by her husband. The 
police prepared the corresponding file on ’Faults against the person’ and sent it to the 
judge. In the police report was written that the accused was punishing his son with a 
rope and the woman intervened to defend their child and was herself physically 
attacked too. In the conciliation agreement it reads: I (the man) recognise the 
magnitude of the aggression against my wife, and 1 promise to abstain absolutely from 
attacking her again and 1 promise to assume the cost o f  her medical treatment. ‘I (the 
woman) accept, trying to live in harmony without harbouring any kind of resentment’.
There are also the judges who justify some beatings by the alleged wrongdoing of 
women. The ex-judge of the district of Limatambo (Prov. Anta), paradoxically a 
woman, told me: women sometimes cause themselves to be beaten. /  ask women about 
the motive why the husband has maltreated them and it is because they have not done 
the house's chores. O f course, in the end, I reprimand the man.
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4.1.2 To give 'a time'.
This is another common practice with some judges of the peace They listen to the 
parties and discuss some minimum compromises, if for instance a woman has decided 
for the separation, or both parties are in agreement to separate, judges will give them 
time to think about it before acceding to their request, or will suggest to the woman to 
give the husband a last opportunity I found the following examples:
In the first nomination jnzgado of Huancarani (Paucartambo) I found a case of June 
1997. The complainant stated that her partner beat her constantly for minor details. 
Cited to a ‘conciliation’ the accused said that 'he recognised his fault'. The judge gave 
them '6 months of probation' and that in the case of 'repetition of the behaviour' he 
would proceed with the separation.
In the records of the Chinchero Judge, Urubamba, is written a case of a woman from 
the Yanacona community who reported on 26 March 1997, that her cohabitant 
maltreated her continuously with kicks and punches mainly when he was drunk and 
she asked for a separation. The judge resolved to give them '15 days' to meditate well 
before taking any decision'.
In the conciliatory meeting of the couple of the Ampay community (20 April 1997), 
the Pisac Judge gave them 15 days to think whether they really wanted to separate or 
not. About this meeting and about the woman's complaint she did not make any 
annotation.
4,1.3 Give new opportunities and sanctions.-
This is a slightly different case to the previous one. Here judges carried on with a full 
agreement in terms of a ‘new opportunity’ to the husband, both in the sense of non 
separation and in the sense of not following with a criminal procedure of fahas.
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Normally within the agreement sanctions (that are not necessarily the ones established 
by the criminal procedure of/alias) are established against the offender.
In the Colquepata /u:gaJo (Prov. Paucartambo) in July 1997 a woman presented a 
complaint claiming that she was the victim of physical aggression by her partner. The 
judge ordered a legal examination that had as a result 3 days of resting and 2 days of 
medical attention. The accused was cited in front of the juzgado and 'seriously 
promised not to relapse'. The judge established that in case of repetition a fine of 500 
soles would be applicable.
A similar attitude is observed in the First Nomination judge of Ocongate district (Prov. 
Quispicanchi). In June of 1997 a woman stated that her husband beat her constantly.
In the conciliation agreement it reads that the husband promised to 'celebrate the civil 
marriage’ and the judge established a fine of 500 soles and his detention if he 
re-offended.
In the records of the judge of Ollantaytambo (Prov. Urubamba) there is a case of May 
1997 in which a woman from the community of Pallata made a complaint against her 
partner because of physical aggression. She complained that he maltreated her 
frequently. The judge 'invited the couple to a reconciliation exhorting them to reach 
an agreement'. The accused apologised to his cohabitant and she accepted. In the 
conciliatory document was established that in case of re-offending the judge would 
proceed with the separation.
The Combapata judge (Prov. Canchis) informed me about the last case of domestic 
violence that she received: ‘a woman had arrived all 'green' (expression for many 
bruises) because of the beating she had received’. The judge called the husband and
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the woman stated that he always beat her when he was drunk. The judge did not make 
any agreement but threatened him with detention if he did it again.
The records of the Pisac judge (Prov. Calca), contains a complaint by a woman of the 
community of Quello Quello (28 January 1997) of having suffered physical aggression 
by her cohabitant. The judge wrote an 'understanding agreement' where both spouses 
agreed to have 'a life of respect' and in the case of reoffence it will proceed with a fine 
and with the imprisonment of the accused.
The evidence appears throughout all my data Sometimes, however, the 'new 
opportunities' do not work and the sanction with which the accused was threatened is 
in most cases very difficult to enforce. In the First Nomination's Juzgado of 
Huancarani (Paucartambo), there is a case processed during May 1997 in which a 
woman complained that her husband continued to beat her despite the 'conciliatory 
agreement' that they signed in front of the judge in 1995. In this document he 
promised not to beat her more. The judge invited them to a new conciliation and they 
signed a new document where the woman 'forgave' him again.
In the records of the judge of Andahuaylillas (Prov. Quispicanchi) is found a case of 
February 1997. A woman made a complaint against her husband because he continued 
to beat her. She asked for the definitive separation based on a document that they 
signed some months ago where the husband promised not to beat her more and that in 
the case of reoffence the judge would 'authorise' the definitive separation111 However, 
the judge resolved again to reconcile them and the husband accepted a new 
commitment not to beat her again and to 'co-operate more at home’.
Ix This is another non legal status affair Cohabitants under the Peruvian legislation are free to 
separate They do not need a legal authorisation. However, an agreement is recommended to define the 
terms of the separation particularly in relation to maintenance and common property.
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As an exception I found the case of the judge of Tinta (Prov Canchis) processed on 
15 March 1997. A woman from the community of Machamarca denounced a new 
aggression by her cohabitant On this occasion he had put animal excrement in her 
mouth and he had beaten her. The woman remembered that some months ago he 
signed a document of conciliation after he broke her nose. In the new document, the 
judge declared the 'separation' and forbade the accused to enter drunk to their home19.
4.1.4 Dissuasion from separation.-
In most of the cases examined, the judges did not facilitate the separation of the
couples However, this case of the Coya district (Prov. Calca) shows there to be an
intransigent attitude against separation. She manifested.
I can spend two hours with the couple until they accept and do not 
behave capriciously. I convince the woman in order that they do not 
separate. I had a case o f  a woman who was supported by her family in 
order to separate from her husband who beat her frequently and drank 
a lot. /  told her that a woman is the fundamental basis for the change 
o f  the family. I also told them that they should marry by the religious 
ceremony [Catholic], attend mass and listen to the Gospel. I told them 
that Jesus suffered the Cross because o f us and that we should reflect 
on that.
In this case the judge’s values were radically different from those of the woman and 
her family. The judge an extreme catholic, imposed her point of view rather than a 
‘common sense’ solution that was expected by the complainant and her family.
5. Domestic violence laws.-
As we saw in chapter five, the judges of the peace were not taken into account in the 
domestic violence laws. The original law 26260 (December 1993) does not mention
If the judges o f the peace were entitled to apply the Domestic Violence Laws this would be a 
coercive legal order
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letrados judges of the peace. The amended law 26763 (March 1997) finally included 
the letrados judges of the peace but excluded the no letrados The function assigned 
by law 26763 to the letrado judge of the peace is the application of protective 
measures within formally open cases of ‘Fallas against the person’. With the 
enactment of the ' Reglamenlo of the Domestic Violence Law’ of February 1998 to the 
no letrado judges of the peace it has recognised the possibility to assume the same 
intervention as the letrado judge. The law states though, that this should be subject to 
study by the Superior Courts. To the date of this review, nothing like that has 
happened but this is not the only restrictive aspect. The demand for ‘formality’ is a 
condition which creates the real gap between the law and rural judges. As was 
mentioned, rural judges do not often follow the formal procedures when intervening in 
a case. Additionally, a significant number of problems brought to the justice of Peace 
level do not have a legal status. In the case of domestic violence, it is even more 
evident, considering that even in urban areas, more than half of the women who attend 
the Women’s police station of Lima are not recognised by the legal system as being 
victims of ‘Fallas against the person’.
Additionally, it is necessary to analyse what are the protective measures suggested by 
the law within an Andean communities context. The law states as ‘protective
measures’:
‘The retirement of the aggressor from the common house, prohibition 
of harassment of the victim, temporary suspension of all types of visits, 
inventory of the property and other measures of immediate protection to 
assure the physical, psychological and moral integrity' of the victims’ 
(Article 10, TUO Law of Domestic violence)
This presumes the aggressor is a dangerous character who constantly jeopardises the 
family members integrity. This is not the way in which an Andean woman understands
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the problem as demonstrated in chapter seven. Additionally, the law assumes that a 
threatening situation deserves police intervention for the protection of the victims 
This kind of ‘protection’, overtly unsuccessful in practical terms in urban settings 
because of the lack of the availability of the Peruvian police to enforce such orders, is 
an undesirable situation for Andean people. Firstly from the practical side, there are 
scant police stations in rural areas. They are concentrated in the capitals of the 
provinces and in some commercially important large towns. However, this police 
absence rather than being seen by the Andean people as a lack of protection is 
perceived by them as less repression and abuse. An Andean man or woman, as I could 
see and my interviewees confirmed, would avoid going to a police station if they 
could.
Terms like temporary suspension of all types of visits to the family’ lack any common 
sense in the reality of the peasant communities of Peru. To be effective it would mean 
the expulsion of the offender from the community and this is a decision that 
corresponds to all the members. The communities are relatively small social and 
geographical groups and they are exclusive. A person who belongs to community ‘A’ 
does not belong to community ‘B’, even if these communities are next to the each 
other. The extended family, the neighbours sum up all an Andean woman/man’s 
social references. This is the real wealth for the Andean people. To leave a 
community means to cease to be a runa. Expelling a member is not an easy decision to 
take.
In Andean communities a ‘fair solution' could be far from a ‘legal solution’. In these 
social settings ‘amendment’ is indispensable. The ‘fair solution’ in domestic violence 
is achieved when the intervention of relatives and judges leads to the modification of
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the husband’s behaviour. However, there is plenty of evidence in the judges records to 
know that some men are persistently violent and do not follow the advice and the 
compromise agreed in front of relatives or judges of the peace In these cases the 
conciliation’ is not supported by an alternative method of constraining a husband 
from beating. This does not mean that nothing can be done against a persistently 
violent husband. Both the judge and the community itself have the potential to 
intervene to stop the violence but it is necessary to develop an overt condemnation of 
domestic violence and a more assertive intervention, particularly from the judges of 
the peace.
In this sense, there is an aspect of the law which can contribute to build a rhetoric 
framework in relation to domestic violence. The law brings the principle that 
domestic violence should not be tolerated and this message can contribute to develop 
an awareness in the people that since violence is not condoned, it should also not be 
allowed to happen. It could have a positive result to get everyone involved in a 
‘conversation’ about the aims of the domestic violence law. NGOs working in the 
area could have an important role in such a ‘conversation’. The law itself 
acknowledges the NGOs role (article 3, e, TUO Domestic Violence law). In relation 
to the judges, the role of the state should favour the awareness of the law proposal 
instead of trying to make the judges participate in the rationality of the judicial system 
and convert them into ‘lawyers’ when they are ‘non lawyers’. It is precisely that they 
do not follow a strict legal criteria which makes them successful in the eyes of the 
population.
Dissemination of the contents of the law is then an important task. One of the causes 
of failure of the first law (26260, December 1993) was that few people had heard
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about it. Interested in this point I asked the judges in the questionnaires if they had 
heard about the domestic violence laws. I did not know, however, that the Superior 
Court had included the text of law 26260 in the printed training material. Although I 
did not prove my assumption because some judges just copied some paragraphs of the 
law the attitude of the Superior Court to include the law 26260 had positive results 
since it made the judges aware that something had been done in relation to domestic 
violence. The results of my questionnaires were:
104 judges did not know or had not heard about the law.
4 judges expressed that the law protected children.
25 judges copied paragraphs of the text of the law as an answer.
20 judges have heard about the law and some of their answers were:
7 have not read the text o f  the law myself but 1 understand that it brings protection 
mainly to women and children
7 have heard about the taw, I think just in recent years there is more protection for the 
members o f the family
'It is about the defence against violence towards women and children 
'It is about women's rights
'The law orders that any neighbour who is witness o f  maltreatment as well as women 
and children have the right to complain in front o f an authority'.
‘It is a law mainly to protect the physical integrity o f women
I differentiate these answers from those judges who expressed that the law was about 
‘children’ because 1 think the main point it is to identify the specific issue about 
women being the object of violence by their partners despite that the law itself talks 
about ‘family violence’. These 20 judges in one way or another recognised that 
dimension of domestic violence. During the training course I had the opportunity to 
talk with them and enquire how they knew about the law and they told me that they, as
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members of their communities, have linked with NGOs working in the area and 
received different training from them Consequently, this was the way that they have 
known about the law. Later in my visits I noticed that some judges even have posters 
of the feminist campaigns on ‘non violence against women’ hanging in their offices. 
These posters were provided by the NGOs. These well informed judges, particularly 
the judge of Pisac (a woman) and the judge of Tinta (a man), were those who 
expressed a strong condemnation of domestic violence and favoured a change of 
attitude by some violent husbands, as I noticed in my visits.
Conclusions:
Judges of the peace in rural areas perform an extremely important role in conflict 
resolutions. It has been estimated that more than 50% of people in these areas will 
take their conflicts to these judges as the preferred forum. Judges of the peace are 
negatively valued by the official legal system, being considered the ‘justice of the 
Poor’ and criticised for their lack of coherence with the rest of the justice system. 
However, these magistrates play the important role of intermediary between the legal 
system and the ‘informal’ networks of conflict management. Judges of the peace 
subsume both functions. On the one hand, they share the understanding that people in 
Andean zones have about their problems but also they are able to offer a ‘legal 
framework’ (in the form of conciliation or in the formalisation of the case) for most 
conflicts taken to them.
Andean people do not regard the judges in a ‘traditional’ position. There is a level of 
acknowledgement that these magistrates are part of the legal system. This is not an 
ancestral position to preserve neither are these judges elected following a traditional 
pattern. However what people expect is a major participation in judge’s appointments 
and also a degree of accountability in such a way that people can relate to the judges
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with confidence. Conciliation, negotiation, and mediation are the expected means 
through which a conflict is expected to be resolved. For the conciliation to work it is 
necessary that the judges have particular characteristics that all together can be 
summarised in the quality of making himself/herself‘being heard’ by the parties. 
Women are the main users of judges of the peace and regard their intervention as 
adequate. Women often are not ‘heard’ since there are few communities that allow 
them into their managerial bodies which set the priorities for the community as a 
whole. Women’s problem are not in that communal agenda Women then look to the 
judges to intervene and make themselves heard through the judges in the wide variety 
of conflicts that they have to face.
In relation to domestic violence, judges and people expect the husband to change his 
attitude through the conciliation, however, when the husband persists with his violent 
behaviour there are no alternatives to challenge his behaviour. Also noticeable in 
some judges’ is the lack of a more assertive condemnation of domestic violence. On 
top of that, within the communities, nothing has been established to assist women with 
persistently violent husbands.
The domestic violence laws started with assumptions that are far distant from the 
reality of the Peruvian highlands and that do not share the choices which Andean 
women will be inclined to use. However, the law underlies a principle (the right to 
live free of violence) able to promote a more activist condemnation of domestic 
violence and can positively influence women ‘being heard’ within their communities. 
Communities have not hesitated in taking collective actions in cases of 'wrongdoing' 
that they regarded as threatening their social groups, a similar assertive attitude is 
lacking towards domestic violence which demands that a more effective social control 
should be developed.
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CHAPTER NINE:
CONCLUSION AND ISSUES ARISING
1. Difficulties in implementing domestic violence legal strategies
It is clear that the law has historically contributed in the creation of gender 
relationships. It has assigned a different set of values for men and women in which 
women have been ordered in a subordinated way Specifically referring to domestic 
violence, the legal system has been responsible both for endorsing husbands with the 
right of correction and for managing the ‘excess’ of this right. Feminists understood 
from the beginning of their constitution as a political force that the law had to be 
tackled to affect positive change for women in society. The obvious discriminatory 
contents of the law prevented early feminists seeing that the whole rationality of the 
law was male and was ruled by male values. This was noticed much later by the 
radical feminists. Other critics of the law have been the Marxist feminists who have 
seen the law as a superstructure of capitalism and serving to its purposes. However, the 
necessity for an affirmative action to improve women’s position in society has led a 
diversity of feminists to take advantage of political moments, negotiating their 
aspirations within various agendas and even forgetting an integral criticism of the 
patriarchy. In these political negotiations they have often taken the law uncritically in 
an effort of achieve concrete results. They also have ‘closed ranks’ around the idea of 
an ‘essential woman' despite that at discursive level feminists have often
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acknowledged the different ways in which women around the world live the various 
aspects of our subordination.
This has been more evident when discussing a global agenda to address women’s 
rights as human rights. To enter into the rationality of the human rights it is necessary 
to set minimum standards Since Western feminists have regarded themselves as the 
role model for the rest of the world and since human rights are ‘suspiciously’ Western 
anyway, it has been this group of activists which have made their voices more 
prevalent It is necessary to note, however, that when referring to Western feminists 
this does not just imply those activists geographically located in the Western world but 
also it includes those who emulate the values of the West in detriment of their 
country’s multiculturality, such is the case of the predominant groups in South 
America.
This work has argued that this is not just a problem of pragmatism but to pursue 
certain objectives with an uncritical evaluation of the state and the legal system can 
not just in real terms not improve women’s position but can even have negative 
effects. One example of this is certain strategies on domestic violence that have 
contributed to conservative agendas to increase crime control. These measures are 
often perceived by some disadvantaged groups in society as excuses for more 
repression against people easily ‘jailed’ by the system. For women belonging to these 
groups who suffer from different categories of oppression: such as gender, race and 
class, some feminist strategies, strongly based in the intervention of the state 
representatives, have the risk of not being useful or being rejected because the 
violence that they suffer as women is one more aspect of the violence that they suffer
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in other circumstances in which often the same state representatives act against their 
fundamental rights.
When despite feminist-oriented legal reforms domestic violence does not decrease and 
even worsens -as other expressions of violence- it is necessary to enquire what are the 
deficits and benefits of investing most effort and resources in using the legal system as 
the main way to challenge domestic violence. For instance, an improvement in police 
attitude has been demanded but the police can be an authoritarian feature of the state. 
Finally, it is necessary to compare the effort pursued in certain legal achievements 
with the efforts that have been dedicated to challenge the existence of an ideology 
which places women in a vulnerable position in society and celebrates male aggressive 
behaviour.
2. Difficulties in implementing domestic violence legal strategies in multicultural
societies
The intertwined categories of oppression (race, class, gender) result in people seeing 
the law in a different light. On some occasions, this historical condition has resulted 
in certain groups creating an alternative ‘legality’ able to play the role of conflict and 
rules management, or in cases of post colonial societies, previous forms of ‘law’ have 
subsisted despite the establishment of the modem law. There is always a tension 
between state law and ‘law out of the state’ although in some places the customary law 
is legally enforced by the tribunals (juridical legal pluralism), in others the tension is 
permanent because since the state holds the monopoly of regulation, the ‘paralegality’ 
is always at risk of becoming illegality and being wiped out by state coercion. This is 
especially evident when some values of the social groups are contradicting those 
interests coming from the hegemonic way of ruling. However, alternative accounts of
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law, or ‘law out of the state’, are not necessarily created in a democratic process, 
having instead the purpose o f preserving certain privileges of those in powerful 
positions within the group There are different situations, but subordination of women 
is the most obvious one. In this sense, women pursuing fair treatment within their 
social groups sometimes end up creating social tension because of their resistance to 
submit to certain rules of customary character. In this sense, not all alternative 
accounts of law can be considered as ‘emancipatory agendas’.
In relation to domestic violence, women suffering from other forms of oppression are 
in a very precarious situation On the one hand, the alternatives offered from the state 
law are often unreachable because they lack the necessary resources to be capable to 
act within the legal system. Additionally, the legal system is not necessarily 
considered as a tool for the defence of their rights but rather as a source of injustice, 
consequently, there is a resistance to use the formal law. On the other hand, women 
who challenge their situation within their own groups have to rely on the values of 
those responsible for justice management. If a particular society is tolerant or even 
supports domestic violence there is no possible hope for women, however, on other 
occasions, there is simply not a practice to address complaints of domestic violence 
through such bodies.
3. A multicultural society: the case of Peru.-
For Santos (1998b: 131) the ‘knowledge-as-emancipation’ necessarily implies the 
opposition of ‘multiculturalism’ to ‘monoculturalism’. Or in other words, ‘solidarity’ 
starts by acknowledging the other as ‘producer of knowledge’. The history of Peru 
has been marked by the constant ‘silence’ of other voices under the (legal) fiction of 
citizenship and the Peruvian nation.
330
Colonisation established styles of oppression unknown by the native population. With 
the colonisers came the government institutions and the law. The colonial legal 
system shaped people into exploitation The relationship of native people with law 
was one of permanent transgression and consequently, of repression Still there were 
some spaces in which the native population managed to manoeuvre within the system 
and even accommodated it to their own customs. In this sense, the ‘native judge’ 
managed a legitimacy to resolve conflict between native people however he was 
powerless when facing the coloniser. This gives evidence of judge’s marginal 
relationship to the ‘central’ colonial judicial bodies.
With independence came the modernisation of the legal system and the formalisation 
of rules and procedures to reflect the principles of the ‘legal science’, in this way 
providing the conditions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ that modernity demanded. 
However, social relationships in front of the ‘post colonial law’ remained basically the 
same and by the contrary the social reality was uncovered by the ‘qualities’ of the 
‘modem state law’ making invisible the disadvantageous situation of larger sectors of 
the Peruvian population and continued giving legitimacy to certain conditions of 
oppression.
4.- Peruvian feminist strategies: from local paralegalitv to the global agenda.-
Histoncally, law has not just been used to regulate exploitation but also to regulate 
patriarchy. Peruvian feminists, identified with socialist feminism, had a strong belief 
in the possibility of women to challenge gender subordination within their own 
popular organisations. There was a strong belief in paralegality, as an alternative 
justice generated by the 'oppressed'. In this sense, challenging discriminatory practise
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went hand in hand with the strength of the social movement and it was part of a wider 
agenda. The objective was to articulate gender claims to the class struggle.
Feminists mainly organised through NGOs, were conditioned by the requirement of 
the international funding bodies By the early 1990s there was a significant reduction 
in the aid received and a demand by the international agency to achieve more 
‘accountable’ results, translating mainly to ‘working with the state’, under the wrong 
presumption that the state in countries like Peru had an infrastructure and resources to 
deal with the complexity of problems such as domestic violence. Consequently, 
domestic violence became an issue exclusively of feminist lawyers who, assuming the 
law in a traditional way and understanding ‘success’ from a conventional legal 
perspective, concentrated on winning some victories through the judicial system and 
legislative reforms.
The domestic violence laws are an example of the distance between reality and the 
legal system. Using a structure which exists only in the urban zones, the law 
‘universalises’ a coastal, urban, woman able to access the law and the legal system to 
achieve her ends.
Legal strategies on domestic violence have been much inspired by ‘global campaigns' 
and in a general circulation of legal recipes which have failed to rethink important 
emancipatory claims from the perspective of multicultural societies, taking the state 
and the legal system umproblematicly and complicating the aim of eradicating 
domestic violence. Once the possible solutions are articulated into a crime control 
strategy, the analysis of gender violence within a wider political agenda loses force 
and as Ferraro (1996) would say became a fundamental conservative perspective. 
Additionally, the homogenisation of the causes of women’s oppression reinforces the
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silence of our multuculturality and contributes to the marginalisation of other already 
marginalised ‘voices’.
5.- Domestic violence in South Andean communities.-
It has been the intention of this work to confront the feminist proposals with the 
Peruvian cultural diversity having as an example the South Andean communities of the 
Department of Cusco. This work has assumed Andean people as ‘producers of 
knowledge’, taking into account their views and contrasting them with the ‘scientific 
knowledge’ of the law and the feminist agendas In this way, we could appreciate 
within these Andean communities, other sources of gender differentiation, that result 
in a better position for Andean women in their societies compared, for instance, to 
other Peruvian women in poor urban zones. This despite the fact that the 
‘modernisation’ of the Andean communities after the Agrarian reform destructured the 
traditional organisation and brought the displacement of women from their traditional 
position in the ‘public’ life of the Andean communities. Andean women have slowly 
regained a presence in the managerial bodies after training themselves in their own 
women’s organisations.
Domestic violence then does not appear in Andean women's lives finding them 
without social resources and the violence itself does not disrupt or erode her from her 
social position. People in Andean communities consider domestic violence a deviant 
behaviour, paradoxically, there is not a strong communal attitude against it and there 
is not a body within the same community able to listen to a woman’s plea for 
overcoming such violence.
Alternatives to face the problem are individuals and communal bodies detached from 
taking responsibility. However, women have two main socially recognised forums
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through which they may challenge their husbands behaviour. The network of relatives 
is one of them, and its success depends on the relationships generated and preserved 
mainly with godparents and parents of both sides of the couple This intervention is 
fully in use, although, does not show a clear pattern and their success depends on the 
good will of all the people involved. In that sense, this study revealed that judges of 
the peace became a more steady and consistent forum of intervention for marital 
disputes.
6.- A different justice: judges of the peace.-
Women are the main users of judges of the peace. Loli (1997) suggests that women 
are not interested in other levels o f state justice management because it is inaccessible 
to them. In this sense, women manoeuvre in ‘wide spatial terms’ more than in 
‘hierarchical terms’, this means they negotiate among different ‘actors of intervention’ 
such as relatives, communal authorities, or judges of the peace although for the 
specific cases of domestic violence as well as for other conflicts, judges of peace are 
the privilege site used by women.
The rationality of the justice management performed by these judge is a very different 
one from the rest of the judicial pyramid. It is a consensual, non professional, direct 
justice. In this sense, parties expect that judges of the peace hold those characteristics 
that normally are considered an expression of backwardness by the rest of the judicial 
pyramid. The capacity of the judge of the peace ‘to be heard’ is fundamental. This is 
basically a ‘conversational’ relationship, or as Santos would say, a fundamental 
'rhetoric' justice. In this sense, judges of the peace build a particular relationship with 
the parties based on their social legitimacy which started from the very election of
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these magistrates but is mainly concentrated in the Andean idea of make well the
justice.
Women considered judges of the peace an appropriate site for processing their marital 
conflicts. General women’s opinion is that judge’s intervention in cases of domestic 
violence is successful in arriving at a good understanding’. I proved in my visits to 
the judge’s places the veracity of this affirmation. This is a rhetorical justice that 
through advice and persuasion works extremely well in the majority o f cases. 
However, the capacity to influence positively the parties in conflict, in this case a 
violent husband, depends much on the judge’s individual qualities and their own ideas 
on the problem. Judges have a strong conviction in their role as 'peacemakers' of their 
communities and while in a good number o f cases judges will maintain a firm attitude 
against a violent husband in some others they will insist on making ‘peace’ even to the 
detriment of what is more convenient for women and/or against her own desire for 
separation. Being consensual means that the judges’ success depends on everybody 
‘hearing’ and there is evidence in the judges records that some men are persistently 
violent and do not follow the advice and the compromises agreed in front of relatives 
or judges of the peace. It is in these cases where the ‘conciliation’ is not supported by 
an alternative method to constrain a husband from beating.
Taking into consideration Santos’ definition (1994) of justiciable bodies, discussed in 
chapter two, it seems that judges of the peace are lacking what Santos considers a 
fundamental element: ‘the capacity of coercion’. However, the judges’ intervention is 
so positive in managing conflict that despite an apparent lack of this coercive capacity 
they are & justiciable body par excellence. Additionally, judges -as Andean people- do 
believe that through an effective mediation it is possible in all cases to arrive at a good
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understanding, even though, this conviction, in many cases, prevented them from 
assuming a a more affirmative action in cases such as domestic violence.
7, Judges of the peace and domestic violence laws.-
Judges of the peace were not taken into account in the domestic violence laws. In the 
background of the preparative process of the laws was the feminist lawyers 
hierarchical understanding o f the judicial system and the belief that women’s right 
should be defended at the ‘highest judicial level’, as if the ‘place’ in which legal 
actions are processed could affect the integrity of the right that is defended or 
vindicated. This position was criticised from the very beginning by other Latin 
American activists (Chiarotti 1993) and other Peruvian feminist lawyers who were 
demanding the modification o f the law to avoid what was qualified as a denial for 
rural women -who only access the legal system through the non letrado judge of the 
peace- of the ‘exercise of their rights’ (Loli 1998). In real terms, rural women were 
not included in the universal category of women protected by the law.
The original law 26260 (December 1993) did not even mention the letrados judges of 
the peace despite most cases involving domestic violence being processed as ‘hollas 
(minor offences) against the person'. The law 26763 (March 1997) partially amended 
that situation giving them the attribution to impose protective measures but exclusively 
within formally open cases of Faults against the Person. That is, no woman can go 
directly to the letrado judges of the peace to apply for protective measures in an 
independent process as is possible in front of the Family judges. The no letrados 
judges were again excluded. More recently the Reglamento of the Domestic Violence 
I .aw (February 1998) opens the possibility for a future inclusion of the no letrado
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judges but as with the letrados within formal criminal cases. As was documented 
judges of the peace avoid the legal formality.
On the one hand, the law presents an ideal situation for the protection of victims of 
domestic violence far from the reality of the legal system in urban settings. On the 
other hand, it relies on a legal structure non existent in rural settings. In relation to 
urban settings, it has reviewed the difficulty for a significant number of women to 
access to the legal system The law 26260 (December 93) established a procedure to 
apply for protective measures in front of the civil judges. To act at this level, it is 
indispensable to have a lawyer, to pay judicial tariffs, and to wait throughout the stages 
of the process. If this is the means to assure immediate protection to the victims, this 
is really a declarative statement. Additionaly, the enforcement of the orders of 
protection correspond to the police who, as is widely known, face an appalling lack of 
resources and lack the disposition for domestic violence cases. The law 26763 (March 
1997) focuses on a specialised judge: the Family judge. At this level there is an 
exoneration of judicial tariffs but still a lawyer is necessary. On top of that there are 
less Family judges than civil ones in the country.
Throughout the law, there comes across an implicit idea of domestic violence as a 
crime, of the dangerous character of the aggressor and of the vulnerability of victims 
in need of immediate protection (even if in practise this is simply an aspiration). 
Consequently, the law is assuming coercion to compliance. In Andean communities, 
most women do not have to face domestic violence without social resources, however, 
they do believe in the central importance of the ‘conjugal pair’ which structures their 
societies. In this sense, and despite that in Andean communities there is no stigma 
against separation, it is obvious that a lot of effort is made around the couple to
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'amend’ the conflict. Additionaly, marital union is developed in stages, it matures 
with time, consequently, people do not expect immediate solutions to domestic 
conflicts including violence. Separation of the couple is a decision taken within the 
extended family and with their support. Terms such as temporary suspension of all 
types of visits to the family’ are far from the reality of small social and geographical 
groups, such as Andean communities, which are based in shared spaces and 
relationships A peasant is not a person who can easily move and live in another place. 
To be a runa is to live in his/her community.
However, there is an obvious lack of communal attitude against domestic violence. 
This sums up to the lack of conviction in some judges to challenge domestic violence 
revealing that not enough is done in Andean communities to reflect women’s interests. 
In this 'rhetoric' a strong element of condemnation of domestic violence is failing. For 
women to see their situation improve involves developing a conviction of the right to 
live free of violence. In this sense, the law can contribute in getting people into a 
conversation about the issue. The ethical aspect of the law, expressed in its principle 
of no tolerance, brings new argument to enter into this rhetoric. NGOs working in the 
area could have an important role in such a ‘conversation’. Andean communities being 
small social groups, it is easier than in other social settings to develop social control to 
face domestic violence. But this has to be bom as a need within the communities.
8- Raising the voice of Andean women within and outside the communitv.-
As was reviewed, historically, the legal representatives have often performed as 
infractors of fundamental rights more than granters of them in front of the Andean 
people. Until this historical condition is overcome it is very difficult to see how 
Andean women can relate to the state legal system as a means through which to fulfil
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their aspiration for a life free of violence. In this case, the initial Peruvian feminist 
conviction that to achieve gender claims it is necessary a process of strength and 
empowerment of disadvantaged groups of society should not be disregarded. In this 
sense, Andean women have strong possibilities to develop strategies to face domestic 
violence in real terms within their social groups due to their better position and degree 
of social and material autonomy compared to other poor women in the country. It is 
necessary, however, to recover their ‘voices’ within the managerial bodies of the 
communities. This is being achieved gradually. This element joined to a major 
awareness of gender claims will lead Andean women to address their specific concerns 
as communal interests. If the eradication of domestic violence in these particular 
groups involves a more assertive attitude from the communal authorities, this would 
just be possible, as some Andean women recognised, when they are fully ‘heard’ in 
their communities, this is when they participate in the government of their social group 
enabling all members to assume a position when facing situations that affect them as 
wurmikuna. as women.
Consequently, the acknowledgement of the diversity of women’s experience should 
not take us, as Santos (1998b) would say, into a ‘celebratory postmodernism’ in which 
‘the very possibility of resistance and alternatives' is also ‘deconstructed ’ but rather in 
the continuous ability to dream of a ‘better world’. It means to redefine the 
alternatives with the participation of the multiculturalism in an authentic democratic 
process. Santos (1998b). self-denominated this position as ‘oppositional 
postmodernism'. In this notion, one valid emancipatory agenda is the development of 
'co-operative domestic communities’ (Santos 1995:484), that is, the possibility to 
move forward from the notion of women’s oppression to construct an alternative 
reality, in that alternative there is nothing ‘absolute’ because it is ‘contextualised’
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(Santos 1998b: 132) in the differential reality of people. Going further, this 
emancipatory dream should be linked to other emancipatory processes at the level of 
the ‘marketplace’, the ‘communityplace’, the workplace’, the citizenplace’, the 
‘worldplace’ ( Santos 1995:484-9).
Andean women should be taken as protagonists within their organisation but also 
within the national life and being listened to within their groups but also and more 
importantly within the larger society. The violence of poverty, of repression, of 
marginalisation, when tolerated jeopardises an authentic desire for eradicating other 
forms of violence in the most intimate sphere because it carries the risk of accepting 
that violence and authoritarianism are normal events and contribute to the passivity to 
challenge the problem of domestic violence. It is also very important to understand 
that Andean women do not have an alternative account of social reality other than that 
of their communities, being out of the community is to renounce being a runa. 
Alternatives generated by the same Andean women will preserve this social identity 
and become an effective way to eradicate domestic violence considering real women 
that in real terms benefit from such achievements.
Feminists in Peru should reconsider the way they are engaging with a ‘universal’ 
discourse that by focusing in addressing ‘all the women’ of the world and 
concentrating on working with the state prevents them from taking into consideration 
the diversity of women in the country and the experiences of their localities. In Peru 
women’s human rights discourse has influenced the way the law tackles domestic 
violence. One positive effect is the incorporation of the principle of a life free of 
violence which challenges other discourses of law that construct and reinforce gender 
relationships However, it also considers the formal legal system and the state
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agencies as instrumental in achieving such aspiration In this case, the tension 
between these universal "recipes’ on how the state should deal with domestic violence 
and the Andean women’s perception of the problem, could be handled empowering 
those spaces that Andean people recognise as appropriate forums, such as judges of the 
peace This should not be understood as increasing the capacity of coercion through 
the state agencies but acknowledging the important role fulfilled by these judges in the 
resolution of conflicts and favouring a democratic relationship with the Andean 
communities This includes considering Andean communities organisations in the 
design of more effective mechanisms to eradicate domestic violence.
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The ju d ic ia l system  in Peru is m ade up by  ju risd ic tio n a l b o d ies and offices re sp o n sib le  for its 
internal co n tro l and m anagem ent. T here  are  five ju risd ic tiona l bod ies in the P eru v ian  Judicial 
System . In a  hierarchical o rd er the  struc tu re  o f  the Peruvian jud ic ia l system  is as fo llow s:
I. SUPREME COURT:
L ocation : T h e  capital o f  the country , L im a. T erritorial Ju risd ic tio n : The w h o le  country. 
R e p resen ta tiv es: Suprem e vocales headed  by  the  President o f  the  Suprem e Court. H e /sh e  is the 
highest a u th o rity  w ith in  the Peruvian  ju d ic ia l system . Jurisd ic tional o ffice s : Specia lised  
D ivisions (Salas Jurisdiccionales). E ach d iv ision  consists o f  5 Vocales. T h e  specialised  
d iv isions a re  d iv ided  by  sub ject m atters into: C ivil, C rim inal and  C onstitutional. Ju risd ic tiona l 
functions: F inal decision  level in the p ro cesses initiated in the S uperio r C o u rts , in those 
initiated in th e  Suprem e C ourt and in those  invo lv ing  constitu tional m atters
II. SUPERIOR COURTS:
L ocation : C ap ita l o f  the  dep artm en ts '. T errito ria l Ju risd ic tio n : T heir ju risd ic tion  is estab lished  
by law. T h e  criteria  is that in dep artm en ts  w ith  a  high ju d ic ia l w ork load, like th e  departm ent 
o f  L im a  th e re  is m ore than one  superio r court; in o ther areas, like the South A ndes, th e re  is one
1 This summary is elaborated based in our current 1993 Constitution and in the 1993 Organic Law of the 
Judicial Power (‘LOPJ’)
2 This refers to  the fact that the same court (juzgado) deals with more than one subject matter 
Commonly, it refers to the joint o f the criminal and civil jurisdiction
1 Peru is politically divided into departments Departments are divided into provinces and provinces in 
districts
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superio r cou rt co rrespond ing  to  tw o departm ents. T h e  S u p erio r C ourt o f  C usco  is a lso  
S uperio r C o u rt o f  the d e p a rtm e n t o f  M adre  d e  D ios. At p resen t, there  are  25 S uperio r C o u rts  in 
Peru. R epresen tatives: S u p e rio r  vocales headed  by the  P residen ts o f  the  Superio r C ourts. 
Ju risd ic tional o ffices. S p e c ia lised  o r  C o m b in ed  D iv isions (Salas especializadas o mixias). 
Each div ision  consists o f  3 vocales. Ju risd ic tiona l fu n c tio n s: Final decision  level in p ro cesses 
initiated in the Specia lised  a n d  C om b in ed  C ourts. First decision  level in civil p ro ced u res 
against ju d g e s  questioned  b y  m isco n d u c t.
111. SPECIALISED AND COMBINED COURTS.-
L ocation : In the cap itals o f  the  p rovinces. T erritorial Ju risd ic tio n : T heir ju risd ic tio n  is 
established by  law. T he n u m b e r  o f  these  co u rts  p e r p rov ince  is d e fin ed  by  the superio r co u rts  
based  on the  w ork load. In m y study, ex cep t fo r C usco  an d  Paucartam bo, w hich have  
specialised  courts, the rest o f  th e  v isited  p ro v in ces have ju s t  o n e  c o m b in ed  court located  in the 
capital o f  the  province. R ep resen ta tiv es : ju d g es . O ne ju d g e  p e r court. Ju risd ic tional o ff ice s : At 
p resen t there are  five k in d  o f  sp ec ia lised  courts: C ivil, C rim inal, L abour, A grarian and Fam ily. 
The ju risd ic tio n  o f  the  c o m b in e d  courts is estab lished  by  the  S uperio r C ourt. T he m ost 
com m on case  is the c o m b in a tio n  o f  the  crim inal and the  civil ju r isd ic tio n . In m y study  ju s t  
C usco hold  the full range  o f  specia lised  co u rts  app o in ted  includ ing  the  Fam ily C ourt. 
Jurisd ictional functions: F irst decision  level in the p ro ced u res w ith in  their specia lised  o r 
com bined  ju risd ic tion . Final d ecisio n  level in p rocedure  started  a t letrado and  no letrado 
ju d g es  o f  th e  peace  level.
IV. LETRAD O  JUDGES OF THE PEAC'E.-
L oca tion : D efined  by the  S u p e rio r  C ourt. Jud ic ia l p ractise  estab lished  the  appo in tm en t o f  these  
ju d g es  in the location o f  the p ro v in c ia l courts. T errito ria l ju risd ic tio n : D efined  by the S uperio r 
C ourt. T hese  ju d g es  are  a p p o in te d  in urban centres. In the  city  o f  L im a there is at least one  
Letrado ju d g e  o f  the p eace  p e r  d istric t o r  per every  tw o  o r th ree  d istric ts. T hese  situation  is 
variable. R epresentatives: ju d g e s . O ne ju d g e  pe r location . Ju risd ic tiona l o ffice s : T h is is  a 
com bined  civ il, crim inal and  la b o u r  m atters  ju risd ic tio n  in the spec ific  p rocedures estab lished  
by  law. Jurisd ic tional fu n c tio n s .-  F irst decision  level.
V. NO LETRAD O  JUDGES O F  THE PEACE.-
L ocation : D efined  by the  S u p e rio r  C ourt. T he ju d ic ia l p ractise  estab lished  the appoin ted  o f  at 
least one  o f  these  ju d g es  in e v e ry  rural d istric t T errito ria l ju risd ic tio n : D efined  by  the S uperio r 
C ourt d ep end ing  on w here the  ju d g e  is appoin ted . R epresen ta tives: ju d g es . O ne per location. 
Ju risd ic tional o ffices: T h is  is  a  com bined  crim inal and  civil ju risd ic tio n  in the spec ific  
p rocedures established by law . Ju risd ic tio n a l fu n c tio n s: F irst d ecisio n  level, how ever, the  sam e 
legislation p ro m o te  their fundam en ta l concilia to ry  capacity  in stead  th e ir ad jud icative  one.
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Appendix 2.d.l
PRO VIN CE O F  ANTA 
(Districts visited are shown in yellow)
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Appendix 2.d.2 
PROVINCE O F  CALCA
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PROVINCE OF C lISrO
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Characteristics of the population from the area of fieldwork 
Information based on the 1993 National Census 
Peruvian National Statistic Institute
A p p e n d ix  3 :
Total
Population
Rural
Population
Illiterate
Population
Married and 
Cohabitants
Quechua
speakers
DANTA
Ancahuasi 6,937 6,157 2,399 2,619 5,387
Limatambo 8,413 7,552 2,583 3,257 6,128
Zurite 4,083 2,379 875 1,510 2,876
2KAICA
Coya 3,402 2,304 1,051 1,382 2,743
Lamay 5,011 3,605 1,863 1,820 3,847
Pi sac 8,777 6,809 2,870 3,377 6,009
Taray 3,803 3,311 992 1,450 3,136
3)CANCHIS
Combapata 5.120"1 37430 1,128 2,043 2,631
Tinta S,759 3,062 1,283 2,021 4,142
4) CUSCO
San Sebastian ' 32,134 2,793 3,080 11,358 18,369
Saylla 956 229 111 338 545
5)PAUCART AMBO
Colquepata 8,572 8,061 3,103 3,149 8,458
Huancarani 6,204 5.551 2,348 2,329 5,123
Paucartambo 11,028 8,095 3,963 430 7,690
6)QUISPICANCHI
Andahuaylillas 4,343 2,054 1,012 1,569 2,772
Carhuayo 2,631 2,162 1,044 1,033 2,099
Ccatca 9,919 8,690
Ocongate2 11,111 10,220
7) UR! BAMBA
Chinchero 9,146 7,155 2,015 3,460 7,382
Huayilabamba 4,736 3,406 817 1,706 2,584
Maras3 7,437 5,425 1,701 2,892 5,599
Ollantaytambo 8,065 6,440 2,449 3,011 5,171
Yucay 2,880 237 357 1.062 1,449
2
i
Includes AC Ccorao
Includes RT Ttinque and Yanama (parcialuiaJ) 
Includes the communities o f  Collana and Chequerec
List of interviewees and participant observation
A p p e n d ix  4:
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11 Interviews with Andean people 
Women:
1) Teodora, 45, AC Tarahuasi, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta.
2) Jacinta 37, AC Tarahuasi, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta
3) Rosa 39, AC Churo, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta
4) Luisa 42, AC Churo, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta
5) Valentina, 32, AC Chuquimarca, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta
6) Armandina, 35, AC Tamacalla, Dist. Limatambo, Prov. Anta
7) Hilda, 20, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca
8) Lucia, 26, AC Cuyo Grande, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca
9) Encarnación, 25, AC Maska, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca
10) Maria, 23, AC Quello Quello, Dist. Pisac, Prov. Calca
11) Filipa, 40, AC Utapia, Dist. Tinta, Prov. Canchis
12) Luisa, 19, AC Queromarca, Dist. Tinta, Prov. Canchis
13) Francisca, 41, AC Machamarca, Dist. Tinta, Prov Canchis.
14) Faustina, 30, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco
15) Luz Marina, 19, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco
16) Francisca, 46, AC CCorao, Dist. San Sebatian, Prov. Cusco
17) Asunción, 39, Dist. Huancarani, Prov. Paucartambo
18) Josefina 34, Dist. Huancarani, Prov. Paucartambo
19) Luz, 42, AC Churu, Dist. Huancarani, Prov. Paucartambo
20) Flor, 23, AC Mahuaybamba, Prov. Paucartambo
21) Natividad, 58, AC Mahuaybamba, Prov. Paucartambo
22) Francisca, 37, AC Mahuaybamba, Prov. Paucartambo
23) Eva, 14, AC Mahuaybamba, Prov. Paucartambo
24) Luisa, 36, AC Chayabamba, Prov. Paucartambo
25) Cristina, 53, P R. Ttinque, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi
26) Victoria, 47, AC Maraspaqui, P.R Ttinque, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi
27) Delfina 20, AC Maraspaqui, P.R. Ttinque, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi
28) Leonarda, 28, AC Santa Cruz, Dist. Sallac, Prov. Quispicanchi
29) Guillermina, 49, AC Santa Cruz, Dist. Sallac, Prov. Quispicanchi
30) Alejandrina, 30, AC Kuper, Dist. Chinchero, Prov. Urubamba
31) Dominga, 38, AC Chilca, Dist. Ollantaytambo, Prov. Urubamba
Men:
1) Feliz, 25, AC Chitapampa, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca
2) Juan, 33, AC Yungaypata, Dist. Cusco, Prov. Cusco
3) Aquilino, 25, AC Mahuaybamba, Prov. Paucartambo
4) Faustino, 52, AC Mahuaypama, Dist. Paucartambo, Prov. Paucartambo
5) Victor, 35, Dist. Carhuayo, Prov. Quispicanchi
6) Enrique, 25, AC Ausangate, Anexo Pachanta, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchis
7) Evaristo, 23, AC Casapata, Dist. Carhuayo, Prov. Quispicanchi
8) Silverio, 36, Dist. Ocongate, Prov. Quispicanchi
9) Maximo, 50, Dist. Ccatca, Prov. Quispicanchi
10) Jacinto, 38, AC Santa Cruz, Dist. Sallac, Prov. Quispicanchi
11) Dario, 18, AC Patacancha, Dist. Ollantaytambo, Prov. Urubamba
12) Jacinto, 30, AC Chequerec, Dist. Maras, Prov. Urubamba.
2. Group Interviews,- .
1) Mother’s Club of Dist. of Taray, Prov. Calca: 16 participants, (all women)
2) Mother’s Club of AC Q’enqo, Dist. Taray, Prov. Calca: 27 participants, (all women)
3) Steering Committee of AC Coya, Dist. Carhuayo, Prov. Quispicanchi: 8 participants 
(all men).
3. Interviews with judges of the Peace -
A) Province of Anta:
1) District of Ancahuasi: Mario Echegaray
2) District of Limatambo: Elmina Huacho
3) District of Zurite: Hugo Huayapa
B) Province of Calca
4) District of Coya: Clotilde Romero
5) District of Lamay: Bernardino Gamarra
6) District of Pisac: Luzmila Cantero
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7) District of Taray: Liberata Cuba
C) Province of Canchis
8) District of Combapata: Sony Luna
9) District of Tinta: Victor Manuel Cruz
D) Province of Cusco
10) AC Ccorao: Walter Ramos
11) Disctrict o f  Saylla: Victor Manuel Cruz
E) Province of Paucartambo
12) District of Colquepata: Francisco Estrada
13) District of Huancarani: Antonio Pumachara
14) District of Paucartambo: Isaac Nazario
E) Province of Quispicanchi
15) District of Andahuaylillas: Rafael Ferrazas
16) District of Carhuayo: Victor Qqero
17) District of Ccatca: Moraima Cama
18) District of Ocongate (First Nomination): Willy Paradicino
19) District of Ocongate (Second Nomination): Jose Portillo
20) Rural town of Ttinque: Florentino Gonzalo
21) Parcialidad of Yanama: Roberto Condori
F) Province of Urubamba
22) District of Chinchero: Justo Malaga
23) AC Collana and AC Chequerec: Alfonso Rodriguez
24) District of Huayllabamba: Julio Luna
25) District of Maras: Andres Tupayachi
26) District of Ollantaytambo: Sergio Santos
27) District of Yucay: Manuel Huayotuna.
4. Interviews with governors and Lieutenant govemors -
1) Fortunato Vargas, governor, Dist. Catca, Prov. Quispicanchi
2) Alberto Ruiz, governor, Dist. Huallabamba, Prov. Urubamba
3) Ricardo Achahua, governor, Dist. Maras, Prov. Urubamba
4) Facundo Palomino, Leieutenant governor AC Ccorao, Dist. San Sebastian, Prov. 
Cusco
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5) Domingo Quispe, Leiutenant governor, AC Mahuaypamba, Dist. Paucartambo, 
Prov. Paucartambo.
5. Interviews with Cusco judicial members.-
1) Dr. Francisco Olivera, President of the Cusco Superior Court
2) Dr. Miguel Castañeda, President of Criminal Division (sala penal) of the Cusco 
Superior Court.
3) Dra. Marina Tagle, 5th Specialised Criminal Judge (court judge) of Cusco
6. Other interviews.-
1) Elizabeth Dueñas, 37, mayor of the District of Taray, Prov. Calca. 1 enquire into 
her experience as a mayor and in her interaction with the women’s organisation of her 
jurisdiction.
2) Martha Garcia, 43, nurse in the health service of Dist. of Combapata, Dist. Canchis 
on cases of domestic violence
3) Alejandra Pinto, 38, co-ordinator on women’s issue in the Prelatura of Sicuani (a 
division of the regional Catholic Church, working with women’s organisations in the 
area) on the situation of domestic violence in their area.
4) Fabiola Villasante and Matilde Rojas, member of training team of NGOs Cadep 
working in gender awareness with Women’s Committees of the Prov. Anta, in 
Department of Cusco and Chumbivilcas and Cotabambas in Department of Abancay, 
in their evaluation of domestic violence.
5) Binolica Porcel, member of the CEA ‘Bartolomé de las Cases’ (NGO specialist in 
the study of Andean culture).
6) Lucas Yanas, accesitario (deputy judge), RT Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi.
7) Luisa Herrera, accesilaria (deputy judge), Dist, Limatambo, Prov. Anta
8) Teófilo Soto, testigo actuario, (secretary), juzgado Ollantaytambo, Prov. Urubamba.
3 7 6
6. Participant research.-
6.1 Activities with Andean community people.-
6.1.1 Workshop in ‘Legal strategies in domestic violence’, organised by the Prelatura 
of Sicuani (Catholic Church division). 22 January 97. Participants were women 
leaders of women’s organisation such a Popular Kitchen, Vaso de Leche amongst 
others. Dynamic: speech, comments and queries of the participants in Quechua and 
Spanish.
6.1.2 Campaign on Women’s rights organised by NGO Cadep, in the District of 
Limatambo, Prov. of Anta. It consisted of general legal advisory meetings with the so 
called Women’s Committee from the Andean communities of the area. 25 January 97.
6.1.3 A group discussion in gender awareness within a workshop organised by NGO 
Cedep-Ayllu in ‘Communal training and social organisation’. 5 February 1997. 
Participants were men and women leaders of the peasant communities of the so called 
‘Cuenca de Taray’, an area along the Provinces of Cusco and Calca.
6.1.4 Workshop on ‘Domestic violence and women’s organisation’, organised by the 
‘Peasant House’ of the NGO Bartolomé Herrera. Participants were women’s leader 
from a wide range of peasant communities of the whole Department of Cusco. 7 May 
1997. Dynamic: speech, comments and queries of the participants.
6,2 Activities with legal representatives,-
6.2.1 A training workshop in ‘Legal advisory’ in cases of domestic violence to the 
Legal Advisory Office team of the Cusco Women and Children Police Station, 24 
January 1997.
6.2.2 During January and February 1997 1 realised visits to the Women and Children 
Police Station of Cusco and hold informal conversation with the personnel
6.2.3 Participation in the training course for judges of the Peace organised by the 
Cusco Superior Court in the city of Cusco. 13-15 February 1997. I was introduced as
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a researcher of the Judiciary Academy, and had the opportunity to explain the 
objective of the surveys as well as hold informal conversations with the participants
6.2 4 Participation in the training course for judges of the Peace organised by the 
Cusco Superior Court in the town of Sicuani. 20-22 February 1997. The same 
dynamic as the previous training.
6.2.5 Workshop in the ‘Modification of the Domestic Violence Law’ to the police 
personnel who work in the Cusco Women’s and Children Police Station 30 March 
1997 Dynamic: speech, comments and queries of the participants.
63 Activities with trainers {canacitadores. promotores) in NGOs and local
govemments-
6.3.1 Seminar on ‘Strategies of the State and NGOs to face domestic violence’. 
Organised by the Women’s National Network, 4 February. Participants gender 
training members of NGOs and representatives of local governments. Dynamic: 
speech, comments and queries of the participants.
6.3.2 Workshop in ‘perspective on gender in the NGOs work’ with the ‘gender training 
team’ of the Cedep-Ayllu. 6 February 1997
6.3.3 Seminar on ‘Strategies of the State and NGOs to face domestic violence’ 
organised by the Regional Government and the Women’s National Network. 28 
March 1997. Participants were NGOs trainers in rural development.
6.3.4 Workshop on ‘Domestic Violence and Human Rights’ organised by the National 
Commission of Human Rights, Cusco office. 19 July 1997. Participants were trainers 
on Human Rights in the Cusco Department. Dynamic: Exposition, comments and 
queries of participants and dramatisations
6.4 Individual advice - These cases were referred to me by recommendation of 
women’s organisations or/and under request of leaders of peasant communities. My 
advice was completely free.
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6.4.1 Eriberta, resident of the town of Calca, Prov. Calca had separated from her 
husband for domestic violence problems but she was still harassed by him. She had 
three legal procedures one at the level of the Municipal Advisory office (Demuna) for 
Maltreatment, a second one was a criminal procedure by bodily harm and a third one 
was a civil procedure for divorce on the ground of cruel maltreatment. I reviewed the 
state of her processes and had a meeting with the civil provincial judge.
6.4.2 Delfina, AC Maraspaqui, Dist. Ttinque, Prov. Quispicanchi, was expelled from 
her house by her in-laws while her husband was working outside the province. I talked 
with the judges of the Peace involved and presented a legal documents on her behalf.
6.4.3 Eva, AC Mahuaypampa, Dist. Paucartambo, Prov. Paucartambo, was 14 years 
old and had been raped by her father who was in jail. Communal authorities and the 
family asked me to review the case with the criminal judge of Paucartambo.
6.4.4 Juana, AC Mahuaypampa, Dist Maras, Prov. Urubamba, asked me to review her 
daughter’s case files for rape before the provincial prosecutor.
6.4.5 Steering Committee of the AC Inca Paucar, Dist Paucartambo, asked for advice 
in the formalisation of communal documents.
6.4.6 Hilda, a resident of the town of Huaro, Prov. Quispicanchi, asked me to review 
her case file for divorce.
7, Mv own experience..-1 had a direct experience of the dynamic of the legal system in 
Cusco from two events: Firstly I rented a flat in the city of Cusco and I was swindled 
by the owners. I took the case to the Prosecutor in the Criminal Prevention Office and 
we signed a conciliatory agreement. Secondly, I was robbed in the house where 1 was 
living I followed the police procedure.

A ppendi»  6:
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cM r'U ESTA S SOBRE CASOS D E  VIOLENCIA FAMILIAR A NIVEL DE JUZGADOS DE PAZ r
ENCUESTA No.
(esta encuesta se realiza con fines de estudio y no evaluatlvos)
DATOS GENERALES:
1. - DISTRITO EN DONDE DESEMPEÑA SU CARGO...................................................................
2. SEXO: FEMENINO......... MASCULINO..y ... 3.- EDAD...¿ i.S / .
¿CUANTOS AÑOS DESEMPEÑA EL CARGO DE JUEZ DE PAZ?..lV..Z
5. -E S U D . LETRADO NO LETRADO..V„
6. - LA POBLACION QUE ATIENDE ES:
SOLAMENTE RURAL...........  MAYORITARIAMEÑTE RURALM -.. RURAL Y URBANA. Jf*
MAY O RITAR LAMENTE URBANA.... SOLAMENTE URBANA.......
7. - ¿EXISTEN COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS EN SU JURISDICC IO N?.,.^/. Mencione tai tres con mayor 
población:
1) V a leca.
2) J  V / / / ¿  C/Z7 (>a.
3) f  f u  / / ‘'¿¿Ce-
8. -  ¿CUALES SON LAS PRINCIPALES CAUSAS (O PROBLEMAS) QUE TIENE QUE ATENDER. 
MENCIONELAS POR SU MPORTANCIA DEL 1 AL 3.
1) //p r ’ r’s/ Ú i
2) f l  b/a-rt chorlo c b
3) 7ex$ h i e m a l  C o V * "” /-"Q
CASOS DE VIOLENCIA FAMILIAR:
9. -  ¿RECIBE QUEJAS O DENUNCIAS DE MUJERES QUE SON AGREDIDAS POR SUS ESPOSOS O 
CONVIVIENTES EN SU JURISDICCION? ¿ p j
I- .■' •
¿RECUERDA APROXIMADAIvENTE CUANTOS DE ESOS PROBLEMAS ATIENDE EN UN MES?
t y /  y -  1
/ ^  (be cr s*nej.  ^ Q e*iaf / j■ rr-
10.- ¿DONDE PIENSA QUE HAY IvAYORES PROBLEMAS DE VIOLENCIA ENTRE ESPOSOS O 
CONVIVIENTES:
EN LAS ZONAS RURALES.......  EN LAS ZONAS URBANO-MARGINALES.^..
EN LAS ZONAS URBANAS ...........  EN LAS ZONAS RURALES Y URBANO-MARO INALES......
EN TODAS LAS ZONAS........
p o r q u e ?.....
.....
T8l
11.- ¿POR QUE CREc UD. QUE LOS HOMBRES GOLPEAN Y/O AGREDEN MORALMENTE A  SUS 
ESPOSAS O CONVIVIENTES EN SU ZONA? CUALES CREEN SON LAS CAUSAS? s ? r 2 * s f
/ “  rr> s /S T S l y  {J /Y t'O  ______ -  .
¿ f o t  £ cí r r n  ¿ c f y  eí^  -* J ■
' yXC£ír-nt^rr^C ei
•’Cs
■y** &a/>*u 
fp-'t-*’ Y y  <v- ¿'^¿ e ^
12.- ¿HAY MUJERES QUE GOLPEAN A  SUS ESPOSOS?, HA ATENDIDO UD. ALGUNO DE ESOS 
CAS°S?.
-?s<yJ ^} ¿2y  s r yT'"/-<Ls'¿-2
s?Z4 <z¿o c¿> ¿ f o x  j& e s - tc s t  , ¿j-
■ ‘ O '
13.- ¿CUANDO SE PRESENTA UNA MUJER DENUNCIANDO QUE SU MARIDO LA MALTRATA QUE ES
r-r-LO QUE UD. HA,CE. DESCRIBA LAS ETAPAS DE SU INTERVENCION: j) _ .
v  '-’y
'S> rj ff y
li, 1-'
h r
1 ^  ¿ i  ¿~„ A  yy- ó i  y  fss  /  (?>? f/t'/S - 'S :.
2) j  ¿ u f e  /¿ ¿ .¿ ¿ O  y  S**1
3) t f c c U  ^ > 4^ .  ; S  A  ■
5) 0  ^  ¿ t f o r C y ^ t  f l /  yv<:r ,  r¿< C ^^O C jy
GyL / I & sLm *  <o¿co J / ó / t »  ¿>¿/ Á y? j¿ r .éo  y y ih  ■/,-> / i a m * ; , /?  ,'(>•.&•■’' í ' ■ A
14. - ¿COMO SE RESUELVEN ESTOS CASOS; COMO CONCLUYEN? &
t/x td ^ y C á s& y y i <¡¿e ¿sO t- / a .  .¿S Y 7r)-¿ ./'i'} y í /^ y X 't .y y
s & L ó y l-  J t* r  é¿/¿/s¡> r7 S s Jl& O ru ' O ^ ' t ’ J j  r t / '  f S  ^ ? f *  
jZ f¿ L c * w  x?¿X C a,.
15. - ¿ RECUERDA EL ULTIMO CASO DE MALTRATOS ENTRE ESPOSOS O CONVIVIENTES QUE 
•u-uOLVIO 0 A.L.NDIO?, CUANDO SUCEDIO? DESCRIBA BREVEMENTE EL CASO
srn  ¿2si, y/y-y*. f  ^ / t y f  y? _
y ^ -  y y o o p c y f o t  c y y y / ’¿w irl^ x <■ a j<y  * 7"> • ;
W f7-~ru\s^ /y '*<£ 'í '-*'-*'1 y y V  V? , : , y y
, '  • / / ; r  lY./’-i't rys>7i f y /<./ y ? s  ,; ■•, ck. j£ax, jXz- J ^ / yk /\¿ u d á ~
X . C  -o . - J  Z Í\ ,< rL ¿ c V ¿ V  ' '
tr?
18.- ¿EXISTEN DENUNCIAS POR MALTRATOS A  MENORES EN SU COMUNIDAD O DISTRITO? 
QUIENES HACEN ESAS DENUNCIAS?
¿QUIENES AGREDEN MAYORMENTE A  LOS NlNOS?
LOS PADRES......  LAS MADRES  AMOOS........  OTROS FAMILIARES 
17.-¿QUE FACULTADES CREE UD. TIENEN EL JUEZ DE PAZ PARA INTERVENIR EN PRODLLMAS DE 
VIOLENCIA FAMILIAR? DESCRIBALAS
v  g  Cf £( c t/if /O  L>i/ s Ctí n c /o  'y/>/'  & /’ jj.t: j  / r t S '
q / ’í '  ^ ( J  t r \  y l / a / í t  X » / ¿ z  y < ^ 0 7  ¿ 7  c / ? s /  Á y t* -1
18.- ¿CONOCE UD. LA LEY 28260? (LLAMADA TAMOIEN 'LEY EN CONTRA DE LA VIOLENCIA 
FAMILIAR)? QUE ES LO QUE CONOCE DE ELLA? DESCRIBA SU CONTENIDO
19.- ¿SE HAN PRESENTADO ACCIONES AL AMPARO DE ESTA LEY EN SU JURISDICCION?
*' ■ ■■' ' 1
m  ■
20.- ¿CUAL OPINA UD. ES EL ROL DEL JUEZ DE PAZ EN LOS CONFLICTOS FAMILIARES? 
CONSIDERA UD. QUE LA INTERVENCION DEL JUEZ DE PAZ ES IvIPORTANTE. POR QUE?
( f ' f  a ?/< ?/e f  J * v ¿ ¿  c/¿ an t f C P s > f ’-¿rt7v ¿ « r  , S r C
c/e,s< -n J r fi/a r tp /v  ¿ / / ty  f f y y j ty  < /y~ S> i '* - ,
/i-Pn <X ¿Lú m  Z rC ^ J ^  ¿ ira ,
rt7sS<¿c!¿ScXr ¿ ft  
Muchas Gracias por su colaboración,
JEV/feb87
w i  T
¡ I
!
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Appendix 7: South Andean division of labour1 
Women's activities:
Agricultural work.-
Participation at sowing time, traditionally planting the seeds in the ground 
Participation in the harvesting of potatoes, com and other crops 
Processing crops for daily consumption.
Production.-
Elaboration of pottery. In some cases, preparation of food to sell such as frozen 
potatoes (papa helada) and other regional dishes.
All tasks of textile production: shearing sheep or alpaca, collecting plants for dyes, 
spinning and dyeing the thread, warping the backstrap loom, weaving and finishing the 
textile Some women knit sweaters especially as a part of the activities of Mother’s 
clubs (women’s survival organisations).
Market.-
Buy or barter for consumer goods in town markets. Sell their own production. These 
activities normally include travelling.
Household.-
a) Cooking food for daily consumption.
b) Cooking and caring for household animals: pigs, dogs, chickens, guinea pigs, cats.
c) Slaughtering, cleaning and butchering smaller animals (and often assisting with 
larger).
d) Keeping house clean: sweeping, defleaing blankets, dishwahisng, etc.
e) Laundry and mending.
0  Health care of people and household animals: knowing the uses of herbs for medical
use.
g) Care and socialisation of children.
h) Reproduction: pregnancy, childbirth, breast feeding, tending small children. 
Community Role-
a) Sharing responsibilities with their husband of fulfilling mayordomo and other 
caryuyok (posts)2
1 This is a modification of a summary provided by Knox-Seith (1995).
2 From ancestral times, Andean people had a complex system o f veneration and religious rituals Main 
site of rituals were the huacas and amongst the most common deities the opus or spirits o f the mountains 
Spaniards did not tolerate indigenous religious beliefs Andean people had to substitute their sacred
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b) Roles in certain rituals and in charge of the veneration of female saints.
c) Participating in the Club de Madres (Mother's Club) and Vaso de Leche (another 
women’s organisation).
d) Food preparation for school-related events, including kermes.se (fund-raising 
bazaar).
e) Cooking and carrying cooked meals for large agricultural work parties and other 
community events.
Property
Making decisions about personal property and products of own labour (weavings, 
animals raised).
Women have a fundamental and exclusive role in the management of the harvests’. 
The peasant family is mainly a production consumption unit. To obtain a good crop is 
as important as to know how to store it and distribute it. Women are the only ones 
allowed to sort the harvest, choose the seed for the following year, separate the 
products for bartering in markets and for the preparation of the meal in communal 
work and religious ceremonies. Women’s decisions in relation to harvest distribution 
are never questioned by husbands who are forbidden to take anything from the tuque 
or marka (larder)3 4. Women are also responsible for the marketing of the small 
quantities of ‘excess’ products .
Men's activities.-
Agricultural work.-
1) Most agricultural work, including ploughing with chakitaqlla and vacataqlla (foot 
and oxen ploughs), field tasks from planting to harvest.
2) Harvesting firewood and transporting it by horse to the house
3) Transporting goods by horse or mule, including manure and seed to field for
planting and harvested crops to village for storage
4) Making and maintaining own tools: includes shaping kuti (sharply angled wooden 
handle fitted with a variety of blades), twisting rope, making leather net for carrying 
firewood, making harnesses for horses and weaving sacks and braiding wuraka (sling).
entities with Catholic saints The result is a mixture o f both spiritualities It has developed in a system of 
religious posts in which the most important is the ma/orJomo There are other carguyok (posts) for the 
veneration o f ‘minor’ saints The Andean religious system is one of the richest aspects of the Andean 
folklore and culture and it has been extensively studied by authors such as Isbell 1978, Allen 1988, Ossio 
1992 and Pena 1998
3 Nunez 1975b:624-5), Casos (1990:28), Skar (1979:454).
4 See Nunez (1975b:625) and Casos (1990:28)
385
Production
1) To weave plain cloth (e g. sacks, blankets)
2) Painting ceramic -especially those around tourist places.
3) Elaboration of pottery in some communities.
Wage labour. -
1) Travelling to lower valleys (yunga) and working the household fields there
2) Occasional wage labour (e.g. porter on Inca trail; harvest in yunga areas -lower 
valleys)
Household-
1) Making certain tools for women e.g. wooden parts of backstrap loom
2) Branding horses and cattle
3) Slaughtering and cleaning larger animals (large pigs, cattle).
4) Building and repair of houses
5) Cutting men's hair.
6) Participating in life cycle rituals for children
7) Cooking simple meals when necessary.
Community roles-
1) Representing household in asemhleas (community assemblies), and working in 
faenas (communal works) held to build and maintain public structures, to farm 
community lands (for community funds), amongst others.
2) Holding political offices (varayok, president, etc.), carguyok and mayordomo for 
male saints.
3) Special roles such as ritual specialists (e.g. lead prayers in rituals, wash and prepare 
body of deceased, prepare despachos (special ritual offerings). The position of paku 
(shaman) is held only by men)
4) Representing the household when dealing with urban bureaucracies, e.g. applying 
for government agricultural loans or arranging official documents.
Property
1) Making decisions about personal property and products of own labour (crops raised, 
animals owned). Handling and trading of large animals (horses, mules, cattle).
2) Making decisions about land use (e.g. where and what to plant)

Women waiting for the meeting of the Mother’s Club, AC Mahuaypampa
A N D E A N  L IFE
A wedding in RT 
Ttinque, 
Quispicanchi.
Youngsters 
from AC 
Patacancha, 
Urubamba 
taking a break 
from a training 
course in 
Ocongate, 
Quispicanchi.
A N D E A N  C O U P L E S
Aquilino, Flor and children (AC Mahuaybamba, Prov. Paucartambo)
Feliz, Sonia and children 
(AC Chitapampa, Prov.
Calca)
Juan and Faustina (AC 
Yungaypata, Prov. Cusco)

JUDGES IN DIFFERENT SETTINGS
A training course for the judges. In front row, members of the Cusco Superior Court.
The judge of 
Ttinque, 
Quispicanchi.
The facade of 
the judge’s 
place of 
Ollantaytambo, 
Prov.
Urubamba



